Judgment Tarkeshwar Nath, J. 1. This appeal by defendant No. 1 arises out of a suit for a declaration that defendant No. 2 had no right and interest in the property conveyed by the sale deed dated 21st November, 1957, or to execute the said sale deed in favour of defendant No. 1 and moreover defendant No. 1 had not acquired any right, title and interest in the said property. The plaintiffs wanted a further declaration that the said sale deed was not binding upon them. 2. The case of the plaintiffs was that one Chandramadho Singh had two wives. From the first wife he had a son, Gopal Saran Singh (defendant No. 2). Rambha Devi (plaintiff No. 6) is the wife of defendant No. 2, whereas plaintiffs 7, 8, 9 and 10 are the minor sons of defendant No. 2. The name of the second wife of Chandramadho Singh is Keshmati Kuer (plaintiff No. 5). Plaintiffs 1 to 4 are the sons of Chandramadho Singh by his second wife, Keshmati Kuer. Chandramadho Singh died in December, 1945, but de- fendant No. 2 had separated from his father and step brothers (Plaintiffs Nos, 1 to 4) during the lifetime of his father. Defendant No. 2 executed a deed of gift on 9-3-1940 in favour of his wife (plaintiff No. 6) in respect of his entire share in the family property which was one-sixth. Later on, defendant No. 2 filed Title Suit No. 10 of 1941 for partition of his share in all the properties (inasmuch as there was no partition by metes and bounds till then). That suit was cumpromised on 28-6-1941 and the deed of gift was accepted as valid. Defendant No. 2 was given a monthly allowance of Rs. 25/- by that compromise and he had no concern with the properties. In the year 1946 one Lachmi Prasad Singh, Pleader, was appointed guardian by the Court to manage the properties of the minor sons and grandsons of Chandramadho Singh, but the said guardian resigned and thereafter the mother of plaintiffs 1 to 4 was appointed guardian. She was discharged from the guardianship by the order of the High Court on 1-9-1955 and thereafter plaintiff No. 1 began to manage the family properties, as he had attained majority. She was discharged from the guardianship by the order of the High Court on 1-9-1955 and thereafter plaintiff No. 1 began to manage the family properties, as he had attained majority. In the year 3954 the proprietary interest of the said family vested in the State of Bihar, but the plaintiffs continued in possession of the bakasht and zirat lands. Defendant No. 2 had no right, title and interest in the lands described in Schedules Ka and Kha of the plaint and he had no right to transfer those properties as the plaintiffs were in possession thereof. The land bearing plot No. 233 of Khata No. 755 did not at all belong to the plaintiffs or their family and the plaintiffs had not acquired title to any portion of that plot by exchange, but defendant No. 2 fraudulently included that land also in the sale deed dated 21-11-1957. Defendant No. 2 fell in bad company and he used to drink wine. Defendant No. 1 took advantage of the weaknesses of defendant No. 2 and got the said sale deed executed by him fraudulently, without paying a single pie as a consideration. Moreover, defendant No. 2 had no necessity at all to take any loan and the aforesaid sale deed was neither for consideration nor for legal necessity. The plaintiffs learnt about the said sale deed on 30-11-1957, and by the execution of that sale deed a cloud had been cast on their title, although they were in possession of the lands transferred by defendant No. 2, barring the land bearing plot No. 233. The plaintiffs thus filed the suit for the reliefs indicated above. 3. Defendant No. 2 filed a written statement supporting the case of the plaintiffs and alleged that no consideration was paid to him in respect of the said sale deed. He gave his left thumb impression and signature on a blank stamp paper under the influence of defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 contested the suit on grounds, inter alia, that the share of defendant No. 2 was one-fifth and not one-sixth in the family properties and defendant No. 2 got the said share by partition, and he was separately in possession of that share. Defendant No. 2 was neither a drunkard nor a vagabond, and he executed the sale deed in question for legal necessity after receiving full consideration for it. Defendant No. 2 was neither a drunkard nor a vagabond, and he executed the sale deed in question for legal necessity after receiving full consideration for it. He fully understood the contents of the sale deed before executing it. The portion of survey plot No. 233 sold by defendant No. 2 had been obtained by the family of defendant No. 2 by an exchange. The plaintiffs had full knowledge of that sale deed much earlier than 30th November. 1957, and there was no fraud at all in the execution of that sale deed, 4. The issues framed by the trial Court were the following:- - "1. Is the sale deed dated 21-11-57 binding upon the plaintiffs and can it affect the property in suit? 2. Is the sale deed, dated 21-11-57 genuine, valid and for consideration and was (it?) executed for legal necessity? 