JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - On July 1, 1951, the petitioner took on lease land measuring 89 acres comprised in Survey Nos. 5/1/1 and 3/3 situate in Cantonment, Shahjahanpur, for agricultural purposes. The lease was renewed from time to time and, admittedly, continued till November 30, 1966, the last renewal being on December 17, 1965, from December 1, 1965 to November 30, 1966. On June 18, 1966, the Military Estates Officer, Lucknow, gave a notice to the petitioner, cancelling the lease for failure to comply with certain requirements, and asked the petitioner to hand over possession on or before June 30, 1966. The petitioner replied to this notice and thereafter some correspondence took place between the parties. On April 10, 1967, the Military Estates Officer served a notice on the petitioner under Section 4 (1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958, to show cause why an order of eviction should not be passed against him. The petitioner replied to the notice but, on June 6, 1967, an order under Section 5 (1) of the Act was passed by the Military Estates Officer for the eviction of the petitioner from the land in dispute and the petitioner was asked to vacate the premises within 30 days of the 'order. The petitioner was informed that, on his refusal or failure to vacate within the specified time, he and all other persons concerned will be liable to be evicted from the premises, if need be, by use of force. The petitioner again wrote to the Military Estates Officer to renew his lease and also made a representation to the Defence Minister. Ultimately, nothing came out of it and the lease was not renewed. On June 15, 1968, a notice under Section 5 (2) of the Act was sent to the petitioner by the Cantonment Executive Officer, Shahjahanpur, asking him to be present at the spot on June 24, 1968, to hand over possession over the land together with structures, crops and fittings. It was further stated in the notice, that if the petitioner did not appear and 'hand over possession, such force, as may be necessary, will be used. According to the respondents, actual possession was taken on the June 26, 1968, over the land etc. It was further stated in the notice, that if the petitioner did not appear and 'hand over possession, such force, as may be necessary, will be used. According to the respondents, actual possession was taken on the June 26, 1968, over the land etc. and on the same date, the land was handed over to respondent No. 3, the Ex-Soldiers Servicemen Farming Co-operative Society, Shahjahanpur, to whom it was leased out. 2. The petitioner challenges the action of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 on the ground that the Act is unconstitutional and the action taken thereunder is illegal. The first ground, on which the constitutionality of the Act is challenged, is that it was beyond the competence of Parliament as it relates to "land" within the meaning of Entry IS of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Entry 18 reads : "18. Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization." .. In my opinion, the Act is not legislation in respect of land, as contemplated in Entry 18, but is legislation in respect of 'property of the Union' referred to in Entry 32 of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule. Entry 32 reads : "32. Property of the Union and the revenue therefrom, but as regards property situated in a State subject to legislation by the State, save in so far as Parliament by the otherwise provides." 4. Article 246, which confers legislative powers on Parliament and the State Legislatures, provides : "246 (1) -Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3) , Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the "Union List") . (2) ................. (3) Subject to clauses (I) and (2) , the legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the 'State List') ." 5. (2) ................. (3) Subject to clauses (I) and (2) , the legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the 'State List') ." 5. The use of the words "notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3) " in clause (1) and the words "subject to clauses (1) and (2) " in clause (3) show that, in case of overlapping between Lists I and II, the power of Parliament under clause (1) shall prevail over that of the State Legislature under clause (3) . If an enactment of Parliament, in pith and substance, falls under an entry in List I, then it would be valid notwithstanding any incidental encroachment upon an entry in List II. See Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khitlna, A.I.R. 1947 PC 60 and Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan, A.I.R. 1941 FC 47. The Act is in relation to the property of the Union and falls squarely within Entry 32 of List I. It was within the competence of Parliament to enact it and is valid even if it incidentally effects "land" as contemplated in Entry 18 of List II also. In Hari Singh v. The Military Estate Officer, Delhi, A.I.R. 1964 Pun 304, the Punjab High Court held that the Act was within the legislative competence of Parliament even with regard to its application to agricultural lands. The first contention is, therefore, without any force. 