JUDGMENT 1. - The defendant, who is a tenant in the suit premises, has been unsuccessful in both the courts below and has filed this appeal against the appellate judgment and decree of Senior Civil Judge, Ajmer, dated May 21, 1968. 2. It is not disputed that plaintiffs Dhansukhlal, Madanlal and Padamchand are the joint owners of the premises on the first floor of which the defendant is a tenant, Plaintiff Madanlal is living on second floor, while the ground floor is in the occupation of plaintiffs Dhansukhlal and Madanlal. It is also not in dispute that plaintiffs Madanlal and Padamchand, who are brothers, used to reside in the house of one Madanlal Chandak and whereas Madanlal shifted to the second floor of the building in which the suit premises are located, Padamchand continues to reside as a tenant of Madanlal Chandak. The plaintiffs therefore instituted the present suit for the eviction of the defendant, who is a tenant of all of them on the first floor as aforesaid, alleging that the premises were required for the reasonable and bona fide use of plaintiff Padamchand. They also pleaded that the defendant had committed defaults in the payment of rent, but nothing now turns on that plea. 3. The defendant took a number of defences in the written statement but for purposes of the controversy in this court it will be sufficient to say that he took the plea that the accommodation in occupation of the plaintiffs was sufficient for their residential requirements and that the plaintiffs had acquired vacant possession of three rooms and a small store room on the ground floor during the pendency of the suit which was sufficient to meet the requirement of plaintiff Padamchand. 4. Five issues were framed by the trial court which ultimately held that the plaintiffs had succeeded in proving their reasonable and bona fide requirement of the suit premises, and decreed the suit. On appeal, the learner, Judge of the lower appellate court has taken a similar view and this is why the defendant has filed the present second appeal. 5. Five issues were framed by the trial court which ultimately held that the plaintiffs had succeeded in proving their reasonable and bona fide requirement of the suit premises, and decreed the suit. On appeal, the learner, Judge of the lower appellate court has taken a similar view and this is why the defendant has filed the present second appeal. 5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant that the finding of the lower appellate court has been vitiated by a substantial error of law inasmuch as, while considering the question whether the accommodation on ground floor was sufficient to meet the requirement of plaintiff Padamchand, that court relied on an observation in the judgment of the trial court that those rooms were unfit for habitation as they were small and dark. It has further, been pointed out that there was no evidence on the record to justify this finding and that even the inspection note of the trial court did hot make a mention the the ground floor rooms were unsuitable for residence. 6. It is true that such an observation has been made in the judgement of the lower appellate court, but there are several reasons why I am not inclined to think that this is sufficient to vitiate its finding of fact regarding the reasonable and bona fide requirement of plaintiff Padamchand. Firstly, I find from the impugned judgment that the learned Judge has given other reasons for upholding the finding of fact of the trial court that the suit premises are required reasonably and bona fide for the use and occupation of plaintiff Padamchand, and it has not been shown how any substantial error of law or procedure could be said to be committed in respect of those reasons. Secondly, the record shows that there was a specific issue (No. 1 A) on the question whether the plaintiffs had acquired vacant possession of certain premises during the pendency of the suit, and, if so, what was its effect ? It is admitted that this issue was meant to cover the plea in paragraph 10 A of the written statement that the plaintiff had acquired vacant possession of three rooms and one small store room on the ground floor curing the pendency of the suit. It is admitted that this issue was meant to cover the plea in paragraph 10 A of the written statement that the plaintiff had acquired vacant possession of three rooms and one small store room on the ground floor curing the pendency of the suit. But the fact remains that this has not been proved to be so and there is no reason to disbelieve the statement of Plaintiff Dhansukhlal PW. 1 that the ground floor did not fall vacant after the institution of the suit. As such issue No. 1 A had to be decided against the defendant and it is not possible for him to make any argument on the basis of the plea that the giouna floor fell vacant during the pendency of the suit and was sufficient to meet the requirement of plaintiff Padamchand. Thirdly, there is satisfactory evidence on the record to prove that while one room on the ground floor has been reserved as a sitting room, the remaining rooms are used for the storage of hard-ware belonging to the plaintiffs. When it is remembered that the suit premises are situated in a Locality in which business