Narendra Nath Kochar v. Sudershan Sekhar — 1969 DIGILAW 46 (GAU)

JUDGMENT This appeal under Sec. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act hereinafter referred to as the Act is directed against the judgment dated 19-3-1969 by which the Additional District Judge, Manipur, dismissed the petition of Narendra Nath Kochar claiming a decree for judicial separation from his wife Sudershan Sekhar. 2. Narendra Nath Kochar had sought judicial separation on the sole ground that Sudershan Sekhar had deserted him for more than two years before the presentation of the petition. Sudershan Sekhar opposed that prayer by traversing the allegation that she had deserted her husband. She pleaded that after their marriage had been solemnised at Delhi they both came to Imphal, where her husband is engaged in business, and took up residence there. The petitioner, however, began to treat her with cruelty. In May 1964 the petitioner took her to Delhi and there she underwent an operation in the Irwin hospital. The petitioner left Delhi for Imphal without caring to attend on her during convalescence at Delhi, nor cared thereafter to bring her back to Imphal. It was, therefore, the petitioner who had deserted her and not the other way about. She offered to live with the petitioner as behoves a dutiful Hindu wife. 3. The learned additional District Judge found, on the basis of evidence led before him, that the petitioner had failed to establish that his wife had deserted him. In consequence, he dismissed the petition with costs. 4. The sole question debated in this Court was whether the additional District Judge had the jurisdiction to try the petition. It was vigorously contended by Shri Ibotombi Singh, appearing for the appellant, that since according to Section 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act a petition under the Act has to be presented to the District Court and since the Court of the Additional District Judge is not the District Court within the meaning of that expression as defined in clause (b) of Section 3 of the Act, the Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to try the petition. Shri Manisana Singh, representing the respondent, urged, on the contrary, that in view of the definition of District Court given in Section 2 (iii) of the Manipur (Courts) Act, 1955, hereinafter called the Manipur Act, the Court of Additional District Judge is a District Court and as such the Additional District Judge had the jurisdiction to try the petition. Shri Manisana Singh, representing the respondent, urged, on the contrary, that in view of the definition of District Court given in Section 2 (iii) of the Manipur (Courts) Act, 1955, hereinafter called the Manipur Act, the Court of Additional District Judge is a District Court and as such the Additional District Judge had the jurisdiction to try the petition. After examining the relevant provisions of the two Acts, the Hindu Marriage Act and the Manipur (Courts) Act, and the authorities cited at the, bar, I have reached the conclusion that the submission made by Shri Manisana Singh, is well founded and so must prevail. I may mention here, before proceeding with the discussion of the relevant provisions of the two Acts and the authorities, that the petition was originally presented to the District Judge, Manipur, and since he was taken ill this Court transferred that petition to the Additional District Judge for disposal. 5. Section 19 of the Act prescribes that every petition under the Act shall be presented to the District Court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction the marriage was solemnized or the husband and the wife reside or last resided together. In Section 3 (b) of the Act, the expression "District Court" is defined to mean, in any area for which there is a City Civil Court, that Court, and in any other area the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, and includes any other Civil Court which may be specified by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette, as having jurisdiction in respect of the matters dealt with in the Act. There is no dispute on the point that the Court of Additional District Judge, Manipur, is neither a City Civil Court, nor it is a Court which has been specified by the State Government as having jurisdiction in respect of matters dealt with in the Act. Therefore, we are left to examine whether that Court is the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the territory of Manipur. The expression "principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction" is not defined in the Act. It was riot disputed by Shri Ibotombi Singh that the meaning of that expression shall have to be determined with the aid of the Manipur Act. The expression "principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction" is not defined in the Act. It was riot disputed by Shri Ibotombi Singh that the meaning of that expression shall have to be determined with the aid of the Manipur Act. Shri Ibotombi Singh invited my attention to Sections 16, 17 and 18 of the Manipur Act to convince me that they do not contemplate any Court of Additional District Judge and as such the Additional District Judge, Manipur, cannot be described as the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Section 16 enacts that in addition to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner and the Courts of Small Causes established under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, and the Courts established under any other law for the time being in force, there shall be the following classes of Civil Courts in the State of Manipur :- (i) the District Court; (ii) the Court of Subordinate Judge; (iii) the Court of a Munsiff. Section 17 provides that the Chief Commissioner, Manipur, may divide the State of Manipur into civil districts and appoint as many persons as he thinks necessary to be District Judges. He shall then post those persons as District Judges in charge of the various districts. Section 18 (1) states that when the business pending before the Court of District Judge requires the aid of Additional District Judge for its speedy disposal, the Chief Commissioner may appoint such number of Additional District Judges as may be necessary. Sub-section (2) of Section 18 prescribes that the Additional District Judges appointed under sub-section (1) shall