M. U. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS is original plaintiffs revision application filed under the amended sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (Bombay Act No. LVII of 1947) which will hereafter be referred to as the Act. It is directed against the decision of the learned Extra Assistant Judge Surat in Regular Civil Appeal No. 39 of 1965 given on August 18 1966 By the said decision the learned Judge has set aside the decree of eviction that was passed by the learned 3rd Joint Civil Judge (Junior Division) Surat in Regular Civil Suit No. 585 of 1962 on December 28 1964 The learned trial Judge decreed the suit on the ground that original defendants Nos. 1 and 2 who are the opponents Nos. 1 and 2 herein and who are the heirs of the original tenant named Rajmal Thanmal who has earlier died on September 8 1960 had vacated the suit premises on or about September 2 1961 and left for good for Rajasthan and do not occupy the suit premises since then without any reasonable cause and thus the case against the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 fell within the purview of clause (k) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act. The learned trial Judge found that defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 who are relatives of defendant No. 1 on his wifes side were occupying the suit premises ever since the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 left Surat for their Home State Rajasthan. The learned appellate Judge has accepted the factual findings of the learned trial Judge but has however on a construction of the expression the purpose for which they were let used in clause (k) found that the case against the defendants did not fall within the meaning of clause (k) as the defendants Nos. 3 4 5 are occupying the suit premises for the same purpose namely residence and has dismissed the suit in the appeal. Hence this revision application by the original plaintiffs. ( 2 ) IT appears that a building comprising a ground floor and first floor rooms etc. and an attic situated in Ravapura in Surat was owned by one Dalichand Virchand Shroff original plaintiff since deceased who has died leaving a will. Executors appointed by his will have been joined as representing his estate. ( 2 ) IT appears that a building comprising a ground floor and first floor rooms etc. and an attic situated in Ravapura in Surat was owned by one Dalichand Virchand Shroff original plaintiff since deceased who has died leaving a will. Executors appointed by his will have been joined as representing his estate. The suit premises which are situated on the first floor and an attic were let out to one Rajmal Thanmal of Rajasthan for the purpose of his residence by the original landlord on a monthly rental some 14 to 15 years back. In the year 1952 the said Rajmal had filed Standard Rent Application No. 30 of 1952 for fixation of standard rent. The original plaintiff named Dalichand Virchand Shroff had then filed Regular Civil Suit No. 224 of 1953 against said Rajmal for recovery of possession of the suit premises. Both these proceedings were disposed of by a consent decree on June 30 1965 by virtue of which the original tenant Rajmal Thanmal continued as a statutory tenant on a monthly rental of Rs. 25/which was fixed as the standard rent of the suit premises. Original tenant Rajmal died on September 8 1960 leaving behind him a son and a widow who were respectively appeared as defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in the suit and are opponents Nos. 1 and 2 in the present revision application. The deceased plaintiff had accepted them as statutory tenants. The plaintiffs case as set up in the plaint was that after the death of original tenant Rajmal and since about September 2. 1961 defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have left Surat for Rajasthan and that they have handed over the possession of the suit premises to original defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 who are in illegal use and occupation of the suit premises ever since. Defendant No. 3 is one Valchand Hansraj who is defendant No. 1s wifes sisters husband. Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 are the sons of defendant No. 3. The plaintiffs case was that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had no right to transfer possession of the suit premises to defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 and such act of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 amounted to subletting assignment or transfer within the meaning of clause (a) of subsec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act. The plaintiffs case was that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had no right to transfer possession of the suit premises to defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 and such act of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 amounted to subletting assignment or transfer within the meaning of clause (a) of subsec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act. The averment in plaint paragraph 4 was that the said defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have without reasonable cause ceased to use the premises with effect from September 2 1961 and given over the use of the suit premises to defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 who are residing therein and doing business. Apparently the latter plea was made to cover the case under clause (k) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 3 ) THE main contention which has been raised before me and on which Mr. S. B. Vakil appearing on behalf of the applicants plaintiffs and Mr. P. D. Desai appearing on behalf of all the defendants opponents including defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 have addressed me at considerable length is whether on the facts as found by the learned appellate Judge thereby affirming the findings of facts of the learned trial Judge on the point the case against the tenants would fall within the purview of clause (k) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act. The contention of Mr. Vakil was that the decision of the learned appellate Judge was erroneous in law as it was based on some