Judgment :- The petitioner herein imported three consignments of steel tie rods with nuts, turn buckles, anchor plates and washers on three different occasions under Bills of Entry D. No. 1195, dated 12-8-1964, No. D. 1791, dated 18-8-1964 and D. No. 1793, dated 18-8-1964. Customs duty was levied on these consignments under Item 63(28) of the Schedule to the Indian Tariff Act, 1934. Subsequently, the petitioner applied for refund of excess duty on the ground that the import of the articles come properly within the scope of item 63(9) and therefore, the articles were liable to duty at the rate applicable to the goods coming within the scope of that Item and hence the petitioner was entitled to the refund of the excess duty. This application for refund of duty was dismissed by the Assistant Collector of Customs, Appraising Department, Madras and the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Appellate Collector of Customs, Madras and these appeals were dismissed. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred revision petitions to the Government of India, and the Government of India informed the petitioner that they have carefully considered the revision application but saw no reason to interfere with the order in appeal passed by the Appellate Collector of Customs, Madras. It is under these circumstances that the three writ petitions in respect of the three consignments have been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari to quash the orders referred to above. 2.The only point in controversy is whether the goods imported by the petitioner fall within Item 63(9) or not. It is the common case of the parties that if they do not fall under Item 63(9) then it is assessable to duty only under Item 63(28). Hence, the very narrow question that arise for consideration is whether the goods imported by the petitioner fall within the scope of Item 63(9) or not. For this purpose, it is necessary to refer Item 63(9) as well as Item 63(28). Item 63(9) is as follows :- "Iron or Steel structures, fabricated partially or wholly not other wise specified if made mainly or wholly of iron or steel bars, sections, plates or sheets, for the construction of buildings bridges, tanks, well curbs, trostles, towers and similar structures or for parts thereof but not including builders' hardware or any of the articles specified in Item Nos. 72, 72(3), 74(1), 75(3), 75(4), or 76(1)" Item 63(28) is as follows :- " All sorts of iron and steel and manufactures thereof not other wise specified." * Thus, it will be seen that Item 63(28) is a residuary item and if an article falls under any one of the specified items, that articles cannot fall under Item 63(28). With the result, the question for consideration is whether the imported goods fall under Item 63(9) or not. For an item to fall under Item 63(9), the very first condition that has to be satisfied is that the goods must be "iron or steel structures", whether the goods fulfill the requirements of the other parts of the Item or not, the goods cannot fall within the said Items. Hence, the crucial question for determinations whether the goods imported by the petitioner constitutes "iron or steel structures". 3.Learned Counsel for the petitioner very strongly relied on the reply affidavit filed before this Court. That reply affidavit gives details as to the purpose for which the goods were intended to be used. The relevant portion of the reply affidavit on which reliance was placed is contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the affidavit, and the paragraphs are extracted below :- "(3) The contract was for the manufacture of 390 sets of tie rods and accessories required for tying back, concrete monoliths forming the side walls of the dock basin 1700 feet long and 500 feet broad and is intended for berthing 3 ships on the East and three ships on the West. The side walls of the dock are of concrete wall foundation (monoliths with steel curb) imbedded deep in the soil. Each monolith is 52 feet long and 28 feet broad and is sunk to a depth of 57 feet below the soil, the portion of the wall above the soil being 13 feet. The tie back imported as stated above are meant to keep the monoliths with steel curbs in position and to prevent them from sliding due to the increased draft. Each of the tie blocks takes 1, 30, 000 lbs. load and about 10 tie backs are provided for each monolith. The tie back imported as stated above are meant to keep the monoliths with steel curbs in position and to prevent them from sliding due to the increased draft. Each of the tie blocks takes 1, 30, 000 lbs. load and about 10 tie backs are provided for each monolith. The tie rods are connected to an anchor wall 1700 feet long 2 feet broad with a depth of 8 feet and 140 feet away from the monolith at one end and to the monolith at the other end by means of nuts and turn buckles. The area between the monolith and anchor wall is filled with rubble and sand to enable the anchor wall to develop resistance. The anchor walls develope resistance and the tie backs the monolith curb from sliding and tilting.