3. Whether the defendant No. 2 had any right to execute the sale deed? 4. ..............." 5. The trial Court held that the sale deed dated 21-11-1957 was not binding on the plaintiffs. No consideration was paid in respect of that sale deed and it was not for legal necessity. Defendant No. 2 had no right to execute that sale deed. In view of these findings, the trial Court (Additional Subordinate Judge) decreed the plaintiffs suit on contest against defendant No. 1. 6. Defendant No. 1, being aggrieved by the said decree, preferred an appeal. The learned Additional District Judge held that Gopal Saran Singh (Defendant No. 2) had never any title to the land bearing survey plot No. 233 and his right, title and interest in the other lands conveyed by the aforesaid sale deed (Ext. B) had been already extinguished by the deed of gift dated 9-3-1940 (Ext. 7) and the compromise decree (Ext. 13/b) and that he was never in possession of those lands after the year 1941. He thus came to the conclusion that plaintiffs 1 to 6 had title to the properties other than Plot No. 233 sold by Ext. B. He further held that consideration was paid in respect of that sale deed, but there was no legal necessity for the execution of the sale deed, and in fact the finding of the trial Court in that respect (which was against defendant No. 1) was not challenged before him. B. He further held that consideration was paid in respect of that sale deed, but there was no legal necessity for the execution of the sale deed, and in fact the finding of the trial Court in that respect (which was against defendant No. 1) was not challenged before him. He granted the plaintiffs a declaration that the sale deed was not binding on them. He dismissed the appeal, and hence defendant No. 1 has filed this second appeal. Gopal Saran Singh (defendant No. 2) had been impleaded as respondent No. 11, but he died during the pendency of this appeal and on his death his heirs have been substituted and some of them are already on the record as respondents 6 to 10. 7. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge held that the sale deed dated 21-11-1957 executed by defendant No. 2 was not for legal necessity, and it appears from the judgment of the Additional District Judge that the Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant (Defendant No. 1) did not advance any argument challenging that finding of the trial Court, and accordingly that finding was affirmed by the Additional District Judge. Learned Counsel for the appellant could not assail this finding in this second appeal. The position thus is that there being no legal necessity for the execution of that sale deed, plaintiffs 6 to 10 (the wife and sons of defendant No. 2) are entitled to the declaration that the said sale deed was not binding on them, and the decree passed in their favour can be affirmed on this score itself. But apart from it, both the Courts have held that on account of the deed of gift dated 9-3-1940 (Ext. 7) and the compromise decree (Ext 13/b), defendant No. 2 had no right at all to execute the sale deed dated 21-11-1957 in favour of defendant No. 1. This finding has been arrived at on a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence. 8. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of the judgment dated 28-11-1956 (the certified copy of which has been marked Ext. This finding has been arrived at on a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence. 8. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of the judgment dated 28-11-1956 (the certified copy of which has been marked Ext. D) of this Court in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 226 of 1951 (Pat) holding that the aforesaid deed of gift and the compromise were collusive and inoperative, it was not open to the Courts below to consider the ether evidence about the validity or otherwise of the deed of gift and the compromise, inasmuch as that judgment in an insolvency proceeding was a judgment in rem in order to appreciate this contention it is essential to mention a few facts. On 11-2-1950, Gopal Saran Singh, present defendant No. 2, had filed an application before the District Judge of Shahabad for being declared as an insolvent, and that application had been registered as Insolvency Case No. 2 of 1950. His case was that he was not possessed of any property, except an allowance of Rs. 25 per month and he was indebted to the extent of Ra 7214/10/9 pies which he could not pay. That application was opposed by Bhola Ram Marwari and others on the ground that the said applicant owned vast properties and as such was not entitled to be adjudged an insolvent. They alleged that the said applicant had executed a bogus deed of gift in the name of his wife to defeat his creditors. The Insolvency Court, by its order dated 28-2-1951, rejected the said application, and hence Gopal Saran Singh filed Miscellaneous Appeal No. 226 of 1951 in this Court. A Division Bench of this Court dismissed that appeal on 28-11-1956, holding that the deed of gift was a collusive deed and the compromise petition based on that deed was similarly a collusive one brought about to shield the appellant (defendant No. 2) from his creditors. In view of that finding it was held that the then appellant failed to establish that he was unable to pay his debts and hence he was not entitled to any protection order from the Insolvency Court. In view of that finding it was held that the then appellant failed to establish that he was unable to pay his debts and hence he was not entitled to any protection order from the Insolvency Court. