Judgment :- 1. The first defendant appeals from the decision of the learned Single Judge in S. A. 1338/60 which was heard and disposed of along with S. A. Nos. 812 and 840 of 1960 by the learned judge, since the main question that arose in the appeals was common. The suit was for redemption of mortgages executed from the Swaroopathu tarwad. The plaintiffs claim to belong to that tarwad; but according to the defendants, the mortgages were executed by Easwari Madhavi the last surviving member of the Swaroopathu tarwad and on her death the tarwad became extinct. According to the defendants, therefore, the plaintiffs were not competent to redeem. In answer to this contention, it was pointed out on behalf of the plaintiffs that on the death of Easwari Madhavi they were adopted into the family on the strength of a royal Neet and as such they are competent to redeem. Ex-P4 is the attested copy of the royal Neet confirming the adoption, by the sovereign. The validity of Ex-P4 is challenged by the defendants since according to them the copy has not been issued by a public officer as required by S.76 of the Evidence Act and as such the document ought not have been made the basis for awarding a decree to the plaintiffs. The defendants had also a case that the Neet in question does not conform to the form prescribed and followed by the sovereign in such cases. Exs-P5 and P6 are copies of judgments in A. S.197/1107 and A. S.328/56 respectively of the District Court, Trivandrum wherein the 'Dathu Neet' which is the subject matter of the present case, had come up for consideration and upheld by the learned Judge. Both these were relied on as prior transactions wherein the right was asserted and recognised. The defendants contended that Exs-P5 and P6 cannot be treated as particular instances coming under S.13 of the Evidence Act. These contentions were repelled and the plaintiffs were awarded a decree by the learned Munsiff which was confirmed in appeal by the Add. District Judge of Trivandrum and which was further affirmed by the learned Single Judge in second appeal. The first defendant has now come up before us in appeal on special leave. 2. The whole question centres round the validity or otherwise of Ex-P4 the copy of the'Dathu Neet'. District Judge of Trivandrum and which was further affirmed by the learned Single Judge in second appeal. The first defendant has now come up before us in appeal on special leave. 2. The whole question centres round the validity or otherwise of Ex-P4 the copy of the'Dathu Neet'. If the Neet is upheld the suit will have to be held as competent; but on the other hand if the Neet suffers any of the infirmities pointed out and as such inadmissible in evidence, the plaintiffs will have to be non-suited. The fact that Easwari Madhavi was the last surviving member is not disputed; but the family was saved from extinction by the adoption of the plaintiffs into it, by virtue of the Neet. The first point emphasised in respect of Ex-P4 is that in so far as it is not issued by a'public officer' as contemplated in S.76 of the Evidence Act it cannot be admitted in evidence. Under S.76,'every public officer having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall be competent, to issue a copy thereof together with a certificate written at the foot of the copy that it is a true copy.' Explanation to the section would say that,"any officer who, by the ordinary course of official duty is authorised to deliver such copies, shall be deemed to have the custody of such documents within the meaning of the section." Ex-P4 is seen to have been issued by one Prabhakaran Tampi who, at the time the copy was issued, was one in the personal staff of His Highness the Rajpramukh of Travancore-Cochin. The former States of Travancore and Cochin were integrated so as to form the United State of Travancore and Cochin under the terms and conditions laid down in the covenant wherein, in the place of the Maharajas of Travancore and Cochin the Rajpramukh of the United State of Travancore and Cochin, was installed as the head of the State and all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler of either of the Covenanting States which appertain or are incidental to the government of that State had devolved on the United State. Sri Prabhakaran Tampi who has issued the copy, as seen from the civil list, was a member of the personal staff of the Rajpramukh. Sri Prabhakaran Tampi who has issued the copy, as seen from the civil list, was a member of the personal staff of the Rajpramukh. The fact, therefore, cannot be disputed that Sri Prabhakaran Tampi under whose signature as officer in charge, Ex-P4 was issued, was a'public officer' for purposes of S.76 of the Evidence Act. Learned counsel argued that since the right to inspect the document in question is not possessed by the public the document cannot be characterised as a public document. We do not see much force in this contention. The right to obtain the certified copy