ORDER M.H. Beg, J. - The petitioner, a company supplying electricity, was a party to the reference No. 17 of 1952 under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. In the award given as a result of the reference the scales of pay of employees of the company were fixed. Steno-typists were to get the scale of Rs. 120-7V2-180-12-300. The scale of pay of clerks and typists was fixed at Rs. 85--5-125-10-245. The scale of the cashier and accountant Was fixed at Rupees 150-10-200 -15-350 -20-450. The grade of steno-typists was higher than that of clerks and typists, but lower than that of the cashier and accountant, the highest grade fixed by the award dated 10th July, 1952. Evidently, arrears of pay could be demanded by employees of different grades at these rates. 2. The contesting opposite party No. 1, Ata Rasul, alleged that he was appointed in 1937 and was entitled to the scale of the steno-typists until he was appointed a cashier in 1940. The employer did not concede this claim. It appears that attempts were made by the employee to get the matter referred, in 1957 and again in 1960, as an industrial dispute, but he was unsuccessful. On 30th November, 1963, the contesting opposite party moved an application under Section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Court, Lucknow, opposite party No. 2, in which he claimed that his case was governed by the terms of the award made on 10th of July, 1952, and that he was entitled to the grade and salary of a steno-typist from the period 1937 to 1940 as he was appointed as steno-typist in 1937 before he was made a cashier. He prayed for the computation of the benefit of the award to him in terms of money and for suitable orders for recovering the same. The petitioner replied that at the time of the implementation of the award the contesting opposite party was a cashier and that He had not made any grievance at that time that his wages had been incorrectly fixed or that arrears of Rs. 564 claimed by him were liable to be paid to him. 3. The petitioner replied that at the time of the implementation of the award the contesting opposite party was a cashier and that He had not made any grievance at that time that his wages had been incorrectly fixed or that arrears of Rs. 564 claimed by him were liable to be paid to him. 3. The above mentioned dispute was decided by the Labour Court, opposite party No. 2, under Section 6-H (2) after making the following observation : "Both parties agreed before me that in case it is found that Sri Ata Rasul was, in fact, originally appointed as a steno-typist, he would be entitled to Rs. 564 as per statement claimed and annexed with the application, and that if it is found that he was a clerk and not a steno-typist before changing over as cashier, he would not be entitled to any amount on computation in accordance with the formula prescribed by the Award of the State Industrial Tribunal. The only question, therefore is what was the original assignment of Sri Ata Rasul from 4-3-37 till 1940 when he was appointed as cashier." 4. The Labour Court decided what it thus indicated as the only question in dispute upon the evidence before it. It held that the contesting opposite party had been appointed as a steno-typist in 1937 and was not a mere clerk. Among the reasons given for the decision was that a concern like the petitioner's must have had one steno-typist at least. No other person was shown as steno-typist working in the concern. The Labour Court gave considerable weight to an admission made on behalf of the petitioner in the course of the proceedings resulting in the award of 10th July, 1952, where the contesting opposite party had been shown as a steno-typist promoted to the post of a cashier. It referred to the oral evidence of Sri Maharaj Krishna, the Engineer-in-Charge of the electricity undertaking, and held that this witness, the only one produced on behalf of the employer, had failed to explain the admission made by the company about the capacity in which the contesting opposite party was initially appointed. The Labour Court also observed that there was no letter of appointment. The Labour Court also observed that there was no letter of appointment. The Labour Court came to the conclusion that the contesting opposite party was entitled to the amount claimed in accordance with the terms of the award dated 10th of July, 1952. This decision of the Labour Court is assailed by the petitioner who prays for a writ of certiorari to quash the award. 5. Mr. T.N. Sapru with his usual thoroughness, took me through the whole evidence and the relevant case law on the question raised by him. The first set of questions raised by Mr. Sapru relates to appraisal of evidence on the question of fact decided by the Labour Court. He has contended that the Labour Court had not given any importance to the admissions made by the contesting opposite party in the pay sheets signed by the contesting opposite party himself as a "clerk". The Labour Court had considered this question and was functioning within the scope of its authority in assigning such weight to it as seemed fit and proper to it. It held that the description "clerk" could and did cover a steno-typist and that, in any case, an erroneous description, even if signed by the contesting opposite party on pay sheets prepared by himself, could not conclude matters in the face of other evidence. 