JUDGMENT : P.K. Banerji, J Appellant Mangar Sahni has been convicted and sentenced by the Sessions Judge of Muzaffarpur to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for the offence of murdering his wife Lilia on the night between the 27th and 28th July, 1965, at his house in vil1age Bhusahi, Police station Patepur, Di5trict Muzaffarpur. 2. On the morning of the 28th July, 1965, at 9 a.m. Saklu Mian (P.W. 1) the Chaukidar of the village reported at the police station as follows :- “... this morning I came to know that accused Mangar Sahni had killed his wife and kept the dead body near the well near his house. The accurate time of the murder could not be known but all the persons saw the occurrence this morning. I also saw the dead body. No injury appears to have been caused to her externally. I promptly arrested accused Mangar Sahni, son of Chakurdhan Sahni, of village Bhusahi and brought him with me to the P. S. and made the statement after producing him. I also came to know this that last evening there was a quarrel between the husband and wife..." The then Officer-in-charge of the police station (P.W. 9) recorded the above statement of Saklu Mian, Chaukidar and registered a case and took up investigation. Mangar Sahni brought to the police station by the Chaukidar was put under arrest. P.W. 9 thereafter, came to the house of the accused and found the dead body of Lilia lying on a mat on the floor of an east facing room of the house of the accused. He held inquest over the dead body in presence of witnesses, wrote out the report attested by them and found ligature mark on the neck of the deceased. Other injuries were also found on the body of the deceased. No rope or anything of the kind was, however, detected in the house, which was a mud-built one facing north, with thatched roof and open space to the contiguous north of the house. The house has a angan and an osara inside it. Another room is contiguous south of the angan and one room is on the eastern side of the house. Witnesses were examined. Statements of some of the witnesses were also recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After completing the investigation, a charge sheet was submitted by the investigating officer. Another room is contiguous south of the angan and one room is on the eastern side of the house. Witnesses were examined. Statements of some of the witnesses were also recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After completing the investigation, a charge sheet was submitted by the investigating officer. 3. The accused was defended at the trial. No particular line of defence had been taken, except that the accused was innocent and did not commit the crime. Some vague suggestion was made in cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses that the deceased woman, Lilia, was epileptic. The suggestion evidently was that she met with her death in one of such fits. 4, The learned Sessions Judge came to the finding, on the basis of the medical evidence adduced in the case, that deceased Lilia, aged about 45 years, was strangled to death on the night between the 27th and 28th July, 1965. He however, found that the evidence of most of the prosecution witness examined in the Case did not connect the accused with the crime and they, being relations of the appellant, were out to suppress the truth. On the basis of the evidence of Chaukidar Saklu Mian (P.W. 1), and on the evidence of Dahaur Mahto (P.W. 6.), the learned Judge came to the finding that the murder of Lilia was, in fact, committed by her husband, the appellant Mangar Sahni. He, accordingly, convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner indicated above. 5. Mr. Surendra Prasad No.2, appearing for the appellant, though faintly, hinted at the possibility of death due to suicidal hanging. He, however, did not dispute the correctness of the finding of the learned Sessions Judge based on the evidence of Dr. Gopi Raman, who held the post mortem examination on the body of deceased Lilia, that the deceased was the victim of homicidal strangulation. I may refer to the evidence of the doctor, who was examined in the Court of the Committing Magistrate as P.W. 9 and which evidence had been tendered and admitted in evidence at the trial under Section 509 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 6. I may refer to the evidence of the doctor, who was examined in the Court of the Committing Magistrate as P.W. 9 and which evidence had been tendered and admitted in evidence at the trial under Section 509 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 6. On the 29th July, 1965, this doctor was attached to the Sub-divisional hospital at Hajipur, and at 3.30 p. m. on that date he held the post mortem examination on the dead body of Lilia, and found it to be a thinly built body of a Hindu female aged about 45 Years. The mouth was half open, tyes closed and congested. Pupils dilated and blood had come out from mouth and nose. Face and nails cyanosed; lungs congested and soft; heart soft; stomach congested and empty; kidneys were markedly congested and soft. Bladder was empty. The following ante mortem injuries were found :- 1. Bruise 3" x 2" with swelling on the upper part of the left cheek with subcutaneous haemorrhage below it. 2. Abrasion 1/2." x 1/3" on the left side of the forehead. 