J. B. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who claims to be the tenant of three Survey numbers 463/2 467 and 479 at village Sonasan Taluka Prantij challenges in this petition the order of Revenue Tribunal dated March 17 1969 by which the Tribunal has dismissed the revision application confirming the order of the Prant Officer dated November 5 1965 ordering summary eviction of the petitioner from all these lands under sec. 84 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 hereinafter referred to as The Act. These three lands were purchased by Respondent No. 1 in May 1946 It appears that the petitioners brother had surrendered these lands on March 25 1957 and this surrender was verified by the order of the Mamlatdar under sec. 15 (2) of the Act on April 2 1957 and was confirmed by the Collector on May 12 1958 Thereafter respondent No. 1 applied in 1958 in the Mamlatdars Court for injunction in respect of S. No. 463/2. The petitioner was found to be in possession of the survey number and so the suit for injunction under the Mamlatdar Courts Act was dismissed and this order was confirmed by the Prant Officer. In 1958 even the petitioner had applied for entering his name in S. No. 463/2 but his name was not entered and he was directed to apply under sec. 70 (b) of the Act. Respondent No. 1 however applied before the Prant Officer under sec. 84 on February 10 1967 and March 20 1967 forgetting possession of these three lands from the petitioner on the ground that he was trespasser as the real tenant was his brother who had surrendered his tenancy. The petitioner raised a contention before the Prant Officer that he was a tenant of all these three lands. The Prant Officer had negatived this contention and held the petitioner to be a trespasser and had ordered his eviction. This order having been confirmed by the Revenue Tribunal the petitioner has filed this petition against the order of the Revenue Tribunal. The Prant Officer had negatived this contention and held the petitioner to be a trespasser and had ordered his eviction. This order having been confirmed by the Revenue Tribunal the petitioner has filed this petition against the order of the Revenue Tribunal. ( 2 ) IT appears that before the Revenue Tribunal a decision of my learned brother Divan J in Special Civil Application No. 702 of 1963 dated October 15 1963 which proceeded upon an earlier decision of the Division Bench in Shivnarayan Motilal v. Fakira Bala Rohem in Special Civil Application No. 529 of 1958 by Chainani and Tarkunde JJ. on April 25 1958 had been cited. My learned brother Divan J in terms held that in an application under sec. 84 if a question was raised whether a person concerned was a tenant or not of the land in question it is only the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) who can decide the question whether a person is or is not a tenant and the Prant Officer dealing with an application under sec. 84 must direct the party concerned to apply to the Mamlatdar and obtain a decision from him whether the person concerned was a tenant or not. My learned brother in terms held that the principle which emerged from the decision of the Division Bench was that the Prant Officer has no jurisdiction to decide under sec. 84 of the Act whether the person concerned was a tenant of the land in dispute and since that contention was urged before him the Prant Officer should have stayed his hands so far as the proceeding under sec. 84 was concerned and asked the party concerned to approach the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) for a proper decision on that particular point. In spite of this categorical pronouncement this Court the Revenue Tribunal surprised summarily brushed off this decision by observing that when the plea is raised that a person is a tenant before the Authority under sec. 84 it is not the law in this State that the Authority is bound to take his hands off and that the question whether that person was or was not a tenant must be left to be decided by the Mamlatdar. 84 it is not the law in this State that the Authority is bound to take his hands off and that the question whether that person was or was not a tenant must be left to be decided by the Mamlatdar. The Revenue Tribunal has further observed that such is not the law and such is not the dictum laid down by the Gujarat High Court and that for that purpose it was not necessary to cite several judgments of the Tribunal and the Gujarat High Court in which this judgment of the Gujarat High Court had been discussed. The Tribunal further stated that the law is well established that in a case in which summary eviction of a person is prayed for if that person raises a plea that he is a tenant the Authority must be satisfied about the prima facie case as to the tenability of the plea and if the plea is untenable the Authority can go into the question and direct eviction. The Revenue Tribunal without indicating any other decision of this Court thus refused to follow the binding decision of this Court ignoring the basic principle of justice and rule of law that every Court and Tribunal in the State is bound to follow the law laid down by the highest Court in the State. It is only a concurrent Court which can distinguish a decision on the ground that it is obiter or per in curiam or that it is distinguishable on facts. A superior Courts decision however can never be distinguished on these grounds as otherwise the whole administration of law through such hierarchy of subordinate Courts and tribunals would come to an end. Therefore the very fact that the Revenue Tribunal refused to follow the binding decision of this Court would amount to denial of justice and would justify reversal of the decision of the Revenue Tribunal especially as even today after an elaborate research by Shri Shah no other decision of this Court is pointed out taking any other view than the one taken by my learned brother Divan J. Even if any other decision was available to the Revenue Tribunal it should have elaborately pointed out such decision and it should not have in this cavalier fashion refused to follow a binding decision of this Court. ( 3 ) MR. ( 3 ) MR. Shah has however after an exhaustive research tried to point out some other earlier Bombay High Court decisions and he has vehemently argued that on the basis of those decisions the Revenue Tribunals order could be supported by him. In fact the whole controversy now stands resolved by the law declared by the Supreme Court and my learned brother Divan J. s decision is in conformity with that settled legal position. In Bhimaji v. Dundappa