Upper Doab Sugar Mills Limited v. State of U. P. — 1969 DIGILAW 59 (ALL)

JUDGMENT A.K. Kirty, J. - The petitioner which is a limited company and carries on business of manufacture and sale of sugar has filed this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution praying that a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other suitable writ or direction be issued calling for the record of Arbitration Case No. 14 of 1964 from the Arbitration Board and quashing the award dated 27-4-1967 insofar as it relates to the cases of respondents 5 to 8. It is admitted by the parties that an arbitration agreement under Section 5-B of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was entered into between the petitioner and the Chini Mazdoor Mill Union, respondent No. 9, in regard to a dispute concerning a number of workmen employed by the petitioner. This agreement was published by the State Government under sub-sec. (3) of Section 5-B of the Act. The dispute referred under the arbitration agreement to the Arbitration Board was as under :- "Whether the workmen mentioned in Annexure 'A' are entitled to be fitted in the grade claimed for ? If so, to what relief they are entitled ?" 2. The original dispute was in respect of 70 workmen. As a result of amicable settlement, the Board ultimately was required to consider on merits the dispute insofar as it related to only 10 persons. The Board rejected the claims put forward on behalf of six out of these ten persons but allowed the claims put forward on behalf of respondents 5 to 8. The petitioner, in the circumstances, has prayed that the award passed by the Board be quashed insofar as it relates to the cases of respondents 5 to 8. 3. The dispute arose in connection with the implementation of a notification dated April 27, 1961, which was published in the U. P. Gazette of the same date. By this notification the report of the. Central Wage Board, as accepted by a tripartite conference held on March 30, 1961, was published for its implementation. The workmen employed in the various sugar factories in the State of Uttar Pradesh had been classified under a number of heads and the various types of work which the workmen performed were brought under the classifications and designations mentioned in the report. The workmen employed in the various sugar factories in the State of Uttar Pradesh had been classified under a number of heads and the various types of work which the workmen performed were brought under the classifications and designations mentioned in the report. This report also prescribed grades of pay and dearness allowance to be paid to various workmen performing various types of duties in the sugar factories. After this notification the petitioner purporting to implement the same fitted respondents 5 to 8 in the grades and assigned certain designations to them the details of which are to be found in paragraph 6 of the writ petition. Respondents 5 to 8 and several other workmen were not satisfied with the assignments which the petitioner had purported to make in accordance with the notification dated April 27, 1961. This gave rise to a dispute which ultimately, as already noted above, was referred to the Arbitration Board. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the Board in giving the award had, in fact, failed to truly implement the notification and because of misconception about the notification committed manifest errors of law. The award, therefore, according to the learned counsel was liable to be quashed as prayed by the petitioner. 4. The petition was not contested on be half of respondents 1 to 4. Respondents 5 to 8 and respondent No. 9 which is the Union of Workmen, however, contested the petition and a counter affidavit was also filed on their behalf. At the hearing also the case was contested on behalf of respondents 5 to 9 only. 5. Before dealing with the case on merits or considering the various submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to consider the soundness of a preliminary objection which has been raised. on behalf of the contesting respondents. It has been urged that the writ petition itself is legally in competent inasmuch as an award given by an arbitrator or arbitrators cannot be quashed under the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution. Mr. on behalf of the contesting respondents. It has been urged that the writ petition itself is legally in competent inasmuch as an award given by an arbitrator or arbitrators cannot be quashed under the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution. Mr. K. P. Agarwal, learned counsel for the contesting respondents, contended that even though the arbitration agreement was entered into in accordance with the provisions of Section 5-B of the Act, the said agreement was a voluntary agreement entered into by private parties and that the arbitrators appointed by the parties also were private arbitrators as distinguished from statutory arbitrators. Therefore, the learned counsel submitted, it would not be competent for this Court to issue any writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction quashing the award given by private arbitrators. Mr. Shansi Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that the function of the arbitrator or arbitrators appointed under Section 5-B of the Act is not in essence the function which can be properly said to be performed by a private arbitrator. He also placed reliance on two reported decisions one by the Supreme Court and the other by the Kerala High Court in support of his contentions that the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution does lie and that it would be open to this Court to grant the relief sought, if the case on merits was established on behalf of the petitioner. Reliance was placed by Mr. K. P. Agarwal also on a number of reported decisions. I shall consider the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the parties at a later stage. I propose to examine the provisions of the Act in order to find out, in the first instance, as to whether arbitrators appointed under Section 5-B of the Act are merely private arbitrators and the award given by them is merely a private award. 