3. Bruise 11/4 x 1" with swelling just above the left eyebrow with subcutaneous haemorrhage below it. 4. Bruise on the left eyelid and round about it. 5. Abrasion 3/4" X 1/2" and 1/2"X 1/3” on the right knee joint. 6. Abrasion 1/3" x 1/4" on the front and upper part of the left leg. 7. Abrasion 1/2" x 1/3" about 2" above injury no. 6. 8. Horizontal abrasion 31/2" x 1/3" on the middle and left side of the neck. 9. Abrasion 1" x 1/3" on the middle and right side of the neck. 10. There was a ligature mark 1/'2" broad situated horizontally on the upper part of the neck. It ran obliquely up, wards on the middle part on the back of the neck where it was deficient. It had made a groove and the base of the groove was reddish brown in colour. It was dry, bard and parchment like. There were ecchymosis and slight abrasions around the edge of the ligature mark. The subcutaneous tissue under the ligature mark was dry, glistering and slightly ecchymosed. The doctor was of the opinion that the death had resulted due to strangulation about 36 hours before the examination. It was dry, bard and parchment like. There were ecchymosis and slight abrasions around the edge of the ligature mark. The subcutaneous tissue under the ligature mark was dry, glistering and slightly ecchymosed. The doctor was of the opinion that the death had resulted due to strangulation about 36 hours before the examination. Since the correctness of this finding of the doctor, which has been accepted by the learned Judge, has not been disputed, I reed not elaborate this point any further. 7. I have looked into Modi's bock on Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, fifteenth edition, at pages 168-69, where he has referred to difference between hanging and strangulation, and has pointed out that, in cases of strangulation, ligature mark is horizontal or transverse, continuous, round the neck, low down in the neck below the thyroid, the base of the groove or fur low being soft and reddish. In the instant case, the ligature mark found was horizontal and the base of the groove was also found by the doctor to be reddish. Subcutaneous tissue under the ligature mark was dry, glistering and slightly ecchymosed. There was also bleeding from the nose and mouth in the instant case. Bleeding from the nose, mouth and ear is very rare in cases of hanging. No saliva was found running out of the mouth down on the chin and chest, which, according to Modi, is a sure sign of death by banging. Consequently, I find, in agreement with the trial court, that Lilia was a victim of violent form of death resulting from strangulation by means of ligature, and (?) due to suicidal hanging and though it may be that the investigating officer could not detect any rope or string in the house of the appellant at the time of his local inspection. 8. The important point that, how ever, arises for consideration now is whether the death of Lilia was caused by the appellant, as is the prosecution case and which case has been accepted by the learned Sessions Judge. The prosecution examined a number of witnesses, and I may briefly refer to their evidence. P.W.1 is Chaukidar Saklu Mian. I will refer to his evidence in more detail hereafter. P.W. 2 is Maheshwari Devi, wife of Jethu Sahni (P.W.4). The prosecution examined a number of witnesses, and I may briefly refer to their evidence. P.W.1 is Chaukidar Saklu Mian. I will refer to his evidence in more detail hereafter. P.W. 2 is Maheshwari Devi, wife of Jethu Sahni (P.W.4). She stated in court that she lives with the appellant in the same house, having a common courtyard, and she knew nothing about the case. P. W. 3 is Mangari. She also lives in the same house as did the appellant which has a common courtyard. She too stated in court that she knew nothing about the occurrence. P. W. 4 Jethu Sahni, husband of P.W. 2, stated in his examination-in-chief that, on a Tuesday evening, the accused had a quarrel with his wife, Lilia, over the question of household matters. Lilia went to the Hatia, and, on return, the met the accused at the duar of Dahaur (P.W.6). They had a quarrel there and later in their own angan. The witness, however, went to the house of one Dukhi to sleep at that night, and next morning he found Lilia dead. In his cross-examination, the witness admitted, and stated before the Committing Magistrate that he had not seen the accused quarrelling with his wife. The evidence of this witness in the court of the Committing Magistrate was tendered and admitted into evidence under Section 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and it appears to be true that he had stated in that court that he did not see any quarrel between the accused and his wife on that particular night. That being so, no value or weight can be attached to what this witness stated in his examination-in-chief before the trial court. He is a thoroughly unreliable witness. P. W. 5 Sammat Sahni, a cousin of the accused, also spoke about a quarrel between