of the extracted observations of the learned Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court in the unreported decision in Dattatraya Balaji Mahajan v. Narayan Vinayak Bhonde (supra) and that the decision has no application in the instant case. Mr. Desai on the contrary contended that the decision applied with equal force to the facts of the case. Contended Mr. Desai that the purpose for which the suit premises were let out to the original tenant of whom defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are the heirs was residence and that even though the said two defendants had left Surat for good defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 were using the suit premises for the same purpose viz. Contended Mr. Desai that the purpose for which the suit premises were let out to the original tenant of whom defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are the heirs was residence and that even though the said two defendants had left Surat for good defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 were using the suit premises for the same purpose viz. the residence for which purpose the premises were let out to the original tenant and therefore the case did not fall within the mischief of clause (k ). It is with these rival contentions that I will be mainly concerned in this revision application. ( 4 ) SUB-SEC. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act enumerates the grounds which would entitle a landlord to recover possession of the premises from the tenant if the Court is satisfied that the case comes within any one of the grounds specified therein. The grounds on which a decree for recovery of possession can be founded are enumerated as grounds (a) to (1) in the said section. The grounds are 16 in number and any one or more of these grounds would entitle a landlord to a decree for possession. This will be notwithstanding anything contained in the Act and subject to the provisions of sec. 13 of the Act with which I will not be concerned in this revision application. Clause (a) which also has some relevance having regard to the contentions raised by the learned advocates reads: - (A) that the tenant has since the coming into operation of this Act (unlawfully sub-let) the whole or part of the premises or assigned or transferred in any other manner his interest therein; or. CLAUSE 13 (1) (k) of the Act which is material for the present purpose reads:- notwithstanding anything contained in this Act (but subject to the provisions of sec. 15) a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied (a) to (j ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (K ). that the premises have not been used without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit; or (1 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (K ). that the premises have not been used without reasonable cause for the purpose for which they were let for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit; or (1 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IN order that clause (k) be attracted three conditions must be satisfied:- (i) that the premises have not been used for the purpose for which they were let; (ii) that such non user was for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit; and (iii) such non-user was without reasonable cause. If these three conditions are satisfied the case would fall within the purview of the clause and the landlord would be entitled to a decree for recovery of possession of the suit premises. This clause is wide enough to include not only mere cesser of user but also a change of user. If the premises were let for one purpose and they are used for a different purpose it can well be said that the premises are not used for the purpose for which they were let. The purpose will have to be ascertained by the Court from the proved facts on record. ( 5 ) NOW it is common ground that the suit premises which are situated on the first floor of a house bearing No. 4112 in Ward No. 3 in Ravapura in Surat and which included an attic were let out to one Rajmal Thanmal of Rajasthan who has died on September 2 1960 leaving behind him the original Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 who are the opponents Nos. 1 and 2 herein as his heirs and legal representatives defendant No. 1 being the son and defendant No. 2 being the widow aged 60. It is not in dispute that after the death of original tenant Rajmal and on or about September 2 1961 the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have left Surat. It is also not in dispute that defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 are since then in occupation of the suit premises. It may be remembered that the concurrent finding of the two Courts below is that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have left Surat. It is also not in dispute that defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 are since then in occupation of the suit premises. It may be remembered that the concurrent finding of the two Courts below is that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have left Surat for good and gone to Rajasthan a State from which they came and are residing there. It may also be remembered that the learned appellate Judge agreeing with the learned trial Judge has found that there was no convincing evidence to show that the defendant No. 1 was occasionally going to village Sadli (Rajasthan State) for looking after his mother as was the case set up by the defendant No. 1 and that the evidence regarding the illness of his mother was not satisfactory. The learned appellate Judge has further held that the illness of the defendant No. 1s mother viz. defendant No. 2 was not proved and so there was no reasonable cause for the defendant No. 1 not to reside in the suit premises. Thus the concurrent finding of the two Courts below are (i) that original defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have not used the suit premises ever since December 2 1961 which means in any case for a period exceeding six months immediately preceding the date of the suit for eviction which was instituted on June 18 1966 (ii) that there was no reasonable cause for the defendant No. 1 not to reside in the suit premises