Judgment :- 1. The 1st defendant has come up in revision challenging an order in execution directing attachment of all her rights in the southern half of a certain item of property which had been set apart to her (together with defendants 2 and 3) in a partition decree. That decree is under execution in regard to the money portion. The money decree is passed only against the 1st defendant and therefore cannot be executed against defendants 2 and 3. So far as the 1st defendant herself is concerned, it is executable, but the question is what right or interest in the property is attachable and saleable; for, she has two distinct interests in the property and the controversy arising in the case is as to whether her right to take the usufructs from the property derived under Ext. Dl can be proceeded against in execution of the decree, or should the decree-holder confine himself to the 1/3 share in the land as such, which she has got in the partition decree. There is no doubt that the 1st defendant's 1/3rd share in the land attached is available for being proceeded against in execution of the decree. All that I am called upon to consider is as to whether the special rights which the 1st defendant obtained under Ext. Dl can be attached and sold by the decree-holder. Even here, one can split up the rights because she has, under Ext. Dl, a right of residence and also a right to take the usufructs of the property. As regards the right of residence there cannot be any doubt that it is purely personal to her and therefore under S.6 (d) of the T. P. Act, read with S.60 CPC., that interest in the property viz., the right of residence, being restricted, in its enjoyment, to her personally, can neither be transferred nor be attached and sold. Counsel for the respondent agrees that the decree-holder will not be entitled to attach and sell the right of residence that the 1st defendant has, even as the revision-petitioner's counsel agrees that the 1/3 share in the land is attachable and saleable in execution of the decree. I mention this only to indicate that the only controversy that need be considered is the one turning on the application of S.6 (dd), together with S.60 CPC. I mention this only to indicate that the only controversy that need be considered is the one turning on the application of S.6 (dd), together with S.60 CPC. in so far as they apply to the right of the 1st defendant to the profits from the property sought to be attached and sold. 2. Although I have indicated what the real controversy is about, I am not proceeding to decide it because a preliminary objection has been raised by counsel for the respondent that the Civil Revision Petition is not maintainable because an appeal will lie under S.47 C.P.C. and that too in a different Court viz., the District Court. I am upholding that objection and so it is not proper that I pronounce upon the attachability and sale ability, in execution of the decree, of the interest that the 1st defendant has derived under Ext. Dl. Nevertheless, I shall briefly indicate the nature of the points urged pro and con. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner relied upon S.6 (d) and (dd) of the T.P. Act to get the right derived under Ext. Dl exonerated from attachment. What is the right that she has obtained under Ext. Dl? Is it merely an interest which is restricted in its enjoyment to the owner personally? Secondly, is it really a right to future maintenance secured by giving her the right to take the profits? If the answer is in the affirmative, the attachment and sale must fail. In support of his case, the petitioner relied upon the ruling reported in Lachhmeshwar Sahai v. Mt. Moti Rani Kunwar (AIR. 1939 P.C.157) which has certainly features of resemblance. However, counsel for the respondent sought to distinguish this decision by drawing attention, to the fact that there the interest in property was created in fulfilment of the right to maintenance and therefore cannot be read de hors that context while, in the present case, although there is some reference to maintenance it is not as if any antecedent right to maintenance is being provided for by the creation of this interest. The ruling reported in Muttathil Damodara Menon v. Ramakrishna Aiyar (AIR. 1925 Mad. The ruling reported in Muttathil Damodara Menon v. Ramakrishna Aiyar (AIR. 1925 Mad. 634), relied upon by the respondent, relates to a thavazhi's right to maintenance under an arrangement where the Madras High Court held that such an interest in property was attachable in execution, the purchaser being entitled to take the usufructs till the extinction of the thavazhi. 3. Another argument which has been addressed by counsel for the revision-petitioner is that a right to unascertained future profits cannot be attached, based on the ruling reported in Khajoh Habibulla v. Kaviraj Jogendra Nath Sen (AIR. 1929 Calcutta 352). Here again, the contention on the other side is that the decision is distinguishable because there, the muthavali's right to profits is subject to various fluctuating deductions and is so variable, chancy and uncertain that it is difficult to characterise it as a definite interest in property and therefore is not attachable. The situation in the present case is obviously different. However, I am not pronouncing on this point either, except to indicate the nature of the arguments on either side. The third point raised related, to the right of residence being attachable or not and, as I have already observed, counsel for the respondent agrees that the said right cannot be attached. The ruling reported in Karupatti v. Singaravelu Pillai (AIR. 1935 Mad 348) is authority, if one were necessary. 