judgment Chandrachud, J. 1. By these petitions, the author and publisher of a book called ""Gandhi-hatya Ani Mee"" (Gandhi-assassination And I) challenge an order of forfeiture passed by the Delhi Administration under Section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Criminal Application No. 332 of 1968 is filed by the author Gopal Vinayak Godse, while Criminal Application 333 of 1968 is filed by the publisher, Gana-pati Vasudeo Behere who runs a publishing house called Asmita Prakashan. The book is written in Marathi and was printed and published in Poona. 2. The 1st Respondent to the petitions is the Union of India which is joined, presumably because the constitutionality of Section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code is challenged. No relief as such is claimed against the 1st Respondent. The 2nd Respondent is the Delhi Administration which passed the impugned order of forfeiture on the 26th September, 1968 in supersession of an earlier order dated the 6th December, 1967. The 3rd Respondent is the State of Maharashtra which republished in its Gazettes of the 1st February, 1968 and the 17th October, 1968, the notifications of the 2nd Respondent dated the 6th December 1967 and the 26th September, 1968 respectively. The 4th Respondent is the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Poona, who issued a search warrant on the 25th January, 1968 authorising a Sub-Inspector of Police in Poona to enter the premises of Asmita Prakashan and seize copies of the book, on the ground that the book contained matter which promoted feelings of enmity and hatred between Hindus and Muslims. The 5th Respondent is the Commissioner of Police, Poona, whose subordinate, a Sub-Inspector- of Police, seized one copy of the book from the residence of the author and two copies from the office of the Asmita Prakashan. The relief claimed against Respondents 3 to 5 is that they should be restrained from enforcing the order of forfeiture passed by the 2nd Respondent. The relief claimed against the 3rd Respondent is that the orders republished in its Gazettes should be declared to be illegal. 3. The petitions raise common questions of fact and law and can be conveniently disposed of by a common judgment. For a proper appreciation of the questions raised before us it is necessary to state the following facts. Some of them are well-known facts of history. 4. 3. The petitions raise common questions of fact and law and can be conveniently disposed of by a common judgment. For a proper appreciation of the questions raised before us it is necessary to state the following facts. Some of them are well-known facts of history. 4. We begin with the 30th January, 1948, the day on which Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated in Delhi. The assassin, Nathuram Godse, was the brother of the author of the present work which is under an order of forfeiture. We will, for convenience, refer to the author as the petitioner. The petitioner was arrested on the 5th February, 1948 and was tried along with seven others on charges like murder, conspiracy to commit murder and so forth. Nathuram, who pleaded guilty to the charge of murder was sentenced to death along with another accused, Narayan Apte. DR. V.D. Savarkar, one of the co-accused, was acquitted by the trial Court, while the petitioner and the other four accused were sentenced to imprisonment for life. In appeal, the Punjab High Court acquitted two more -- Dr. Parchure and Shankar Kistayya. The conviction and sentence of the five others was confirmed. Nathuram had appealed against his conviction on the charge of conspiracy only. He neither challenged his conviction for murder nor the sentence of death passed on him. The statement made by him in Trial Court under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was proscribed by the Government of India. 5. Nathuram and Apte were executed in the Ambala Jail on the 15th November, 1949. The petitioner and another accused called Karkare were transferred from the Ambala Jail to Nasik Road Central Prison in Maharashtra on the 19th May, 1950. The petitioner was thereafter transferred to the Aurangabad Central Prison. 6. The petitioner filed several petitions in the Supreme Court praying that he be directed to be released. He was sentenced by the Trial Court on 10-2-1949 and his contention was that taking into consideration the remissions earned by him he was entitled to be released. He was eventually released from jail on 13th October, 1964, during the pendency of one of such petitions, in which he was directed to be produced before the Supreme Court on the 19th October, 1964. 7. The petitioner was arrested again on the 25th November, 1964 under the Defence of India Act. He was eventually released from jail on 13th October, 1964, during the pendency of one of such petitions, in which he was directed to be produced before the Supreme Court on the 19th October, 1964. 7. The petitioner was arrested again on the 25th November, 1964 under the Defence of India Act. He was released from detention on the 30th November, 1965. 8. These facts do not directly concern the legality of the order of forfeiture passed by the 2nd Respondent. But these facts and these names occur frequently in the book and indeed some of these have been accorded a special separate treatment. The partition of the country, the genesis of Gandhijis murder the possibility that the murder could have been averted, the Court scene, the involvement of Dr. Savarkar in the accusation of murder, the treatment received by the petitioner in the Nasik and Aurangabad Jails and the vexed problem of his rehabilitation in society -- these and other topics which are dealt with in the book revolve around the facts and figures mentioned above. 9. The book first appeared in a serial form. Fifteen out of its sixteen chapters were serialized in a monthly Marathi magazine called Painjan in its issues of June 1966 to October 1967. What is now the seventh chapter of the book -- ""Throw my ashes into the Indus"" -- appeared in the issue dated the 8th October, 1967 of a Marathi weekly called Sobat. Both the journals are published by Asmita Prakashan, Poona, of which Behere is the proprietor. 10. On the 6th December, 1967, the Lt. Governor of Delhi issued a notification under Section 99-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the following terms:-- DELHI ADMINISTRATION : DELHI NOTIFICATION Dated the 6th December, 1967. No. F-292/67-C. Whereas the Lt. Governor, Delhi, is satisfied that the book entitled ""Gandhi Hatya ani Mee"" in Marathi by Gopal Godse, published by G. V. Behere, Asmita Prakashan 461/1 Sadashiv Peth, Tilak Road, Poona 2 and printed by M. H. Patwardhan at Sangam Press Private Ltd., 383, Narayan Peth, Poona-2, contains matter which promotes feelings of enmity and hatred between Hindus and Muslims in India and the publication of which is punishable under Section 153-A of the I.P.C. 1860 (Act XLV of 1860). Now therefore, on the above stated grounds and in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 99-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), the Lt. Governor Delhi, hereby declares to be forfeited to Government every copy of the said book and all other documents containing copies, reprints and translation of or extracts from the said book. By order, (Sd.) V.K. Seth, Under Secretary, (Home), Delhi Administration. 11. On the 25th January, 1968, the 4th Respondent, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Poona, issued a search warrant authorizing a Police Sub-Inspector to seize copies of the book from the premises of the publishing house. On the 26th, one copy of the book was seized from the residence of the petitioner, while on the 27th, two copies were seized from the publishers. 12. On the 1st February, 1968, the Government of Maharashtra re-published in its gazette, the notification of forfeiture, issued by the Delhi Administration on the 6th December 1967. The notification of the Maharashtra Government begins by saying: ""The following notification of the Delhi Administration is republished"". It then sets out the notification of the Delhi Administration and concludes with the endorsement ""By order of and in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra"", under the signature of a Deputy Secretary to the Government. 