6. The main contention of the petitioner is that the Act offends Article 14 of the Constitution as it discriminates between unauthorised occupants of public premises inter se. The argument is that the Act provides a procedure parallel to the ordinary law but much more onerous, and it leaves to the unguided discretion of the Estate Officer to take action against a particular unauthorised occupant either under the Act or under the ordinary law. Before examining this contention, it may be stated that Parliament had earlier enacted the Public Premises (Eviction) Act, 1950 which was struck down by this Court in Brigade Commander, Meerut Sub-Area v. Ganga Prasad, A.I.R. 1956 Alld. 507 on the ground that it offended Al tide 14 of the Constitution. Before examining this contention, it may be stated that Parliament had earlier enacted the Public Premises (Eviction) Act, 1950 which was struck down by this Court in Brigade Commander, Meerut Sub-Area v. Ganga Prasad, A.I.R. 1956 Alld. 507 on the ground that it offended Al tide 14 of the Constitution. This Act was also struck down by the Calcutta High Court in Jagu Singh v. Shaukat Ali, 58 CWN 1066 and by the Punjab High Court in Satish Chander v. Delhi Improvement Trust, A.I.R. 1958 Pun 1 on the ground that it contravened Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. The 1950 Act was replaced by the present Act in 1958. In the statement of objects and reasons with which the Bill was introduced in Parliament, it was stated referring to the above mentioned decisions :- "The above decisions have made it impossible for Government to take speedy action even in flagrant cases of unauthorised occupation of public premises and the only way, in which such persons may be evicted, is by the ordinary process of ,,haw which often involves considerable delay. It has, therefore, become necessary to provide a speedy machinery for the evict Lion of persons who are in unauthorised occupation of public premises, keeping in view at the same time the necessity of complying with the provisions of the Constitution." 7. Section 2 of the Act is the definition section. Clause (a) defines a estate officer, clause (b) defines public premises and clause (e) defines unauthorised occupation. Section 3 provides for the appointment of estate officers. Section 4 empowers the estate officer to issue notice to unauthorised occupants of public premises to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made against them. Clause (a) defines a estate officer, clause (b) defines public premises and clause (e) defines unauthorised occupation. Section 3 provides for the appointment of estate officers. Section 4 empowers the estate officer to issue notice to unauthorised occupants of public premises to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made against them. Section 5, the constitutionality of which is challenged, is in these words :- "5 (1) -If, after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance of a notice under Section 4 and any evidence he may produce in support of the same and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the estate officer is satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorised occupation, the estate officer may, on a date to be fixed for the purpose, make an order of eviction, for reasons to be recorded therein, directing that the public premises shall be vacated by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises. (2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction within forty-five days of the date of its publication under sub-sec. (1), the estate officer or any other officer duly authorised by the estate officer in this behalf may evict that person from, and take possession of, the public premises and may, for that purpose, use such force as may be necessary : Provided that in the case of any such person who is not a Government employee and who has been in continuous occupation of the public premises for a period exceeding three years immediately preceding the date of the publication of the order of eviction, the estate officer shall not, if an application is made to him in this behalf, evict such person from the public premises within ninety days of such publication." 8. Section 6 deals with the disposal of property left on public premises by unauthorised occupants. Section 7 confers a power to recover rent or damages in respect of public premises as arrears of land revenue. The other provisions are not material for our purposes. Section 6 deals with the disposal of property left on public premises by unauthorised occupants. Section 7 confers a power to recover rent or damages in respect of public premises as arrears of land revenue. The other provisions are not material for our purposes. The Act was amended in 1963 by Act XL of 1963 and the only change introduced by this Act, with which we are concerned, is that, instead of the period of 45 days in sub-sec. (2) of Section 5, .a period of 30 days was substituted. The Act was again amended by the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Ordinance, 1968, which was promulgated on June 17, 1968. This Ordinance introduced Section 10-E into the Act, barring the jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of public premises. 