JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an appeal from the judgment dated 3 July, 1964 passed by the City Civil Court in Ejectment Suit mo. 741 of 1963. 2. THE defendant is the appellant,. The plaintiffs filed the suit for possession of the premises described fully in the suit. In the trial court 5 issues were framed. First, whether the notice was valid and whether the tenancy was for manufacturing purposes ? Secondly, whether the court had jurisdiction to try the suit ? Thirdly, whether the plaintiffs reasonably required the premises for purposes of building and rebuilding ? fourthly, whether the defendant sub-let the premises without the written consent of the plaintiffs ? Fifthly, whether there was any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties in respect of the disputed premises and whether the defendant was thika tenant ? 3. THE two issues as to jurisdiction of the trial court to try the suit and whether the defendant was a thika tenant were heard on 22 July, 1963 and are dealt with by the judgment of the same day in Order No. 10. The defendant contended that the defendant was a thika tenant and therefore the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. The trial court rightly came to the conclusion that there was not a single document to show that the defendant was a tenant in respect of the land only and not of the structure. Exhibit F (1). was relied on by the trial court to indicate that the defendant was a tenant in respect of the premises. Exhibit A which was a receipt was also relied by the trial court to point to the same conclusion. The trial court also referred to Exhibit B to show that the defendant prayed for permission to secure and repair the hut. It was rightly held by the trial court that there was no plan to prove construction of a structure and there was nothing to show that the defendant demolished the hut and constructed a new structure. 4. COUNSEL for the defendant impeached the propriety of the trial court in dealing with these two issues on 22 july, 1963. There is no merit in that contention. It was at the joint request of lawyers of both sides that the issues were taken up for hearing on that day. 4. COUNSEL for the defendant impeached the propriety of the trial court in dealing with these two issues on 22 july, 1963. There is no merit in that contention. It was at the joint request of lawyers of both sides that the issues were taken up for hearing on that day. The defendant in the written statement which will be found at page 15 of the paper book alleged in paragraphs 7 and 9 that after the execution of lease in the year 1935, the defendant's predecessors constructed the mud kottah structures and 2 rooms with pucca walls and tiled roofs. The further allegations in paragraph 9 of the written statement are that on 11 May 1958 the plaintiffs entered into an agreement with the defendant giving him lease of the suit premises and that the defendant was compelled to sign the agreement and the agreement should be set aside. 5. ON behalf of the appellant it was contended that the defendant constructed a structure. In aid of that contention reliance was placed on the agreement at page 36 Part II of the paper book. That agreement is marked as exhibit G. Curiously enough that is the agreement which the defendant in the written statement alleged to impeach on the ground that the defendant was compelled to sign. Be that as it may, that agreement according to the appellant contains a recital that the defendant would have to construct a structure. The agreement is not to that effect at all. It was stated that the mud kottah if reconstructed on any portion of the said premises would be constructed by the party at his own cost and he would be entitled to use the old building materials for such reconstruction. A more important term in that agreement is that the tenant would keep the premises with its structures in a tenantable well repaired condition. There is intrinsic evidence in the agreement itself first, that the defendant was a tenant in respect of the structure and secondly, that reference to construction was a. mere wish expressed at that stage. Unless and until the defendant actually constructs any structure any term in the agreement that the defendant would construct cannot by any strength of imagination, be indicative of construction of structure itself. That will not be a reasonable reading of the agreement itself. 6. Unless and until the defendant actually constructs any structure any term in the agreement that the defendant would construct cannot by any strength of imagination, be indicative of construction of structure itself. That will not be a reasonable reading of the agreement itself. 6. EXHIBIT A which is to be found at page 18 part II of the paper book is a receipt granted by the plaintiffs to the defendant's mother Lakshmi-Moni dassi in the year 1940. The receipt is dated 15 May, 1940. It will appear in the receipt that Us. 1,100/- was received from Lakshmi-Moni Dassi being Selami for the premises and in the receipt it was stated that repairing was to be done by the tenant named there. Counsel for the respondent rightly contended that the words "repairing must be done by the tenant above named" contained intrinsic evidence that the defendant's mother Lakshmi-Moni dassi was a tenant not of the land but of the structure on the land. Counsel on behalf of the appellant relied on a letter at page 20 part II of the paper book which Was issued by the Corporation of Calcutta on 7 July, 1957. An order was passed to demolish the entire corrugated iron structure and the addressee of the letter was required to deposit the cost of the demolition. That letter does riot prove that the defendant constructed any structure. The other two documents on which Counsel for the appellant relied are to be found at pages 21 and 33. part ii of the paper book. At page 21 is a complaint and a decision thereon, The complaint was under Section, 144 of the criminal Procedure Code. It was filed by Tejpal Jhunjhunwalla. In the complaint it was alleged that the mother of the opposite party namely the defendant was a tenant in respect of the premises and it was alleged that the opposite party carrying on business there intended to make a construction. It was therefore said that it Would amount to" evidence of construction of a structuure. Similarly, it was said with regard to the receipt dated 16 July 1957 granted by D. Banerjee to the effect that Rs. 305/80 paiuse was received from Krishna Pada Das as demolition cost that it would be evidence of construction of structure. Neither of these two letters in my opinion has any probative value with regard to construction of structure. Similarly, it was said with regard to the receipt dated 16 July 1957 granted by D. Banerjee to the effect that Rs. 305/80 paiuse was received from Krishna Pada Das as demolition cost that it would be evidence of construction of structure. Neither of these two letters in my opinion has any probative value with regard to construction of structure. The complaint noticed that repairs would be made to the premises and if any new construction would be made it would be according to sanctioned plan. No such plan was proved. 