J. B. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THESE petitions are filed by the landlords against the order of the District Deputy Collector dated October 16 1964 setting aside the order of the Mamlatdar and the Agricultural Lands Tribunal dated July 4 1963 on the preliminary question whether the applications filed before the Mamlatdar were barred by limitation. The petitioners are the Ex-Inamdars of two villages in Chorasi Taluka in Surat District. By the order dated May 8 1957 of the Assistant Collector under sec. 5 (2) of the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act 1952 the petitioners were held to be occupants keeping at the same time the question open as to whether these respondents were permanent or protected tenants for which purpose they were asked to approach the competent authority under the Tenancy Act. The tenants filed an application on June 19 1962 for getting the nature of their tenancy determined on the ground that they were permanent tenants. The tenants had filed these applications stating that time was fast approaching for determining the purchase price and therefore it was necessary for them to get declarations as to their status. In those applications the petitioners applied on May 8 1963 for deciding the preliminary issue of limitation. The Mamlatdar who was the Lands Tribunal gave the parties a fortnights time to adduce necessary evidence and he determined this issue of limitation holding that these applications were time barred as they were not filed within six months from May 8 1957 when the cause of action accrued. The Deputy Collector has set aside the said orders and has remanded the matters to the Mamlatdar for deciding the original application on merits according to law. It is this order which is challenged in all these petitions. All the petitions involve common questions of law and facts and therefore they are disposed of by this common order. ( 2 ) AT the outset Mr. Vakil vehemently argued that it is well settled that the Mamlatdar has no jurisdiction to give declaration as the declaratory relief can be given only by a civil Court and therefore the applications were wholly incompetent before the Mamlatdar in these cases. Mr. Vakil in this connection relied upon my decision in Ambalal Ranchhod v. Shamjibhai X G. L. R. 197. That decision could not help Mr. Vakil. I have pointed out therein that sec. Mr. Vakil in this connection relied upon my decision in Ambalal Ranchhod v. Shamjibhai X G. L. R. 197. That decision could not help Mr. Vakil. I have pointed out therein that sec. 70 of the Tenancy Act mentions duties and functions to be performed by the Mamlatdar for the purposes of the Act In various sub-clauses of sec. 70 various questions are mentioned which are to be decided by the Mamlatdar. But no where the Legislature has used any phraseology to suggest that the Mamlatdar shall give such a declaration. Following the decision in Bai Achhuba v. Kalidas A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 651 I have held at page 205 that even though the Mamlatdar would be deciding the question whether the person is a tenant or not the decision would be a finding of the question left to the Mamlatdar by the Legislature within his exclusive jurisdiction and it would not amount to any formal declaration which only the civil Court could give. In that case also the application before the Mamlatdar was held to be competent. In the present case also even though the applicants have prayed for a declaration as to their status the application substantially is for having a decision of the Mamlatdar on the question whether the applicants were permanent tenants as alleged by them or protected tenants as contended by the petitioners landlords. This dispute is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar and had been rightly entertained under sec. 70 (b) of the Tenancy Act. Therefore the first objection raised by Mr. Vakil must fail. Even on the question of limitation I have pointed out in that decision relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Rukhamabai v. Late Laxminarayan 1960 S. C. R. 353 that there would be no compulsory cause of action for filing an application under sec. 70 (b) until there was an infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe the applicants right by the opponent against whom the application is made. Every threat by a party to such a right however ineffective or innocuous it may be could not be considered to be a clear and unequivocal threat so as to compel him to take the action. It was only the threat which effectively invaded or jeopardised the said right that gave rise to a compulsory cause of action. Every threat by a party to such a right however ineffective or innocuous it may be could not be considered to be a clear and unequivocal threat so as to compel him to take the action. It was only the threat which effectively invaded or jeopardised the said right that gave rise to a compulsory cause of action. In the present case the petitioners-landlords never threatened to invade the status of the tenants and even in the earlier order dated May 8 1957 by the Assistant Collector the question of the status of the tenants was left open. There being no effective threat which invaded or jeopardised the rights of the respondents-tenants they had no compulsory cause of action which would require them to make an application for adjudication of their status under sec. 70 (b ). In fact the tenants stated in their applications under sec. 70 (b) that as the purchase price was to be determined it was necessary for them to have the adjudication of their status. Therefore there was no bar of limitation whatsoever to such an application. The view of the Mamlatdar being patently erroneous in law in view of the settled legal position and as the Mamlatdar had refused to embark on the inquiry on merits it would amount to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction and the Deputy Collector was right in quashing the said order as without Jurisdiction. ( 3 ) MR. Vakil therefore next argued that the Deputy Collector had no jurisdiction to quash this order of the Mamlatdar. The Deputy Collector