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the provisions of Sec. 41 of the Evidence Act which reads thus:- - "A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant. Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof -- that any legal character which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation. that any legal character to which it declares any such person to be entitled, accrued, to that person at the time when such judgment, order or decree declares it to have accrued to that person: that any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declared that it had ceased or should cease; and that anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declares that it had been or should be his property". 9. Learned Counsel submitted that, generally speaking, judgment in a suit only concerned those persons who were parties to it and other persons were not affected by it. But there was an exception in respect of a final judgment of a competent Court in the exercise of insolvency jurisdiction. According to him, the judgments which come within the purview of Sec. 41 are known as judgments in rem and they would bind even persons not parties to the proceeding in which those judgments were given. He laid stress on the expression "which declares any person ............... According to him, the judgments which come within the purview of Sec. 41 are known as judgments in rem and they would bind even persons not parties to the proceeding in which those judgments were given. He laid stress on the expression "which declares any person ............... to be entitled to any specific thing" occurring in Section 41 and also upon the last clause of that section, according to which a judgment declaring any person to be entitled to a certain property would be conclusive proof of the fact that that property should be deemed to be the property of that person from the time of that judgment. He pointed out that the effect of the judgment of the High Court referred to above was that the property, which was the subject matter of the deed of gift dated 9th March, 1940, continued to be the property of Gopal Saran Singh (defendant No. 2), inasmuch as that deed was held to be collusive and, similarly, the interest of that defendant was not, in any way, jeopardised or extinguished by the compromise decree in Title Suit No. 10 of 1941. According to him, in this manner, Gopal Saran Singh was declared tc be entitled to that property, and this finding was conclusive and binding not only against the parties to the insolvency case but also against all the persons including even the plaintiffs. He further contended that this question could not be reagitated in the present suit, and it was nut open to the Courts below to consider the other evidence and come to a different conclusion with regard to the effect of the deed of gift and the compromise decree. 10. Learned Counsel appearing fop some of the respondents, on the other hand, urged that there was no declaration at all in respect of the ownership of Gopal Saran Singh (Defendant No. 2) with regard to any property by that judgment, and, in any event, the plaintiffs not being parties in that insolvency case, the said judgment was not binding on them. According to him, the judgment relied upon was a judgment in personam and not in rem. He pointed out that the word absolutely occurring in Sec. 41 was of great significance and, in no event, there was any declaration in favour of defendant No. 2 absolutely. 11. According to him, the judgment relied upon was a judgment in personam and not in rem. He pointed out that the word absolutely occurring in Sec. 41 was of great significance and, in no event, there was any declaration in favour of defendant No. 2 absolutely. 11. A judgment is conclusive proof, as against persons and privies, of facts directly in issue in the case, actually decided by the Court, and appearing from the judgment itself to be the ground on which it was based. But there are certain exceptions to this general rule and the provisions contained in Section 41 are by way of exceptions. This section consists of two parts. The first one makes certain judgments, orders or decrees relevant, and the second one makes those judgments conclusive evidence in certain matters. In order that a judgment should come within the purview of Sec. 41, it must be (1) of a competent Court in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction and (2) it must (a) confer upon or take away from any person any legal character, or (b) declare any person to be entitled to any such character, or (c) to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely. According to learned counsel, the case of the appellant came within the last part indicated by me in Clause (c), referred to above. It is true that the judgment relied upon was a judgment of a competent Court in the exercise of insolvency jurisdiction, but the question for consideration is as to whether by that judgment any declaration was given that defendant No. 2 was entitled to any specific thing absolutely. 