6. It was then urged that oral evidence had been overlooked by the Labour Court. I find that the Labour Court rightly observed that Sri Maharaj Krishna, the Engineer-in-Charge, had not explained the admission made on behalf of the company in the course of the proceedings which ended in the award. From the copies of the statements of the claimant and Sri Maharaj Krishna, attached to the petition, I find that the claimant had asserted that he was not only appointed but had worked as steno-typist, but no evidence whatsoever was given to controvert this. Sri Maharaj Krishna was not even Engineer-in-Charge when the claimant was appointed and frankly admitted that he could not explain the admission made on behalf of the company in the course of the adjudication which resulted in the award. The claimant was not even cross-examined to show that he had not worked as a steno-typist. Sri Maharaj Krishna was not even Engineer-in-Charge when the claimant was appointed and frankly admitted that he could not explain the admission made on behalf of the company in the course of the adjudication which resulted in the award. The claimant was not even cross-examined to show that he had not worked as a steno-typist. I find that every piece of evidence, including the alleged failure of the claimant to put forward a claim when a notice was put up by the company on 28-4-1953, asking its employees to get corrections made in their claims for wages after the award, had been considered by the Labour Court. Findings of fact could not, therefore, be reopened in proceedings under Article 226 of the (Constitution of India even if it could be urged that there was an erroneous finding. 7. The petitioner's objections to the validity of the proceedings under Section 6-H (2) on the ground that these proceedings do not lie where an antecedent claim is not established deserve more serious consideration. Section 6-H (2) leads as follows : "Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be determined by such Labour Court as may he- specified in this behalf by the State Government and the amount so determined may he recovered as provided for in sub-sec. (1)." 8. Section 6-H (1) enables a workman to make an application to the State Government for the recovery of any money due to him under the provisions of Sections 6-J to 6-R or under a settlement or award without prejudice to any other mode of recovery which may be open to the applicant. The State Government is bound, on having satisfied itself that the money is due, to issue a certificate to the Collector directing the recovery of money as if it were arrears of land revenue. Proceedings under Section 6-H (1) are, therefore, mere recovery proceedings after certification. 9. On the other hand. Section 6-H (2) makes it clear that it involves a determination of the amount due by the Labour Court, and, therefore, the amount so determined may be realised in the manner provided by Section 6-H(l). Proceedings under Section 6-H (1) are, therefore, mere recovery proceedings after certification. 9. On the other hand. Section 6-H (2) makes it clear that it involves a determination of the amount due by the Labour Court, and, therefore, the amount so determined may be realised in the manner provided by Section 6-H(l). In other words, the enquiry or adjudication contemplated by Section 6-H (2) is wider in scope and ambit than the certification proceedings under Section 6-PI (1). Even if proceedings under Section 6-H (2) are capable of being compared to or described as execution proceedings, they cannot be held to preclude adjudications of disputed questions of fact in order to determine whether the case of a particular employee is or is not covered by a particular provision of the award or whether it falls under one provision or another in the award. The ambit of "execution proceedings" covers adjudication of fairly complicated questions of fact and law even under Section 47, Civil P. C. The general principle which limits the powers of an execution Court is that it cannot go behind the decree which is being executed. Similarly, the Labour Court cannot, in proceedings under Section 6-H (2) of the Act, go behind or outside or contrary to the award. This, however, does not mean that the Labour Court has no power to determine disputed questions of fact so as to decide how a particular employee's case is related to the terms of the award or what benefit the employee can get from the award. Indeed, such adjudication is the very object of Section 6-H (2) of the Act. 10. Mr. T.N. Sapru contended that the claim made by the contesting opposite party could either fall within Section 6-H (1) if the amount was calculated and determined, as it was according to the claimant or, in the alternative, if the basis of the claim was disputed, as it was by the employer, the proper course was an adjudication through a reference of an industrial dispute. Mr. Sapru conceded that, after a decision of this Court in British India Corporation Ltd., Kanpur v. State of U. P., 196J-14 FLR 380 (All). the contention that the dispute raised by the employer would fall outside the scope of Section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act would not be open to him. Mr. Sapru conceded that, after a decision of this Court in British India Corporation Ltd., Kanpur v. State of U. P., 196J-14 FLR 380 (All). the contention that the dispute raised by the employer would fall outside the scope of Section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act would not be open to him. The view taken there was repeated in U. P. Electric Supply Co., Ltd. v. H. V. Bowen, AIR 1968 Allahabad 95. by Satish Chandra, J. Learned Counsel, however, tried to pursuade me to adopt the view that the question deserves reference to a larger bench. He relied upon the U. P. Electric Supply Co., Ltd. v. Mohd. Gause, Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 3059 of 1964, D/d. 14.9.1967 (All) where my learned brother S. D. Khare, J., held that the determination of a pre-existing right was an essential condition precedent to a claim under