13. On the 20th March, 1968 these petitions were filed under Section 99B of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge the notification of the Delhi Administration and that of the Maharashtra Government republishing that notification. Every application under Section 99B is required by Section 99C to be heard and determined by a Special Bench of the High Court composed of three Judges. That is how the matter has come before us. 14. Every application under Section 99B is required by Section 99C to be heard and determined by a Special Bench of the High Court composed of three Judges. That is how the matter has come before us. 14. The petitions came up for hearing on the 16th September, 1968 when the learned Advocate General, appearing for Respondents 1 and 2 (The Union of India and the Delhi Administration), raised three preliminary objections to the maintainability of the petitions: one, that this High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 99B, challenging the legality of the notification issued by the Delhi Administration; two, that the petitions are barred by time, not having been filed within two months of the date of the order of forfeiture, as required by Section 99B; and three, that the petitions, in so far as they purport to be under Article 226 could not lie as the authority exercising power under Section 99A does not function as a quasi-judicial tribunal. Later, the two latter objections were not pressed by the Advocate General and we therefore heard the arguments on the first objection only. We reserved our ruling on the point of jurisdiction, particularly as the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the questions arising under Article 226 of the Constitution and the questions governing the petitioners fundamental rights would also have a material bearing on the question of jurisdiction and therefore, it was desirable to consider the petitions in their entirety. We accordingly proceeded to hear the petitions on the other points. 15. We heard the parties for seven days during which many a point was urged before us. One of the points that the order of forfeiture passed by the Delhi Administration on the 6th December 1967 was bad because the grounds of opinion, that the book contained matters which promoted feelings of enmity and hatred between Hindus and Muslims, were not stated in the order as required by Section 99A. It was contended that the order must refer to the objectionable passages specifically or else it cannot be sustained. The learned Advocate General controverted this position, contending that grounds are conclusions of facts drawn from facts but are different from facts and evidence. Therefore, he urged, it was not necessary to mention in the order the specific passages which fell within the mischief of the section. 16. The learned Advocate General controverted this position, contending that grounds are conclusions of facts drawn from facts but are different from facts and evidence. Therefore, he urged, it was not necessary to mention in the order the specific passages which fell within the mischief of the section. 16. This particular point lost its relevance because, during the course of hearing before us, the Delhi Administration came out with a fresh order of forfeiture, dated the 26th September 1968, rectifying the defect from which the earlier order was said to suffer. That order reads thus :-- DELHI ADMINISTRATION: DELHI NOTIFICATION Dated the 26th September, 1968, No. F. 292/67-C:--The Lt. Governor, Delhi, is pleased to pass the following order in supersession of the order notified under Notification No. F. 292/67-C dated the 6th December, 1967. Whereas the Lt. Governor, Delhi, is satisfied that the book entitled ""Gandhi Hatya Ani Mee"" in Marathi by Gopal Godse, published by G. V. Behere, Asmita Prakashan, 161/1, Sadashiv Peth, Tilak Road, Poona-2 and printed by M. H. Patwardhan at Sangam Press Private Ltd. 383, Narayan Peth, Poona-2 contains matters which promote feelings of enmity and hatred between Hindus and Muslims in India and the publication of which is punishable under Section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code 1860, (Act XLV of 1860). Now, therefore, on the ground that the book contains passages, references to which are given in the Schedule, which passages read in the context of the book as a whole, promote feelings of enmity and hatred between Hindus and Muslims in India, and in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 99-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), the Lt. Governor, Delhi hereby declares to be forfeited to the Government every copy of the said book and all other documents containing copies, re-prints and translation of or extracts from the said book. By order, (Sd.) Vinod Kumar Seth, Under Secretary, (Home), Delhi Administration: Delhi. 17. The schedule annexed to the order refers to the objectionable passages by references to the pages of the book at which they appear. Such passages are 52 in number. 18. The new order of forfeiture necessitated a new challenge. But rather than drive the petitioners to file fresh petitions, we permitted them to amend their petitions, the Advocate General not objecting. Such passages are 52 in number. 18. The new order of forfeiture necessitated a new challenge. But rather than drive the petitioners to file fresh petitions, we permitted them to amend their petitions, the Advocate General not objecting. We have now to consider the validity of the notification issued by the 2nd Respondent on the 26th September, 1968. This notification was re-published by the Government of Maharashtra in its Gazette dated the 17th October, 1968. 19. We might mention before we begin to consider the several points raised before us that after the questions of law were argued and before the argument on the merits of the book commenced, the learned Advocate General applied to us that further proceedings be held in camera. He apprehended that arguments on the drift and meaning of the objectionable passages might receive wide publicity in newspapers and that persons not directly concerned with the case and yet present in the Court-room would hear the passages read out by Counsel and thereby the very purpose of the order of forfeiture shall have been frustrated. We found ourselves unable to agree that there were any circumstances justifying a departure from the normal rule that all Court proceedings must be open to public. The proceedings before us did not appear to have excited public curiosity. In so far as we knew or had the means to know, no newspaper gave undue publicity to the hearing before us nor was our Courtroom anywhere near to being crowded at any time. Though therefore, there is no doubt that in the exercise of our inherent powers, we could have directed that further proceedings be held in camera, we did not think that the ends of justice clearly required the adoption of such a course. However, in order that under the guise of reporting Court proceedings, passages charged as objectionable may not be reproduced in print, we directed by a written order dated the 8th October, 1968 that until further orders, no newspaper, journal, periodical or pamphlet shall, while reporting the proceedings of the case, set out any of the passages mentioned in the schedule to the order of forfeiture dated the 26th September, 1968 or any part or gist of any of such passages. 20. 20. We must now consider the preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocate General that this High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in so far as it purports to be filed under Section 99B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The contention is that the order of forfeiture was passed by the Delhi Administration and therefore the application under Section 99B to set aside that order can lie to the High Court of Delhi only. No other High Court, it is urged, has jurisdiction to entertain the application. As the contention is based on language of Section 99B, it is necessary to consider that section and other allied sections. 21. Section 99A of the Code under which the 2nd Respondent passed the impugned order reads thus: ""99A. (1) Where- (a) any newspaper, or book as defined in the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, or (b) any document, wherever printed, appears to the State Government to contain any seditious matter or any matter which promotes or is intended to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of India or which is deliberately and maliciously intended to outrage the religious feelings of any such class by insulting the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, that is to say, any matter the publication of which is punishable under Section 124A or Section 153A or Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette stating the grounds of its opinion, declare every copy of the issue of the newspaper containing such matter, and every copy of such book or other document to be forfeited to Government and thereupon any police-officer may seize the same wherever found in India and any Magistrate by warrant authorize any police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector to enter upon and search for the same in any premises where any copy of such issue or any such book or other document may be or may be reasonably suspected to be. (2) In Sub-section (1) ""document"" includes also any painting, drawing or photograph, or other visible representation."" 