the accused and his wife on a Tuesday a year and a half before the date of his deposition in court. In his cross-examination, however, the witness stated that he was hard of hearing and he had not heard or seen the accused quarrelling with his wife. I shall refer to the evidence of P. W. 6 Dahaur Mahto hereafter. In his cross-examination, however, the witness stated that he was hard of hearing and he had not heard or seen the accused quarrelling with his wife. I shall refer to the evidence of P. W. 6 Dahaur Mahto hereafter. That being the position of the witnesses, the learned Sessions Judge had to discard the evidence of all these witnesses, each of whom was found to be unre1iable, and, as the learned Judge has observed, it is likely that they, being the relations have suppressed the truth to save the appellant from the punishment of law. P. W. 7 Munga Lall Mahto was only tendered. P. W. 8 Nabi Hussain was a constable who had accompanied the dead body of Lilia to Hajipur hospital and had identified the dead body before the doctor. P. W. 9 Sia Lal Singh is the investigating officer, and I have already referred to his evidence earlier. 9. The learned Sessions Judge, as I have stated earlier, has based the conviction of the accused only on the evidence of P. W's 1 and 6, and it would be useful to reproduce Paragraph 14 of his JUDGMENT : in this connection. "14. P.W. 1 stated that in the morning of 28-7-65, the accused came and told him that his wife had died and when he questioned him as to how his wife died, the accused fled away from his house and when he reached his house, he did not find the accused there. The Chaukidar does not bear any grudge against the accused and no reason was assigned on his behalf as to why this Chaukidar would give false evidence against him. I do not, therefore, find any reason to disbelieve P. W. 1 when he said that on the next morning, when he questioned the accused as to how his wife had died, he fled away. P. W. 6 is also an independent witness and he does not bear any grudge against the accused. He said what he had seen and nothing beyond that. His evidence bears the stamp of truth. Considering, therefore, the evidence, we find that in the evening of 27.7.65, the accused was found quarrelling with his wife in his house and on the next morning his wife was found lying dead and when in the morning the Chaukidar questioned the accused as to hew his wife had died, he fled away. Considering, therefore, the evidence, we find that in the evening of 27.7.65, the accused was found quarrelling with his wife in his house and on the next morning his wife was found lying dead and when in the morning the Chaukidar questioned the accused as to hew his wife had died, he fled away. These facts and circumstances, establish beyond any shadow of doubt that it was the accused who had murdered his wife. I find that the charge has been established against the accused beyond any shadow of doubt." 10. The appraisement of the evidence of P.W.'s 1 and 6, the conclusion arrived at therefrom and the reasoning in support thereof are entirely unsatisfactory and Mr. Kameshwari Nandan Singh, counsel for the State, fairly conceded that he could not support the JUDGMENT : of the trial court. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant urged before us that P.W. 1 had proved himself to be a wholly unreliable witness, inasmuch as he developed the case from what was stated by him in the first information report. I have already quoted the relevant portion of his fardbeyan earlier. The informant Chaukidar added in court that accused Mangar Sahni came to his place on that particular morning at about 6 a. m. and told him that his wife was dead. This part of his evidence finds no corroboration from his fardbeyan or from any other evidence on record. Then again, the witness stated in court that he questioned the accused as to how his wife had died, and the accused ran away towards his house. This part of the evidence of the witness is also conspicuously absent from his statement in the fardbeyan. Another statement of the informant in court was to the effect that the daughter-in-law of the accused told him that, on the previous night, the accused had a quarrel with his wife and he had assaulted his wife. The daughter-in-law has not been examined in this case, and this part of the statement of the witness is also conspicuous by its absence in the fardbeyan. The appellant, when examined under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was never questioned by the learned Sessions Judge about the fact stated by the Chaukidar in his evidence in court and the accused was given no opportunity to explain those facts. The appellant, when examined under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was never questioned by the learned Sessions Judge about the fact stated by the Chaukidar in his evidence in court and the accused was given no opportunity to explain those facts. The only question put to the accused was-• "You have heard the statement of the prosecution witness. Do you want to say anything ?" The answer was : "I committed no offence." Section 342 is based on the principle that