12. The learned Additional District Judge referred to Official Assignee of Madras V/s. Official Assignee of Rangoon, AIR 1924 Mad 662, but that decision is not relevant, inasmuch as the question which arose for consideration in that case was as to whether an order made by an Insolvency Court declaring that a particular person was never a partner of a firm and was never adjudged an insolvent by that Court was a judgment in rem and it was held that it was not so as it did not confer or take away any legal character within the meaning of Section 41. In the present case, learned counsel for the appellant has not submitted that any legal character was conferred by the judgment in question. The learned Additional District Judge has referred to "In the matter of P. C. Venkataramanayya Pantulu". AIR 1931 Mad 441 (SB). The earlier decision of the Madras High Court in the case of the Official Assignee of Madras, AIR 1924 Mad 662 was relied upon, and it was further held that it was not enough to show that under the judgment of an Insolvency Court one had become entitled to a specific thing, but his title to such a thing must have boon declared not as against any specified person, but absolutely. The relevant observations are these: "So far as I could see, there is nothing in the Insolvency Act for declaring the title of any portion (person?) to a specific thing in the manner provided for in Sec. 41 of the Evidence Act. The title to the specific thing should be declared absolutely and not merely as against another person, and in such a case only it would have to be conclusive as against the whole world". In that case a question arose whether an actionable claim, such as a right to recover a debt from any person, could be deemed to come under, "any specific thing" mentioned in Sec. 41, and it was held that the final judgment (Ext. 13) of the appellate Court in insolvency jurisdiction, holding that L. V. N. Sastri was entitled to recover the debt, did not amount to a judgment in rem within the meaning of Sec. 41 of the Evidence Act so as to bind persons who were not parties or privies to that case. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on Hla Gyaw U V/s. U Tun Kyaw Sen, AIR 1937 Rang 369, but the facts of that case are entirely different, inasmuch as the receiver appointed in that case had moved the Court to avoid the transfer of certain lands made by the insolvent Hmwe Ban in favour of his wife, Ma Tarokma, by registered deed on 25th May 1934, which was prior to the application for adjudication as an insolvent and the order of adjudication. The wife, in turn, sold those lands to the appellant, Hla Gyaw U by a registered deed dated 14th May, 1935. The wife, in turn, sold those lands to the appellant, Hla Gyaw U by a registered deed dated 14th May, 1935. The Court found that the transfer made by the insolvent to his wife was fraudulent and annulled it. The receiver then sold those four pieces of paddy land (which were transferred by the insolvent in favour of his wife) to one Pu Hla Aung on 21-1-1936. On 1-2-1936, Hla Gyaw U filed an application to pay into Court the amount that had been bid at the auction of those lands. He filed another application asking the Court to direct the receiver to set aside the sale of those paddy lands and made a prayer for enquiry as to the title in respect of the paddy lands as between himself and the receiver. This application was dismissed and the appeal against the order of dismissal also was dismissed. In second appeal by Hla Gyaw U, it was urged that the decision to the effect that the gift to Ma Tarokma had been avoided was not binding on him, in view of the fact that that decision was reached in an enquiry in which he was not a party. Sparge, J., referred to Sec. 4, Sub-section (2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act and came to the conclusion that the appellant, Hla Gyaw U should be regarded as a claimant through Ma Tarokma and he was bound by the finding that the transfer to Ma Tarokma was void, although he was not a party to the application, inasmuch as the decision to that effect was a decision in remand was valid against all persons. It is quite obvious from these facts that in that case the transfer (the gift) in question had been avoided at the instance of the receiver and that decision was arrived at in a proceeding under Sec. 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. In the instant case, however, the deed of gift dated 9th March, 1940, in favour of plaintiff No. 6 has not been avoided and there was no proceeding under Sec. 