22. Section 99B, which provides for a challenge to the order of forfeiture reads thus:-- ""99B. (2) In Sub-section (1) ""document"" includes also any painting, drawing or photograph, or other visible representation."" 22. Section 99B, which provides for a challenge to the order of forfeiture reads thus:-- ""99B. Any person having any interest in any newspaper, book or other document, in respect of which an order of forfeiture has been made under Section 99A, may, within two months from the date of such order, apply to the High Court to set aside such order on the ground that the issue of the newspaper, or the hook or other document, in respect of which the order was made, did not contain any seditious or other matter of such a nature as is referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 99A."" 23. Section 99G of which the marginal note reads ""jurisdiction barred"" provides:-- ""99G. No order passed or action taken under Section 99A shall be called in question in any Court otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of Section 99B."" 24. The question which falls for consideration in the light of these provisions is whether an application under Section 99B can lie in that High Court only which has jurisdiction over the area comprised within the territorial limits of the State Government which passes the order of forfeiture or whether any other High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction any part of the cause of action arises for challenging the order of forfeiture can also entertain the application. The contention of the petitioner is that the book was printed and published in Poona, copies thereof were seized in Poona in enforcement of the order of forfeiture and therefore this High Court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application in so far as it is referable to Section 99B. 25. We must confess that the question is not free from difficulty. The Sections on which the decision of the question turns are couched in terms far too vague and general to afford any real assistance. Section 99A, in so far as is relevant on the question of jurisdiction, provides that where any book, ""wherever printed"", appears to ""the State Government"" to contain any matter which is punishable under Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code, it may declare every copy of the book to be forfeited to Government and thereupon any police officer may seize the same ""wherever found in India"". The width of the language employed in Section 99A leaves no doubt that the power of a State Government to forfeit objectionable matter is not governed by the consideration whether the matter is printed or published within its territory. The place of publication finds no reference in Section 99A and therefore it is not a relevant factor on the power of the State Government to forfeit a book. The place of printing is expressly made inconsequential because the power to forfeit a book can be exercised by the State Government wherever the book may have been printed. Whether the book enjoys wide circulation or any circulation at all in the area within the limits of the State Government which passes an order of forfeiture is also not made relevant by the Section. Finally on the language of the Section, it does not seem necessary that the harmful consequences of the matter charged as objectionable must ensue or be felt within the State. In short, therefore, it is competent to a State Government to pass an order of forfeiture under Section 99A, even if the objectionable matter is printed or published outside its area, the matter has comparatively little or no circulation within its area and even if the harmful consequences thereof are not particularly or especially felt within that area. 26. At one end, thus, the width of power is striking. But would it justify a construction that will correspondingly confer a remedy on an aggrieved party, equally striking in its width? That is the position for which the petitioner contends. It is urged on his behalf that if the Delhi Administration chooses to forfeit a Marathi book printed, published and substantially circulated in Maharashtra and if in pursuance of such an order, an order which the Government of Maharashtra did not deem it necessary to pass, copies of the book are seized in Poona, it would be unjust to deny to the petitioner an easy remedy in the highest Court of his own State. Section 99B does not restrict the right to apply by specifying any particular High Court and therefore, according to the petitioner, this High Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the application filed under that Section. 27. The argument is not wholly devoid of substance but there are reasons that have led us to reject it. Section 99B does not restrict the right to apply by specifying any particular High Court and therefore, according to the petitioner, this High Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the application filed under that Section. 27. The argument is not wholly devoid of substance but there are reasons that have led us to reject it. Firstly, whether a remedy is as wide as the power against the exercise of which it is enforceable must primarily depend on the language of the statute which confers the remedy. It may be good policy to balance the width of a power by the width of a remedy afforded to prevent the abuse of that power. But that is for the Legislature to consider. A Court called upon to construe the nature and content of a remedy is bound by the language of the Section which prescribes the remedy. What is sound policy may not be a safe-guard to the true construction of a Section. Therefore, the argument of the petitioner that the remedy should be held to be unhampered by the consideration as to which State Government passed the order of forfeiture, because the power of State Governments to act under Section 99A is untrammelled by considerations like where the book was printed or published fails to impress us. 28. If an order of forfeiture passed by a State Government could be permitted to be challenged in the High Courts of other States, a sharp conflict of jurisdiction will arise. Copies of the forfeited book can be seized under Section 99A wherever they are found in India. If such copies are seized, say, from a dozen different States, a dozen applications would lie under Section 99B in as many different High Courts. In Khajoor Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1961 SC 532 the Supreme Court refused to introduce in Article 226 of the Constitution (as it then stood) the concept of the place where the order has effect, in order to determine which High Court had jurisdiction to grant relief under Article 226, on the ground, mainly, that the introduction of such a concept may give rise to ""confusion and conflict of jurisdictions"". Sinha, C.J. who delivered the majority judgment has taken, what is for our purposes, a useful illustration of an order passed by an authority in Calcutta affecting six persons living in six different States. Sinha, C.J. who delivered the majority judgment has taken, what is for our purposes, a useful illustration of an order passed by an authority in Calcutta affecting six persons living in six different States. On the language of Article 226 (without Clause 1A which was introduced in 1963), it was held that the order could be challenged only in the High Court within whose jurisdiction the authority was located, ""if one is to avoid confusion and conflict of jurisdiction"" (Para 13). Therefore, unless the wording of the statute compels such a construction, one must so construe it as would avoid a conflict of jurisdiction. There is nothing in Section 99B to compel the construction that an order of forfeiture passed under Section 99A can be challenged under Section 99B in any High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the order has taken effect. Therefore, the better view is that the order passed by a State Government under Section 99A can be challenged under Section 99B in that High Court only which has jurisdiction in relation to the territories of that State. 