no one should be condemned unheard and the accused should be heard not only on what is prima facie proved against him, but on every circumstances appearing in evidence against him, and it has been repeatedly pointed out that Judges and Magistrates must realise the importance of the examination under this section and it is incumbent upon them to question the accused properly and fairly bringing home to his mind in simple and clear language the exact case he has to meet and each material point that is sought to be made against him and to afford him a chance to explain. There was thus inadequate compliance with the provision of law. It is regrettable. In spite of this inadequate compliance with the provision of law, the learned Sessions Judge considered the above circumstances to be convincing grounds for the purpose of finding the accused guilty of the offence of murder of Lilia. In my opinion, the trial court should have ignored the important developments introduced in the evidence of the informant Chaukidar at the trial and should not have allowed itself to be influenced by them. 12. The court below has also relied on the evidence of P. W. 6 Dahaur Mahto to find the accused guilty. It would appear from the evidence of P.W.6 that all that he stated was that his house is about 10 laggis from the house of the accused, and a year and a half ago on a Tuesday evening he had ruturned to his house after the day's work and Mangar, the appellant, was also at his darwaza, when he heard him quarrelling with his wife, Lilia, who came and told her husband that he was always under the influence of liquor and he was not giving her anything to enable her to carryon household affairs. His evidence further discloses that the two began to quarrel and the witness asked them to go away and they went to their darwaza and began to quarral there. Next morning, he found Lilia dead. In his cross examination the witness stated that he asked Mangar and his wife to go from his duar, and when they left, the witness went inside his house and did not know what happened thereafter. The evidence of this witness, therefore, Even if accepted as correct, proves only the fact that in the evening preceding the death of Lilia, the accused and his wife had some quarrel over domestic matters. That alone cannot lead us to the conclusion that Lilia was killed or murdered by the appellant Mangar during the night hours that followed the quarrel. Consequently, neither the alleged conduct of Mangar as stated for the first time in Court by Saklu Chaukidar, whose evidence stands entirely uncorroborated, nor the evidence of P.W. 6 Dahaur can reasonably lead us to the necessary conclusion that Lilia was murdered by appellant Mangar. The prosecution case suffers from paucity of evidence of a reliable character and I cannot hold that it proves its case against the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. In this view of the matter, therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the learned Sessions Judge was wholly unjustified in convicting the appellant and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for life on the evidence on record. 13. The appeal must, therefore succeed, and is allowed; and conviction as also the sentence are set aside and the appellant is acquitted, and must be set at liberty forthwith. 14. I agree that this appeal should be allowed. There can be no doubt that Lilia was murdered by strangulation, but it is equally clear that nobody saw who killed her. The circumstances relied on by the trial Judge do raise some suspicion against the appellant, but the evidence given by the prosecution does not establish beyond all reasonable doubt that he was the murderer. In (1) Hanumant Govind Nargundkar V. State of Madhya Pradesh (A.I.R 1952 S.C. 343), the Supreme Court had occasion to point out the duty of the Court in appreciation of circumstantial evidence, which may be usefully quoted here: “... In dealing with circumstance evidence the rules specially applicable to such evidence must be borne in mind. In (1) Hanumant Govind Nargundkar V. State of Madhya Pradesh (A.I.R 1952 S.C. 343), the Supreme Court had occasion to point out the duty of the Court in appreciation of circumstantial evidence, which may be usefully quoted here: “... In dealing with circumstance evidence the rules specially applicable to such evidence must be borne in mind. In such cases there is always the danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof and, therefore, it is right to recall the warning addressed by Baron Alderson to the Jury in Reg. V. Hodge [(1838) 2 Lawin 227] where he said: 'The mind was apt to take a pleasure in adopting circumstances to one another, and even in straining them a little, if need be, to force them to form parts of one connected whole; and the more ingenious the mind of the individual, the more likely was it, considering such matters, to overreach and mislead itself, to supply some little link that is wanting, to take for granted some fact consistent with its previous theories and necessary to render them complete.' "It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." Appeal allowed