In this petition filed under Arti­cle 226 of the Constitution the prayer made by Sachindra Mohan Das Gupta is that a writ of mandamus be issued directing the two respondents, the Chief Commissioner of Tripura and the Government of India, to dis­charge their obligations in terms of Sec­tion 29 (3) of the West Bengal Security Act (hereinafter called the Act) as extended to the territory of Tripura. E. The facts relevant to the prayer made can be set out in a few words. By orders, dated 29-5-1951 and 22-10-1952, lands mea­suring 1183.4 acres and 109.96 acres belong­ing to the petitioner were requisitioned by the Tripura Government under the provi­sions of the Act. The possession of the first mentioned area of the land was taken by the Government on 11-6-1951 and of the second area on 22-10-1952. Subsequently, land measuring 388.38 acres was derequisi­tioned, leaving a balance of 904.98 acres under requisition. This latter area was ac­quired in 1955 under the provisions of the West Bengal Land Development and Plan­ning Act of 1948. Though in the writ petition compensation was claimed respecting 902.3 acres out of a total of 904.98 acres, but in the- replication the petitioner stated that he claimed compensation only respect­ing 882.b4 acres, Shri J. K. Roy, appearing for the petitioner, stated at the bar on the date of arguments that compensation was claimed in regard to 882.54 acres from 11-6-1951, until the date this land was acquired in the year 1955. It is mentioned in the writ petition that compensation for the period of requisition was allowed to the petitioner along with the compensation which was deter­mined for acquiring the land, but that com­pensation was much too short as compared to what he is entitled in law. The com­pensation for the requisitioned property was allowed, it is commonly agreed, at the rate of 6% per annum on the market value of the land. The precise claim of the petitioner now is that he is entitled to get the differ­ence between the compensation to which he is entitled in law minus what he has already been paid. 3. The respondents denied that the peti­tioner was entitled to any further compensa­tion. They pleaded that adequate compen­sation had been paid to the petitioner for the period during which the land remained under requisition. 4. The writ petition, it looks, is not only highly belated but is also misconceived. 3. The respondents denied that the peti­tioner was entitled to any further compensa­tion. They pleaded that adequate compen­sation had been paid to the petitioner for the period during which the land remained under requisition. 4. The writ petition, it looks, is not only highly belated but is also misconceived. Con­sequently, I feel satisfied that it merits dis­missal. 5. The Government had secured posses­sion of the entire requisitioned area by 22nd of October, 1952, and the whole of that area was acquired sometime in 1955. The writ petition was filed on 23-6-1964. Obviously a civil suit for recovery of compensation was barred by the date the writ petition was Filed. It is correct that no period of limita­tion governs writ petitions filed under Arti­cle 226. However, it is well settled that the outside limit by which an aggrieved party can come to the writ court for seeking any relief is the date by which it could have brought a suit in the civil court for grant of such relief. If the writ petition is filed after that date, it has to be rejected on the ground that it is highly belated. In support of this proposition I may cite the observations of the Supreme Court made in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006 . They are as under:- "Learned Counsel is right in his submis­sion that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seek­ing remedy under Article 226 can be mea­sured. This Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it is un­reasonable." Since, as stated above, this writ petition was filed after the period of limitation for filing a suit had run out, the writ petition must be rejected on the ground of its being unreasonably belated. 6. 6. The land had been requisitioned by the Government under sub-section (1) of sec­tion 29 of the Act. Sub-section (3) of that section provides that the State Government shall pay compensation for any property re­quisitioned by it under sub-section (1), and the principles according to which and the manner in which such compensation is to be determined and paid shall be, inter alia, as follows:- (a) where the amount of compensation can be fixed by agreement, it shall be paid within three months in accordance with such agreement; (b) where no such agreement can be reached, the amount of compensation shall be such as an arbitrator appointed in this behalf by the Chief Commissioner of Tripura may award. These provisions are subject to a proviso which states that in the case of immoveable property, the arbitrator shall be a District Judge or an Additional District Judge. It may be safely assumed that no agreement had been reached in terms of Clause (a) between the petitioner and the^ Government in regard to the amount of compensation payable to the former. Therefore, the com­pensation had to be determined by a District Judge or an Additional District Judge in his capacity as an arbitrator. No step was taken by the petitioner to refer the matter to arbi­tration. Shri J. K. Roy contended for the petitioner that since it was the privilege of the Chief Commissioner to appoint an arbi­trator and since the Chief Commissioner had not