meaning that the non user was without reasonable cause; and (iii) that defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 have occupied the suit premises for the purpose of their residence. From these findings it stands out preeminently that defendant No. 1 who is the son of the original tenant who has since then died has left the suit premises and has not been residing in Surat for a period exceeding six months immediately preceding the date of the suit; that defendant No. 2 who is the mother of defendant No. 1 and widow of the original tenant Daisal Tharmal is also residing in Rajasthan since then that the said defendants have left Surat for good; and further that the defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 are occupying the suit premises for their residence. In my opinion these facts would lead to an inescapable legal conclusion that the defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 are occupying the suit premises for their residence. In my opinion these facts would lead to an inescapable legal conclusion that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have abandoned the suit premises before the relevant date and that since then the defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 are in the occupation of the suit premises and using them for the purpose of their residence. ( 6 ) IT is no doubt true that the purpose for which the suit premises were let out to the original tenant was residence. But it has to be remembered that the residence intended was of the tenant himself which may in a given case include the residence of his heirs and of some others. But when a tenant abandons the premises as is the case here and has no control left over the premises and no interest left in the premises and has left the premises in the occupation of some other persons who are not referable to him he cannot be said to be using the premises for the purpose for which it was let. Such parting with possession by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and user by defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 for the purpose of their residence which is not shown to have any connection with the intended user by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 cannot in my opinion be said to be user for the purpose for which the suit premises were let out to the original tenant. Such a user cannot be said to be the purpose for which the premises were let out to the tenant. The expression purpose for which they were let out cannot have the extended meaning so as to cover cases where the tenant has abandoned the premises and put some other persons in the premises who use it as residence for their own purpose. In my opinion to be protected the user must be in a way referable to the tenant and cannot be independent of the tenant. To put an extended meaning to the word purpose will lead to a rather startling view and defeat the very object of the enactment. The object of the Act to use the words of Chagla C. J. in the aforesaid unreported decision is inter alia to protect bona fide tenants. To put an extended meaning to the word purpose will lead to a rather startling view and defeat the very object of the enactment. The object of the Act to use the words of Chagla C. J. in the aforesaid unreported decision is inter alia to protect bona fide tenants. The learned Chief Justice has observed in that connection that:-IN construing sub-clause (k) one must also bear in mind the object of the Legislature in passing this legislation. The Rent Restriction Act is passed because there was a scarcity of premises and therefore it was necessary to protect bona fide tenants and also to see that premises were not left unoccupied so that people in need of premises should not be deprived of them and also a tenant should not have one set of premises at one place and go about residing in some other premises. Therefore the purpose within the meaning of sub-clause (k) for which premises are let is the purpose of permanent residence; not a mere casual occupation not a mere spasmodic stay in the premises. I would like to observe that the reference by the learned Chief Justice to the Rent Restriction Act sub-clause (k) appears to be to clause (k) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act. I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations. Thus while construing sub-clause (k) one must bear in mind the object of the Legislature viz. to protect bona fide tenants. In my opinion the expression the purpose for which they were let to be found in sub-clause (k) has to be read having regard to the object of the Act viz. to protect bona fide tenants. When a tenant abandons the suit premises which in the instant case are situated in the State of Gujarat and goes back to reside in his home town in another State viz. in Rajasthan State in my opinion it could not be said that he is a bona fide tenant whose interest in the suit premises needs be protected. If the tenant himself is not in possession it is difficult to understand what is attempted to be protected under the Act. ( 7 ) HOWEVER strong reliance was placed by Mr. in Rajasthan State in my opinion it could not be said that he is a bona fide tenant whose interest in the suit premises needs be protected. If the tenant himself is not in possession it is difficult to understand what is attempted to be protected under the Act. ( 7 ) HOWEVER strong reliance was placed by Mr. Desai on behalf of the opponents on the earlier observation of the learned Chief Justice in the case which read:-THEREFORE it is true that so long as the premises have been used for the purpose for which they were let sub-clause (k) is satisfied and the landlord cannot eject the tenant because he himself did not reside in the premises. THERE can be no dispute about this broad proposition of law. But in order to better appreciate the contention of Mr. Desai I would with benefit reproduce the relevant discussion in the context whereof the learned Chief Justice came to make the aforesaid observations. It reads:-MR. Parulekar is perfectly right when he contends that under sub-clause (k) of sec. 13 (1) of the Rent Control Act it is not necessary that the tenant himself should reside in the premises. He points