29. And indeed, if the petitioners argument is correct, why is it even necessary that in order to give us jurisdiction to entertain the application in so far as it purports to be under Section 99B, copies of the book should have been seized from a place within our jurisdiction? Section 99B speaks of the existence of no such condition to the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court. It does not say that the application can be made to the High Court in whose jurisdiction the order of forfeiture takes effect. It says, in terms as wide as is conceivable, that any person having interest in the book may ""apply to the High Court"" to set aside the order of forfeiture. It seems to us that the argument that this Court has jurisdiction because the copies of the book were seized from a place within its jurisdiction wrongly imports in the construction of Section 99B the concept that one can enforce a remedy in a Court within whose jurisdiction a part of the cause of action has arisen. That is not a common law principle. That is not a common law principle. In India, it applies in civil actions by reason of the express provision in Section 20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure by virtue of which a suit can be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part arises. It applies to certain criminal actions by reason of the provision in Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure under which, if a person is accused of an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of any consequence which has ensued, the offence may be tried by a Court in whose jurisdiction any such thing has been done or any such consequence has ensued. Section 99B does not contain a corresponding clause. Logically, therefore, the form which the petitioners argument must take is that this Court has jurisdiction because under the wide language of Section 99B any and every High Court has jurisdiction to consider the validity of an order of forfeiture passed by any State Government. Such an argument merely takes note of the convenience of an individual. It ignores the salient rule that you must, unless so compelled by the language of the statute, avoid a conflict of jurisdiction. 30. It is possible to suggest a reason why the Legislature did not specify in Section 99B that the application will lie to that High Court only which exercises jurisdiction in relation to the territory of the State Government which passes the order of forfeiture. Section 4 (i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure says, in so far as is relevant, that in relation to any local area other than Andaman and Nicobar Islands, ""High Court"" means the highest Court of Criminal Appeal for that area. Sections 99A to 99G of the Code are parts of the same scheme so that words or phrases occurring in one of these sections must be construed in the light of the provisions of the other cognate sections. The expression ""the High Court"", occurring in Section 99B, must therefore be understood in the light of the expression ""the State Government""--the Government which is empowered to take action under Section 99A. The expression ""the High Court"", occurring in Section 99B, must therefore be understood in the light of the expression ""the State Government""--the Government which is empowered to take action under Section 99A. Reading these two sections together and reading them along with the definition clause in Section 4 (i), it would be reasonable to say that an application under Section 99B would lie to that High Court only, which exercises jurisdiction in relation to the area of the State Government which passes an order of forfeiture under Section 99A-Section 99A empowers ""the State Government"" to pass an order of forfeiture, while Section 99B confers a remedy on a person aggrieved by that order to apply to ""the High Court"" to set aside the order. The implication is that the remedy must lie in the High Court which exercises jurisdiction in relation to the territories of the State Government which passes the order of forfeiture. 31. Section 99G of the Code provides that ""no order passed or action taken under Section 99A shall be called in question in any Court otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of Section 99B."" Thus, not only does the statute limit the remedy to an application, but it ordains that the application must be filed in ""the High Court"" as contemplated by Section 99B and in no other Court. This is some indication that the remedy was intended to be restricted. The language of Section 99G is not suited to convey an intention that a free choice of forum was, as it were, left to the discretion of the person aggrieved by the order of forfeiture. The language of Section 99G is the language of exclusion, not of enlargement of jurisdiction. 32. The fact that the notification issued by the Delhi Administration on the 26th September, 1968 was republished by the Government of Maharashtra in its gazette dated the 17th October, 1968 cannot confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain the application under Section 99B. Republication of the notification by the Maharashtra Government is obviously for the general information of the public. The notification of the Delhi Administration was re-published in Part IV-C of the Gazette of the Government of Maharashtra. In that part are published notifications of Government other than the Government of Maharashtra. Republication of the notification by the Maharashtra Government is obviously for the general information of the public. The notification of the Delhi Administration was re-published in Part IV-C of the Gazette of the Government of Maharashtra. In that part are published notifications of Government other than the Government of Maharashtra. There is therefore no scope for saying that by republishing the notification of the Delhi Administration, the Government of Maharashtra adopted it as its own. The challenge contemplated by Section 99B is to the order of forfeiture and not to a notification republishing that order. Therefore, no application can lie under Section 99B to challenge the notification of the Maharashtra Government republishing that of the Delhi Administration. In re, Ghulam Sarvar Figar, AIR 1962 Andh Pra 526 and in Gulam Sarwar Firgar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 Pat 284 , it was held that a notification re-publishing a notification of forfeiture cannot be challenged under Section 99B. Thus the challenge under Section 99B can only be to the parent notification of forfeiture. 33. We must therefore uphold the preliminary objection taken by the learned Advocate General that the petitions, in so far as they purport to be filed under Section 99B of the Code, cannot lie in this Court. In our opinion the High Court of Delhi, and no other High Court, would have jurisdiction to entertain the petitions filed under Section 99B to challenge the order of forfeiture passed by the Delhi Administration on the 26th September, 1968. 34. It is plain that as the petitions are not maintainable in this Court under Section 99B, we cannot give to the author or the publisher the benefit of the wide powers possessed by the High Court under Section 99D. Under that Section, the High Court can examine the objectionable matter on merits and decide whether the grounds on which the Government formed its opinion that the matter is objectionable justify that opinion. If the High Court is not satisfied that the book is objectionable as alleged, it can set aside the order of forfeiture. The special jurisdiction created by Sections 99B and 99D would have given to the petitioner a two-fold advantage. If the High Court is not satisfied that the book is objectionable as alleged, it can set aside the order of forfeiture. The special jurisdiction created by Sections 99B and 99D would have given to the petitioner a two-fold advantage. Acting under those provisions we could have reviewed the book on merits and set aside the order of forfeiture if we were not satisfied that the book contains matter which promotes feelings of enmity and hatred between the Hindus and Muslims in India, the publication of which is punishable under section 153A of the Penal Code. However, we could not have sustained the order on grounds other than those mentioned in the order of forfeiture. We cannot add to the grounds but we can review the book on merits under Section 99D. That benefit cannot now go to the petitioner as we have no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions under Section 99B. 35. That, however, is not the end of the petitions because Article 226 of the Constitution is also invoked. On that aspect, the fact that the order of forfeiture was passed by the Delhi Administration makes no difference because under Clause 1A which was inserted in Article 226 by Section 8 of the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1963, the power conferred on the High Courts by Clause 1 can be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power notwithstanding that the seat of the Government to which a direction, order or writ is to be issued is not within those territories. In the instant case, the copies of the book were seized in Poona in pursuance of the order of forfeiture passed by the Delhi Administration and therefore a part of the cause of action has arisen in the territory in relation to which we can exercise our jurisdiction. The petitions are therefore competent under Article 226. We will consider later whether, though the petitions are competent, we should, in our discretion, grant any relief to the petitioner. 