named any arbitrator, the petitioner had no right to seek the assistance of the civil court for getting an arbitrator appointed. I regret my inability to accept that argument as well founded. Section 29 (3) makes it clear that in the case of immoveable pro­perty the arbitrator shall be a District Judge or an Additional District Judge. Hence, the Chief Commissioner had no option in naming the arbitrator for determining the compen­sation payable to the petitioner because the property requisitioned was immoveable. Only a move had to be made by the petitioner, which, unluckily, he failed to initiate. H the petitioner had approached the Chief Commissioner to refer the dispute to arbitra­tion and the latter had failed to respond, ft would have been open to the petitioner to go to the civil court under the Arbitration Act, 1940, with the prayer to appoint an arbitrator. H the petitioner had approached the Chief Commissioner to refer the dispute to arbitra­tion and the latter had failed to respond, ft would have been open to the petitioner to go to the civil court under the Arbitration Act, 1940, with the prayer to appoint an arbitrator. I may appropriately mention her that Section 45 of the Arbitration Act, en­joins that the provisions of the Arbitration Act are binding on the Government, while Section 46 of the same Act enacts that the provisions of that Act (excepting certain parts of it) shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force, as if the arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if that other enactment were an arbitration agreement except in so far as the Arbitration Act is in­consistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder. Hence, quite obviously the arbitration contemplated by Section 29 (3) of the Act is subject to the provisions of the Arbitration Act. It was, therefore, clearly open to the petitioner to move either the Chief Commissioner or the civil court for referring the matter of com­pensation payable to him to the arbitration of the District Judge or an Additional Dis­trict Judge. He having failed to do so, he must bear the consequences. 7. The last point urged by Shri J. K. Roy was that Section 37 of the Act stands in the way of a private person to file a suit or take other proceedings against the Gov­ernment respecting the rights arising out of requisitioning of property. Here, again, Shri Roy does not appear to be on sound footing. Section 37 reads as under:- "(1) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is or is deemed to have been in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any order made or deemed to have been made thereunder. Section 37 reads as under:- "(1) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is or is deemed to have been in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any order made or deemed to have been made thereunder. (2) No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against Government for any damage caused or likely to be caused by anything which is or is deemed to have been in good faith done or intended to be done in pur­suance of this Act or any order made or deemed to have been made thereunder." Its marginal heading is, "protection of action taken under the Act." It is too obvious that the object behind Section 37 is to afford protection to the various functionaries men­tioned in the Act against criminal prosecu­tions or suits for damages for anything done by them in good faith to carry out the duties assigned to them under the Act. This sec­tion has nothing to do with the enforcement of the right to compensation by an individual whose property has been requisitioned. That right is clearly vouchsafed to him by sub­section (3) of Section 29 of the Act, and if the right is there the remedy to enforce it through the courts of the country is neces­sarily implied unless it is abridged by some legislative measure, which clearly is not the case respecting the right we are concerned with. Consequently, I repel the point can­vassed by Shri Roy. 8. In view of the only relief sought in the writ petition, namely, that the respon­dents be directed to proceed in the manner provided by Section 29 (3) of the Act for determining the compensation payable to the petitioner, I fail to see what function such a direction will serve. Section 29 (3) itself; being available to the petitioner, I doubt if any direction given by this Court would { make the provisions of that section more j effective. It is not denied that writ Court cannot determine for want of data, the amount of additional compensation payable' to the petitioner. The only purpose which f such a direction could serve would be that 1 the petitioner may get over the bar of limitation. However, the jurisdiction of writ I court cannot be permitted to be abused in that manner. The only purpose which f such a direction could serve would be that 1 the petitioner may get over the bar of limitation. However, the jurisdiction of writ I court cannot be permitted to be abused in that manner. Hence, I feel clear that the ': present writ petition is altogether misconceived. 9. As a result, I dismiss the writ peti­tion. However, I leave the parties to bear their own costs. It is for the reason that the compensation payable to the petitioner for the period during which his lands re­mained requisitioned was never determined in the manner envisaged by section 29 (3) of the Act and so the petitioner had some genuine grievance against the respondents. Advocates fee Rs. 50. Petition dismissed.