7. IT will appear from exhibit G namely the agreement dated 11 May, 1958 to which I have already referred that Lakshmi Moni Dassi was a party to the same. Lakshmi Moni Dassi is the mother of the defendant and the defendant was also a party. Lakshmi moni Dassi surrendered the interest in tenancy in favour of the defendant. The defendant became a tenant and entered into possession on the strength of the said agreement dated 11 May, 1958. Counsel for the respondent rightly contended that section 116 of the evidence Act raised a bar preventing the defendant not only from challenging the document but also from contending that the defendant was a thika tenant. I am of opinion that the trial court correctly came to the conclusion that the defendant was not a thika tenant. 8. THE second contention on behalf of the appellant is that the premises were for manufacturing purposes. It was said that the defendant manufactured sugar candy. In the Bench decision in (1) Joyanti Hosiery Mills and anr. v. Upendra Chandra Das and anr. reported in AIR 1946 Calcutta 317 it was said that the word manufacture meant to work up materials into forme suitable for use. The word 'material' did not necessarily mean the original raw material because a finished article might have to go through several manufacturing processes before it was fit and made ready for the market. The example that was given in the Bench decision was that for the tenor, the material would be the raw hide, but the leather itself a manufactured article would constitute the material for the shoe-maker's business. The reason why i have referred to this decision is because of the succint observations made there which should be kept in the forefront in appreciating the meaning of the words manufacturing purposes. The reason why i have referred to this decision is because of the succint observations made there which should be kept in the forefront in appreciating the meaning of the words manufacturing purposes. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what is a manufacturing purpose and what is not. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, namely, the nature of goods manufactured, the ingredients used, the "process employed for manufacturing goods, the machinery or apparatus with the aid of which the goods are manufactured, the power with the assistance of which the goods are manufactured. It is of the utmost importance that in order to constitute a manufacturing purpose there should be work of such a type that goods are actually manufactured in the sense given to the words in the bench decision in Joyanti Hosiery Mills case. In the present case one will look in vain into the evidence to find out as to what the manufacturing purpose in the present case was. All that the defendant said was that he manufactured sugar candy and sold the same. This evidence is in my opinion utterly useless to prove the manufacturing purpose. The third contention on behalf of the appellant was that the plaintiffs did not prove that the plaintiffs had the means to build and rebuild. It is in evidence that a trustee and the son of a trustee gave oral evidence that a sum of rupees one Lakh and a half could be raised. The evidence is overwhelming that the plaintiffs have genuine desire to build and they also have the means. It is not always necessary to produce cash to substantiate the means. "The plaintiffs in the present case have given evidence that a sum of Rupees one lakh and a half will be available for the purpose of building and re-building. That evidence has not been shaken. On the contrary documentary evidence has forfeited that oral evidence. I am therefore of opinion that the plaintiffs proved their means to build and rebuild. 9. THE last contention advanced on behalf of the appellant was that the defendants were not guilty of subletting. The trial court came to the conclusion that the defendants sublet the premises. On the contrary documentary evidence has forfeited that oral evidence. I am therefore of opinion that the plaintiffs proved their means to build and rebuild. 9. THE last contention advanced on behalf of the appellant was that the defendants were not guilty of subletting. The trial court came to the conclusion that the defendants sublet the premises. The reasons given by the trial court were that business of transport corporation was carried on at the premises forming the subject matter of the suit. The defendant contended that the defendant is an agent of the transport corporation. The trial court commented on the significant absence of such a plea in the written statement. The trial court was right in the criticism of the absence of such a plea. It is well settled that if the plea, is not taken in the pleading a party is not entitled to adduce evidence in support therefor, (see 1953 S. C. R. 789 see also A. I. R. 1930 P. C. 57 ). The other reason given by the trial court was that the plea of the defendant that his name appeared on the signboard as agent was not put to any of the plaintiff's witnesses in the cross-examination, and further that the defendant did not file any accounts to substantiate the plea. It will appear from the evidence that the defendant alleged to be delivery agent of the transport corporation. But it is curious that there was really no evidence adduced by the defendant that he was an agent. The absence of a document to substantiate the plea of agency is in my opinion a very important feature in the present case. Mere oral evidence that the defendant is an agent is not conclusive proof. The trial court rightly rejected such evidence in the absence of document to substantiate the plea. All the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant fail. The judgment is affirmed. The appeal is dismissed with costs.