36. The petitioner challenges in the first place the constitutionality of Section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that it violates the guarantees contained in Articles 19 (1) (a), 19 (1) (f) and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. 36. The petitioner challenges in the first place the constitutionality of Section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that it violates the guarantees contained in Articles 19 (1) (a), 19 (1) (f) and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. Clauses (a) and ff) are relied upon on behalf of the author, while Clause (g) is relied upon on behalf of the publisher. The argument is that Section 99A is unconstitutional because it places unreasonable restrictions on, the right of free speech and expression the right to acquire and hold property and the right to carry on business as a publisher. Reasons why the restrictions are unreasonable are said to be these: (a) The restrictions are unreasonable not only because the power conferred by Section 99A is wide but more so because it must be exercised in its fullest amplitude or not at all. Even if a State Government takes the view that an objectionable matter needs to be proscribed within its own territory only or within any narrower limits or within an area larger than its own but not extending over the entire country, it has no power to restrict the operation of the order of forfeiture in that fashion. It is obliged, in all cases, to pass an order which will embrace the whole country whether or not the harmful effects of the objectionable matter are likely to be felt in the entire country. The order thus, requires neither intelligent care nor deliberation. (b) One State Government is given the power to pass an order which will interfere with the discretion of another Government. In the instant case, for example, the Government of Maharashtra did not, apparently, feel the necessity of proscribing the book but notwithstanding that, the order of the Delhi Administration will operate in Maharashtra, as copies of the book can be seized wherever they are found. (c) The order must remain in force in perpetuity, for there is no provision for its withdrawal even after the reasons for forfeiture have ceased to exist; assuming that the order can be withdrawn, there is in any case no provision for the return of the copies seized in pursuance of the order of forfeiture. (c) The order must remain in force in perpetuity, for there is no provision for its withdrawal even after the reasons for forfeiture have ceased to exist; assuming that the order can be withdrawn, there is in any case no provision for the return of the copies seized in pursuance of the order of forfeiture. (d) The section does not stipulate that there must be nexus between the proscribed matter and the local conditions obtaining within the territory of the State Government which passes the order of forfeiture. A State Government can pass an order of forfeiture even if the harmful consequences are not felt within its territory. (e) The section does not contemplate any hearing being given to the author or the publisher before an order adverse to their interests is passed. (f) The remedy provided by Section 99B against an order passed under Section 99A is illusory because, if the preliminary objection raised by the Advocate General to the jurisdiction of this Court is well founded, (i) the remedy is inconvenient and expensive, and (ii) the application under Section 99B has to be filed within 2 months of the date of the order. It may be well-nigh impossible for an author or publisher to know within that time that some State Government has in some part of the country passed an order of forfeiture. 37. Some of these grievances and some of the difficulties which a person in the position of the petitioner may have to countenance are genuine but we are unable for that reason to hold that the impugned section imposes unreasonable restrictions on the petitioner's right of free speech and expression or the right to acquire and hold property or the publisher's right to carry on his business. 38. There is no doubt that the freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of the press and circulation but the right, as stated in Article 19 (2), cannot affect the operation of any existing law in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on that right, in the interests, inter alia, of public order. 38. There is no doubt that the freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of the press and circulation but the right, as stated in Article 19 (2), cannot affect the operation of any existing law in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on that right, in the interests, inter alia, of public order. Similarly assuming that the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 19 (1) (f) is violated as he cannot, on account of the order of forfeiture, acquire or hold a copy of the book that right, as provided in Article 19 (5) cannot affect the operation of any existing law in so far it imposes reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. In the same manner, the right of the publisher to carry on his business is subject, as provided in Article 19 (6) to the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes reasonable restrictions on that right in the interests of the general public. Section 99A is an 'existing law' as it was in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, having been inserted in the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Press Law Repeal and Amendment Act No. XIV of 1922. The question therefore to be considered is whether the restrictions imposed by Section 99A on the aforesaid fundamental rights are reasonable. That the restrictions on the right of free speech and expression are in the interests of public order and those on the other rights are in the interests of the general public is undeniable. 39. On the reasonableness of restrictions, Patanjali Sastri, C.J. laid down a test in State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196 , which has been adopted in several subsequent decisions. The learned Chief Justice said: ""It is important......to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time should all enter into the judicial verdict."" 40. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time should all enter into the judicial verdict."" 40. In Chintamanrao v. State of M. P., AIR 1951 SC 118 it was explained that what is meant by 'reasonable restriction' is: "".........that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public. The word 'reasonable' implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course which reason dictates. Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness......"" 41. Let us, in the light of these tests, consider the various grounds urged by the petitioner as constituting excessive or arbitrary encroachment on his rights. 42. The first ground of challenge is that the State Government which deems it necessary to pass an order of forfeiture is left no choice save to pass an order which will pervade the whole country. It cannot restrict the operation of the order to a lesser area even if it deems fit to do so. The grievance in other words is that the limitations imposed by Section 99A on the freedom of speech and expression are of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the general public. 