out again rightly that when we look at the other sub-clauses of sec. 13 (1) whenever action against the tenant is contemplated the tenant is mentioned but in the case of sub-clause (k) the Legislature has not stated that the tenant should use the premises for the purpose for which they were let. Then follows the aforesaid observations on which reliance is sought to be placed by Mr. Desai. Thereafter occur the following further observations:-IN other words it would be open to a tenant to permit a member of his family a guest a licensee to reside in the premises and not risk ejectment at the hands of the landlord. IN the aforesaid Bombay case the facts were that the tenant who was occupying the premises in the city of Poona did not reside in the tenanted premises for a period of ten months but during these ten months one of his sons had occupied the suit premises on two occasions for some few days. IN the aforesaid Bombay case the facts were that the tenant who was occupying the premises in the city of Poona did not reside in the tenanted premises for a period of ten months but during these ten months one of his sons had occupied the suit premises on two occasions for some few days. The decree was passed against the tenants for eviction on the ground of non-user and when the matter went to the Bombay High Court it was urged on behalf of the tenant that it was sufficient compliance with the provisions of the Rent Act when the sons of the tenant occupied the suit premises. It was urged that it was not necessary that the tenant must occupy the suit premises. On the facts the learned Chief Justice has observed that:-X x x In my opinion the purpose for which these premises were let was residence and residence is not the same as mere stay. Residence involves a more or less permanent or continuous stay at a place. HERE also I may say that I am in respectful agreement with all the aforesaid observations. In the Bombay case the fact was that the son who stayed at Poona had his permanent residence in Bombay. The observation in this connection then is that:-X x x It is open to a person to have more than one residence; but a mere casual stay in Poona for a short period cannot constitute residence so that it could not be said of the son that he resided both in Bombay and in Poona during the relevant period. THE learned Chief Justice then stated that as a matter of fact the learned District Judge found and he was bound by that finding that there was merely a casual occupation by the petitioners son for a spasmodic period of a week each and a mere casual occupation of premises does not constitute residence in those premises. In the concluding part of the decision the learned Chief Justice has observed as under:-X x x As I said before there is no obligation upon the tenant himself permanently to reside at the premises. But somebody either a member of his family or his guest or his licensee must for the relevant period permanently reside in the premises which are let to him. But somebody either a member of his family or his guest or his licensee must for the relevant period permanently reside in the premises which are let to him. THE learned Chief Justice then reached a conclusion on the findings of fact arrived at by the learned District Judge and on the facts proved in that case that it could not be said of the son of the petitioner that he resided in those premises for a period of two weeks and in that view of he matter he dismissed the revision application. ( 8 ) HOW as aforesaid the learned Chief Justice was dealing with a case of a casual occupation of the suit premises by a tenants son for two separate weeks during the relevant period which was sought to be considered as a user for the same purpose viz. of residence of the tenant who admittedly did not stay in the suit premises but stayed with his son at Jalgaon. The learned Chief Justice has clearly observed that in considering sub-clause (k) one must bear in mind the object of the Legislature. viz. the protection of bona fide tenants. Thus the decision in my opinion can have no application to the facts of the instant case where the tenant has left for good leaving the premises in occupation of defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 whose occupation is not shown to be referable to defendants Nos. 1 and 2. I may say with respect that the observations of the learned Chief Justice must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved in the case and the generality of the expression which may be found in the earlier part of the judgment shown from the context and the observations in the latter part of the judgment are not intended to be exposition of the whole law covering sub-clause (k ). As observed by Lord Halsbury in (1901) A. C. 495 at p. 506 the observations which have been approvingly referred to by the Privy Council in Punjab Cooperative Bank Ltd. Amritsar v. Commissioner of Income-tax Lahore A. I. R. 1940 P. C. 230 at p. 234. . . . . . . . . As observed by Lord Halsbury in (1901) A. C. 495 at p. 506 the observations which have been approvingly referred to by the Privy Council in Punjab Cooperative Bank Ltd. Amritsar v. Commissioner of Income-tax Lahore A. I. R. 1940 P. C. 230 at p. 234. . . . . . . . . every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law but are governed or qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. In my opinion as aforesaid the observations of the learned Chief Justice in the Bombay case do not lay down an absolute rule of law that simply because the non-tenant uses the premises in a technical sense for the purpose for which they were let to the tenant sub-clause (k) is not satisfied and the landlord cannot eject the tenant although the tenant himself did not reside in the premises. The user to be protected as would appear from the other observations of the learned Chief Justice which I have set out in extenso earlier must be a permissive user and one referable to the tenants. As aforesaid the tent himself (defendants Nos. 1 and 2) is not in possession it is difficult to understand what is attempted to be protected under the Rent Act. This is apart from the material fact that the defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 did not prefer an appeal