(4)Each tie back is made up of four lengths of tie rods inter-connected by turn buckles with nuts, washers and anchor plates at either end making a total length of 140 feet. The tie rods themselves are manufactured out of 3"diameter steel rounds. The ends are heated and forged by hammer to 33/4" diameter and threaded to suit the nuts and turn buckles as per specifications to suit the particular requirement of the Trust for the construction of the Jawahar Dock." * 4.These paragraphs do not help to decide whether the imported materials are iron or steel structures or not. They merely elaborate the purpose for which the goods were imported and the use to which they were intended to be put. On the other hand, the nature and the character of the goods are to be found in the impugned orders. The Assistant Collector of Customs, Appraising Department, Madras, when he declined to grant the refund of duty applied for by the petitioner, stated thus :- "The tie rods in question were inspected by the appraiser at the docks. They are solid round rods with a head at one end and are threaded at the other end. They are used for supporting the masonry sea wall." * The correctness of this description of the imported materials by the Assistant Collector of Customs, Appraising Department, Madras is not disputed by the petitioner. On the other hand, this description is approved by the petitioner in the affidavit filed in support of these writ petitions. They are used for supporting the masonry sea wall." * The correctness of this description of the imported materials by the Assistant Collector of Customs, Appraising Department, Madras is not disputed by the petitioner. On the other hand, this description is approved by the petitioner in the affidavit filed in support of these writ petitions. In paragraph 7(13) of the affidavit it is stated thus : "The respondents 2 and 3 having rightly observed that the tie rods are solid round iron rods with a head at one end and threaded at the other end, erred in holding that they are not structures, but only supports for the masonry sea walls." * Consequently, there is no dispute about the nature and the character of the import materials that they are "solid round iron rods with a head at one end and threaded at the other end". In my opinion such solid round iron rods with a head at one end and threaded at the other end cannot constitute "structure". The word "structure" is not a terms of art. Even according to the ordinary acceptation of the meaning of the word, there must be certain constructions involved in a structure. The expression "structure" has been defined in Ballantine's Law dictionary with Pronounciation, II Edition, as follows :- "Any production or piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner; any construction. Any edifice for any use; that which is built, as a dwelling house, church, shed, stone etc." * In Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the relevant meaning of the expression "structure" has been given as - "that which is built or constructed; a building or edifice of any kind, especially, one of considerable size and imposing appearance." * Similarly, websters International Dictionary defines the expression "structure" as - "something constructed or built; something made up of more or less inter-dependent elements or parts; something having a definite or fixed pattern of organisation." * 5.In South Wales Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Assessment Committee for the Neath Assessment Area [1943 (2) A.I.R. 567] Atkinson, J. stated thus :- "There is nothing to suggest here that the word "structure" is not to be used in its ordinary sense. Ltd. v. Assessment Committee for the Neath Assessment Area [1943 (2) A.I.R. 567] Atkinson, J. stated thus :- "There is nothing to suggest here that the word "structure" is not to be used in its ordinary sense. As used in its ordinary sense, I suppose it means something which is constructed in the way of being built up as is a building; it is in the nature of a building." * No doubt, the learned Judge in that case was considering the meaning of the expression 'structure' appearing in a provision which had stated thus :- "The following parts of a plant or combination of plant and machinery whenever and only to such extent as any such part is or is in the nature of a building or structure....... ." * Still, the expression by the learned Judge as to the ordinary sense in which the expression 'structure' is understood still holds goods independent of the context in which that expression occurred in the relevant provision which the Court was considering in that case. If this test is to be applied, I am of the view that tie rods in this case cannot be called 'structure' at all. 6.Mr. V. V. Raghavan, learned counsel for the petitioner, laid very great stress on two decisions, one of the Calcutta High Court with regard to the identical item in the tariff and the other of Court of King's Bench Division. As far as the decision of the Calcutta High Court is concerned, it is Assistant Collector of Customs v. Mercantile Express Co. 1961 AIR(Cal) 636). That was a case where the imported goods were steel culverts made of steel sheets artificially shaped and formed by human operation and adopted and fashioned for the construction of culverts. The Calcutta High Court came to the conclusion that such a material will definitely fall within the scope of Item 63(9). 7.In this context, the Court stated thus :- "The expression 'structure' is not a technical term of art. The plain and popular import of the expression furnishes the true role of its interpretation. The expression 'structure' means some construction, or fabrication some production artificially constructed and fashioned in some definite manner" * . 8.I am of the view that this decision is not of any assistance to the petitioner in the present Writ Petitions. The plain and popular import of the expression furnishes the true role of its interpretation. The expression 'structure' means some construction, or fabrication some production artificially constructed and fashioned in some definite manner" * . 