6. I propose to examine the provisions of the Act in order to find out, in the first instance, as to whether arbitrators appointed under Section 5-B of the Act are merely private arbitrators and the award given by them is merely a private award. 6. Section 5-B of the Act reads as follows : "5-B (1) Where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and the employer and the workmen agree to refer the dispute to arbitration, they may, at any time before the dispute has been referred under Section 4-K to a Labour Court or Tribunal, by a written agreement refer the dispute to arbitration and the reference shall be to such person or persons (including the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court or a Tribunal) as an arbitrator or arbitrators as may be specified in the arbitration agreement. (2) An arbitration agreement referred to in sub-sec. (1) shall be in such form and shall be signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed. (3) A copy of the arbitration agreement shall be forwarded to the State Government, the Conciliation Officer and Labour Commissioner and the State Government shall, within fourteen days from the date of receipt of such copy, publish the same in the official Gazette. (4) The arbitrator or arbitrators shall investigate the dispute and submit to the State Government the arbitration award signed by the arbitrator or all the arbitrators, as the case may be. (5) Nothing in the Arbitration Act, 1940, shall apply to arbitration under this section." 7. On a reading of Section 5-B of the Act it will be clear that this section only provides an alternative mode of deciding an industrial dispute. So, the subject-matter of reference must necessarily be an industrial dispute which expression has been defined under the Act. Again, the mere act of entering into an arbitration agreement under Section 5-B (1) of the Act does not ipso facto invest the arbitrator or arbitrators with jurisdiction and power to enter on the reference immediately and to give an award. The agreement has got to be entered into in the form prescribed and it is also to be required to be signed by the parties concerned in the manner prescribed. When the agreement has been entered into as provided under sub-secs. The agreement has got to be entered into in the form prescribed and it is also to be required to be signed by the parties concerned in the manner prescribed. When the agreement has been entered into as provided under sub-secs. (1) and (2) of Section 5-B of the Act, the agreement has got to be published in the official gazette under sub-sec. (3) . The arbitrator or arbitrators have been required under sub-sec. (4) to submit the award to the State Government. The award has again got to be published by the State Government as provided under Section 6 (3) of the Act. Even after the publication of the award it does not automatically become operative or effective immediately. Under Section 6-A of the Act it has been provided that the award shall become enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 6. There is, however, a proviso to Section 6-A of the Act under which the award even though published shall not become enforceable where the State Government, after such enquiry as it considers necessary, is satisfied that the same has been given or obtained through collusion, fraud or misrepresentation. The award when it becomes enforceable can be got implemented under Section 6-H of the Act by recovery of money due from an employer under the award as if it were an arrear of land revenue. Again, when an award has been duly published and has become enforceable, the employer, may under certain circumstances, be liable to be prosecuted and punished for its non-implementation under Section 14 of the Act. From what has been stated above it would, to my mind, be clear that although the arbitration agreement may originate as a result of voluntary act of two parties and may in a sense be termed a private arbitration agreement, yet to be operative that arbitration agreement has got to fulfil the requirements prescribed under the Act and has also got to be published. Even after the making of the award, the award to be effective and enforceable must fulfil certain other requirements laid down under the provisions of the Act. Even after the making of the award, the award to be effective and enforceable must fulfil certain other requirements laid down under the provisions of the Act. After the award has been duly published and accepted by the Government to be an award liable to be enforced, a statutory sanction has been given to it and it has been made enforceable by virtue of specific statutory provisions as mentioned above. In the circumstances, I find myself unable to accept the submissions of Mr. Agarwal that the original agreement being a private agreement the arbitration proceedings throughout remained private arbitration proceedings and the award is also only a private award given by a private arbitrator. I am also unable to accept the submission that sub-sec. (2) to (5) of Section 5-B of the Act and other sections of the Act, referred to above, are mere machinery provisions for the enforcement of the award for purposes of maintaining industrial peace. Independently, therefore, of the rulings relied upon by the parties, upon a