JUDGMENT 1. - This is an anneal by the defendant against the appellate judgment and decree of Additional Civil Judge, Ajmer, dated August 12, 1968. 2. The dispute relates to a shop which belongs to the three plaintiffs-respondents and has been let out to the defendant. They raised the suit for eviction of the defendant on the ground that the premises were required reasonably and bona fide by plaintiff Dhansukhlal for the use and occupation of his son who is at present carrying on his business in a rented shop. Eviction was also sought on the other ground that there were defaults in the payment of rent, but it is agreed that that point has been decided in favour of the defendant and does not require reconsideration. The defendant admitted the tenancy but denied the claim for eviction. The trial court framed five issues and while it decreed the suit for arrears of rent, it dismissed it so far as the prayer for eviction of the defendant was concerned. The plaintiffs filed an appeal in the court below and as it has been allowed by the impugned Judgment and the defendant has been ordered to be evicted, he has preferred this second appeal. 3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the defendant appellant that the learned Judge of the lower appellate court failed to appreciate the fact that Rikhab Chand, son of Plaintiff Dhansukhlal, for whose use the suit shop was required to be vacated by the defendant, was a separated son and that he was not therefore a member of the plaintiff Dhansukhlal's family within the meaning of section 13 (1) (h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. 4. A perusal of the record shows however that while in paragraph 3 (a) of the plaint it was specifically pleaded that the premises were reasonably and bona fide required for the personal use and occupation of Rikhabchand son of plaintiff Dhansukhlal who was doing business in rented premises, it was not pleaded in the written statement that Rikhabchand was not a member of Dhansukhlal's family, or that he was a separated son. This is why no issue was framed on the question whether Rikhabchand was a member of the family of his father plaintiff Dhansukhlal, and no such argument can be allowed to be raised now because there was no occasion for the parties to lead their evidence on the point. The argument which has now been raised by Mr. Bhargava is clearly an after-thought and, as it relates to a question of fact, it cannot be allowed to be made for the first time in second appeal. 5. It has next been argued that as there were three owners of the suit premises, Dhansukhlal could not alone be said to be the landlord within the meaning of section 13 (1) (h) read with section 3 (iii) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. But, here again, no such plea was taken in the written statement, there were no issue with regard to it and the point was not raised for consideration of any of the courts below. The said section 3 (iii) defines the term "landlord", and as the plaintiff had no opportunity of proving that Dhansukhlal was a landlord within the meaning of that definition, it is not possible to allow the argument that he is not entitled to evict the defendant under section 13 (1) (h). 6. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on Saifuddin Hussainibhoy Saiamwala and others v. The Burma Cycle Trading Co, A.I.R. 1968 Madras 154 , for the argument that the requirement of one of the three joint owners of the property cannot be said to fall within the purview of section 13 (1) (h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. But no such plea was taken in the trial court, there was no issue in regard to it and it was not raised in any o the courts below. It is not a pure question of law and it cannot therefore be allowed to be raised in this Court. Moreover, Saifuddin Hussaint Bhoy Saimwala's case does not take notice of another judgment of the same High Court in Messrs. T. N K. Govindaraju Chetty v. P. Urajlal Gulabdass & Co. and another, (1967) II M.L.J. 465 , even though it was decided earlier in point of time. Moreover, Saifuddin Hussaint Bhoy Saimwala's case does not take notice of another judgment of the same High Court in Messrs. T. N K. Govindaraju Chetty v. P. Urajlal Gulabdass & Co. and another, (1967) II M.L.J. 465 , even though it was decided earlier in point of time. In that judgment, K. Veeraswamt J., took the view teat the requirement of one of the owners would "squarely fall" within the scope of section 10 (3) (a) (1) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. It may also be mentioned that it has been held in Kanika Devi and others v. Amarendra Nath Roy Choudhuri and others, LXV Calcutta Weekly Notes, 1078 , as follows : ''It is true that where there are more than one landlord, the word 'landlord' in clause (h) of the Proviso to section 12 (1) (must be read as 'landlords' and the expression 'for his own occupation' therein must be read as 'for their own occupation'; nevertheless in the light of the decisions of this Court the word 'their' in the last expression must be read as meaning 'of them or any one or more of them' so that the requirement of the premises by the landlords for the occupation of one or more of them is sufficient to bring the case within the clause". This view has been followed in Vir Bhan v. Avtar Krishan, LXIV (1962) Punjab Law Reports 1185 and Taherbhai Hebtullabhai and other v. Ambalal Harital Saha and others, I.L.R. (1966) Gujrat, 693 , I am in respectful agreement with this view. 7. No other point has been argued and the (appeal is dismissed with costs.) Leave to appeal is prayed for, but, is refused.Appeal dismissed. *******