JUDGMENT T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, J. This appeal filed by defendant 127 to 135, 139 to 141, 145 and the legal representatives defendant arises out of suit for partition and it is confined to plaint B schedule items 1 to 16 and 39. The properties sought to be partitioned in the suit are those attached to the first stanom of the Kuthiravattath Swaroopam of which the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 107 are members. The first stani was known as the Kuthiravattath Nair. Damodaran alias Kunhunni Thampan who was the first stani of the Kuthiravattah Swaroopam died on 23rd May 1957. During his life time the Court of Wards assumed superintendence of the stanom properties and also the personal properties of Damodaran alias Kunhunni Thampan under section 9(d) of the Madras Court of Wards Act, 1902 on the ground of mental defect rendering him unfit to manage them. The Court of Wards had invested, the income of the stanom properties collected during the life time of Damodaran alias Kunhunni Thampan in Government bonds and in Bank deposits. Plaint- B schedule items 1 to 16 are the Government bonds and plaint B schedule item 39 represents the Bank deposits. Section 7 (3) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 states that when a stanomdar dies after the commencement of the Act, the stanom property held by him shall devolve upon the members of the family to which the stanomdar belonged and the heirs of the stanomdar as if the stanom property had been divided per capita immediately before the death of the stanomdar among himself and of the members of his family then living and the shares falling to the members of his family and the heirs of the stanomdar shall be held by them as their separate property. The explanation to the sub-section is not relevant for the purpose before us. It is admitted that the heirs of Damodaran alias Kunhunni Thampan are defendants 1 to 16, and 127 to 146 who are also children of his brothers and sisters and they are together heirs to the share of the deceased Kunhunni Thampan and the stanom properties. On the date of his death there were 112 members in the Swaroopam and the stanom properties were divided into 112 shares. On the date of his death there were 112 members in the Swaroopam and the stanom properties were divided into 112 shares. The plea of the appellants is that the income of the stanom properties received by Damodaran alias Kunhunni Thampan either directly or through the Court of Wards formed his separate properties which on his death would devolve on his personal heirs and the members of the Swaroopam, cannot claim any share therein. The trial court took the view that the items in dispute in the appeal are also liable to be partitioned as part of the stanom properties because the investment was made by the Court of Wards and cannot therefore be considered to have been appropriated by the stani. Before proceeding further we shall extract the reasoning of the learned Judge for his conclusions : " The question is whether such income belongs to the personal estate of the stani or continue to form part of the stanom estate. It is one thing to say that the stani has absolute power of disposal over the income and it is a different thing to say that the income is the absolute property of the stani. If the income is separate from the stanom properties and is the absolute property of the stani, I do not see how a distinction could be made between uncollected and unappropriated income and collected and appropriated income. " The learned Judge relied on Ext. B-56 judgment of the Madras High Court for his finding. The Court of Wards assumed management of the estate of Damodaran alias Kunhunni Thampan on 2nd April 1950. It is admitted that the management was assumed for the reason mentioned in section 9 (d) of the Madras Court of Wards Act. Section 33 of the said Act prescribes the method of investing the surplus income of the estate of the ward and section 33 (a) provides for investments on the security of promissory notes, debentures, stock and other securities of the Central Government. It is admitted that B schedule items 1 to 16 were investments by the Court of Wards under section 33 of the Madras Court of Wards Act. In order to decide the question of partibility of B schedule items 1 to 16 and 39 among the members of the Swaroopam it is necessary to examine the rights of a stani over the income of stanom properties. In order to decide the question of partibility of B schedule items 1 to 16 and 39 among the members of the Swaroopam it is necessary to examine the rights of a stani over the income of stanom properties. The history and legal incidents of stanom have been summarised by Their Lordships, of the Supreme Court in Kochunni v. States of Madras and Kerala (A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1080), thus: "The origin of the sthanam is lost in antiquity. It primarily means a dignity and denotes the status of the senior Raja in a Malabar Kovilagom or palace. It is surmised that sthahams were also created by the Rajas by giving certain properties to military chieftains and public officers and also by tarwads creating them and allocating certain properties for their maintenance. Most of the incidents of a sthanam are well settled. Usually the seniormost male member of