4. The real point that falls for my decision at present, is whether an appeal will lie under S.47 CPC., if so, a revision under S.115 CPC. will not ordinarily lie. S.47 CPC. deals with determination by the executing court of questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. If the present question of attach ability of the right of the 1st defendant is such a question which falls within S.47 CPC. then it is appealable & not revisable. Read with S.2 (2) CPC. we reach the conclusion that only such orders as conclusively determine the rights of the parties arising in execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree that can be said to be appealable. The ruling reported in Barkat Ram, General Manager, Bharat National Bank Ltd. v. Sardar Bhagwan Singh (AIR. 1943 Lahore 140 (FB )) relying upon Jogodishury Debea v. Kailash Chundra Lahiry (ILR. 24 Cal. The ruling reported in Barkat Ram, General Manager, Bharat National Bank Ltd. v. Sardar Bhagwan Singh (AIR. 1943 Lahore 140 (FB )) relying upon Jogodishury Debea v. Kailash Chundra Lahiry (ILR. 24 Cal. 725), decided by a Full Bench of five judges of the Calcutta High Court, held that the expression "the determination of any question" in the second sentence of S.2 (2) is used ejusdem generis with the phrase 'conclusively determines', etc in the first. When the effect of an order is to determine conclusively the rights of the parties with respect to any matter material to the execution etc. of the decree, the order would be one under S.47 C P.C. and therefore a decree within the meaning of S.2 (2) from which an appeal would lie. An interlocutory order in the course of execution proceedings, even if it decides, for instance, a point of law or fact is not a decree within the meaning of S.2 (2). The Calcutta High Court in Jogodishury Debea v. Kailash Chudra Lahiry (I.L R.24 Calcutta 725) had indicated the real test when they observed : "I may add that the language of S.244 which enacts that certain'questions shall be determined by an order of the Court executing the decree and not by separate suit', clearly indicates that the questions contemplated by the Section must be of a nature such that it is possible to suppose that but for the Section they could have formed the subject of determination by a separate suit. But a question of an incidental character can never come under that description, and an order determining such a question cannot, therefore, be a decree as defined in S.2". The ruling reported in Sankarlal Aggarwala v. Shankarlal Poddar (A.I.R;1965 S.C. 507) relied upon in a later decision of the Supreme Court reported in The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Gokal Chand (AIR. 1967 SC. 799) lays down the proposition that interlocutory orders of a procedural character cannot be appealable even where the wording of the statute may be wide. The real test is whether rights have been determined or are affected by the decision, as I have indicated in a decision reported in P.M. Thankappan v. Muhammed Kutty (1969 KLT.104). Of course, these decisions were not under S.47 CPC. but under other statutes. The real test is whether rights have been determined or are affected by the decision, as I have indicated in a decision reported in P.M. Thankappan v. Muhammed Kutty (1969 KLT.104). Of course, these decisions were not under S.47 CPC. but under other statutes. What is essential is a determination of the substantive rights of parties and not any processual orders which only clear the way for the final adjudication of the rights in dispute. So far, I agree with the counsel for the revision petitioner, but what is the order here? Is it one which conclusively determines the rights of the parties so far as that Court is concerned, or can we characterise it as interocutory or processual? The learned counsel took me through the scheme of the Civil Procedure Code, particularly, S.51, S.60, 0.21 R.54 CPC. and finally to 0.21 R.64 CPC. which deals with property being attached and being liable to sale. Counsel's contention is that a right to attach is not a substantive right nor a substantial relief in itself, but merely paves the way for what the decree holder really wants viz., sale of the property and realisation of the proceeds by which the decree could be satisfied. That stage has not arisen and the present order which merely states that Certain interest in the property is attachable cannot therefore be treated as conclusively determining rights of parties. But the real question is whether it does not amount to a final determination of the rights of parties so far as that Court is concerned, because attachment is refused on the ground that there is no saleable or transferable interest in the 1st defendant. The determination of the question of attach ability is also a decision on the question of sale ability. There is, therefore, a conclusive decision of the substantive rights of the parties involved in the order under attack. The determination of the question of attach ability is also a decision on the question of sale ability. There is, therefore, a conclusive decision of the substantive rights of the parties involved in the order under attack. Counsel for the respondent drew my attention to certain passages in Chittaley's Civil Procedure Code, Vol.1 page 780 where the learned author states that "All objections to attachment and sale in execution of a decree raised between parties to the suit on the ground that the properties are not liable to be attached or are not saleable in execution of that decree are matters coming within the Section " Various rulings have been cited at the footnote in support of his proposition although to the extent one has been able to check up they are not directly in point. Nevertheless, as I have already discussed, the correct legal position has been set out in that passage 5. In this view I hold that an appeal against the order in question under S.47 C.P.C. is maintainable and therefore the present C.R.P, is liable to be dismissed. 6. I should not be taken to have expressed any opinion definitely or conclusively on the real questions in controversy in appeal if one were to be filed. I have merely indicated the lines of argument adopted by both sides before me. The C.R.P. is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. 7. A carbon copy of this order will be furnished to the petitioner so as to enable him to file his appeal without further delay. Dismissed.