JUDGMENT PATEL J-This is a plaintiffs appeal against the dismissal of his suit for damages and it arises under the following circumstances: 2. The plaintiff-firm manufactures Diamond Apicin and Diamond Jantpudis at Miraj. The defendant is a trader at Sholapur. By an agreement dated January 2, 1959, between the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant was appointed as the selling agent of the plaintiffs medicines for the Districts of Sholapur and Gulabarga, and for the Talukas of Humnabad, Tuljapur, Latur and Indi. The agreement was to be in force for a period of three years. By this agreement the defendant undertook to purchase and sell a minimum of 80,000 pudis of Diamond Apicin and 5,000 of Diamond Jant-pudis, agreeing further that the defendant would not discontinue the agency for a period of three years and, if he did so, he would have to pay damages to the plaintiff. In pursuance of this contract, the defendant ordered some goods but it appears that by about February, 1959, the Civil Surgeon at Sholapur ordered the defendant not to sell any of these articles as a wholesaler as the defendant had no licence for wholesale trade in drugs. It appears from the correspondence between the parties that the defendant had already made an application by about February 1959 for a wholesalers licence under the Drugs Act and the correspondence further shows that he actually got the licence on June 6, 1959. Even so, by notice dated August 17, 1959, the defendant terminated the agreement on the ground that the agreement was void and illegal as the defendant had no licence when the agreement was entered into. He also made a statement in that notice that the goods sent to him for about five months were lying with him undisposed of as he had no licence, evidently a statement which was untrue, since he had already obtained a licence about two and a quarter months prior to the issue of this notice. It may be mentioned that the defendant got another agency. The plaintiff after some correspondence filed the present suit for damages claiming a sum of Rs. 70,000 from the defendant. 2. The defendant resisted the suit contending that the agreement of agency was illegal and void as he had no wholesale licence when the agreement was entered into. He also questioned the amount of damages. The plaintiff after some correspondence filed the present suit for damages claiming a sum of Rs. 70,000 from the defendant. 2. The defendant resisted the suit contending that the agreement of agency was illegal and void as he had no wholesale licence when the agreement was entered into. He also questioned the amount of damages. The learned trial Judge held that the agreement was invalid in law and therefore unenforceable. He also gave a finding on the question of damages which he assessed at Rs. 20,527. In view of his finding on the first and the main issue, the learned Judge dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appeals. 3. The first question is whether the agreement of the nature here can be said to be a void agreement, so that the plaintiff should be held not entitled to claim damages. On behalf of the respondent it is argued that the agreement is contrary to the terms of the Drugs Act read with the rules and the licence issued to the plaintiff and therefore section 23 of the Contract Act is attracted and the plaintiff cannot sue. 4. Section 18 of the Drugs Act, 1940, prohibits the manufacture and sale of drugs and cosmetics except as provided therein. Clause (a) relates to the quality, clause (b) prohibits the sale of any of these articles or distribution thereof if imported or manufactured in contravention of the provisions of the Act or the rules and clause (c) prohibits the manufacture for sale, or sell or stock or exhibit for sale or distribute any drug, except under, and in accordance with the conditions of a licence issued for such purpose under the Chapter. Rule 61 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules framed under the Drugs Act prescribes different forms for different kinds of licences to deal in drugs. As in the present case the defendant had to act as a wholesale agent of the plaintiff, the Form applicable would be Form 20-B The plaintiff undoubtedly and admittedly has a licence as per this Form. Now, the conditions of his licence amongst other things provide by condition 3 (ii) that no sale of any drug shall be made to a person not holding the requisite licence to sell, stock or exhibit for sale or distribute the drug. The proviso is not material to the present purposes. 5. Now, the conditions of his licence amongst other things provide by condition 3 (ii) that no sale of any drug shall be made to a person not holding the requisite licence to sell, stock or exhibit for sale or distribute the drug. The proviso is not material to the present purposes. 5. What is prohibited is the actual sale of drugs by condition 3 (ii) of plaintiffs licence. If, therefore, in contravention of this provision a person actually sells or supplies the goods to a person who does not hold the licence for the particular purpose, then, as the sale is prohibited by law, he may not be entitled to recover the price of the goods. In the present case, however, there is an agreement of agency between the parties. An agreement of agency is capable of being carried on if each party does what is required of him to do. The plaintiff in order to fulfil his part had to have a licence for the sale of such drugs which he manufactured. Similarly the defendant in order to carry out his part of the contract was bound to have a licence which permitted him to deal in wholesale business of the drugs. It is admitted that he already held a licence for retail trade. There is nothing in the Drugs Act to show that no agreement can be entered into agency unless and unit the person who gives the agency is satisfied that the agent holds the licence. It would only mean that after the agreement is entered into between the parties, each party must do his best to fulfil his part. If per chance one party or the other cannot obtain such licence, then of course the agreement would be unenforceable but that would be not by reason of the fault or neglect of the party but because the licensing authority refused to grant the licence. It is only if the parties with a deliberate desire to evade the law enter into the contract to do something which is not legal, then the agreement must be regarded as void. 6. In this connection we may refer to a few cases which have come up before Courts. The case of Mrs. Chandnee Widya Vati v. Dr. It is only if the parties with a deliberate desire to evade the law enter into the contract to do something which is not legal, then the agreement must be regarded as void. 6. In this connection we may refer to a few cases which have come up before Courts. The case of Mrs. Chandnee Widya Vati v. Dr. C. L. Katial (1) arose out of a contract entered into by the appellant with the respondent to sell to the respondent a house which stood on a plot which was granted