JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - This is a plaintiff's first appeal. The plaintiff, Smt. Dropadi, who died during the pendency of this appeal and is now represented by her legal representatives, filed the suit which has given rise to this appeal for a declaration that house No. D-481142-A (hereinafter referred to as house No. 1) and house No. D-481142-C (hereinafter referred to as house No. 2) were owned by her and that defendant No. 1 had wrongly got them attached in execution of a decree obtained by him against defendant No. 5. It was, however, stated in the plaint that although the plaintiff was the owner of both the houses, house No. 1 had been purchased by her in the name of defendant No. 6 who was her close relation. The suit was contested by defendant No. 1 who pleaded, inter alga, that both the houses were really the property of defendants 2 to 5, that he had obtained a decree against all. of them and that the houses were rightly got attached and sold in execution of the decree. It was, however, admitted in the written statement filed by defendant No. 1 that the title deed relating to the site of house No. 2 stood in the name of the plaintiff. It was also alleged in the written statement that house No. 1 had been purchased by defendants 2 to 5 in the name of defendant No. 6. The position emerging from the pleadings of the parties, therefore, was that, according to the plaintiff, defendant No. 6 was Benamidar for her with respect to house No. 1 while, according to defendant No. 1, the plaintiff was a Benamidar for defendants 2 to 5 with respect to the site of house No. 2. With respect to house No. 1, the case of the contesting defendant too was that defendant No. 6 was only a Benamidar, the point of difference between him and the plaintiff being that, according to him, the real owners were defendants 2 to 5. 2. Out of the issues framed by the trial court, issues Nos. 1 and 5 related to the ownership of the houses and they were in the following terms : Issue No. 1. Was house No. D-481142-A purchased by the plaintiff with her own money in the name of Ram Devi Benamidar of plaintiff or of defendants 2 to 5? Issue No. 5. 1 and 5 related to the ownership of the houses and they were in the following terms : Issue No. 1. Was house No. D-481142-A purchased by the plaintiff with her own money in the name of Ram Devi Benamidar of plaintiff or of defendants 2 to 5? Issue No. 5. Whether the plaintiff is the real owner of the houses in suit it will be seen that issue No. 1 related to house No. 1 only whereas issue No. 2 covered both the houses. 3. Before we come to the findings recorded by the trial court we have to note certain other facts. It appears that the hearing of the suit was adjourned on several dates on applications for adjournment made by the plaintiff on the ground of her illness. On January 18, 1961, the last date on which the suit came up for hearing before the trial court, there was again an application for adjournment. The court rejected the application and proceeded to deal with the suit on merits. No oral evidence was, however, adduced by the parties and the hearing of the suit closed on that very date. On January 25, 1961, the court delivered judgment and dismissed the suit. 4. It has firstly been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant before us that there was sufficient cause for adjournment of the hearing of the suit on January 18, 1961, and the trial court acted wrongly in rejecting the application for adjournment. It has next contended that on the material on record the suit of the plaintiff should have been decreed in respect of house No. 2 and the trial court erred in dismissing the suit in entirety. 5. After going through the order sheet. of the trial court and the various application for adjournment moved on behalf of the plaintiff from time to time, we cannot say that the order of the trial court rejecting the application for adjournment made on behalf of the plaintiff on January 18, 1961 was unjustified. Had it not been for the fact that we find the second contention of the learned counsel to be correct, we would have been reluctant to suet aside the judgment of the trial court on the ground of the first contention raised by him. Had it not been for the fact that we find the second contention of the learned counsel to be correct, we would have been reluctant to suet aside the judgment of the trial court on the ground of the first contention raised by him. Since, however, we find that the judgment of the trial court in respect of one of the two houses in dispute cannot be sustained, we think it will be just and proper, in the circumstances of the case,. to set aside the judgment in entirety and to remand the case for a fresh trial. 6. As we have pointed out earlier, the contesting defendant conceded in his written statement that the site of house.No. 2 was purchased by defendants 2 to 5 in the name of the plaintiff, Admittedly, therefore, the plaintiff was the ostensible owner of the site of house No. 2, with the result that the burden of paving that defendants 2 to 5 were the real purchasers of the site lay on the contesting defendants. It is true that it was merely the site of house No. 2 but the house itself that was being claimed by the plaintiff. The presumption in regard to ownership of the site, however, gave rise to another presumption as well, viz., a presumption as to the ownership of the house standing on the site. In saying so we are not invoking the application of the maxim "quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit" (whatever is planted on or affixed to the soil belongs to soil) , a maxim which is found in