The prayer made in this application, dated 8-9-69 filed under Sec­tion 149 of the Civil Procedure Code by the appellant Hem Chandra Sarkar, is for condonation of the delay that occurred in paying the deficient Court-fee required for the memorandum of appeal presented in this Court on 29-1-1969. 2. The relevant facts are that the res­pondent Jyoti Bala Chakraborty instituted a suit against the appellant Hem Chandra Sarkar for the latter's ejectment from a house and for the recovery of arrears of rent, compensation, and mesne profits. The reliefs granted in the decree made by the trial Court were for the eviction of Hem Chandra from the house in dispute and for payment by him of Rs. 1750/. on account of rent, Rs. 300/- by way of com­pensation, and Rs. 50/- P. M. as mesne profits until the delivery of possession of the house by him to Jyoti Bala. Hem Chandra went in appeal against that decree and the Additional District Judge, Tripura, set aside the decree for his evic­tion and for mesne profits but affirmed the rest of it. Jyoti Bala filed second appeal in this Court against the decree of the Additional District Judge and that appeal was accepted and the decree of the trial Court was restored in full This Court made the following order respecting mesne profits:- "The appellant will be entitled to re­cover possession of the house and also damages @ Rs. 50/- per mensem for the sub­sequent period from 1-10-57 until the date on which she obtains possession of the suit house. They should be ascertained under Order 20. Rule 12 C. P. C. separate­ly on a petition. The appellant will have to pay Court fee on the ascertained amount before she executes the decree for arrears of rents or for damages." 3. Pursuant to the direction given by this Court, Jyoti Bala moved a petition in the trial Court for ascertaining the damages. Hem Chandra filed objections pleading non-maintainability of the peti­tion and bar of limitation. The trial Court held, by its order dated 16th of December, 1968 that Jyoti Bala was entitled to a decree for mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 50/- per mensem from 1-10-1957 until 4-11-1968, the date preceding the one on which she had secured possession of the demised house. A final decree hi accord­ance with this finding was consequently passed. 50/- per mensem from 1-10-1957 until 4-11-1968, the date preceding the one on which she had secured possession of the demised house. A final decree hi accord­ance with this finding was consequently passed. It is against that decree that Hem Chandra filed an appeal in this Court on 29-1-1969. 4. The appeal was filed on a Court-fee stamp of Rs. 10/- and the nature of the appeal was mentioned as miscellaneous. The appeal was admitted by this Court and notice issued to the respondent. When the appeal came up for hearing before me on 29-7-1969, none put in appearance on behalf of the respondent Jyoti Bala. How­ever, I raised the following two objections suo motu:- (i) Whether the memorandum of appeal has been properly and adequately stamp­ed and (ii) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try this appeal. 5. I adjourned the case on that day to 23-8-1969 to enable the appellant's counsel to prepare himself for addressing the Court respecting those two points. On that date the appellant put in an addi­tional Court-fee of Rs. 538.25 to make up the deficiency. 6. The appeal was put up before me on 8-9-1969 in the presence of the counsel for both the parties. It was urged on be­half of the appellant that the deficiency in the Court-fee having been made up, arguments on point no. (ii) raised by the Court on 29-7-1969 be heard. However, since there was no application for con­doning the delay in making up the defi­ciency in Court-fee, an adjournment was granted until 9th of September for pre­senting such an application. The applica­tion was filed on 8th of September, 1969, itself and since it was opposed by the res­pondent on the 9th, parties' counsel addressed arguments on its merits. 7. Shri P. K. Sarkar urged on the authority of AIR 1966 Punj 332, State of Punjab v. Nand Kishore, that the appel­lant should be permitted to make up the deficiency in terms of Section 149 of the Code. 7. Shri P. K. Sarkar urged on the authority of AIR 1966 Punj 332, State of Punjab v. Nand Kishore, that the appel­lant should be permitted to make up the deficiency in terms of Section 149 of the Code. Shri M. K. Dutta, representing the decree-holder, contended, on the other hand, that the prayer made by the appel­lant should be rejected for the reasons that it was not proved that it was on account of some bona fide mistake that the full Court-fee had not been paid when the appeal was filed on 29-1-1969, and that no application under Section 149 had been made at the tune the appeal was present­ed in this Court. He cited the case of Jai Bhagwan v. Om Prakash, AIR 1969 Punj and Har 308 to shore up this stand. After examining the two authorities, I have come to the conclusion that the one reli­ed upon by Shri M. K. Dutta is distinguishable and that the facts of the case in hand are more analogous to that of the authority cited by Shri P. K. Sarkar. 