JUDGMENT The deity Radha Krishna, Paona Bazar, Imphal, and the Secretary of Radha Krishna Mandir Prabandhak Karya Karini Committee of the same place filed a suit against Purnananda Sharma claiming the relief inter alia, that he (Purnananda Sharma) be restrained from performing puja and other religious rites in respect, of the deity, and from entering into the temple for those purposes. Along with the plaint, an application under Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39 and Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code was filed wherein the prayer for temporary injunction on line with the relief asked for in the plaint was made. Purnananda Sharma opposed that prayer, and Shri M. C. Ray, the second Subordinate Judge in whose Court the suit was filed, rejected that prayer by his order dated 14-3-1966. Having felt aggrieved, the plaintiffs have come up in appeal. 2. The allegations on which the suit was founded are that there has been a Committee for a long period managing the affairs and properties of the deity in its capacity as the Shebait of the deity. Though originally the Committee was an unregistered body, but in the year 1960-61 it got itself registered under the Societies Registration Act in the name and style of Radha Krishna Mandir Prabandhak Karya Karini Committee. The defendant is a pujari appointed by the Committee for the purposes of performing puja of, and other religious ceremonies in connection with, the deity. The Committee had provided one building, belonging to the deity and described in Schedule B of the plaint, to the defendant for his residence as the pujari of the deity. On 16-4-1960 the defendant instituted a suit in the Court of the Munsiff at Imphai against the members of the Committee, claiming, inter alia, the declaration that he is the Shebait of the deity and its properties. That suit, however, was dismissed by the Munsiff on 20th February 1969. After the institution of that suit, in April 1961 the defendant filed another suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Manipur, claiming, in his capacity as the Shebait, an account relating to the income of the deity and its properties. This suit was filed in forma pauperis. That suit was dismissed by the trial Court on 26-12-1961 and that dismissal was confirmed by this Court in due course. This suit was filed in forma pauperis. That suit was dismissed by the trial Court on 26-12-1961 and that dismissal was confirmed by this Court in due course. The Committee, it was alleged further, did not approve of the attitude and behaviour of the defendant in filing two suits asserting his right as Shebait and so the Committee terminated the services of the defendant as pujari on 21-2-1965, the date following the one on which the suit for declaration was dismissed by the Munsiff. The prayer made in the suit was for a decree for possession of the Schedule B property made over to the defendant for the purposes of his residence as pujari and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from performing the puja and religious ceremonies in the Mandir. 3. In his written statement the defendant traversed all the allegations made in the plaint. He denied that the so-called Committee has any existence in law or any right respecting the deity or the property owned by the deity. In regard to the building said to have been given to him by the Committee for the purposes of his residence as pujari, the stand of the defendant was that it was his private ownership. The defendant also detailed the history of how the deity was installed and how the land on which the Mandir and the other buildings stand was acquired. According to his version, it was his father, Gopal Ram Sharma, who had acquired the patta of the land underneath the temple and the other properties from the Maharajah of Manipur, and then constructed the residential house mentioned in Schedule "B" of the plaint, as also the temple, a Mandop, and three shops detailed in Schedule "A" of the plaint. It was Gopal Ram Sharma, again, who installed the deity of Shri Radha Krishna in the temple and dedicated the three shops, the temple and the Mandop to the deity, he himself having taken over as the founder-Shebait. On 20th January, 1934, that Gopal Ram appointed the defendant, his son, as the Shebait of the deity after resigning himself from that office. Since then, the defendant pleaded further, he had been acting as the Shebait of the deity and performing the duties and functions connected with that office. On 20th January, 1934, that Gopal Ram appointed the defendant, his son, as the Shebait of the deity after resigning himself from that office. Since then, the defendant pleaded further, he had been acting as the Shebait of the deity and performing the duties and functions connected with that office. In the year 1955 the defendant constituted a Committee, for his own assistance, for management of the temple, with himself as its only permanent member in his capacity as Shebait and one Nathmal as the Secretary-cum-Treasurer. The Committee, however, did not function properly and so it was dissolved by the defendant within two months of its constitution. However, Nathmal continued to act as a Treasurer-cum-Accountant with the defendants consent. On 6-7-1958, the said Nathmal and a few others, availing themselves of the opportunity provided by the absence of the defendant from the station, constituted themselves into a self-styled Committee in the name of Radha Krishna Mandir Prabandhak Karya Karini Committee. When the defendant learnt about the constitution of that Committee, he sent a registered notice to them on 8-2-1960 challenging their authority to realise the rents from the tenants of the shops dedicated to the deity. It is to assert his right as Shebait that he instituted the two suits mentioned in the plaint. The defendant alleged further that the first suit had undoubtedly been dismissed on 20th February 1965 but his appeal had been accepted and the suit remanded. Respecting the other suit for account, the stand of the defendant was that it had been dismissed not on merits but on the footing that a suit in the name of the deity could not be filed in forma pauperis. 4. Shri M. C. Ray dismissed the plaintiffs application for temporary injunction observing that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case. 5. Shri Manisana Singh, representing the appellants, urged in this Court that the trial Court had grievously erred in rejecting the prayer for temporary injunction. He submitted that it is the Committee which is now managing the deity and its properties, that the defendant had been working as pujari appointed by the Committee, that the defendant had never worked as Shebait, and that since the Committee had terminated his appointment as pujari he had no right or authority to continue to act in any capacity in the Mandir. 