had mentioned three provisions of law for invoking his jurisdiction:- (1) sec. 23 of the Mamlatdars Courts Act (2) sec. 74 of the Tenancy Act and (3) sec. 76a of the Tenancy Act. As regards sec. 23 of the Mamlatdars Courts Act it is obvious that the Mamlatdar had no jurisdiction to determine this dispute whether the respondents were permanent tenants or protected tenants as the jurisdiction of the Mamlatdars Court was clearly excluded under sec. 85 (1) of the Tenancy Act. Merely because in a proceeding under sec. 70 (b) the procedure which the Mamlatdar has to follow is the procedure under the Mamlatdars Courts Act the order passed by the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) would not be an order which can be revised under sec. 23 of the Mamlatdars Courts Act. 85 (1) of the Tenancy Act. Merely because in a proceeding under sec. 70 (b) the procedure which the Mamlatdar has to follow is the procedure under the Mamlatdars Courts Act the order passed by the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) would not be an order which can be revised under sec. 23 of the Mamlatdars Courts Act. 4 As regards the applicability of sec. 74 it should be kept in mind that sec. 74 (1) gives appellate jurisdiction to the Collector against specified orders of the Mamlatdar and the Tribunal. One of those orders is under sec. 74 (1) (a) is an order under sec. 4. The only other provision which was relied upon in this connection was sec. 74 (1) (mb) mentioning a decision under sec. 31 or 32 for an order under sec. 32g. At the outset it should be noted that sec. 74 (1) no where specifies an order under sec. 70. Therefore the appeal would not be competent against the decision under sec. 70 (b) adjudicating the dispute whether the person is a permanent tenant or a protected tenant. It would not be appealable under sec. 74 (1) unless such an order is treated as one under sec. 4 or under sec. 32g. The Deputy Collector has held that as this adjudication had become necessary for the fixation of purchase price under sec. 32g the order could be treated as one falling under sec. 32g. It is well-settled after the decision of the Division Bench in Abdul v. State VI G. L. R. 300 chat various orders before the stage of determining the purchase price are contemplated under sec. 32g including the order determining whether a person is a tenant protected tenant or a permanent tenant. It is only the order of fixation of the final purchase price which was made appealable to the State Government under sec. 32j and these appeals can be disposed of by the Collector as a delegate of the State Government. It was only that final order determining the purchase price that becomes final under sec. 32j and was not revisable by the Revenue Tribunal; while the other orders passed before the final stage was reached determining the purchase price were all appealable to the Collector under sec. 74 (1) (mb ). In view of this decision if this order was passed during the proceedings under sec. 32j and was not revisable by the Revenue Tribunal; while the other orders passed before the final stage was reached determining the purchase price were all appealable to the Collector under sec. 74 (1) (mb ). In view of this decision if this order was passed during the proceedings under sec. 32g the appeal would clearly lie under sec. 74 (1) (mb) before the Collector. In the present case however the proceeding under sec. 32g was not started by the Lands Tribunal and therefore there was no question of any order being passed under sec. 32g in anticipation as held by the Deputy Collector. Mr. Joshi therefore vehemently argued that the order must be treated as an order under sec. 4 because unless a person was held to be first a tenant there would be no question of adjudication of his status as a permanent tenant or as a protected tenant. Under the definition of a tenant under sec. 2 (18) it means a person who holds lands on lease and includes :- (A) a person who is deemed to be a tenant under sec. 4 (b) a person who is a protected tenant and (c) a person who is a permanent tenant. Therefore the order under sec. 4 would only be in those cases where a person is deemed to be a tenant though he could not be holding contractual lease on the ground that he was lawfully cultivating land and whose case was not excluded by the other conditions mentioned in sec. 4. In the present case there was no dispute about the respondents being tenants. The dispute was as to the nature of their tenancy whether they were permanent tenants or protected tenants. The Legislature has failed to provide any appeal against such adjudication as to whether a person was a permanent tenant or a protected tenant which has been made under sec. 70 (b) by the Mamlatdar. It is of course a lacuna as the Legislature would never have failed to provide an appeal on such a substantial adjudication. Where however the Legislature keeps a lacuna it is not open to this Court to fill up the lacuna on any assumed intention of the Legislature. It should also be kept in mind that before the relevant amendment in 1955 clause (mm) in sec. 74 (1) provided an appeal against an order passed under sec. Where however the Legislature keeps a lacuna it is not open to this Court to fill up the lacuna on any assumed intention of the Legislature. It should also be kept in mind that before the relevant amendment in 1955 clause (mm) in sec. 74 (1) provided an appeal against an order passed under sec. 31 as it then existed which provided for the recognition of protected tenants if such persons were deemed to be protected tenants under secs. 3 3 and 4 of the Bombay Tenancy Act 1939 That clause was deleted when sec. 31 was replaced by sec. 4a which is exactly in the same terms by Bombay Act XIII of 1956. The order under this new sec. 4a even has not been mentioned as the order against which an appeal lies to the Collector under sec. 74 (1 ). At the time of this very amendment sec. 70 (b) was amended enabling the Mamlatdar to decide whether a person is a tenant or a protected a tenant or a permanent tenant. Those last words or a permanent tenant were added by this amendment in Bombay Act XIII of 1956. Even