the family and occasionally a female member attains a sthanam. Properties are attached to the sthanam for the maintenance of its dignity. The legal position of a sthanee is equated to that of a Hindu widow in that he represents the estate for the time being and he can alienate the properties for necessity or for the benefit of the estate. Unlike a Hindu widow, the successor to a sthanee is always a life-estate-holder. In that respect his position is more analogous to an impartible estate-holder. He ceases to have any present interest in the tarwad properties. Like a Hindu widow or an impartible estate-holder, he has an absolute interest in the income of the sthanam properties or acquisitions therefrom. His position is approximated to a member separated from the family and that the members of the tarwad succeed to his acquisitions unless accreted to the estate and he succeeds to the tarwad properties, if the tarwad becomes extinct." Their Lordships therefore took the view that a stani has absolute rights in the income of the stanom properties or in the properties acquired with the income of the stanom properties as is the position in the case of a Hindu widow or an impartible estate-holder. In Vira Rayen v. The Valiya Rani (I.L.R. 3 Madras 141) the Madras High Court, observed : " "All property acquired by the holder of a stanom, which he has not disposed of in his lifetime, or shown an intention to merge in the property attached to the stanom, becomes, on his death, the property of the kovilagom in which he was born." Sundara Ayyer in his treatise on Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law has dealt with the rights of a stani over stanom properties thus: "The estate taken by a stani in the stanom property is a limited one. It is not a mere life estate, for the stani is not only entitled absolutely to the income accruing during his life but he has also the power of creating a charge upon the estate or of alienating it where such charge or alienation is necessary or beneficial to the estate. His position may be best likened to that of a Hindu widow with respect to the property inherited by her from her husband.t The above statement of law is in accord with the decision of the Judicial Committee in Venkateswara lyan v. Shekhari Varma(I.L.R. 3 Madras 384 at 386). Sir Arthur Hobhouse said : " The Sthanamdar represents the corpus of his sthanam much in the same way as a Hindu widow represents the estates which have devolved upon her, and he may alienate the property for the benefit or proper expenses of the sthanam." In Ittirarichan Unni v. Kunjunni (I.L.R. 21 Madras 144), Their Lordships of the Madras High Court, observed thus: " The position and powers of a stani have been often discussed. He is not a mere tenant for life, and he is certainly not impeachable for waste in the sense in which that expression is used in the English books." If the position of a stani is comparable to that of a Hindu widow in regard to her husband's estate how does the matter stand? A widow is not a tenant-for-life, but is the owner of the property, inherited by her from her husband subject to certain restrictions of alienation, and subject to its devolving upon the next heir of the last full owner upon her death. The whole estate is for the time vested in her and she represents it completely. A widow is not a tenant-for-life, but is the owner of the property, inherited by her from her husband subject to certain restrictions of alienation, and subject to its devolving upon the next heir of the last full owner upon her death. The whole estate is for the time vested in her and she represents it completely. As stated by the Privy Council in Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasami Aiyer( I.L.R. 39 Madras 634 at 637) : " Her right is of the nature of a right of property; her position is that of owner; her powers in that character are, however, limited; but, to use the familiar language of Mayne's " Hindu Law ", paragraph 625 page 870, 'so long as she is alive no one has any vested interest in the succession' " The above principle is restated by Mukerjea, J. in Kalishanker Das v. Dhirendra Nath Palra (1955) 1 S.C.R. 467 by observing that it is settled doctrine of Hindu Law that nobody has a vested right so long as a widow is alive and the eventual reversioner does not claim through any one who went before him. In Jaisri v. Rajdevan (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 83), Their Lordships of the Supreme Court pointed out: " When a widow succeeds as heir to her husband, the ownership in the properties, both legal and beneficial, vests in her. She fully represents the estate, the interest of the reversioners therein being only spes successionis. The widow is entitled to the full beneficial enjoyment of the estate and is not accountable to any one. It is true that she cannot alienate the properties unless it be for necessity or for benefit to the estate, but this restriction on her powers is not one imposed for the benefit of reversioners but is an incident of the estate as known to Hindu law. " The position in respect of accumulations of the income invested by her and also which remain uninvested in her hands is discussed by Mulla in his work on Hindu Law, 13th edition, at page 197 thus: "The third case is where the accumulations are made by the widow