Section 33-C (2) of the Central Industrial Disputes Act which corresponds to Section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. It was also observed there that the proceedings under Section 6-H (2) are in the nature of execution proceedings. It was, however, pointed out there that disputed questions of fact, such as the question whether the claimant was a workman or not and whether the claimant had qualified himself for the particular claim he put forward under the terms of the award or settlement, could be decided by the Labour Court in proceedings under Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act corresponding to Section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Act. It was held there, in line with the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan, A.I.R. 1964 SC 743 that cases falling within the scope of Section 10 (1) of the Central Act could not be brought within the scope of Section 33-C. In other words, cases where the basis of the liability sought to be fastened was itself undetermined could not fall under Section 33-C of the Central Act or Section 6-H (2) of the U. P. Act. This was the main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. In Mohd. Gause's case, Civil Misc. Writ Petn. This was the main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. In Mohd. Gause's case, Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 3059 of 1964, D/-14-9-1967 (All) (Supra) my learned brother S. D. Khare indicated the kind of disputes which had been decided under Section 33-C (2) of the U. P. Act. Reference to East India Coal Co., Ltd. v. Rameshwar, (1968) 1 Lab LJ 6 (A.I.R. 1968 SC 218) also shows that the scope of an enquiry under Section 33-C (2) includes computation, in terms of money, of benefits accruing from an award to a particular workman. In this case, the question whether the claimant was disentitled to bonus on the ground that he had worked only as a domestic and personal servant at the residences of the officers of the company was gone into and decided. In Bombay Gas Co., Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva, A.I.R. 1964 SC 752 the claim decided under Section 33-C (2) of the Central Act involved adjudication of disputed questions of fact arising out of the terms of the award. In A.I.R. 1964 SC 743 (Supra), the question whether the claimants were entitled to a special allowance on the ground that they were operating certain adding machines was gone into and decided. 12. After having examined the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner and having considered the place of Section 6-H(2) in the scheme of adjudication of industrial disputes and implementation of awards, I have no doubt in my mind that the scope of enquiry under Section 6 -11(2) of the U. P. Act cannot be so restricted as to exclude questions of the nature decided by the Labour Court in the instant case. It may also be mentioned that it was held in Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. K. L. Kharbanda, A.I.R. 1963 SC 487 that a dispute under Section 6-H(2) is not confined to benefits other than those claimed in terms of money. In fact, in the instant case also, a benefit was really claimed under the terms of an award, but it was converted into and stated also in terms of money so that the claim appeared to be a claim for money. Even if Section 6-H(2) were literally construed, such a claim for benefit under an award, computed in terms of money, could not, in my opinion, fall outside of it. 13. Even if Section 6-H(2) were literally construed, such a claim for benefit under an award, computed in terms of money, could not, in my opinion, fall outside of it. 13. Another objection put forward by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the labour Court had given effect to a very belated claim which should have been thrown out on the grounds of laches and estoppel. The objection on grounds of delay or laches lacks substance after the view expressed by the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1964 SC 752 (supra) about claims preferred under the analogous provisions of Section 33-C of the Central Act. It held that a period of limitation could not be indirectly introduced on grounds of fairness or justice when the legislature had not thought fit to prescribe it. No such conduct on the part of the contesting opposite party has been proved as could be said to have misled the petitioner so as to induce it to alter its position to its disadvantage and thus to raise any estoppel against the contesting opposite party. 14. I may also mention that no objection relating to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, either on the ground that the claim made by the contesting opposite party No. 1 fell under Section 6-H (1) of the U. P. Act or on the ground that it could only properly form the subject matter of reference of an industrial dispute, appears to have been advanced before the Labour Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed some reliance on the reply filed on behalf of the company before the Labour Court from which some kind of objection as to whether the claim fell within the ambit of Section 6-11(2) could perhaps be spelt out. Even if this could be done, the question never seems to have been argued before the Labour Court. For this additional reason, I think the petitioner is not entitled to raise questions relating to jurisdiction of the Labour Court in this case by means of this petition. This could not be a case of patent lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the failure to take an objection to jurisdiction before the Labour Court itself could not be overlooked. 15. For the reasons give above, I dismiss this writ petition with costs.