English law. We are conscious that it was observed by a Full Bench in Thakur Chandra Poramanick v. Ram Dhone Bhuttaharajui, 6 W.R. 228. "We have not been able to And in the Laws or Customs of this country any traces of the existence of an absolute Rule of Law that whatever is affixed or built on the soil becomes a part of it, and it is subjected to the same- rights or property as the soil itself;" ' and this observation was quoted, apparently with approval, by the Privy Council in Narayan Das Ketrry v. Jatindra Nath Roy Chowdhry, AIR 197 Privy Council 135 where it was also conceded at the Bar that the maxim has at the most a limited application in India. But the result of the inapplicability of the doctrine embodied in the above maxim to a building constructed on another land, is only this that title to the building does not become 'necessarily vested in the owner of the soil, merely by reason of the building having been constructed thereon. The question of burden of proof is a different matter altogether. It is no doubt open to a person to prove that the building constructed on a land 'does not belong to the owner of the land, but in the absence of such proof it should be presumed that the building constructed on a land after a person had acquired title to the land, is also owned by such person. This is presumption of fact and has for its basis the normal course of human affairs. The force' of the presumption will, of course, vary with circumstances and depend upon numerous factors, but it does not appear to be disputable that there should be an initial presumption to that effect. 7. The plaintiff in this case had, therefore, two presumptions in her favour, one giving rise to the other. The title deed in respect of the site of house No. 2 being in her name there was presumption that she had the title to it, and as it was to be presumed that she was the owner of the site it was also to be presumed that the building constructed thereon was owned by her. As an authority we may refer to the Division Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court in Purushottam Kashirao Deshmukh v. Akhada Panchayati Naya Udasi Kankhai, A.I.R. 1949 Nagpur 378 where in almost similar circumstances, a dual presumption was held to arise. Dealing with the facts of that case the Bench. observed : "As regards the question of ownership of survey No. 2911 and the bunglow and the two wells situate therein, we are unable to accept the finding of the trial court. The burden of proving that this property belonged to her, and that her husband Sundar Das was only a Benamidar was on the plaintiff..... She has thus failed to discharge the burden of proof that the purchase in the name of Sundar Das was benami for her and that it was her property. The burden of proving that this property belonged to her, and that her husband Sundar Das was only a Benamidar was on the plaintiff..... She has thus failed to discharge the burden of proof that the purchase in the name of Sundar Das was benami for her and that it was her property. The title deed i.e. the sale deed shows that the land was his property and there would be a presumption of fact in the absence of evidence to the contrary that the bungalow and the wells constructed thereon were his property specially when it is not unlikely that he had some money to spare for that purpose. Our finding, therefore, is that the land and the bungalow and the wells constructed thereon were the property of Sundar Das." We have emphasised the question of burden of proof in view of the fact that the judgment of the trial court rests entirely on the footing that the plaintiff had produced no evidence in proof of her title and that even though. she had ,fled a copy of the sale deed purporting to be in her favour she had not proved it. It has also been observed in the judgment that she had produced no evidence to show that the house had been constructed by her. This, in our opinion, was not a proper approach to the case so far as house No. 2 is concerned. It cannot be denied that the plaintiff had to establish her title to the house, but by admitting in the written statement that the title deed relating to the site of house No. 2 stood in the name of the plaintiff, the contesting defendant relieved her of the burden which would undoubtedly have been on her and made available to the plaintiff a presumption in her favour both as to the site and as to the house constructed on it. There is no reference in the judgment to any evidence produced by the contesting defendant in rebuttal of the presumption or to any circumstances which may take away the presumption, and the finding of the trial court in respect of house No. 2 as well is based only on the consideration that the burden of proving her claim lay on the plaintiff. The finding cannot, therefore, be accepted and must be set aside. The finding cannot, therefore, be accepted and must be set aside. In the circumstances of the case, we do not think it would be proper for us to decide the case on the material on record and the right course appears to be to remand the entire case for being tried afresh. 8. The issues framed in the case should be re-cast by the trial court. There should be separate issues in respect of the two houses in dispute and each issue should indicate, in the light of the pleadings of the parties, on whom the burden of proving it lies. The case should then be decided afresh after allowing the parties opportunity to produce their evidence. 9. The appeal is allowed, the judgment and the decree of the lower court are set aside and the case is remanded to the lower court for being tried afresh in accordance with the directions given above.