pre-supposes the right to inspect; but the converse, viz., the right of inspection carries with it the right to take copies does not necessarily follow. In the present case the right to get a copy of the Dathu Neet' having been conceded, the other right, viz., the right to inspect must also be taken as conceded. There is no case for the defendant that the right to inspect was at any time foiled so far as he is concerned. "A right to inspect public document, is however, assumed in S.76. I think it might be inferred that the legislature intended to recognise the right generally (i. e, the right to inspect) for all persons who can show that they have an interest for the protection of which it is necessary that liberty to inspect such document should be given." (vide R, v. Arumugam, 20 Mad. 189 FB Sarkar on Evidence 11th-Edn., Vol. I, p. 689). We are, therefore, of the view that Ex-P4 is a Certified dopy of a public document issued by a public officer as contemplated in S.76 of the Evidence Act. 3. On the question of the validity of the Neet the point taken is that Ex-P4 does not show that "Adiyara" fees was paid. According to the learned counsel, for the validity of the adoption Adiyara fees should be paid. 3. On the question of the validity of the Neet the point taken is that Ex-P4 does not show that "Adiyara" fees was paid. According to the learned counsel, for the validity of the adoption Adiyara fees should be paid. In the Principles of Marumakkathayam Law by M. P. Joseph at page 44 the learned author dealing with this question has pointed out that "the payment of Adiyara fees is not the indispensable condition precedent to the confirmation by the sovereign of the State, of adoptions made in the families of Malayalies." The learned author has cited in support of his view a Division Bench decision of the Travancore High Court reported in 6 T. L. R.108 (quoted by the learned single judge himself), wherein the learned judges have observed that payment of Adiyara fees is not essential to the validity of the adoption. The learned judges also discounted the view that Adiyara represented consideration for the grant. According to them Adiyara is "analogous to a Nazar" which is paid as a token of allegiance to the sovereign and has no connection whatever with the exercise of the prerogative. Regarding Exs-P5 and P6 the previous judgments wherein the self-same 'Neet' was upheld the defendant's contention is that even though Exs-P5 and P6 are admissible in evidence under S.13 of the Evidence Act the learned Munsiff ought not have accepted the reasoning of the learned judges in Exs-P5 and P6 as basis for his own conclusions. In other words, the learned Munsiff ought to have come to his own conclusions irrespective of the reasoning adopted in Exs-P5 and P6. In support of this position reliance was placed by the learned counsel on the decisions in A. I. R.1954 S. C. 379 & 606 and AIR. 1960 Ker.123. These decisions have, no doubt, laid down that judgment in a previous suit, though not inter parties, is admissible under S.13 of the Evidence Act, only in proof of the fact that the right was asserted on a previous occasion; but the reasons upon which the judgment is founded cannot be treated as part of the transaction nor can any finding of fact there came to, other than the transaction itself, be relevant in the subsequent case. A finding in the previous suit cannot be made the basis on which a decree in the later suit can be granted. A finding in the previous suit cannot be made the basis on which a decree in the later suit can be granted. There need not be any controversy on this aspect of the matter. The previous judgment can, no doubt, lend corroboration to the point asserted in the present suit in so far as in those suits which also were for redemption, the'Dathu Neet' was put forward in proof of the fact that the plaintiffs who are also the plaintiffs in the present suit are members of the jenmi tarwad (Swaroopathu tarwad) and as such competent to redeem. Only as an item of corroboration Exs-P5 and P6 have been ushered-in in the present suit. The decision in this suit is made to depend on the evidence available in the suit itself and not on the evidence or reasons relied on in Exs-P5 and P6 judgments to grant decrees to the plaintiffs in those suits. The only point in dispute between the parties is the competency of the plaintiffs to redeem and in proof of that fact the Dathu Neet' is a sufficient item of evidence and we have already seen that Ex-P4 is a valid Dathu Neet' issued by the sovereign in exercise of the royal prerogative vested in him. It is important to remember that none of these points, viz., that Ex-P4 is not a certified copy, that there is no evidence to corroborate the Neet etc., was taken before the trial court. In the circumstances, we hold that the suit has rightly been decreed and there is no point in this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed; but in the circumstances without costs.