8. Section 149 of the Code reads as under: "Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the tune being in force relating to Court-fees has not been paid, the Court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such Court-fee; and upon such pay­ment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance." The appellant can surely avail of this statutory provision for praying to the Court to make up the deficiency in Court-fee. It is correct that the appellant can­not claim as of right, while moving the Court under this section, the payment of the additional Court-fee for it is plainly deducible from the language used that the matter rests in the discretion of the Court. In the present case, however, I am inclin­ed to exercise the discretion in favour of the appellant for it appears, as is men­tioned in the application made under Section 149, that his counsel did not give him the proper advice. In the present case, however, I am inclin­ed to exercise the discretion in favour of the appellant for it appears, as is men­tioned in the application made under Section 149, that his counsel did not give him the proper advice. The appeal was headed as a 'Miscellaneous Appeal' by the counsel, although actually it was an ap­peal against the final decree. The Regis­trar of this Court also laboured under the impression that it was a Miscellaneous Appeal and adequately stamped as is ap­parent from his report dated 25-2-1969. It is not in dispute that a Court-fee of Rs. 10/- was sufficient if it were in fact a Miscellaneous Appeal. It would indeed be hard if the appeal were thrown out on a technical point for no apparent fault of the appellant himself, especially when he lost no time in making up the deficiency after the objection was raised by this Court suo motu. Hence, if the matter rested only on the exercise of discretion in favour of the appellant I would do so in context of the circumstances narrated for I feel satisfied that it is a case of bona fide mistake on part of the appellant and that mistake is attributable to wrong advice given by a highly senior counsel engaged by him. However, I find that the appellant can claim as of right the privi­lege of making up the deficiency in Court-fee in view of clauses (b) and (c) of Order VII Rule 11, read with Section 107 of the Code. 9. Clauses (b) and (c) of O. VII, R. 11, of the Code run as under:- "The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:- (a).................................... (b) Where the relief claimed Is under­valued, and the plaintiff, on being requir­ed by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so: (c) Where the relief claimed Is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plain­tiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so: (d) It appears appropriate that Section 107 of the Code be reproduced here. It is in the following terms:- "(1) Subject to such conditions and limi­tations as may be prescribed, an Appellate Court shall have power- (a) to determine a case finally? It is in the following terms:- "(1) Subject to such conditions and limi­tations as may be prescribed, an Appellate Court shall have power- (a) to determine a case finally? (b) to remand a case; (c) to frame issues and refer them for trial; (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. (2) Subject as aforesaid, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original juris­diction in respect of suits instituted there­in." Sub-section (2) of Section 107 gives the appellate Court the same powers and as­signs to it the same duties as are conferr­ed and imposed on the Court of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. Indisputably, a Court of original jurisdiction has to give time to a plain­tiff for correcting the valuation of a suit if the relief claimed is undervalued, and to make up the deficiency in the Court-fee if the plaint is insufficiently stamped, as enjoined by clauses (b) and (c) of O. VII, Rule 11. In the memorandum of appeal submitted to this Court by Hem Chandra, the relief claimed has been undervalued and in consequence it had been also insufficiently stamped. There­fore, in terms of clauses (b) and (c) of O. VII, Rule 11, read with Section 107 of the Code this Court was bound to give time to him for correcting the valuation and making up the deficiency in Court-fee. That was admittedly never done until the deficiency was noted by me on 29-7-1969. Thereafter as well, the Court did not call upon the appellant to correct the valuation and make up the deficiency in Court-fee. Instead, he was asked to satisfy this Court that the memorandum of appeal had been adequately stamped. The appellant then felt, it appears, that the plaint had not been properly stamped and so he voluntarily put in the additional Court-fee stamps to make up the deficiency. Under the circumstances, no fault can be found with the appeal as at present in the matter of its valuation and the Court-fee stamp required for it. The appellant then felt, it appears, that the plaint had not been properly stamped and so he voluntarily put in the additional Court-fee stamps to make up the deficiency. Under the circumstances, no fault can be found with the appeal as at present in the matter of its valuation and the Court-fee stamp required for it. Section 149 states unambiguously that when the document has been properly stamped after it had been filed in the Court the document shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance. 11. I must state here that there is a sharp conflict of opinion amongst the various High Courts in India on the point whether the provisions of clause (c) of Rule 11 apply to appeals. I am inclined to follow the view that they do apply to the appeals because the phraseology of sub­section (2) of Section 107 leaves no room for doubt on the point. Therefore, the appellate Court is bound to grant time to the appellant for making up the deficiency in the Court-fee if the memorandum of appeal is insufficiently stamped. That Court cannot in the latter circumstance adjudge the fate of appeal merely on the basis of the provisions of Section 149 in exercise of its discretion without complying with the command given by clauses (b) and (c) of Rule 11 of Order VII and giving time to the appellant to do the needful. If the appellant fails to make up the deficiency in the court-fee within the time allowed to him by the appellate Court, then alone the latter may reject the memorandum of appeal as insuffici­ently stamped and not otherwise. 