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. In the instant case, however, the deed of gift dated 9th March, 1940, in favour of plaintiff No. 6 has not been avoided and there was no proceeding under Sec. 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. Moreover in the case relied upon by learned counsel the decision that the gift was not valid was arrived at in a proceeding in which the wife, Ma Tarokma, was a party, and as such it could be reasonably held that her transferee, Hla Gyaw U was claiming title through her and he was bound by the decision given in the proceeding under Section 4 initiated at the instance of the receiver. In my opinion, this decision is not of any assistance to the appellant. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the provisions of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Sec. 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, and they read thus: "4.(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Court shall have full power to decide all questions whether of title or priority, or of any nature whatsoever, and whether involving matters of law or of fact, which may arise in any case of insolvency coming within the cognizance of the Court, or which the Court may deem it expedient or necessary to decide for the purpose of doing complete justice or making a complete distribution of property in any such case. (2) Subject to the provisions of this Act and notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every such decision shall be final and binding for all purposes as between on the one hand, the debtor and the debtors estate and on the other hand, all claimants against him or it and all persons claiming through or under them or any of them, (3) ..... He contended that the decision of the High Court in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 226 of 1951 (referred to above) was binding on the present plaintiffs, according to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Sec. 4. But this contention cannot be accepted. According to Sub-section (2), the decision shall be final between a debtor and the debtors estate on the one hand and all claimants against him or it and all persons claiming through or under them or any of them on the other hand. But this contention cannot be accepted. According to Sub-section (2), the decision shall be final between a debtor and the debtors estate on the one hand and all claimants against him or it and all persons claiming through or under them or any of them on the other hand. The present plaintiffs were admittedly not the debtors, but besides this they were not the claimants as against the debtor (defendant No. 2), inasmuch as they were not parties to the insolvency case or the appeal arising therefrom. Moreover, the plaintiffs were not claiming through the persons who were the claimants in the insolvency case. The position thus is that the provisions of Sec. 4 (2) are not at all attracted. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out any provision in the Provincial Insolvency Act for declaring the title of any person to a specific thing absolutely which alone could make that declaration conclusive even as against the persons who were not parties to a proceeding under that Act. 1 would now refer to D. G. Sahasrabudhe V/s. Kilachand Deochand and Co., AIR 1947 Nag 161 (FB). The question referred to the Full Bench was as follows: "When an act of insolvency which, forms the basis of the order of adjudication consists of a certain transfer can the transferee question the correctness of that order in the subsequent proceedings for annulment and contend that the transfer is good when he was not a party to the adjudication proceedings"? Pollock, J, referred to Sec. 41 of the Evidence Act and observed as follows:--"The order of adjudication under that section is conclusive proof that any legal character which it confers or takes away accrued or ceased as stated in the order. It does not, however, appear to me that the order is conclusive proof of anything more than that the insolvent has been so adjudged. It seems to me that a judgment in rem is conclusive only as regards status but not as regards the grounds on which the order is based, see Ballantyne V/s. Machinnon, (1896) 65 LJQB 616; Radhakishin V/s. Mt. Gangabai. It seems to me that a judgment in rem is conclusive only as regards status but not as regards the grounds on which the order is based, see Ballantyne V/s. Machinnon, (1896) 65 LJQB 616; Radhakishin V/s. Mt. Gangabai. AIR 1928 Sind 121 and ILR 54 Mad 601 = ( AIR 1931 Mad 441 (SB)), and that therefore the order adjudging the debtor insolvent is inadmissible in evidence as between third parties to prove that the act on which the order was based was an act of insolvency". His Lordship answered that question by saying that it was open to the transferee to contend that the transfer was good. Sen, J., also held that under Sec. 41, Evidence Act, the order of adjudication in an insolvency case was admissible to prove the legal character of the debtor as an insolvent, but was inadmissible as against third parties to prove that the act on which the order was passed was an act of insolvency. His