herself personally, and either are invested by her or remain uninvited in her hands. A widow, as stated above, may spend her whole income either upon herself, or by giving it away as she likes during her life. A widow, as stated above, may spend her whole income either upon herself, or by giving it away as she likes during her life. She is not bound to make any savings. But if she does make savings, the question arises whether she has the fame power of disposal of the savings as she has of the income, or whether the savings are to be treated as accretions to the estate, that is, as part of the corpus of the estate, so as to be subject to the same restraint on alienation as the corpus itself. The trend of decisions is that the case should be determined by the intention of the widow. If she does nothing to indicate an intention to make the savings part of her husband's estate, or to justify the inference that she wished them to revert to her husband's heirs, the savings are her stridhana which she may dispose of by deed or will. But if she indicates any such intention or does anything to justify any such inference, she takes only a widow's estate in them, and she cannot dispose of them except for legal necessity, and on her death they will pass to her husband's heirs?" The learned counsel for the members of the Swaroopam relied on the decision in Sheolochun Singh v. Saheb Singh (1887)m 14 Calcutta 387 and 393 to show that the presumption is that the widow intended to keep the income whether invested or not as an accretion to the estate. In the said decision Their Lordships of the Privy Council said: "Where a widow comes into possession of the property of the husband, and receives the income, and does not spend it, but invests it in the purchase of other property, Their Lordships think that, prima facie it is the intention of the widow to keep the estate of the husband as an entire estate, and that the property purchased would prima facie, be intended to be accretions to that estate. There may be, no doubt, circumstances which would show that the widow had no such intention, that she intended to appropriate the savings in another way." The Madras High Court after pointing out in Akkanna v. Venkayy (1902) 25 Madras 351 that the above dictum of the Judicial Committee must be understood in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case, which, indicated that it was the intention of the widows to keep the estate entire, and that the same should descend in one line of succession proceeded to observe thus: "The acquirer of property presumably intends to retain dominion over it, and in the case of a Hindu widow the presumption is none the less so when the fund with which the property is acquired is one which though derived from her husband's property, was at her absolute disposal. In the case of property inherited from the husband, it is not by reason of her intention but by reason of the limited nature of a widow's estate under the Hindu Law, that, she has only a limited power of disposition. But her absolute power of disposition over the income derived from such limited estate being now fully recognised, it is only reasonable that, in the absence of an indication of her intention to the contrary, she must be presumed to retain the same control over the investment of such income. The mere fact that properties thus acquired by her are managed and enjoyed by her without any distinction, along with properties inherited from her husband, can in no way affect this presumption." In Saodamini Dasi v. The Administrator General of Bengal (I.L.R. 20 Calcutta 433) the Privy Council was not prepared to rule that in respect of the income received by a Hindu widow from her husband's estate there is a presumption that it is an accretion to the estate. The right of a widow to create a trust in respect of the accumulated income was recognised in that case, on the ground that it is her absolute property. In Gurusami Pandiyan v. Pandia Chinna Thambiar (I.L.R. 44 Madras 1), the right of the mother of the Zamindar of Sivagiri to succeed to the impartible estate of Sivagiri as his heir was contested by the plaintiff who filed a suit for recovery of possession of the property from the mother. In Gurusami Pandiyan v. Pandia Chinna Thambiar (I.L.R. 44 Madras 1), the right of the mother of the Zamindar of Sivagiri to succeed to the impartible estate of Sivagiri as his heir was contested by the plaintiff who filed a suit for recovery of possession of the property from the mother. It was held that that the Zamindari was the separate property of the late Zamindar and since there were no nearer heirs the mother would take the estate first. During the pendency of the suit the mother died and the plaintiff was declared to be the next heir entitled to the estate. But a dispute arose about the income of the estate accrued due from the death of the late Zamindar until the death of his mother collected by the receiver appointed in the suit. It was held that the income accumulated in the hands of the receiver was the absolute property of the mother. In Venkatadri Appa Rao (v. Parthasarathi (A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 105 (48 Mad. 312) Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee found that a limited owner under Hindu Law can dispose of the income received from the