reading of the relevant provisions of the Act itself I have come to the conclusion that an award given by arbitrator or arbitrators appointed under Section 5-B (1) of the Act, which has been published and has become enforceable under Section 6-A of the Act, may in appropriate cases be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and that it would be wrong to say as an absolute proposition of law that such an award can in no case be quashed or dealt with by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. Coming to the rulings relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties I may mention that Mr. Shanti Bhushan relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd., A.I.R. 1963 SC 874 in support of his contention that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is legally maintainable even though it may relate to an award given by arbitrator or arbitrators under the Industrial Disputes Act. In that case an arbitration award had been given under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act -4, (Central Act No. XIV of 1947) . A petition under Article 136 of the Constitution was filed in the Supreme Court which was directed against the arbitration award. In that case an arbitration award had been given under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act -4, (Central Act No. XIV of 1947) . A petition under Article 136 of the Constitution was filed in the Supreme Court which was directed against the arbitration award. The question which directly arose for consideration by the Supreme Court was as to whether the petition for special leave was legally maintainable or not. The Supreme Court held that the arbitrator or arbitrators who had given the arbitration award could not be said to constitute a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136 of the Constitution. In considering the point raised the Supreme Court made certain observations which definitely go to support the submission made by Mr. Shanti Bhushan that a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would lie for quashing even an arbitration award. It may here be mentioned that in regard to arbitration agreement and arbitration award concerning industrial disputes the provisions in the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act are almost identical with the provisions contained in the Central Act. Therefore, the observations which were made by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case would apply with equal force to an arbitration award under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The observations on which reliance in particular was placed by Mr. Shanti Bhushan are to be found in paragraphs 15 to 16 of the judgment in the aforesaid case. I do not consider it necessary to recapitulate or to quote those observations. 9. The next decision relied upon by Mr. Shanti Bhushan is the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Alleppey District Small-Scale Coir Manufacturers' Association v. Travancore Coir Factory Workers' Union, Alleppey, (1965) 1 LLJ 650 . On a perusal of this judgment it would appear that, although previously the view which obtained in Kerala and certain other High Courts was that an arbitration award given under the Industrial Disputes Act was not liable to be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution, yet, on the basis of the observations made by the Supreme Court in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha'sl case, a definite pronouncement was made that such a writ petition would be legally competent. I shall now refer to the rulings cited by Mr. Agarwal. 10. I shall now refer to the rulings cited by Mr. Agarwal. 10. In support of his submission that an arbitration agreement entered into under Section 5-B (1) of the Act retains its private character throughout, Mr. Agarwal placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hanskumar Kishan Chand v. The Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 SC 947. In that case an award was given in respect of compensasation payable for the requisition of some property under the Defence of India Act, 1939. The award was given by the Additional District Judge, Khandwa. The question was whetehr the Additional District Judge who had given the award acted as a court or as a person designata and the further question was as to whether an appeal did or did not lie against the award given by him. The Supreme Court in deciding the case observed that an appeal against the award having been provided by the statute the proceeding which at its inception was an arbitration proceeding must retain its character as arbitration even when it was taken up in appeal. This decision of the Supreme Court, to my mind, is of no help in the decision of the contentions raised in the instant case. It is now well settled that an appeal is a continuation of the suit or of the original proceeding subject, of course, to any statutory provision which may be applicable to a particular case or under particular circumstances. Therefore, if I may say so with utmost respect, the Supreme Court in that case made observations which are in conformity with the aforesaid accepted principle of law. 11. The next case relied on by Mr. Agarwal in this connection was a decision of this Court in Uttar Pradesh Government v. Ram Swarup, 1961 ALJ 258. This Court reiterated the observation which was made by the Supreme Court in Hans Kumar's case. For the reasons already given I am of opinion that this case also does not furnish any cogent ground for accepting Mr. Agarwal's submission. 12. To support his contention that no writ can be issued to quash an award given by an arbitrator or arbitrators, Mr. Agarwal relied on the decision in R. v. Disputes Committee of the National Joint Council for the Craft of Dental Techniciang, (1953) I All England Reports 327. Relying on this decision, Mr. Agarwal's submission. 