12. That an appellant can make up the deficiency in the court-fee in the manner Hem Chandra of this case has done can also be supported on the basis of section 28 of the Court-fees Act. That section enacts, in its first part, that no document which ought to bear a stamp under this Act shall be of any validity unless and until it is properly stamped. That section enacts, in its first part, that no document which ought to bear a stamp under this Act shall be of any validity unless and until it is properly stamped. It is mentioned in the second part of the section that if such document is through mistake or inadvertence received, filed or used in any court or office without being properly stamped, the Presiding Judge or the head of the office, as the case may be, or, in the case of a High Court, any Judge of such court, may, if he thinks fit, order that such document be stamp­ed as he may direct; and on such docu­ment being stamped accordingly, the same and every proceeding relative there­to shall be as valid as if it had been pro­perly stamped in the first instance. I have stated above that the Registrar of this Court made a report on 25-2-1969 that the memorandum of appeal had been properly stamped. It is apparent that he had admitted the memorandum of ap­peal and then acted upon it by sheer in­advertence. He was, I believe, chiefly influenced in acting in that manner by the fact that the memorandum had been described as a Miscellaneous Appeal. Nevertheless, its admission without ob­jection indicates inadvertence and as such I have the statutory authority to call up­on the appellant to make the deficiency in court-fee, and once that deficiency is made up in compliance with the order given, the appeal shall be considered as having been properly stamped as in the first instance. 13. In fairness to Shri H. N. Kar a brief reference must be made to the case of Jai Bhagwan, AIR 1969 Punj. & Har. 308 cited by him. In that case the certi­fied copies of judgments of the first ap­pellate and trial courts had been insuffi­ciently stamped when filed along with the memorandum of second appeal. The High Court held that the appeal must be dismissed as barred by time because the deficiency in the court-fee stamp on the two documents had been made good after the period of limitation for the ap­peal had run out. The High Court evi­dently refused to exercise the discretion vesting in it under section 149 of the Code in favour of the appellant. The High Court evi­dently refused to exercise the discretion vesting in it under section 149 of the Code in favour of the appellant. The distinguishing feature between the facts of that case and the case in hand is that in the latter case it was the memoran­dum of appeal which had not been ade­quately stamped. Clause (c) of rule 11 of O. VII read with section 107 of the Code applies only to the memorandum of appeal and not to the certified copies of the judgments subjoined to the memo­randum of appeal. Hence, the High Court could not have given time to the appel­lant of the reported case for making up the deficiency of stamp respecting the certified copies under clause (c) of rule 11. The High Court failed to exercise its discretion in favour of the appellant under section 149 on the basis that it had not been proved that the documents could not be fully stamped despite the exer­cise of due care and attention. The High Court followed the view taken by a sin­gle Judge of the Lahore High Court in the case of Shahadat v. Hukam Singh, AIR 1924 Lah 401, in preference to a Full Bench decision of that Court in Jagat Ram v. Misar Kharaiti Ram, AIR 1938 Lah 361 (FB) and a decision of the Delhi High Court in AIR 1968 Delhi 183. Custodian of Evacuee Property v. Rameswar Dayal. It appears that an ear­lier Division Bench authority of the Pun­jab High Court in the case of AIR 1966 Punj 332, in which the aforementioned Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in the case of Jagat Ram, AIR 1938 Lah 361 (FB) was cited with approval, was not brought to the notice of P. C. Pandit, J., who gave the judgment in the case of Jai Bhagwan, AIR 1969 Punj & Har. 308. It was held by the Lahore High Court in Jagat Ram's case. AIR 1938 Lah 361 (FB) that the discretion conferred on the Court by section 149 is normally expected to be exercised in favour of the litigant except in cases of contumacy or positive mala fides or rea­sons of a similar kind. The question of bona fides in this connection, it was observed further, should be construed in the sense that word is used in the Gene­ral Clauses Act and not as used in the Limitation Act. The question of bona fides in this connection, it was observed further, should be construed in the sense that word is used in the Gene­ral Clauses Act and not as used in the Limitation Act. I may point out that the expression "good faith" is defined in the General Clauses Act as : "A thing shall be deemed to be done in good faith where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not". Following these observations made by the Lahore High Court, and which observations were cited with approval by the Punjab High Court and the Delhi High Court as stated above,, I feel satisfied that it would be proper exercise of discretion under section 149 of the Code if Hem Chandra, the appel­lant in this case, were permitted to makes up the deficiency in court-fee. 14. As a result, I allow the applica­tion made under section 149 but make no order as to costs. The appeal shall be considered to have been filed within the period of limitation. The parties' counsel shall now address arguments on the second point raised by me on 29th of July, 1969. Application allowed.