estate during her life by will or otherwise as it belongs to her absolutely. It will be advantageous to refer to the decision in Kailasanath v. Parasakti (A.I.R, 1935 Madras 740, where Varadachariar, J. after discussing the entire case law on the subject said: "If as is now established by the decision in Saodamini Dasi v. The Administrator General of Bengal (20 Cal. 433), the income is her 'absolute property', and as shown by the decision in Venkatadri Appa Rao v. Parthasarathi Appa Rao (48 Mad. 312) she does not lose her power of control even at her death but can deal with the accumulated income by her will, there is no reason for drawing the line at testamentary disposition and refusing to reach the logical conclusion that even if she happens to die intestate, the surplus amount should be treated as 'her absolute property' for purposes of devolution as well." The position is therefore well established that a widow under Hindu Law is absolutely entitled to the income from her husband's properties. It is not necessary that she should have actually realised and appropriated the income. It is not necessary that she should have actually realised and appropriated the income. Her right to the income arises as soon as it accrues and in the absence of any indication to the contrary it continues to be her absolute property which she can dispose of by will or which is descendible to her heirs if she dies intestate. The position of a holder of an ancestral impartible estate under the Madras Impartible Estates Act is the same. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has abolished impartible estates save those which are expressly saved by section 5 (ii) of the same. In respect of the income from Impartible Estates Multa in his book on Hindu Law at page 568 says thus : "The income of an ancestral impartible joint estate is not so affected by its origin that it, should be assumed to accrete to the estate. The income when received is the absolute property of the holder of the estate. It differs in no way from property which he might have gained by his own effort, or acquired in circumstances entirely disassociated from the ownership of the estate. Therefore the principle applicable to ordinary joint family estate that self-acquired moneys are to be regarded as joint property if mixed with the money of the joint family, does not necessarily apply to property acquired by the holder of an impartible estate out of the income." In Rani Jagadamba v. Wazir Narain (A.I.R. 1923 P.C. 59), the Judicial Committee pointed out: "The income when received is the absolute property of the owner of the impartible estate. It differs in no way from property that he might have gained by his effort, or that had come to him in circumstances entirely disassociated from the ownership of the Raj." If a stani is analogous to the holder of an impartible estate or to a Hindu widow in regard to her husband's properties he is the owner of the income as and when it accrues. In the absent of clear intention to incorporate, the same with the stanom property it continues to be his separate property descendible to his heirs under the Hindu Succession Act. The learned counsel appearing for the members of the Swaroopam attempted to differentiate the case before us on the ground that the investment was made by the Court of Wards. We are unable to appreciate the said contention. The learned counsel appearing for the members of the Swaroopam attempted to differentiate the case before us on the ground that the investment was made by the Court of Wards. We are unable to appreciate the said contention. The Court of Wards was only managing the estate on behalf of Damodaran alias Kunhunni Thampan. Any collection of the income from the stanom properties by the Court of Wards or any investment made out of the said income as provided in the statute was done only on behalf of Damodaran alias Kunhunni Thampan. It was not contended before us that the estate taken by a stani in the stanom property is a mere life estate. If that is so, a stani is entitled to the income accruing from the stanom properties during his tenure. There will be a vesting of that income in him as and when it accrues. If the theory of accretion to the corpus as suggested by the learned counsel for the members of the Swaroopam can be accepted, an expression of intention on the part of Damodaran alias Kunhunni Thampan is necessary. It was rendered impossible because the hand that was actually collecting the income was different. Thus there was no intention to incorporate the income with the stanom properties. There are at least four decided cases where the income collected and accumulated by the Court Receiver or the Court of Wards from the estate of the husband inherited by a Hindu widow or an impartible estate was considered to be the separate property of the widow or the holder of the impartible estate. They are Gurusami Pandiyan v. Pandia Chinna Thambiar, (I.L.R. 44 Madras 1) Rani Jagadamba v. Wazir Narain, (A.I.R. 1923 P.C. 59) Venkatadri Appa Rao v. Parthasarathi (A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 105) and Balasubrahmanya v. Subbayya (A.I.R. 1938 P.C. 34). in Gurusami Pandiyan v. Pandia Chinna Thambiar the income for the period when the widow was entitled to the estate was collected by the Receiver. Krishnan, J. sasd: " The