12. To support his contention that no writ can be issued to quash an award given by an arbitrator or arbitrators, Mr. Agarwal relied on the decision in R. v. Disputes Committee of the National Joint Council for the Craft of Dental Techniciang, (1953) I All England Reports 327. Relying on this decision, Mr. Agarwal urged that the arbitration agreement in the instant case cannot be said to be a 'statutory arbitration agreement' nor the award given by the Board a 'statutory award'. He contended that there was no statutory compulsion for the disputing parties to resolve their dispute by submitting the same to the Arbitration Board. The act of entering into the arbitration agreement was completely voluntary. This being so, Mr. Agarwal urged, it cannot be said that in the instant case there was any-statutory arbitration. I have already observed that I am unable to accept any submission as correct which goes to the length of propounding that there is an absolute bar against issuing any writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution in cases of arbitration agreement culminating in an arbitration award under the Act. I have also observed above that, in my opinion, the arbitration under Section 5-B of the Act and the award given in such arbitration are not entirely dependent on what the parties do or what the arbitrator ultimately decides. Therefore, although at its inception there may not have been any compulsion under the statute for resolving the dispute by arbitration yet once the parties agree to make a reference under Section 5-B, the reference and the subsequent proceedings are definitely subject to certain statutory provisions. In this respect there is a clear distinction between a private arbitration and an award given in such arbitration on the one hand and an arbitration and award under the Act on the other. It may be mentioned here that by virtue of sub-sec. (5) of Section 5-B of the Act and Section 13 therefore, the entire Arbitration Act, 1940 has been made inapplicable to arbitrations under Section 5-B of the Act. Therefore, an arbitration under the Act is necessarily something different from an ordinary arbitration to which the provisions of Arbitration Act, 1940 are applicable. There may exist some doubt as to whether an arbitration under Section 5-B of the Act can or cannot come under 'statutory arbitration'. Therefore, an arbitration under the Act is necessarily something different from an ordinary arbitration to which the provisions of Arbitration Act, 1940 are applicable. There may exist some doubt as to whether an arbitration under Section 5-B of the Act can or cannot come under 'statutory arbitration'. That by itself, however, would be no ground to hold that such arbitration must necessarily remain, under all circumstances, completely beyond the reach of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. To distinguish an arbitration under the Act from an ordinary arbitration to which the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1910 are applicable and from a statutory arbitration, and to give it a identity, it would not, perhaps, be in appropriate to describe and treat it as a quasi Statutory arbitration. I am of opinion that such an arbitration, including the award given therein, would, under certain circumstances which I need not elaborate, be amenable to the Writ jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 13. Before dealing with the other submissions made in the case, I may refer to two decisions from which support was sought to be derived by Mr. Agarwal for his contention that that Writ petition is not legally maintainable. In Rajdhari Devi v. Deputy Registrar Co-operative Societies, U.P. Goraklzpu, 1962 ALJ 876, relying on the dictum of Lord Goddard, C. J. in R. v. Disputes Committee of the National Joint Council, (1953) 1 Alld. ER 327, Srivastava, J. held that arbitration's under rule; 115 to 138 of the Cooperative Societies Rules, 1936, could not be said to be Statutory arbitration's so as to be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. It was pointed out by the learned Judge that by virtue of Section 46 of the Arbitration Act, barring certain sections, other provisions of that Act would be applicable to arbitration's under rules 115 to 138 of the Co-operative Societies Rules. Therefore, the learned Judge was of the view that it could not be said that though ordinary arbitrators are not amenable to writ jurisdiction arbitrators under the Co-operative Societies Rules could be controlled by Writs. Therefore, the learned Judge was of the view that it could not be said that though ordinary arbitrators are not amenable to writ jurisdiction arbitrators under the Co-operative Societies Rules could be controlled by Writs. I have already mentioned that, in my opinion, arbitration's under the Act have got a separate identity and are different from ordinary or private arbitration's and also statutory arbitration's. Therefore, on the basis of the decision of Srivastava, J. in Rajdhari Devi's case I am unable to hold the present petition to be legally incompetent. Mr. Agarwal then referred to the decision of a Division Bench in District Co-operative Federation Ltd., Meerut v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, U.P. Laucknow, 1966 ALJ 36 for the purpose of showing that although the Division Bench, disagreeing with the view of Srivastava, J., held arbitration's under the Co-operative Societies Rules to be statutory arbitration's and amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, yet the Bench did not disapprove of the view expressed by Srivastava, J. to