43. We cannot accept this argument. While judging of the reasonableness of restrictions, we must have regard to the nature of the right infringed and the purpose for which the restrictions are imposed. The object of Section 99A is to prevent the circulation of written matter, (i) which is seditious so as to fall under Section 124A or (ii) which promotes or is intended to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes or communities so as to fall under Section 153A or (iii) which is deliberately and maliciously intended to outrage the religious feelings of any such class by insulting the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, so as to fall under Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code. Sedition consists of bringing or attempting to bring into hatred or contempt or exciting or attempting to excite disaffection towards the Government established by law in India. Any order forfeiting seditious writing must in the very nature of things operate throughout the country, for it cannot be that a writing is seditious in one part of the country but not in another. The two other evil consequences of the written word which Section 99A seeks to combat, namely, promotion of class hatred and disparagement of religious beliefs such as would attract Sections 153A and 295A, stand more or less on the same footing. Promotion of hatred between different classes of citizens, as for example, Hindus and Muslims or deliberate, malicious acts intended to outrage the religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs are not purely local problems. Recent history shows that these tendencies constitute a serious danger to the very way of life to which we are pledged under the Constitution. Writings calculated to foment communal or class rivalries by encouraging enmity or hatred between different religious, racial or language groups or by insulting the religion or religious beliefs of a class have country-wide repercussions. Experience, for example, shows that communal disturbances which, now, are by no means infrequent have the disconcerting tendency of spreading rapidly from one region to another. The notification of the Government of India dated the 1st November. 1967 (The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 3 (ii), Page 1713) by which a Commission of Inquiry was appointed under the Chairmanship of Mr. Raghubar Dayal, ex-Judge of the Supreme Court, to inquire into ""a definite matter of public importance, to wit, the communal disturbances that have occurred in the country since the first day of August 1967"" shows that the problem is of national importance. How infectious the communal virus is, would appear from the proximate dates mentioned in the schedule to that notification, on which disturbances occurred in areas as far removed as Ranchi and Sursand (Bihar) Jainpur and Suchetpur (U.P.), and Sholapur, Ahmednagar and Malegaon (Maharashtra). How infectious the communal virus is, would appear from the proximate dates mentioned in the schedule to that notification, on which disturbances occurred in areas as far removed as Ranchi and Sursand (Bihar) Jainpur and Suchetpur (U.P.), and Sholapur, Ahmednagar and Malegaon (Maharashtra). Considering therefore that the right invaded is the right of free circulation and the object of the restrictions is to prevent an abuse of that right which will have countrywide repercussions, we are of the opinion that the restrictions are not beyond what is necessary in the interests of public order or the interests of the general public. 44. It is also necessary to bear in mind that if objectionable literature were to be banned in one State and not in others, the order of forfeiture will be difficult to enforce because copies which are in circulation in the other States are bound to trickle into the neighbouring State. But what is really more important is that if the forfeiture were not to operate in all other areas the harmful effects of the writing which will occur in those areas where the writing circulates freely will sooner or later, be felt in the State issuing the order of forfeiture. 45. We must also point out that it is not strictly accurate to say that the State Government issuing an order of forfeiture under Section 99A gives or must give to that order a country-wide operation. The State Government merely passes an order of forfeiture as it has done in the present case. It does not stipulate in the order that it will operate all over the country. The effect however, of the order is that any police officer may seize copies of the objectionable matter, wherever found in India. It is not a fair reading of Section 99A to say either, that the State Goverment gives or is required under the terms of that section to give an extra-territorial operation to its order or that the moment a State Government passes an order of forfeiture, police officers in other States must, without more, act in aid of that order by seizing copies of the objectionable matter which are in circulation within their, respective jurisdictions. Section 99A merely enables all police officers to seize copies wherever found, and that is because, without that power the order of forfeiture would be denuded of its efficacy. 46. Section 99A merely enables all police officers to seize copies wherever found, and that is because, without that power the order of forfeiture would be denuded of its efficacy. 46. This consideration also answers the second objection mentioned in (b) above. The Delhi Administration has in no way interfered with the discretion or the powers of the Maharashtra Government. It has passed an order of forfeiture the conseguence of which, under Section 99A is, that any police officer may seize copies of the book wherever found in India. A police officer in Maharashtra can, if so required, seize copies found in the State and likewise police officers in other States may seize copies found in those States. Such an enabling power of seizure cannot be construed as constituting an encroachment on the rights or privileges of other State Governments. Besides, the petitioner has no locus to complain that the rights of the other State Governments are invaded. He can only complain of unreasonable restrictions imposed by the statute on his rights. 47. There is no substance in the objection mentioned in (c) above for, under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, if by any Central Act a power to issue a notification or order is conferred, then that power includes a power to rescind the notification or order. The question of the return of copies seized in pursuance of a notification would only arise on the rescission of the notification. We have no doubt that though Section 99A does not make any specific provision therefor, if a State Government withdraws the order of forfeiture it must return the copies seized in enforcement of that order. The validity of the seizure would lapse with the withdrawal of the order under which the seizure was made. 48. Regarding (d) above, we have In the first place pointed out already that matters which fall under Sections 124A, 153A or 295A are of national importance because they have country-wide repercussions. In the very nature of things, there cannot, for example, be nexus between local conditions and a seditious writing. Sedition is sedition all over the country. Besides, there is no warrant for assuming that any State Government will pass an order of forfeiture in disregard of the local conditions obtaining within its territory. In the very nature of things, there cannot, for example, be nexus between local conditions and a seditious writing. Sedition is sedition all over the country. Besides, there is no warrant for assuming that any State Government will pass an order of forfeiture in disregard of the local conditions obtaining within its territory. In appropriate cases, an order which discloses non-application of mind or mala fides can be set aside but these are not to be assumed. ""Abuse of power given by a law sometimes occurs: but the validity of the law cannot be contested because of such an apprehension"" (Per Kania. C.J. in N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 211 ). On the contrary as observed by Patanjali Sastri, C. J. in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75 , where the question is whether a discretionary power is liable to be abused, there is a presumption that a public authority will act honestly and reasonably in the exercise of its statutory powers. In the instant case the discretion is vested, not in an inferior official but, in the State Government itself and therefore the presumption, as stated in Matajog v. H.C. Bhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 , is strengthened. 