9. Reliance is placed by learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his contention, on the decision of the Supreme Court in Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd. v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 SC 1581. In this case, the Supreme Court struck down Section 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959, on the ground of infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution. Section 5 of the Public Act dealt with eviction of unauthorised persons from public premises and sub-sec. (1) provided that, if, after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance of a notice under Section 4 and any evidence as he may produce in support of the same and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the Collector was satisfied that the public premises were in unauthorised occupation, the Collector may make an order of eviction, giving reasons.. The Supreme Court held : "Assuming that persons in occupation of Government properties and premises form a class by themselves as against tenants and occupiers of private owned properties and that such classification is justified on the ground that they require a differential treatment in public interest, those who fall under that classification are entitled to equal treatment among themselves. The Supreme Court held : "Assuming that persons in occupation of Government properties and premises form a class by themselves as against tenants and occupiers of private owned properties and that such classification is justified on the ground that they require a differential treatment in public interest, those who fall under that classification are entitled to equal treatment among themselves. If the ordinary law of the land and the special, law provide two different and alternative procedures, one more prejudicial than the other, discrimination must result if it is left to the will of the authority to exercise the more prejudicial against some and not against tile rest. A person who is proceeded against under the more drastic procedure is bound to complain as to why the drastic procedure is exercised against him and not against the others, even though those others are similarly circumstanced. The procedure under Section 5 is obviously more drastic and prejudicial than the one under the Civil Procedure Code where the litigant can get the benefit of a trial by an ordinary court dealing with the ordinary law of the land with the right of appeal, revision etc. as against the person who is proceeded against under Section 5 of the Act as his case would be disposed of by an executive officer of the Government, whose decision rests on his mere satisfaction, subject no doubt to an appeal but before an-other executive officer, viz., the Commissioner. There can be no doubt that Section 5 confers an additional remedy over and above the remedy by way of suit and that by providing two alternative remedies to the Government and in leaving it to the unguided discretion of the Collector to re-sort to one' or the other and to pick and choose some of those in occupation of public properties and premises for the application of the more drastic procedure under Section 5, that Section 4 as lent itself open to the charge of discrimination and as being violative of Article 14. In this view Section 5 must be declared to be void." 10. There is no material difference between the provisions of Section 5 of the Punjab Act and the provisions of Section 5 of the present Act. Learned counsel for respondents Nos. In this view Section 5 must be declared to be void." 10. There is no material difference between the provisions of Section 5 of the Punjab Act and the provisions of Section 5 of the present Act. Learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 has not been able to show me that, in respect of the unauthorised occupants of public premises, the procedure prescribed by the Act alone has to be followed and that it is not open to the authorities to resort to the ordinary remedy of a suit. It is obvious that the provisions of the Act are supplemental to the ordinary procedure of law and not substitutive of it. The use of the word 'may' in Section 5 shows that the Estate Officer is given a discretion to utilise the machinery of the Act or not to do so in a particular case. The procedure prescribed by the Act, which permits of forcible eviction by the Estate Officer, is much more onerous than the procedure by way of an ordinary suit. There is no guidance provided in the Act for selecting one procedure or the other in a particular case. The decision of the Supreme Court is fully applicable to Section 5 of the Act. A Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court has also, in Rajendra Prosad Singh v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1968 Cal 560 (FB), held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958, vest unguided power in the Government to choose either the speedier remedy under the Act or the ordinary remedy of suit and are void as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. For these reasons, I hold that Section 5 of the Act offends Article 14 of the Constitution. 11. Learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 then contended that the amendment of 1968 introducing Section 10-E into the Act removes the vice of discrimination in Section 5 and, therefore, now Section 5 is a valid provision of law. It may be noticed here that Section 10-E was introduced on June 17, -1, 1968, a few days before the eviction of the petitioner under Section 5. If this contention is accepted, then the action of the authorities in evicting the petitioner will be under a valid provision of law and then it may be inexpedient to interfere in the case. If this contention is accepted, then the action of the authorities in evicting the petitioner will be under a valid provision of law and then it may be inexpedient to interfere in the case. 12. The Bill to further amend the Act was published in the Gazette of India (Extraordinary) on March 5, 1968. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing this Bill makes interesting reading and is set out hereunder :- "Recently the Supreme Court in Northen India Caterers Private Limited v. State of Punjab, declared Section 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959, void on the ground that the section was discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, inasmuch as it conferred an additional remedy over and above the usual remedy by way of suit and provided two alternative remedies to the Government, leaving it to the unguided discretion of the Collector to resort to one or the other. The object and the procedure prescribed by the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958, are also similar to those of the Punjab Act. In view of this it is felt that in order to meet the objection raised in the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of the Punjab Act, suitable amendment should be made to the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958, so that the alternative remedy by way of suit that may be resorted to by the Estate Officer in his discretion is taken away." 13. It thus appears that it was the intention to take away the alternative remedy by way of a suit for the eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises and to make it obligatory to resort to the provisions of the Act for the eviction of such persons. As already stated above, the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Ordinance, 1968 (Ordinance No. 5 of 1968) was promulgated on June 17, 1968. Section 10-E introduced by this Ordinance is in these words :- "10-E. Bar of jurisdiction-No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises or the recovery of the arrears of rent payable under sub-sec. (1) of Section 7 or the damages payable under sub-sec. (1) of Section 7 or the damages payable under sub-sec. (2) of that Section or costs awarded to the Central Government under sub-sec. (4-A) of Section 9 or any portion of such rent, damages or costs." 14. This Ordinance was replaced by the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1968, which was published in the Gazette on August 16, 1968. The consequences of a law being inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental right are provided in Article 13 of the Constitution, he relevant part of which reads : "13 (1) -All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void." 15. The question whether a law, which is void under Article 13, can again be made valid has arisen before the Supreme Court in several cases. In Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1955 SC 781, the question, which arose for consideration, was whether the G. P. and Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947, which imposed unreasonable restrictions on the right of citizens guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g) , became valid after the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. It is to be noticed that the Supreme Court was dealing with a pre-Constitution Act to which Article 13 (1) applied. It was held by the Supreme Court that the Act, which was an existing law, became void under Article 13 (1) to the extent it was inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution but it remained in operation qua non-citizens and for all past transactions and, as soon as the Constitution (First Amendment) Act was made, the Act ceased to be inconsistent with Article 19 (1) (g) and it became operative again even against the citizens. Das, Ag., C. J. (as he then was observed : "The true position is that the impugned law became, as it were, eclipsed, for the time being, by the fundamental right. Das, Ag., C. J. (as he then was observed : "The true position is that the impugned law became, as it were, eclipsed, for the time being, by the fundamental right. The effect of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, was to remove the shadow and to make the impugned Act free from all blemish or infirmity." 16. In Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1959 SC 648, the Supreme Court had to consider a similar question in respect of a post-Constitution statute namely, the U. P. Transport Services (Development) Act, 1955. This Act offended Article 31 of the Constitution and the question was whether it became valid again after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. It was held that a law enacted after the coming into force of the Constitution, which is in conflict with any of the fundamental rights, is void ab initio under Article 13 (2) and is a still-born law. It was further held that the doctrine of eclipse has application only to a law which was valid when enacted and not to a law which was void from the inception. In Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1963 SC 1019, the question was whether the U. P. Land Tenures (Regulation of Transfers) Act, 1952, which did not comply with the provisions of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution as it stood at the time when the Act was passed, became valid; on the enactment of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act. It was held that the Act of 1952 was void under Article 13 (2)", that the doctrine of eclipse did not apply to the post-Constitution laws which are governed by Article 13 (2) and that the Act did not revive on the enactment of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act. Wanchoo, J, who delivered the judgment of the Court, observed : "Article 13 (2), on the other hand, begins with an injunction to the State not to make a law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III. There is thus a constitutional prohibition to the State against making laws taking away or abridging fundamental rights. Wanchoo, J, who delivered the judgment of the Court, observed : "Article 13 (2), on the other hand, begins with an injunction to the State not to make a law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III. There is thus a constitutional prohibition to the State against making