against the decree of eviction passed against them by the trial Court. Having regard to the findings of the two Courts below viz. that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have left Surat for good and gone to Rajasthan and are residing there and further that the defendants Nos. 3 4 and 5 although they have their own premises in the same city although in a different locality are occupying the suit premises for their residence findings which are binding to me must hold that the case falls within the mischief of sub- clause (k ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 9 ) MR. Desai had contended that sub-clause (e) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 9 ) MR. Desai had contended that sub-clause (e) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act set out by me earlier was exhaustive of the case where a tenant has either sublet or assigned or transferred in any other manner his interest therein. Mr. Desais submission was that if the landlord fails to bring his case under clause (e) either by concession or by evidence which is short of the requisite standard of proof then that particular ground is not available to the landlord. That may be so. But Mr. Desais submission further was that the same facts even if proved cannot be considered for deciding whether the case falls under any other clause of sec. 13 (1) of the Act. There is no substance in this latter contention. Now the plaintiffs case as set up in the plaint and as referred to by me earlier was one both under sub-clause (e) and under sub-clause (k ). Under sec. 13 (1) of the Act a plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the suit premises if the Court is satisfied on any one or more of the grounds specified being made out. A decree can be passed on one or more grounds. It may here be recalled that the learned advocate for the plaintiff appearing in both the Courts below had given up the case under clause (e) for reasons not brought out on record. But that would not mean that if the case is shown to the satisfaction of the Court as falling under some other clause a decree for eviction cannot be passed. There may conceivably be cases where a case may fall within one or more sub-clauses of subsec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act. There may as well be cases where a case of the tenant abandoning the suit premises and other persons coming in occupation of the premises may fall both under clause (e) and clause (k) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act. In such a case a decree of eviction may be passed under either or both. ( 10 ) MR. Desai had contended that the evidence led to prove or disprove a particular issue cannot be used to arrive at a finding on another issue. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act. In such a case a decree of eviction may be passed under either or both. ( 10 ) MR. Desai had contended that the evidence led to prove or disprove a particular issue cannot be used to arrive at a finding on another issue. Mr. Desais submission was that the evidence recorded on original issue No. 2 viz. subletting etc. cannot be considered while deciding additional issue No. 2-A falling under sub-clause (a ). For the purpose Mr. Desai has sought reliance on the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Magubai Ammal and others v. R. Shama Rao and others A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 593 at p. 598 which read:-THE true scope of this rule is that evidence let in on issues on which the parties actually went to trial should not be made the foundation for decision of another and different issue which was not present to the minds of the parties and on which they had no opportunity of adducing evidence. But that rule has no application to a case where parties go to trial with knowledge that a particular question is in issue though no specific issue has been framed thereon and adduce evidence relating thereto. IT appears that before the Supreme Court reliance was sought to be placed on the observations of Lord Dunedin in Siddik Mahmed Shah v Mt. Saran 1930 P. C. 57 that no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward relying upon which it was urged that as no plea of lis pendens was taken in the pleadings the evidence bearing on that question could not be properly looked into and that no decision could be given based on Exhibit J series that the sale dated 30-1-1920 was effected by lis. The observations aforesaid were made in that connection. Now in the case before me although it appears that the additional issue was raised at the time of the final arguments in the case as found from the observations of the learned trial Judge in Paragraph 10 of his judgment which I have set out earlier both the parties had led evidence on the point and the learned advocates of the parties had advanced arguments on it and no prejudice was caused to either of them. The ground was urged in the plaint and traversed in the written statements. It is not shown to have been the case urged on behalf of the defendants in the Courts below that any prejudice was caused to their case by raising the additional evidence and giving a finding thereon. The decision of the Supreme Court cannot therefore be pressed in service by Mr. Desai. ( 11 ) I may say that having regard to the fact that I am inclined to allow this revision application. I have not considered Mr. Vakils submission that on the very facts found by the Courts below a decree under sub-clause (e) may be passed notwithstanding the concession made. ( 12 ) IN my opinion the case against the tenants falls under sub clause (k) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Act. I am satisfied that the decision in appeal is not according to law and must therefore be revised and reversed. A decree for eviction of the defendants from the suit premises must therefore necessarily follow. Accordingly I set aside the decree of dismissal of the suit passed by the learned appellate Judge in Regular Civil Appeal No. 39 of 1965 and restore the decree of eviction passed by The learned trial Judge in Regular Civil Suit No. 585 of 1962. ( 13 ) RULE absolute with no order as to costs of this revision application under the circumstances of the case. .