in hard-ware is carried on and one of the plaintiffs is carrying on such business in a shop in the same building, it cannot be said that the accommodation which has been used for storage of merchandise is not being put to proper use and is available for the residence of Padamchand. Fourthly, it maybe mentlened that if the defendant had any reason to think that that plaintiff Padamchand could live on the ground floor and did not require the suit-premises, there was nothing to prevent him from questioning Padamchand in that respect, the fact that be did not undertake any such cross-examination shows that a belated attempt is being made in this second appeal to show that the ground floor could be used for the residence by Padamchand. I have no hesitation in rejecting this contention as an alter thought, the more so because I find that even the defendant has not stated that the rooms on the ground floor are sufficient for the residence of Padamchand I am therefore not inclined to take the view that I should reopen the concurrent finding of fact of the two courts below that the suit premises are required for the reasonable and bona fide use of plaintiff Padamchand. 7. An argument has however been made that the plaintiffs are not entitled to succeed in their claim for the possession of the suit premises because the requirement of one of them, namely, plaintiff Padamchand, could not be said to be the requirement of all of them within the meaning 4 section 13 (1) (h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. The learned counsel has argued that plaintiff Padamchand was one of the three joint owners of the suit premises and that the section could be invoked by the plaintiffs only if they had claimed and proved that the suit premises were required reasonably and bona fide for the use and occupation of all of them. To support this argument, the learned counsel has placed reliance on Saifuddin Hussainibhoy Siamwala and others v. The Burma Cycle Trading Co, A.I.R. 1968 , Madras 154. 8. It is not disputed however that no such plea was taken in the written statement and there was no issue on the question whether or not Padamchand was a landlord within the meaning of section 3 (iii) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. So also, it is not in dispute that the parties had no occasion to lead evidence in this regard, and the point was not raised for the consideration of the trial court. It was urged for the first time In the first appellate court which rejected it, inter alia, for the reason that no such plea was taken in the written statement and the argument was outside the pleadings. The lower appellate court was justified in taking this view because the question whether Padamchand was a landlord within the meaning of section 3 (ii) was essentially a question of tact and as the plaintiffs did not get an opportunity of leading their evidence to show that this was so, it would prejudice them considerably if they were non-suited on the ground that they had not succeeded in proving that Padamchand was a person, who, for the time being, was receiving or was entitled to receive the rent of the suit premises. It therefore appears to me that this new argument of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be allowed. 9. It therefore appears to me that this new argument of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be allowed. 9. Saifuddin Hussainibhoy Saimwala's Case (h) was cited for the consideration of the learned Judge of the lower appellate court also, but it does not take notice of another judgement of the same High Court in Messrs. T. N. K. Govindraraju Chetty v. P. Urajlal Gulabdass and Co. and another, (1967) 116 M.L.J. 465 , even though it was decided earlier in point of time. In that judgment, K. Veeraswami V.J. took, the view that the requirement of one of the owners would "squarely fall" within the scope of section 10 (3) (a) (i) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. It may also be mentioned that it has been held in Kanika Devi and others v. Amrendra Nath Roy Chouduri and others, LXV. Cal. Weekly Notes 1078 , as follows:-It is true that where there are more than one landlord, the word "landlord" in clause (h) of the proviso to section 12 (1) must be read as 'landlords' and the expression for his own occupation' therein must be read as 'for their own occupation; never the less in the light of the decisions of this court the word 'their' in the last expression must be read as meaning of 'of them or of any one or more of them' so that the requirement of the premises by the landlords for the occupation of one or more of them is sufficient to bring the case within the clause".This view has been followed in Vir Bhan v. Avatar Krishan, LXIV (1962) Punjab Law Report 1185 and Taherbhai Hebtullabhai and another v. Ambalal Harilal Shah and another, L.L.J. (1966) Gujrat 963 . I am in respectful agreement with the view taken in these cases. 10. No other point remains for consideration and the appeal is dismissed with costs. It may be mentioned that Mr. Jindal has agreed to give two months' time to the appellant to deliver vacant possession of the suit premises and this may be done. Leave to appeal is prayed for, but is refused.Appeal dismissed. *******