Rani, therefore, succeeded to the zamindari in preference to him and the income during her life was thus her property and plaintiff can claim only a one-sixth share in it as one of her heirs. It was faintly suggested that as she had not drawn it and spent it, it must be taken to have been incorporated by her with the zamindari. It was faintly suggested that as she had not drawn it and spent it, it must be taken to have been incorporated by her with the zamindari. Her inability to deal with it was due to the action of the Court in appointing a Receiver and not to any act of volition on her part; and so no inference of any intention of hers to leave it unspent for the benefit of the estate can be drawn. The Receiver of Court holds property for the person rightfully entitled to it and the money collected by him must therefore be treated as the Rani absolute property."t In Rani Jagadamba v. Wazir Narain, A.I.R. 1923 P.C. 59 since the holder of the impartible estate was a minor, the estate was placed in the custody of the Court of Wards. Though he got back the estate after attaining majority towards the end of his life he became insane and the estate was once more placed in the hands of the Court of Wards until his death. The question arose regarding the nature of the acquisition made with the income of the estate by the Court of Wards. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed: "Their Lordships think that this conclusion is wrong, and that its error is due to the idea that the produce of the impartible estate naturally belongs to and forms an accretion to the original property. In fact, when the true position is considered there is no accretion at all. The income when received is the absolute property of the owner of the impartible estate. It differs in no way from property that he might have gained by his own effort, or that had come to him in circumstances entirely disassociated from the ownership of the Raj. Nor could the monies have been used by him for the purpose of acquiring or endowing an impartible estate. It is, therefore a strong assumption to make that the income of the property of this nature is so affected by the source from which it came that it still retains its original character. It is possible that this confusion is due to the consideration of the position with regard to an ordinary joint family estate. It is, therefore a strong assumption to make that the income of the property of this nature is so affected by the source from which it came that it still retains its original character. It is possible that this confusion is due to the consideration of the position with regard to an ordinary joint family estate. In such a case the income, equally with the corpus, forms part of the family property, and if the owner of the estate mixes his own monies with the monies of the family as for example, by putting the whole, into one account at the bank, or by treating them in his accounts as indistinguishable his own earnings share, with the property with which they are mingled, the character of joint family property; but no such considerations necessarily apply to the income from impartible property.t In Venkatadri Appa Rao v. Parthasarathi (A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 105) the Rani of Medur who became entitled to the estate on the death of her son and its income till his death filed a suit to recover the same. Pending disposal of the suit the estate was in the hands of the receiver appointed by court. Before the disposal of the suit the Rani died leaving a Will bequeathing the estate. The Judicial Committee observed: "On the death her son Narayya Appa Rao on 4th August, 1895, she became entitled to the Medur estate and its income to hold for her own life, and that income included the interest on investments of all monies received in respect of the Medur estate collected before the death of her son on the 4th August, 1895. To that income she remained entitled until her death on the 9th March, 1899. That income or any part of it she could, while she remained entitled to it, have added as an accretion to the Medur estate if she had wished to do so. There is no evidence to suggest that she had ever added any part of that income as an accretion to the Medur estate. She was consequently entitled to dispose of it by will or otherwise." In Balasubrahmanya v. Subbayya (A.I.R. 1938 P.C. 34) after the death of the last male owner of the Uttumalai Estate his adoptive mother Minakshi succeeded for a Hindu widow's estate. She was consequently entitled to dispose of it by will or otherwise." In Balasubrahmanya v. Subbayya (A.I.R. 1938 P.C. 34) after the death of the last male owner of the Uttumalai Estate his adoptive mother Minakshi succeeded for a Hindu widow's estate. Thereafter the management of the Uttumalai Estate was handed over to the Court of Wards who remained in possession until her death in 1921. She had made certain testamentary dispositions bequeathing the accumulations made by the Court of Wards. In dealing with the nature of the accumulations Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed:" " There remains to be considered the testamentary dispositions made by the Rani in favour of her adopted son. By her will dated 9th May, 1921, the due execution of which is not now disputed, she bequeathed to him the accumulations