discharge any of the functions of a District Judge which the District Judge may assign to them and in the discharge of those functions they shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge. The provisions contained in Sections 16 to 18 have to be read in conjunction with Sections 2 (iii) and 20 of the Manipur Act to comprehend their exact scope. According to Section 2 (iii) the expression "District Court" means "the Court of the District Judge and includes the Court of the additional District Judge." This definition makes it abundantly clear that the District Court in Manipur means not only the Court of District Judge but it also includes within its ambit the Court of the additional District Judge. According to Section 2 (iii) the expression "District Court" means "the Court of the District Judge and includes the Court of the additional District Judge." This definition makes it abundantly clear that the District Court in Manipur means not only the Court of District Judge but it also includes within its ambit the Court of the additional District Judge. Section 20 of the Manipur Act states that the District Court shall be the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the District. Therefore, the District Court in Manipur, which comprises the Courts of District Judge and that of the additional District Judge, is the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. As such, the expression "District Court" as defined in Section 3 (b) of the Act comprises in the territory of Manipur not only the Court of District Judge but also the Court of the Additional District Judge. The matter appears to be so clear and simple as to not to necessitate the consideration of authorities cited at the bar by the parties Counsel. In fairness to them, however, I have decided to make a short reference to them. 6. Shri Ibotombi Singh placed reliance on the authority reported in AIR 1959 Punj 50, Janak Dulari v. Narain Dass, to support the contention that the Court of Additional District Judge in Manipur cannot be said to be the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Act. The Punjab High Court undoubtedly held that the Court of an Additional District Judge in the Punjab cannot be considered to be the principal Civil Court of original civil jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 19 of the Act, and that as such a District Judge to whom a petition under the Act is presented cannot transfer it to an Additional District Judge, and if such a transfer is made the latter Court would have no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. This decision was founded on the authority of Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 391 , wherein the Supreme Court held, after examining the various provisions of the Punjab Courts Act of 1918, that the Court of the Additional Judge or Additional District Judge in the Punjab is not a Division Court of the Court of the District Judge but is a separate and distinct Court of its own. The Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in the case of Janak Dulari, AIR 1959 Punj 50 (supra) held that although they were bound to accept and act upon the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Kuldip Singh, AIR 1956 SC 391 (supra), they could not "refrain from observing with the utmost respect that it runs counter to the way in which the Punjab Courts Act has been interpreted and acted upon in the State of Punjab and also the State of Delhi to which Punjab Courts Act has been extended". It would, therefore, appear that the Punjab High Court left to itself would have negatived the contention that the Court of Additional District Judge in the Punjab does not answer the description of the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction contemplated by Secs. 19 and 3 (b) of the Act. Further, it remains to be emphasised that the Supreme Court gave its finding on the basis of the specific provisions of the Punjab Courts Act and if those provisions happen to differ from the provisions of the Manipur Act, there would be no obligation on this Court to hold that in Manipur the Court of Additional District Judge is either not the "District Court" or "principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction". The Supreme Court clarified the position by observing as under in para 24 or the judgment : "We make it clear that our decision on this point is confined to the Punjab Act. We understand that similar Acts in other States are differently worded so that what we decide for the Punjab may not hold good elsewhere. We say this because rulings were cited before us from other parts of India which take differing views. We do not intend to refer to them because it would not be right to examine the language of Acts that are not directly before us. Accordingly, we confine ourselves to the Punjab Act (Act VI of 1918)". The Punjab Courts Act contemplates three classes of Civil Courts, besides the Courts of Small Causes and Courts established under other enactment. The three classes of Civil Courts are : (1) the Court of District Judge; (2) the Court of Additional Judge; and (3) the Court of the Subordinate Judge. The Punjab Courts Act contemplates three classes of Civil Courts, besides the Courts of Small Causes and Courts established under other enactment. The three classes of Civil Courts are : (1) the Court of District Judge; (2) the Court of Additional Judge; and (3) the Court of the Subordinate Judge. Shri Ibotombi Singh was not able to bring to my notice any provision of the Punjab Courts Act corresponding to Section 2 (iii) of the Manipur Act, where the expression "District Court" is defined to mean the Court of the District Judge including the Court of the Additional District Judge. Therefore, the Supreme Court and the Punjab High Court authorities relied upon by Shri Ibotombi Singh are clearly distinguishable and so are not helpful in comprehending the meaning and scope of the expressions "principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction" and "District Court" as used in Section 3 (b) of the Act for the purposes of the territory of Manipur. 