6. 6. Shri Nilamani Singh, appearing for the respondent, urged, on the other hand, that the defendant had been managing the temple and its properties in his capacity as Shebait appointed by his father, who had founded the institution, since 20th January 1934, and that there was no material on the record to establish that he had relinquished that office in favour of the Committee or that he had ever been appointed as a pujari by that Committee. 7. After going through the arguments addressed at the bar and analysing the pleadings of the parties and the affidavits put in by them, I have reached the conclusion that the appellants have failed to establish that any interference with the discretion exercised by the trial Court in the matter of temporary injunction is called for. It is well settled that in every appeal it is incumbent on the appellant to show some justification why the order appealed from should be disturbed. In other words, it is for the appellant to satisfy the Court that there is some balance in his favour to justify the alteration of the impugned judgment or order. In support of this view I invite attention to the case of Chandra Kishore v. Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow, AIR 1949 PC 207. Another principle equally well established is that in any appeal arising out of prayer for temporary injunction, it is for the appellant to show that the lower Court had acted wrongly in the exercise of its discretion. The mere fact that the appellate Court might have come to a different conclusion is not enough to justify interference with the discretion exercised by the trial Court. The appellate Court will interfere only if it is satisfied that the trial Court had acted in the exercise of its discretion not judicially but in a capricious manner. The Calcutta High Court held in the case of Umesh Chandra v. Nibaran Chandra, AIR 1914 Cal 531, that an order of injunction is a discretionary order, and it is essential for the party appealing against a discretionary order to prove that the Court against whose judgment the appeal is preferred acted in the exercise of its discretion wrongly in not granting the prayer for injunction. It would therefore follow that it is for the appellants to satisfy this Court, before their appeal can be accepted and temporary injunction issued, that the trial Court had exercised its jurisdiction wrongly in making the order under appeal. 8. The considerations which should weigh with the Court in deciding the prayer for temporary injunction, it is not in dispute, are, (i) whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, (ii) whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff, that is to say, whether it would cause greater inconvenience to the plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted than the inconvenience to which the defendant would be put if it is granted, and (iii) whether the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury if his prayer for temporary injunction is disallowed. All these three conditions must co-exist before the relief sought can be granted to the plaintiff. In the instant case, the trial Court has expressed the opinion that the plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case. It was held in Mst. Govindi Bai v. Lakshmi Chand, AIR 1953 Raj 136 , that where the first Court has given the finding that a prima facie case has not been made out by the plaintiff, the appellate Court can grant the relief of temporary injunction only on setting aside that finding of the trial Court on the basis of justifiable grounds. Therefore, before I can grant the temporary injunction prayed for by the plaintiffs, it was obligatory for Manisana. Singh to satisfy this Court that the finding of the trial Court that a prima facie case is not made out is faulty. Frankly speaking, he was unable to satisfy me that it is so. The pleadings adopted by the defendant in his written statement undoubtedly indicate that there had been some Committee managing the properties attached to the temple. However, it is not clear whether that Committee had been constituted in a manner and by a person different from those mentioned in the written statement. The plaintiffs have not furnished the details of how the Committee came into being in the first instance. However, it is not clear whether that Committee had been constituted in a manner and by a person different from those mentioned in the written statement. The plaintiffs have not furnished the details of how the Committee came into being in the first instance. Nor have they mentioned in the plaint how the land on which the temple and other buildings stand had been acquired, who constructed the temple and the other buildings, who was responsible for installation of the deity in the temple, in what manner the various properties were dedicated to the deity, and when the Committee appointed the defendant as pujari. Unless all these particulars are brought before the Court, it is not possible to reach any conclusion, even tentatively, that the Committee has a better right to manage the temple and its properties as compared to the defendant who admittedly has been working as pujari of the deity for a long time. The situation, to say the least, is very nebulous, and so I am not inclined to interfere with the order under appeal. However, I must mention that nothing said in this judgment or in the order under appeal would influence the mind of the trial Court while deciding the suit on merits. Shri Manisana Singh expressed the apprehension, during the course of arguments, that the trial Court may be influenced in its final decision in the suit by its finding in the order under appeal that a prima facie case had not been made out by the plaintiffs. I cannot share that apprehension, nor can find any fault with the reasoning adopted by the trial Court while disposing of the injunction application. It is the demand of law that while deciding an application for temporary injunction the Court must form the opinion whether or not a prima facie case has been made out. I trust that the trial Court expressed itself in that spirit only while stating that a prima facie case had not been made out. 9. As a result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocates fee Rs. 16/-. Appeal dismissed.