of the income of the estate amounting to Rs. 89,000 and her jewels, vessels, etc. The District Judge held that the savings were not her property but went with the estate, and that it was not established that the jewels, etc., in her possession at the time of her death were her personal property. He therefore rejected the claim of the adopted son. The High Court on appeal came to a different conclusion. They held that the savings which were found to be a sum of Rs. 89,000 in the hands of the Court of Wards and Rs.9,244 in the lady's own possession, were the personal property of the Rani and would pass under her will. With regard to the jewels, etc., they came to the same conclusion. Subbayya has appealed against this decision, but the correctness of the High Court's finding has not been seriously contested before the Board in either case, and Their Lordships see no reason to differ from the High Court's findings." The learned counsel for the personal heirs of the stani submitted relying on the decisions in Pushpavathi Vijayaram v. P. Visweswar (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 118) and Shiba Prasad v. Prayag Kumari (A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 216 ) that since it is not possible to incorporate movable properties with an impartible estate or limited estate the income accrued and invested in movable properties will always remain the personal property of the person deriving the income. It was also argued in view of the decision in Shiba Prasad v. Prayag Kumari (A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 216 ) that to allow the operation of the doctrine of incorporation would be giving the holder of the estate the right to prescribe a rule of succession different from that of the ordinary law in respect of his separate property. In the view that we are taking it is unnecessary to give an answer to this problem though we think that it deserves serious consideration. In this appeal we are not concerned with the quality of the uncollected income from the stanom property during the lifetime of the stani. We shall now refer to Ext. B-56 on which the learned Judge has based his conclusions. The learned Judge observed: "Ext. B-56 is a direct authority that the uncollected income forms part of the sthanom estate and that the prior sthani has no right in the same. It is also well established by the other decisions referred to above that the income appropriated by a sthani and properties acquired with such income will be the personal assets of the sthani unless there is evidence that the sthani has merged the same with the sthanom properties. There is no direct decision in respect of the income collected, but not appropriated by the sthani. There is the observation in Ext. B-56 that uncollected and unappropriated income will form part of the sthanom assets." Ext. B-56 is a decision of the Madras High Court in an appeal filed by Prabhakaran Thampan who was the third stani of the Kuthiravattath Swaroopam when he became the second stani for recovery of the accrued arrears of rent due from the third stanom properties before he vacated the third stanom. A custom was pleaded that the uncollected income of the property belonging to a stani is part of the property of the stanom and therefore Prabhakaran Thampan is not entitled to the same. A finding was called for by the Madras High Court on the above custom from the trial court. The finding returned by the Subordinate Judge was that in the case of the third stanom of the Kuthiravattath Swaroopam the invariable practice has been for the Succeeding stani to collect the arrears left uncollected by his predecessor. The said finding was challenged in Ext. B-56. The finding returned by the Subordinate Judge was that in the case of the third stanom of the Kuthiravattath Swaroopam the invariable practice has been for the Succeeding stani to collect the arrears left uncollected by his predecessor. The said finding was challenged in Ext. B-56. Their Lordships of the Madras High Court did not demur from the proposition that a stani becomes entitled to the income of the stanom property as and when it accrues. But with reference to the third stanom the case was decided on the custom pleaded and Their Lordships found thus: "In accordance with the principles which we have set out in our judgment, so long as the arrears are uncollected and unappropriated, it will devolve only upon the successor in office and not upon the legal representatives of the deceased stani. " Ext. B-56 is therefore not an authority for the proposition that the income accrued but uncollected and unappropriated will form part of the stanom property. When once it is collected it must be deemed to have been appropriated by the stani as his personal property unless it is merged with the stanom property. It is also essential to point out that no custom is pleaded in the case before us. The learned Subordinate Judge was prepared to admit in view of the decision in Secretary of State v. Kunhi Krishna (A.I.R. 1933 Madras 376), that if the income had been collected by the stani the position would have been different. The headnote of the decision reads thus: "On the death of a stani such of his assets as originated from the income of the sthanam go to the Kovilagam from which he has sprung. They do not under the ordinary law pass