8.I am of the view that this decision is not of any assistance to the petitioner in the present Writ Petitions. As I pointed out already, the imported goods were steel culverts which were constructions made of steel sheets artificially shaped and formed by human operations and adopted and fashioned for the construction of culverts. But in the present case, the imported goods are "solid round rods with a head at one end and threaded at the other end." The other decision relied on is Hobday v. Nicol [1944 (1) A.I.R. 302]. In that case, Humphreys, J. observed as follows :- "Structure" as I understand it, is anything which is constructed, and it involves the notion of something which is put together, consisting of a number of different things which are so put together or built together, constructed as to make one whole, then is called a structure ". 9.I am of the opinion that even this enunciation of the test to find out whether a particular article is a structure or not does not help the petitioner in these petitions. All that the learned counsel contends is that in order to get a tie rod of 140 feet length, four pieces have to be put together and 3"diameter steel rounds are heated and forged by hammer to 33/4" diameter. This alone will not make the solid round iron rods with a head at one end and threaded at the other end, a structure. Consequently, I am of the view that the tie rods imported by the petitioner do not come within the scope of the expression iron or steel structures' appearing in Item 63(9). If the imported articles do not satisfy this requirements of being "iron or steel structures" certainly they cannot come within the scope of Item 63(9). Hence, I am of the view that conclusion of the authorities below that the imported materials do not fall within the scope of Item 63(9) is correct. If so, there is no dispute about the fact that the articles ought to be taxed only under Item 63(28). Hence, I am of the view that conclusion of the authorities below that the imported materials do not fall within the scope of Item 63(9) is correct. If so, there is no dispute about the fact that the articles ought to be taxed only under Item 63(28). 10.Learned Counsel for the respondents contended that the determination of the question whether an imported article falls within one item or the other is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities, & this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot interfere with that conclusion. Stated in such broad terms, the contention cannot be sustained. However, it is settled by a number of decisions of the Supreme Court that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with the determination of such a question by the Customs authorities is a very limited one. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider this question in A.V. Venkateswaran v. R. S. Madhwani. In that particular case, the Bombay High Court had interferred with the order of the Customs authorities and against that, an appeal was preferred to the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court, the only question that was argued was that the Bombay High Court ought to have interferred with the determination of the Customs authorities, since the petitioner had an alternative remedy by way of preferring a revision under the Customs Act itself. It is in that context, the Supreme Court pointed out that the existence of an alternative remedy is merely one of the matter of discussion with the Court & does not bar the jurisdiction of the High Court itself under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Apart from that, in that case, the Learned Solicitor General of India appearing for the Deptt. conceded that the view of the Learned Judges of the Bombay High Court that on any reasonable interpretation of the items in the Schedule to the Tariff Act, the consignment imported by the respondent could have been liable only to a duty of 30% under Item 45(3) was correct, which actually involved that the determination of the Customs authorities was plainly erroneous. 11.The next decision of the Supreme Court is Collector of Customs v. K. Ganga Setty. 11.The next decision of the Supreme Court is Collector of Customs v. K. Ganga Setty. In this decision, after referring to the earlier decision which I have already referred to above, the Supreme Court pointed out thus :-" * This Court proceeded on the basis that it is primarily for the Import Control authorities to determine the head of entry under which any particular commodity fall; But that if in doing so, these authorities adopted a construction was perverse than it was a case in which the Court was competent to interfere. In other words, if there were two constructions which an entry could reasonably bear and one of them which was in favour of Revenue was adopted, the Court has no jurisdiction to interfere merely because the other interpretation favourable to the subject appeals to the Court as the better one to adopt. "On the basis of this general principle, the Supreme Court in that particular case came to the following conclusion :-" * The decision of the Asstt. Collector and of the Collector on appeal holding the oats imported by the respondent to be 'grain' cannot therefore be characterised as perverse or mala fide and in the circumstances, we consider that the learned Judges of the High