the effect that the High Court has no inherent power to set aside an award on the ground that there is an error of law apparent on the face of the award. The question in the instant case is not whether the High Court has any inherent power to set aside an award for any error apparent on the face of it, but whether the award in the instant case is one which can be accepted as an ordinary award or a private award not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this court. On this point I have already expressed my opinion that it is not so. 14. Mr. Agarwal also submitted that, even if it be held that the Writ petition is legally maintainable, the award which is based on findings of fact given by arbitrators cannot be quashed or interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The correctness of the findings of fact given by the arbitrators, according to the learned counsel, cannot be questioned. This proposition needs no canvassing. The correctness of the findings of fact given by the arbitrators, according to the learned counsel, cannot be questioned. This proposition needs no canvassing. It is well settled that the court, whether acting under Article 226 of the Constitution or under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, has no power to interfere with the findings of fact given by an arbitrator, unless such findings fall completely outside the ambit of the reference. Even under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 the power of the court to interfere with an award is extremely limited and an award can be set aside only on the grounds mentioned in Section 30 of that Act. In support of his contention that findings of fact cannot be interfered with by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution reliance was placed by Mr. Agarwal on the following cases :- 1. Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Labour Court, 1966 (1) LLJ 381 . 2. Parry's & Co., 1966 (1) LLJ 5535 3. Raza Textiles Ltd. and Kithori Lal Sharma, 1966 (1) LLJ 605 4. Bhagwati Singh and North-Eastern Railway Bigh District Electric Engineering, Muzaffarnagar, 1967 (1) LLJ 102 . 5. Hind Strip Mining Corporation Ltd. Berns and Raj Kishore Prasad (Central Government Industrial Tribunal) Dhanbad, 1967 (1) LLJ 108 . 6. State of U. P. & Muir Mills Company Ltd., Kanpur, 1967 (2) LLJ 598 . 7. Anil Behari Saran and State of Bihar, 1967 (2) LLJ 540 . 15. I do not consider it necessary to discuss the above-mentioned rulings relied on by Mr. Agarwal. The legal position that the findings of fact given by arbitrators cannot be interfered with has not been questioned by the petitioner. If in granting relief to the petitioner it becomes necessary to set aside or to interfere with any finding of fact given by the arbitrators then the petitioner would certainly not be entitled to get any relief. If, however, a3 contended by Mr. If in granting relief to the petitioner it becomes necessary to set aside or to interfere with any finding of fact given by the arbitrators then the petitioner would certainly not be entitled to get any relief. If, however, a3 contended by Mr. Shanti Bhushan, it is established by the petitioner that in arriving at any decision affecting the rights of the petitioner the arbitrators acted under clear misapprehension about the scope and ambit, or the true construction of the Notification published in the U. P. Gazette on 27-4-1961 or misconstrued or misapplied the same, then it would be open to this court to quash the adverse decision given by the arbitrators in exercise of its jurisdiction and power under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has, there-fore, to be examined as to whether any case, as contended by Mr. Shanti Bhushan, has been made out or not for the grant of any relief to the petitioner. 16. The petitioner, as already noted above, has prayed that the award given by the Arbitration Board be quashed in so far as it relates to the cases of respondents No. 5 to 8. It would, therefore, be appropriate, in my opinion, to consider the question of granting reliefs with particular reference to the individual cases or respondents 5 to 8. 17. Respondent No. 5 in the petition is Anand Prakash Mital. Prior to the implementation of the Notification, his designation in the petitioner's establishment was as 'Sales Accountant' and the Grade of his salary was Rs. 125-7f-200 (Consolidated) . After the notification, by way of implementing the same the petitioner designated respondent No. 5 as 'Sales Incharge' and assigned to him Clerical Grade II B in the pay scale of Rs. 130-7-165 EB-8-205 (plus Rs. 40/- D. A.) . Under the award, respondent No. 5 has been held to be entitled to the grade and designation of 'Assistant Sales Manager Supervisory 'B' Grade.' The contention on behalf of the petitioner is that under the notification, no such designation or grade could be legally assigned to respondent No. 5. Paragraph 2 of the notification provides as follows :- "The classification of posts into the various grades specified above shall be in accordance with the principal functions, duties, and qualifications mentioned in Appendices I, II and III". 18. Paragraph 2 of the notification provides as follows :- "The classification of posts into the various grades specified above shall be in accordance with the principal functions, duties, and qualifications mentioned in Appendices I, II and III". 18. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the Arbitration Board was labouring under a clear misapprehension in thinking that any act of rendering mere assistance to the Sales Manager would entitle the employee rendering such assistance to the designation and the grade of Assistant Sales Manager. The learned counsel submitted that even an ordinary clerk in the course of performance of his duties may have to and often does render some sort of assistance to the Sales Manager, although in rendering such assistance he may be performing duties of a clerical or ministerial nature only. According to the learned counsel it is only when an employee principally assists the Sales Manager in administrative work and also performs certain administrative duties independently on his own responsibility in the absence of the Sales Manager or in respect of certain matters assigned to him that he can be said to be rendering assistance to the Sales Manager entitling him to be designated as Assistant Sales Manager under the notification. This submission, to my mind, is correct. That the Arbitration Board was labouring under a misapprehension will be clear from a perusal of the award in so far as it relates to the case of respondent No. 5. It is admitted that respondent No. 5 did not do any administrative work independently. Merely because respondent No. 5 had been doing some work which might be in the nature of rendering some assistance to the Sales Manager it could not be said that he was assisting the Sales Manager in such a capacity as would entitle him to be designated as an Assistant Sales Manager and to the Grade for such post. I am satisfied that in so far as respondent No. 5 is concerned, the award suffers from a patent illegality which, in my opinion, the Arbitration Board committed as a result of a clear misapprehension on their part about the scope, ambit and true construction of the notification. 19. I am satisfied that in so far as respondent No. 5 is concerned, the award suffers from a patent illegality which, in my opinion, the Arbitration Board committed as a result of a clear misapprehension on their part about the scope, ambit and true construction of the notification. 19. In so ar as respondent No. 6, Jagdish Prasad Sharma, is concerned, upon a perusal of the relevant portion of the award it would be clear that the Arbitration Board did not commit any manifest error of law as a result of which the decision of the Arbitration Board could be said to be vitiated. The arbitrators considered in detail the various duties which Jagdish Prasad Sharma had been performing and came to the conclusion that he was entitled to be classified as Assistant Accountant in the Clerical Grade II B. This part of the award cannot, in my opinion, be interfered with. 20. Respondent No. 7, Brahma Prakash, has been assigned the designation of Assistant Accountant, clerical grade II B by the arbitrators. Prior to the notification respondent No. 7 was working as Accounts Section clerk, grade II in the petitioner's establishment. He was getting a salary in a lower scale than the scale of the salary which respondent No. 6, who was working as Accounts section grade I clerk, was getting. On a comparison of the types of duties which. respondents Nos. 6 and 7 were performing it would appear that respondent No. 6 was certainly performing duties of a much more responsible nature than respondent No. 7. Although the Arbitration Board in considering the case of respondent No. 6 mentioned in detail the various duties which he had been performing, yet in dealing with the case of respondent No. 7 the arbitrators did not do so. The arbitrators in deciding the case of respondent No. 7, to my mind, did not clearly keep in view the principal duties and qualification which were required under notification for the designation of an employee as Assistant Accountant, clerical grade II B. I am, therefore, of opinion that the award in so far as it relates to respondent No. 7 also deserves to be quashed. 21. 21. Respondent No. 8, R. D. Sod, has been given the designation and pay scale of Security Officer, clerical grade II A. Arguments at length were advanced by the learned counsel for-the parties with reference to the case of this respondent. Various documents on record were also placed before me. After considering the sumissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the relevant portion of the award, I am satisfied that the award, in so far as it relates to respondent No. 8, deserved to be quashed. It is clear. from the documents placed before me that Soti was really working in the Provident Fund department and that he had been assigned a part-time duty in the security department. Soti also claimed from the employers additional or extra payment for .the work which he was required to perform in the security department. He was admittedly placed on probation for ultimate appointment in the post of Security Officer. He was not found suitable for the post by the employer and, therefore, he was not confirmed. The employer thereafter gave an advertisement for filling in the post of Security Officer which was also a newly created post. Sod admittedly did not make any application for appointment to that post. In the circumstances, I am of opinion that Soti legitimately could not be given the designation and the pay scale of the Security Officer, clerical grade II-A as has been done by the arbitrators. The decision given by the arbitrators, to me, appears to suffer from an apparent misconception in regard to the necessary qualifications and other circumstances which, under the notification, were required of an employee to be given the designation and pay scale of the Security Officer, clerical Grade II A. This part of the award also, therefore, deserves to be set aside. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, I allow this Writ petition in part and quash the impugned award in so far as it relates to the cases of Anand Prakash, respondent No. 5, Brahma Prakash, respondent No. 7 and R. D. Soti, respondent No. 8. In the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.