as Accretions or otherwise to the sthanam." The learned Judge distinguished the above decision by observing thus : "In the present case, the investments of the amounts collected by the Court of Wards cannot be taken as investments made by the stani. The stani was insane and he could not have exercised any independent volition. The Court of Wards made these investments in accordance with the directions contained in the Court of Wards Act itself. Such investments cannot be treated as appropriation by the stani. The stani was insane and he could not have exercised any independent volition. The Court of Wards made these investments in accordance with the directions contained in the Court of Wards Act itself. Such investments cannot be treated as appropriation by the stani. Therefore, these investments are income collected, but un-appropriated by the stani." We do not agree with the above reasoning and the conclusion if the learned Subordinate Judge. The submission on behalf of the members of the Swaroopam that the Court of Wards was constituted a statutory agent for the management of the estate on behalf of the ward cannot in any way support the conclusions of the learned Subordinate Judge. If the collection and the investment by the Court of Wards is on behalf of the ward no further appropriation of the income by him is necessary. That income collected and invested is liable for the debt of the ward. It is liable to be spent for the necessities of the ward. If the legal position of the stani is therefore analogous to the holder of an impartible estate or to a woman's estate inherited by a Hindu widow, it has to be held that the income that accrues is the absolute property of the stani and that unless and until there is an expression of intention to incorporate the same with the corpus, the income does not partake the character of the corpus and devolves upon the personal heirs of the stani. In view of the fact that the estate was in the management of the Court of Wards during the lifetime of the stani it may be possible to say that the stani died without expressing the intention one way or other and from this it is not possible to infer that he intended that the income should be incorporated with the stanom properties. The intention of the Court of Wards is absolutely irrelevant and in the absence of anything else the income collected continued to be the separate properties of the stani. We have therefore no hesitation to hold that B schedule items 1 to 16 and 39 are the separate properties of the deceased Kunhunni Thampan and his personal heirs are entitled to succeed to the same in preference to the members of the Swaroopam. Now we shall deal with the other points raised on behalf of the members of the Swaroopam. Now we shall deal with the other points raised on behalf of the members of the Swaroopam. It was contended that according to the custom of the family any income remaining unspent by the stani should partake the character of the properties attached to the stanom. No such custom was pleaded. Realising this difficulty the learned counsel appearing for the members if the Swaroopam vehemently pleaded for an opportunity for the amendment of the pleadings. We are of the view, that there are absolutely no reasons to grant this request at this late stage. We therefore overrule, the same. Next it was contended that the acquisitions of B schedule items 1 to 16 and 39 were out of the income of the stanom properties accrued due after the lifetime of Damodaran alias Kunhunni Thamrjan. This contention also is devoid of any substance. The entire plaint as well as the written statements filed by the member, of the Swaroopam have proceeded on the basis that B schedule items 1 to 16 and 39 were acquired with the income of the stanom properties derived during the lifetime of Kunhunni Thampan. There was no claim that any portion of the income accrued due from the stanom properties subsequent to the death of Kunhunni Thampan was used for the acquisitions of B schedule items 1 to 16 and 39. We therefore overrule this contention as well. The next submission was that some amounts received on account of compulsory acquisition of stanom properties have proceeded for the acquisition of B schedule items 1 to 16 and 39. For this also, there is neither pleading nor proof. This contention also is devoid of any substance. It was lastly argued that the estate duty paid for the estate of the deceased Kunhunni Thampan has to be borne by his personal heirs. This contention was not raised in the court below. We therefore overrule the same. There was no contention raised before us that the income from A-1 and A-2 schedule stands on a different footing from the income of A schedule items. We therefore modify the decree and judgment of the court below and hold that B schedule items 1 to 16 and 39 have to be excluded from partition as they are the separate properties of Damodaran alias Kunhunni Thampan descendible to his personal heirs under the Hindu Succession Act. We therefore modify the decree and judgment of the court below and hold that B schedule items 1 to 16 and 39 have to be excluded from partition as they are the separate properties of Damodaran alias Kunhunni Thampan descendible to his personal heirs under the Hindu Succession Act. The appeal is therefore allowed with costs in this Court.