Lordships answer to the said question was that the transferee could contend in subsequent proceeding for annulment that his transfer was good notwithstanding that the order of adjudication was based on the alleged transfer as being an act of insolvency. Bose, J., however, took a contrary view and answered the question referred to the Full Bench by saying that the transferee could not question the order of adjudication in the annulment proceedings either as regards the fact of insolvency or as regards the act on which the order was founded, and the remedy of the transferee was to appeal under Section 75 as a person aggrieved. In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the answer to the question referred to was that the transferee, who was not a party to the adjudication proceedings could contend in subsequent proceedings for annulment that his transfer was good notwithstanding that the order of adjudication was based on the alleged transfer as being an act of insolvency. In accordance with the opinion of the majority, the answer to the question referred to was that the transferee, who was not a party to the adjudication proceedings could contend in subsequent proceedings for annulment that his transfer was good notwithstanding that the order of adjudication was based on the alleged transfer as being an act of insolvency. 16 In the present case, the question which arose for determination in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 226 of 1961 was as to whether Gopal Saran Singh, defendant No. 2 (the appellant in that appeal) was entitled to be adjudicated as an insolvent, and the decision given on that question is of course conclusive, but only with regard to the fact that the said appellant was not adjudicated as an insolvent and that his application for being declared as an insolvent failed and was dismissed. The ground on which that application failed cannot be deemed to be conclusive so far as the present plaintiffs are concerned, inasmuch as they were not parties to the insolvency case. It is true that the question whether the deed of gift executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of the plaintiff No. 6 was a collusive one or not was gone into in that miscellaneous appeal, but the finding arrived at on that question is conclusive only between the parties to that case and not against the present plaintiffs. The determination of the nature of the deed of gift or the compromise was not absolute as against all the persons, and hence the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant was not a conclusive proof of the title of defendant No. 2 in respect of the properties which he transferred in favour of defendant No. 1 on 21-11-1957. I am thus of the view that the learned Additional District Judge was right in holding that the findings arrived at by the High Court in Miscellaneous Appeal No 226 of 1951 were not binding on the present plaintiff. The position thus is that it was open to him to consider the other evidence as well as regards the title claimed by the plaintiffs on the basis of the deed of gift and the compromise. 17. Mr. The position thus is that it was open to him to consider the other evidence as well as regards the title claimed by the plaintiffs on the basis of the deed of gift and the compromise. 17. Mr. Jaleshwar Prasad appearing for some of the respondents referred to Kalyanchand Lalchand V/s. Sitabai, ILR 38 Bom 309 = (AIR 1914 Bom 8) (FB), but in that case the question for consideration was whether the judgment refusing probate was as much within the scope and intention of Sec. 41 of the Evidence Act as a judgment granting probate and whether the judgment in the probate proceeding operated as res judi-cata. It was held that Sec. 41 was not applicable to the judgment of the appellate Court refusing probate and the said judgment in the probate proceeding operated as res judicata between the parties under Section 83 of the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881) and Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. This decision is not relevant for the present purpose. He further urged that the plaintiffs suit could be decreed even on the basis of the finding of the learned Additional District Judge that Rambha Devi (plaintiff No. 6) was in possession of the gifted properties and that Gopal Saran Singh (defendant No. 2) had no concern with those properties. He submitted that the possession of plaintiff No. 6 and the other plaintiffs should be deemed to be adverse, and on that basis they had acquired a title in respect of the properties in question. This was, however, not the ground on which the plaintiffs claimed any relief in the present suit, and as such defendant No. 1 was not called upon to meet this ground. I thus do not find any merit in this contention: but the plaintiffs have been rightly granted a decree on the basis of the deed of gift and the compromise. 18. No other point was raised by learned counsel for the appellant. There is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with costs payable to respondents 1 and 6. Dutta, J. 19 I agree.