when this duty was added in the list of duties to be performed by the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 the Legislature failed to provide an appeal before the Collector in case of such an order passed under sec. 70 (b) deciding whether a person is a tenant or a protected tenant or a permanent tenant or not. From this it is obvious that the Legislature has provided an appeal only against the order under sec. 4 or when such a question is determined in a proceeding under sec. 32g. But it has failed to provide for an appeal against the order determining the dispute whether a person was a permanent tenant or a protected tenant. This being the sole dispute raised in the present litigation the Deputy Collector had no appellate jurisdiction under sec. 74 (1 ). ( 4 ) THE Deputy Collector was however justified in invoking his revisional jurisdiction under sec. This being the sole dispute raised in the present litigation the Deputy Collector had no appellate jurisdiction under sec. 74 (1 ). ( 4 ) THE Deputy Collector was however justified in invoking his revisional jurisdiction under sec. 76a which runs as under :- Where no appeal has been provided for it the Collector may suo motu or on a reference made in this behalf by the Divisional Officer or the State Government at any time (A) call for the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any Mamlatdar or Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal as the case may be and (b) pass such orders thereon as he deems fit:-PROVIDED that no such record shall be called for after the expiry of one year from the date of such order and no order of such. Mamlatdar or Tribunal shall be modified annulled or reversed unless opportunity has been given to the interested parties to appear and be heard. Sec. 76 thus gives a wide revisional jurisdiction to the Collector to call for the record of any inquiry or proceeding of any Mamlatdar to satisfy himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by the Mamlatdar and as to the legality of the proceedings of such Mamlatdar provided two conditions are satisfied:- (1) that the record is called for within one year from the date of such order and (2) interested parties are given opportunities to appear and be heard before such order is modified annulled or reversed. The only limitation which is provided in this wide revisional jurisdiction is in the opening words where no appeal has been filed within the period provided for. Thus jurisdiction to revise any order of the Mamlatdar under sec. 76a on fulfilment of the two conditions mentioned in the proviso comes in after a period of sixty days which is provided for appeals under sec. 79 expires from the date of the other revised. If during that period no appeal has been filed the revisional jurisdiction of the Collector can always be invoked. Mr. 76a on fulfilment of the two conditions mentioned in the proviso comes in after a period of sixty days which is provided for appeals under sec. 79 expires from the date of the other revised. If during that period no appeal has been filed the revisional jurisdiction of the Collector can always be invoked. Mr. Vakil however argued that the opening words 44 no appeal has been filed within the period provided for would mean on a plain literal construction that the revisional jurisdiction had the same field as appealable order so Such construction of the opening words would be wholly inconsistent with the wide words used by the Legislature in sec. 76a that the revisional jurisdiction can be exercised in respect of any order or inquiry or proceedings of the Mamlatdar or the Tribunal. The nature of the orders which can be revised being not limited in sec. 76a but being any order passed the revisional jurisdiction is of the widest amplitude and it could never be cut down by the opening words. The limitation contained in the opening words would be applicable whenever language of that clause would apply. By its very nature the opening words would never apply where no appeal could be filed against any particular order. It is only those orders which are appealable that the limitation contained in the opening words be applicable viz. that the revisional jurisdiction could not be invoked in such appealable orders until 60 days limitation period expires. That limitation clause is wholly inapplicable by its nature to other orders which are not appealable under sec. 74 (1) and the revisional jurisdiction would be governed only by two conditions mentioned in the proviso of course if the ground for interference or for invoking revisional jurisdiction exists. The Legislature has by the opening words intended to widen the scope of this revisional jurisdiction not only in cases where no appeal lies but also where an appeal lies but may for some reason or other is not preferred during the period of limitation. It is with this end in view that the opening words were inserted in sec. 76a and those words can never be construed to cut down the wide import of the expression any order which can be revised. Therefore there is no substance in the contention of Mr. Vakil that the Collector has no revisional jurisdiction. It is with this end in view that the opening words were inserted in sec. 76a and those words can never be construed to cut down the wide import of the expression any order which can be revised. Therefore there is no substance in the contention of Mr. Vakil that the Collector has no revisional jurisdiction. In the present case as I have already mentioned the order of the Mamlatdar was without jurisdiction he invoked bar of limitation on a patently erroneous view of law and he refused to embark upon an inquiry on the merits. Such an order which is without jurisdiction and which is so patently erroneous in law that it could always be revised by the Collector in his revisional jurisdiction. Therefore in any event the Dy. Collector was justified in revising the present order passed by the Mamlatdar holding that the application of the concerned tenants under sec. 70 (b) were barred by limitation. Therefore on that ground in any event this petition must fail. Rule therefore is discharged in each case with costs. .