7. Shri Manisana Singh cited before me the authorities reported in AIR 1960 Cal 565 , Ajit Kumar Bhunia v. Sm. Kanan Bala, and AIR 1962 J and K 41, Ram Pal v. Mst. Ajit Kaur, to support the rival contention propounded by him. On the basis of their respective Acts, the two High Courts, of Calcutta, AIR 1960 Cal 565 , and of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1962 J and K 41, held that the Additional District Judge is competent to decide a petition lodged under the Act if transferred to him by the District Judge. Since the decisions given by the two High Courts turned on the provisions of the Acts prevalent in the two States, I feel clear that not much help can be derived from them in deciding the point canvassed before this Court. I feel clear that in each State the answer to the question raised in this appeal will depend upon the provisions of the respective Act under which the Courts are constituted. I feel clear that in each State the answer to the question raised in this appeal will depend upon the provisions of the respective Act under which the Courts are constituted. Since, however, in Manipur the Court of the Additional District Judge is specifically declared as constituting or forming part of, the "District Court" within the meaning of that expression as defined in Section 2 (iii) of the Manipur Act, and since Section 20 of that Act provides that the District Court shall be the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, I have no misgivings that the Additional District Judge had the necessary jurisdiction to decide the petition made by Narendra Nath Kochar to the District Judge after this Court had transferred the same to him for disposal. 8. The decisions of the Calcutta and Jammu and Kashmir High Courts however, call for one observation. It appears that both the High Courts tried to distinguish the Supreme Court decision from the cases they had to deal with on the assumption that the appeal by Kuldip Singh, AIR 1956 SC 391 in the Supreme Court case against the order of the Senior Subordinate Judge Mr. Pitam Singh had been filed directly in the Court of the Additional District Judge. The two High Courts also appear to be of the opinion that if Kuldip Singh had filed the appeal in the Court of the District Judge and the latter had assigned the same to the Additional District Judge for disposal, the order made by the latter would not have suffered from any legal infirmity. However, the factual assumption made by the two High Courts, viz. that the appeal had been filed directly in the Court of the Additional District Judge, does not appear to be correct. I know it from my personal experience in the Punjab that all cases are filed in the Court of the District Judge and it is he who assigns some out of them to the Additional District Judge for disposal. No case is directly instituted in the Court of the Additional District Judge. Exactly this practice appears to have been followed in the case of Kuldip Singh. I invite reference in this connection to Para 35 of the Supreme Court judgment. It is mentioned there that even after Mr. No case is directly instituted in the Court of the Additional District Judge. Exactly this practice appears to have been followed in the case of Kuldip Singh. I invite reference in this connection to Para 35 of the Supreme Court judgment. It is mentioned there that even after Mr. Pitam Singh had passed an ineffective order, that still left the District Court free to act under Section 476-A Cr. P. C. when the matter came back to it again. This time, the Supreme Court observed further, the matter came by way of appeal from the order made by Mr. Pitam Singh. It was incumbent on the District Judge, the Supreme Court emphasised, either to make an appropriate order himself under Section 476-A Cr. P. C., or to send the matter for disposal to the only other Court that had jurisdiction, namely, the original Court. But the District Judge, the Supreme Court pointed out, did not deal with it himself and instead the matter went to the Additional District Judge. Therefore, it is abundantly clear from the facts mentioned in the Supreme Court judgment that the appeal was filed by Kuldip Singh in the Court of the District Judge and it was the District Judge who assigned it to the Additional District Judge for disposal. Hence, the distinction drawn by the High Courts of Calcutta and Jammu and Kashmir between the facts of the cases dealt with by them and those of the Supreme Court case simply does not exist. The true ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court was that the Punjab Courts Act does not contemplate the appointment of Additional Judges to the District Court and as such the Court of Additional District Judge is not a Division Court of the Court of the District Judge but a separate and distinct Court of its own. This conclusion was founded on the specific provisions enacted in Section 18 of the Punjab Courts Act. The Supreme Court clarified the situation by making reference to Articles 214 and 216 of the Constitution. It is mentioned in Article 216 that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint. The Supreme Court clarified the situation by making reference to Articles 214 and 216 of the Constitution. It is mentioned in Article 216 that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint. In para 37 of their Judgment the Supreme Court pointed out that the Punjab Courts Act nowhere speaks of an Additional District Judge or of an Additional Judge to the District Court, and then observed that the Additional Judge is not a Judge of co-ordinate judicial authority with the District Judge. These distinctive features of the Punjab Courts Act are not to be found in the Manipur Act. As pointed out above, the definition of the expression "District Court" given in Section 2 (iii) of the Manipur Act read with Section 20 thereof leaves no room for doubt that the Additional District Judge is a part and parcel of the District Court in the same way as are the Judges of the various High Courts in India. Looked at from this standpoint, there is no scope for criticism against the judgment of the Punjab High Court in the case of Janak Dulari (supra). 9. Shri Ibotombi Singh was frank in conceding that on merits his client has no case. The Additional District Judge recorded the finding that Narendra Nath Kochar had failed to prove that his wife had deserted him for a period of more than two years and this finding was not challenged in this Court. 10. As a result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocates fee Rs. 50/-. Appeal dismissed.