laws taking away or abridging fundamental rights. The legislative power of Parliament and the legislatures of the States under Article 245 is subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and, therefore, subject to Article 13 (2), which specifically prohibits the State from making any law taking away or abridging the fundamental rights. Therefore, it seems to us that the prohibition contained in Article 13 (2) makes the State as much incompetent to make a law taking away or abridging the fundamental rights as it would be where law is made against the distribution of powers contained in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution between Parliament and the Legislature of a State ................................... In view of this clear provision, it must be held that unlike a law covered by Article 13 (1) which was valid when made, the law made in contravention of the prohibition contained in Article 13 (2) is a still-born law either wholly or partially depending upon the extent of the contravention. Such a law is deed from the beginning and there can be no question of its revival under the doctrine of eclipse." 17. The last case of the Supreme Court, to which reference may be made, is B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, A.I.R. 1967 SC 1480 The Legislature of Pondicherry enacted the Pondicherry General Sales Tax Act, 1965, section 2 (1) whereof provided for the extension of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, to Pondicherry. This provision was void as it delegated excessive legislative power. The Pondicherry General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1966, was passed to remove this defect and to revive Section 2 (1) of the original Act. The question for consideration was whether the Amendment Act of 1966 made the original Section 2 (1) valid. The Supreme Court held that, as the original provision was void ab initio the amendment, which attempted to .revive it, became frustrated and had no efficacy. The question for consideration was whether the Amendment Act of 1966 made the original Section 2 (1) valid. The Supreme Court held that, as the original provision was void ab initio the amendment, which attempted to .revive it, became frustrated and had no efficacy. The Supreme Court was also of the view that only a valid Act can be amended what was void or dead from the inception, could not be brought to life by an amendment. Shelat, J., who spoke for the majority in that case, observed : "But the question is can the Amendment Act be said to be an independent reenactment of the Principal Act and has the Pondicherry legislature extended the Madras Act by this Act ? If that was what the legislature intended to do, it would have either repealed the Principal Act or even without repealing it on the footing that it was void enacted the Amendment Act as an independent legislation extending the Madras Act retrospectively as from April 1, 1966. The Amendment Act, as is clear from its long title was passed to amend the Principal Act. That can only be on the footing that it was a valid Act and still on the statute book. Under Section 2 what the legislature purports to do is to amend Section 1 (2) of the Principal Act ................. Since the Amendment Act was thus passed on the footing that there was in existence a valid Act, viz., the said Principal Act, it is impossible to conceive that it was or intended to be an independent legislation extending thereunder the Madras Act. The Amendment Act was and was intended to be an amendment of the Principal Act and it would be stretching the language of the Amendment Act to a breaking point to construe it as an independent legislation whereby the Madras Act was retrospectively brought into operation as from April 1, 1966. That being so, and on the view that the Principal Act was still-born, the attempt to revive that which was void ab initio was frustrated and such an Act could have no efficacy." 18. The decision in this case is fully applicable to the case before me. Section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958, offended Article 14 and was void under Article 13 (2) . It was stillborn and dead. The decision in this case is fully applicable to the case before me. Section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1958, offended Article 14 and was void under Article 13 (2) . It was stillborn and dead. Since Article 14 applies to all persons, the section cannot be said to be alive in respect of any matters or any persons. It is as though the section did not exist at all. The Amending Ordinance or the Amending Act did not re-enact Section 5 but merely purported to remove the Vice of Section 5 by introducing Section 10-E. Since Section 5 was still-born and did not exist, it could not be revived or resuscitated by the introduction of Section 10-E. Section 5 could not be revived but could only be re-enacted but this has not been done. The Amending Ordinance and the Amending Act have completely failed to achieve their object to revive Section 5 which was void ab initio. 19. Section 5 of the Act being void ab initio wand the attempt to revive and to resuscitate it having failed, there is no valid provision of law under which the actions of the Military Estates Officer or the Cantonment Executive Officer in evicting the petitioner from the land in dispute can be sustained. The action is without the authority of any law. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the respondents are directed to puted land to the petitioner. The petirestore forthwith possession over the distioner will be entitled to his costs from respondents Nos. 1 and 2