Court erred in interfering with the order of the appellant "The last of the decision of the Supreme Court with regard to this is Girdharilal v. Union of India. In that case the Supreme Court pointed out thus :-" * This apart, from we must emphasise that a Court dealing with a petition under Article 226 is not sitting in appeal over the decision of the Customs authorities & therefore the correctness of the conclusion reached by these authorities on the appreciation of the several item in the Hand Book or in the Indian Tariff Act which is referred to in these item, is not a matter which falls within the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. "On the basis of those enunciation of principles Governing the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with a determination of the Customs Authorities, can it be said that the conclusion of the Customs Authorities in the present case that these solid iron rods with a head at one end and threaded at the other end did not constitute "iron or steel structures" is a perverse or mala fide one? Even assuming that there can be reasonable doubt about the tie rods in question falling within that item still by no stretch of imagination it can be characterised that the conclusion of the Customs Authorities is perverse or mala fide. Hence even on the assumption that there is scope for entertaining any doubt about the correctness of the conclusion of the Customs Authorities still there is no justification for interfering with the same under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 12.Mr. V.V. Raghavan strongly relied on a decision of Ramakrishnan, J in Carborundum Universal Ltd. v Asstt. Collector of Customs 1968 II M.L.J. 374] in support of his contention that the observations of the Supreme Court in the decision cited above will apply only when there are two competing entries & there is a doubt whether a particular item falls under one entry or the other and in this case, there are no competent entries, but on the other hand there is one specific entry, and the other is a residuary entry. I am unable to perceive any substance in this distinction sought to be made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 13.When the question before the authorities is whether a particular item falls under one entry or the other, the fact that one of them happens to be a residuary entry does not in any way affect the position. Apart from this aspect of the matter in the case which was dealt with by Ramakrishnan, J. the question was whether the imported articles known as 'silk bolting cloth' fall under Item 72(3) of the First Schedule of the Import Tariff under the heading 'component parts of machinery, or under Item 48 under the description 'fabrics, not otherwise, specified containing more than 90 per cent of silk, including such fabrics embroidered with artificial silk'. In that case, the stand taken by the Department was that they themselves were treating the imported 'silk bolting cloth' only under Item 72(3) of the First Schedule in view of the other uses to which the same was put, for instance, as wearing apparel, they treated it as falling under Item 48(c). This is apparent from the following observations of the learned Judge in the judgments :-" * In the counter affidavit filed to the Writ petition by the Department, it is stated that formerly silk bolting cloth was being used exclusively for flour milling machinery, but it has been subsequently reported that it has got a larger use in other than flour mills, for instance; in printing in shifting abrasive grains, in textiles, printing etc. and there is a further observation that there is a possibility of its also being used as a wearing apparel, and such a possibility could not be ruled out altogether. It was in these altered circumstances that it was assessed under Item 48(c). "It is with reference to these facts the learned Judge observed as follows-" * Therefore I held that this is not a case where the Customs Authority had to make an election between two possible alternative classification one under one item of the Indian Customs Tariff Guide and the other under another item of the same guide which was more favourable to the revenue. In that event, following the dicta in several decisions of the Supreme Court including A.V. Venkateswaran v. R. S. Madhwani (1962 1 S.C.R. 753) followed in Collector of Customs v. Ganga Setty [ 1963 (2) S.C.R. 277 ], the decision of the Customs Authority would not be open to interference by this Court in Writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. On the other hand, this appears to be a case where the Customs Authorities when faced with every probability and every justification for classifying this item under Item 72(3) of the Schedule, decided to classify it under Item 48(c) under circumstances which are opposed to common experience and also ordinary knowledge of the limitation in the use to which a textile fabric altered into a particular form and shape can be put into. From this point of view, the classification made by the Department of the article in question appears to be one which could not be made by any reasonable interpretation of the provision in Item 48(c) relied upon by the Department." 14.Such is not the case in the present Writ Petitions for the reasons I have already indicated. Under the circumstances, the decision of Ramakrishnan, J. does not lend any support to the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner. Hence, these Writ Petitions fail and they are dismissed.