49. Regarding (e), it is true that Section 99A does not provide that the writer or publisher should be heard before passing an order of forfeiture but it is very important to bear in mind that Sections 99B and 99D provide for a full judicial review of the order. Under Section 99B an application to set aside the order of forfeiture can be made to the High Court within two months from the date of the order by any person having any interest in the forfeited matter. This application is required under Section 99C to be heard and determined by a Special Bench of the High Court composed of three Judges. Under Section 99D the Special Bench has got the power to set aside the order of forfeiture, ""if it is not satisfied that the issue of the newspaper, or the book or other document, in respect of which the application has been made"" contains objectionable matter of the nature referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 99A. Under Section 99D the Special Bench has got the power to set aside the order of forfeiture, ""if it is not satisfied that the issue of the newspaper, or the book or other document, in respect of which the application has been made"" contains objectionable matter of the nature referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section 99A. These provisions virtually give to every aggrieved person the right of an appeal against the order of forfeiture and therefore, the fact that there is no provision for hearing the writer or the publisher before the order is passed cannot constitute an unreasonable restriction on their fundamental rights. 50. While determining whether the restrictions are reasonable, the reasonableness of substantive as well as procedural provisions of law has to be considered and one must inquire whether the impungned law provides reasonable safeguards either by conferring a right of appeal to a higher authority or a right to have the matter judicially reviewed. In Virendra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896 , the Supreme Court considered the validity of Sections 2 and 3 of the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act. 1956. The order issued against the petitioner under Section 2 (1) (a) of that Act prohibiting him from publishing any article relating to certain activities for a period of two months was upheld by the Supreme Court as the order was of a limited duration and there was a right of representation against it. The order passed under Section 3 prohibiting the petitioner from bringing into Punjab certain newspapers printed and published at Delhi was set aside as it was not limited in point of time and as there was no provision for making a representation against that order. 51. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that in assessing the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed on the petitioner's rights, we must not ignore that the power to impose restrictions has been given to the State Government which has to act subjectively and not objectively. For example, if a book ""appears to the State Government"" to contain objectionable matter of the nature mentioned in Section 99A, the State Government can pass an order of forfeiture. Now, normally, a subjective decision depends conclusively on the opinion formed by an authority charged with the duty to form a particular opinion. For example, if a book ""appears to the State Government"" to contain objectionable matter of the nature mentioned in Section 99A, the State Government can pass an order of forfeiture. Now, normally, a subjective decision depends conclusively on the opinion formed by an authority charged with the duty to form a particular opinion. The reasonableness of the satisfaction of such authority cannot be tested by the Court. The fact, however, that the order of forfeiture can be passed by the State Government on its subjective satisfaction loses its sting, because a person aggrieved by the order can take the matter to the High Court which is entitled under Section 99D to review the order on merits. The vesting of subjective discretion in the State Government cannot therefore be considered to be an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of the petitioner. In Tika Ramji v. State of U. P., AIR 1956 SC 676 , the Supreme Court held that the requirement of procedural reasonableness was satisfied even though the statute which was assailed on the ground that it imposes unreasonable restrictions on the right to carry on business, provided for an administrative appeal only. Similarly, in Kishan v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1955 SC 795 the Supreme Court upheld Section 86 of the Marwar Land Revenue Act, 1949 on the ground, inter alia, that the orders of the Settlement Officer were subject to revision by the Board of Revenue. 52. Thus, even a judicial review is not held to be an essential condition of reasonableness, if adequate safeguards are provided by the Legislature to prevent the executive authority from exercising its discretionary power arbitrarily. The case before us is stronger, for the Legislature has provided a remedy in the nature of an appeal to the High Court against the order of forfeiture. 53. Lastly, regarding the objection mentioned in (f) above, we do not agree that the restrictions are unreasonable either because the remedy is inconvenient and expensive or because the application has to be filed within 2 months of the date of the order. The inconvenience and expense involved in making a journey, say to Delhi from a distant part of the country where the book might have been printed or published or where copies of the book might have been seized is not relevant on the question whether the restrictions are reasonable. The inconvenience and expense involved in making a journey, say to Delhi from a distant part of the country where the book might have been printed or published or where copies of the book might have been seized is not relevant on the question whether the restrictions are reasonable. The remedy by way of an application to the High Court of Delhi, the order of forfeiture having been passed by the Delhi Administration could have been said to be illusory, if before a person could avail himself of that remedy he was required by law to satisfy onerous conditions. Section 99B however does not impose any such conditions. It confers an absolute right to apply to the High Court and the only condition which qualifies that right is that the application must be filed within two months of the date of the order. 54. This condition cannot also be considered unreasonable. A period of limitation had to be provided within which to apply to the High Court for setting aside the order of forfeiture and whether the period fixed by the statute was two months or anything else, a certain amount of arbitrariness is inevitable in the fixation of a period of limitation. In this connection attention must be drawn to a significant departure made by the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act 36 of 1963) from the Act of 1908 (Act 9 of 1908). Under Section 29 (2) (a) of the Act of 1908, in so far as is material, if a special law prescribed for an application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule, then for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for an application by the special law, the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18, and Section 22 were applicable to the extent to which they were not expressly excluded by the special law. By Clause (b) of Section 29 (2), the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act were made inapplicable. By Clause (b) of Section 29 (2), the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act were made inapplicable. Under Section 29 (2) of the Act of 1963 this position has undergone a significant change, because under the new provision, if a special law prescribes for an application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, then for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for an application by the special law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 would apply to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by the special law. Clause (b) of Section 29 (2) of the Act of 1908, under which the provisions of that Act other than those referred to in Clause (a) were excluded, has now been deleted. The result is that whereas Section 5 of the Act of 1908 would have been inapplicable to an application under Section 99B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 5 of the Act of 1963 would apply to it. Section 5 provides, in so far as is material, that any application may be admitted after the prescribed period if the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring it within that period. The grievance of the petitioner is that a person aggrieved by the order of forfeiture may not know within a period of two months that such an order was passed, because the orders are notified in local gazettes and in the normal course, one cannot have knowledge of notifications published in distant parts of the country. As the period of two months can in proper cases be extended under Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963, the objection raised by the petitioner must fail. We have not gone into the provisions of the Limitation Act, particularly Section 29 thereof, minutely, because such doubts as might have been raised about the view which we have taken are removed by the judgments of the Supreme Court in Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh, AIR 1964 SC 260 and Vidyacharan v. Khubchand, AIR 1964 SC 1099 . 