by the Government. The vendor-appellant could not have sold the house without the permission of the Government. As the vendor refused to complete the contract on that ground, the respondent filed a suit. The trial Court dismissed the suit. The respondent appealed to the High Court who decreed the plaintiffs suit saying that the Court had to enforce the terms of the contract enjoining upon the defendant to make the necessary application to the Chief Commissioner for the required sanction and it would then be for the Chief Commissioner to decide whether or not to grant the necessary sanction. The principle was accepted by the Supreme Court. The second case where similar principle was laid down is the decision in Dy. Director of Consolidation v. Deen Bandhu (2) which arose under the United Provinces Consolidation of Holdings Act of 1954. In a case under the statute where sanction was refused, the Supreme Court intervened and directed that the sanction for the transfer should be made. Following these cases, this Court in Tukaram Zipru v. Baban Dhondu (3) held that, in a case where sanction was necessary for transfer of the property, either the Court can compel the defendant to make the application for the same or appoint a Court Commissioner to do so or permit the plaintiff to make the application. The underlying principle of these cases is that unless the transaction is itself of such a nature that it contravenes the law, it must be enforced by requiring the defendant to take such steps as are necessary for its completion. Much more so would be the case where the suit is not for specific performance but for damages such as the present, where, the Court, cannot specifically enforce the agreement of agency since it would be impossible to supervise the carrying out of it. Much more so would be the case where the suit is not for specific performance but for damages such as the present, where, the Court, cannot specifically enforce the agreement of agency since it would be impossible to supervise the carrying out of it. The plaintiff would in such a case not be barred from asking for damages where the defendant does not carry out the contract not because the law prevents it but because he refuses to take any action to satisfy the conditions imposed by law upon him before fulfilment of the contract. In this case it is much worse because the defendant terminated the contract after be had already got a wholesalers licence for the drugs and, according to the plaintiff, he started competing the plaintiffs sales by pushing the drugs of other manufacturers. The plaintiff is right in this allegation. 7. A somewhat similar question though in a slightly different context arose in H O. Brandt & Co. v. H. N. Morris & Co. (4). The contract in that case was for monthly deliveries of pure aniline oil. After the contract was made, the export of the oil was prohibited by an Order in Council except otherwise than under licence to export. The Court held that the agreement was not void nor it became unenforceable by reason of the subsequent restrictions but that an obligation to apply for a licence lay upon the buyers who could not refuse to perform their part of the contract merely by alleging inability. Same principle has subsequently been followed in Taylor & Co. v. Landauer & Co (5). 8; Dr. Naik relying upon some cases urged that the agreement such as the present is void in law. He relies upon the decisions in Janu Sait v. Ramasuami Naidu (6), Hormasji Motabhai v. Pestanji Dhanjibhai (7) and V. Narasimha Raju v. V. Gurumurthy Raju (8). None of these cases have any application whatsoever. The first case arose out of an actual transaction of buying and selling. The plaintiff who had given the money and agreed to take the goods in payment thereof could not have received the goods by sale in this manner unless he had a licence. None of these cases have any application whatsoever. The first case arose out of an actual transaction of buying and selling. The plaintiff who had given the money and agreed to take the goods in payment thereof could not have received the goods by sale in this manner unless he had a licence. The Court held that the contract could not be enforced as the plaintiff himself had no licence, though, if he was not in pari delicto with the defendant in the making of the contract, he could recover the amount which he had paid. In the second case the question arose in relation to Abkari law where a partnership was absolutely prohibited. The Court found that both the parties were in pari delicto and as the partnership was absolutely prohibited the plaintiff could not succeed in his suit for account. The third case arose out of stifling of a prosecution which was filed against the promisor and as the Court came to the conclusion that it was intended to stifle the prosecution which was already launched, the promise could not succeed on the promise. To the same effect are the other cases which are cited before us which we do not think it necessary to refer. 9. Dr. Naik bas relied particularly upon Prahlad Rai (9) where the Supreme Court after marized the position in law as follows (p. 218): "The correct position in law, in our opinion, is that what one has to see is whether the illegality goes so much to the root of the matter that the plaintiff cannot bring his action without relying upon the illegal transaction into which he had entered. If the illegality be trivial or venial, as stated by Williston and the plaintiff is not required to rest his case upon that illegality, then public policy demands that the defendant should not be allowed to take advantage of the position. A Strict view, of course, must be taken of the plaintiffs conduct, and he should not be allowed to circumvent the illegality by resorting to some subterfuge or by misstating the facts. A Strict view, of course, must be taken of the plaintiffs conduct, and he should not be allowed to circumvent the illegality by resorting to some subterfuge or by misstating the facts. If, however, the matter is clear and the illegality is not required to be pleaded or proved as part of the cause of action and the plaintiff recanted before the illegal purpose was achieved, then, unless it be of such a gross nature as to outrage the conscience of the Court, the plea of the defendant should not prevail." The principle stated in this decision is not irreconcilable with the principles of the cases we have referred to. The Court either in enforcing the specific performance of the contract by requiring the party to apply for the required sanction, or in giving damages for the negligence of the party in carrying out his part of the contract in not even applying for a licence, is not doing something which is contrary to the principle above stated. Having regard to the terms of the provisions, we are of the view that the learned Judge was not justified in holding that the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was void ab initio. 10. [The rest of the judgment is not material to this report.] Decree set aside.