55. In regard to the right claimed by the publisher under Article 19 (1) (g), crime is not a business and there can be no fundamental right in a crime. 55. In regard to the right claimed by the publisher under Article 19 (1) (g), crime is not a business and there can be no fundamental right in a crime. A question was raised in State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, AIR 1957 SC 699 , whether the Bombay Prize Competition Act, which regulated prize competitions of a gambling nature infringed Article 19 (1) (g). It was held that crime could not be a business. In State of U.P. v. Kartar Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1135 also, it was held that a person cannot assert a fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (g) to carry on business in adulterated foodstuffs. 56. In our opinion, therefore, the challenge made by the petitioner to the constitutionality of Section 99A of the Code of Criminal Procedure must fail. This conclusion accords with the view taken by a Special Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in District Board v. Tahir Hussain, (?) (N. Veerabrahman v. State of Andhra Pradesh), AIR 1959 Andh Pra 572. 57. The next point urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the order of forfeiture was passed without application of mind and therefore, it is bad. The book was first serialised in the monthly issues of a Marathi magazine, Painjan, from June 1966 to October 1967. The seventh chapter of the book. ""Throw my ashes into the Indus"" appeared in the issue dated the 8th Oct. 1967 of a Marathi weekly called 'Sobat'. The argument is that copies of these journals were submitted to the authorities concerned as required by the Press Act and yet no action was taken against the author or the publisher. After the book was published, the Government of Maharashtra, in whose territory the book had the widest circulation, did not take any steps to forfeit it and it is alleged that the Minister for Home Affairs to the Government of India made a statement in the Parliament that on consultation with the Legal Department of the Government of India, the Government did not think it necessary to proscribe the book. The circumstance that in face of these facts the Delhi Administration passed the order of forfeiture shows, according to the petitioner, that the order was passed without application of mind. 58. No such conclusion can, in our opinion, be deduced. The circumstance that in face of these facts the Delhi Administration passed the order of forfeiture shows, according to the petitioner, that the order was passed without application of mind. 58. No such conclusion can, in our opinion, be deduced. The publication of a book in a serial form may not produce the same impact on the readers as the publication of the matter in a book form would produce. Then again, social and political conditions are not static. They may undergo a change in the period intervening between the appearance of the earlier instalments of the series and the publication of the book. In fact, we must in this context refer to a significant fact. What is now the seventh chapter of the book, ""Throw my ashes into the Indus"" appeared in the issue of 'Sobat' dated the 8th October, 1967 while the book was published on the 12th October. The first order of forfeiture was passed by the Delhi Administration on the 6th of December, 1967. The learned Advocate General has raised a strong objection to some of the passages occurring in the seventh chapter and the schedule to the second order of forfeiture dated the 26th September, 1968 also refers to as many as six pages from this chapter as containing objectionable material. The notification of the Government of India dated the 6th November 1967 under which a Commission of Inquiry was appointed to inquire into the communal disturbances which occurred in the country also shows that such disturbances occurred in different parts of the country from August till October, 1967. It cannot therefore be said that the order was passed by the Delhi Administration without a proper application of mind. 59. The argument of mala fides was also made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner but it is substantially founded on the same set of facts on which the argument which we have just disposed of is based. It was suggested during the course of arguments that the Government of Maharashtra has persuaded the Delhi Administration to pass the impugned order, but of that we see no evidence. As the facts necessary to establish mala fides are not proved, we must reject this contention. 60. It was suggested during the course of arguments that the Government of Maharashtra has persuaded the Delhi Administration to pass the impugned order, but of that we see no evidence. As the facts necessary to establish mala fides are not proved, we must reject this contention. 60. A point was made that by passing the order dated the 6th December, 1967 the Delhi Administration had exhausted its power to act under Section 99A and therefore, it had no jurisdiction to pass the second order dated the 26th of September, 1968. It is impossible to accept this contention. As indicated earlier, under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a power to issue a notification or order includes a power, inter alia, to rescind it. It was therefore competent to the Delhi Administration to rescind the first notification. It was thereafter open it to pass a fresh order, for there is nothing in Section 99A or in any principle of law which can affect the exercise of such a power. 61. The last of the legal contentions that Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code is ultra vires was merely mentioned. No argument was made to show how or why the particular provision is unconstitutional. We will therefore not pursue the point beyond saying that for reasons similar to those for which Section 124A of the Penal Code was held constitutional in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 and Sections 295A and 505 were held constitutional in Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 620 , we would uphold Section 153A. Briefly, the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 153A on the ground that it violates the guarantee of free speech and expression must be rejected because the Section seeks to punish only (a) such acts which have the tendency to promote enmity or hatred between different classes or (b) such acts which are prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different classes and which have the tendency to disturb public tranquillity. These acts are clearly calculated to disturb public order and so the limitations imposed by Section 153A are in the interests of public order. Article 19 (2) would therefore save Section 153A as being within the scope of permissible legislative restrictions on the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a). 62. These acts are clearly calculated to disturb public order and so the limitations imposed by Section 153A are in the interests of public order. Article 19 (2) would therefore save Section 153A as being within the scope of permissible legislative restrictions on the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (a). 62. What remains now to consider is whether the impugned order is justified on merits, that is, whether the opinion formed by the 2nd Respondent can, on any reasonable view, be upheld. We must record that learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Advocate General invited us to consider the merits of the matter, ir"