A. I. R. 1966 Supreme Court p. 166 at page 168 their Lordships laid down the combined effect of secs. 29 70 85 and 85a of the Act in the following words:-THE Mamlatdar has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain an application by a landlord for possession of agricultural lands against a tenant and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try a suit by a landlord against a tenant for possession of agricultural lands. The Mamlatdar has no jurisdiction to try a suit by a landowner for recovery of possession of agricultural lands from a trespasser or from a mortgagee on redemption of a mortgage and the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain such a suit; but if the defendant to the suit pleads that he is a tenant or a protected tenant or a permanent tenant and an issue arises whether he is such a tenant the Court must refer the issue to the Mamlatdar for determination and must stay the suit pending such determination and after the Mamlatdar has decided the issue the Court may dispose of the suit in the light of the decision of the Mamlatdar. THEIR Lordships thereafter pointed out the history of this legislation as a result of which sec. 85a was introduced by Bombay Act XIII of 1956 from March 23 1956 Their Lordships in terms pointed out that even prior to the introduction of sec. 85a the Bombay High Court in Dhondi Tukaram v. Hari Dadu A. I. R. 1954 Bombay p. 100 held that the effect of secs. 85a was introduced by Bombay Act XIII of 1956 from March 23 1956 Their Lordships in terms pointed out that even prior to the introduction of sec. 85a the Bombay High Court in Dhondi Tukaram v. Hari Dadu A. I. R. 1954 Bombay p. 100 held that the effect of secs. 70 (b) and 85 read in the light of the other provisions of the Act was that if in a suit filed against the defendant on the footing that he is a trespasser he raises the plea that he is a tenant or a protected tenant the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the plea and the proper procedure was to refer the issue to the Mamlatdar for his decision and not to dismiss the suit straightway. As the High Court at that time had expressed the view that the Legislature would make suitable changes and the Bombay Legislature approved of this decision and gave effect to it by enacting sec. 85a which proceeds on the assumption that though the Civil Court has otherwise jurisdiction to try a suit it would have no jurisdiction to try an issue arising in the suit if the issue was required to be settled decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar under the Act. On that assumption sec. 85a provides for suitable machinery for reference of the issue to the Mamlatdar for his decision. Further proceeding at page 169 their Lordships pointed out that this result was somewhat startling for normally the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try all the issues arising in a suit properly cognizable by it. But having regard to the fact that the Bombay Legislature approved of Dhondi Tukarams case by introducing sec. 85a it must be held that the decision correctly interpreted the law as it stood before the enactment of sec. 85a. It follows that independently of sec. 85a and under the law as it stood before sec. 85a came into force the Courts below were bound to refer to the Mamlatdar the decision of the issue whether the defendant is a tenant. 85a. It follows that independently of sec. 85a and under the law as it stood before sec. 85a came into force the Courts below were bound to refer to the Mamlatdar the decision of the issue whether the defendant is a tenant. Their Lordships thereafter referred to a decision of Mysore High Court where on the identical scheme a view was taken that the jurisdiction of the Authority being limited to cases arising by or under the Act by the words for the purposes of the Act the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide all the points in dispute in an otherwise competent suit was not excluded by the mere plea of the defendant. Their Lordships in terms pointed out that it was not necessary to express any opinion one way or the other on the correctness or otherwise of the Mysore decision in view of some points of distinction between that scheme and legislative history of Mysore Act and those of the Bombay Act. Therefore however startling the legal position appears to us at first sight so far as the scheme of the Tenancy Act is concerned the settled legal position is that because the tenancy authorities have exclusive jurisdiction to decide this question under sec. 70 (b) whether a person is a tenant or not even a plea raised by the defendant excludes the jurisdiction even of a competent Civil Court which is otherwise competent to decide the suit as it would have no jurisdiction to decide this issue. Therefore even a competent Civil Court must refer the issue under sec. 70 of the Tenancy Act to the Mamlatdar and if the competent authority decides that a person was not a tenant but a trespasser it would be open to the Civil Court thereafter when the plea of the tenancy was rejected by the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) to deal with the dispute on the footing that the defendant was not a tenant but a trespasser. Mr. Shah tried to distinguish this decision on the ground that this decision would apply to its own facts as it only held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. It cannot be urged before this Court that the decision of the Supreme Court is distinguishable on the facts. It is the law declared by the highest Court and the land which binds this Court. It cannot be urged before this Court that the decision of the Supreme Court is distinguishable on the facts. It is the law declared by the highest Court and the land which binds this Court. The law declared is in categorical terms that not only the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded but that the Act creates an exclusive jurisdiction only in the competent Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) to decide a question whether a person is a tenant or not. Once this ratio is given effect to Mr. Shahs contention can never be accepted that this decision proceeded on its own facts and that only Civil Courts jurisdiction is barred by the decision when it is and held that the only authority in the State to decide the question whether a person is a tenant or not of this agricultural land is the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) subject to an appeal and revision as per the hierarchy created under the Tenancy Act. In that view of the matter even the Prant Officer under sec. 84 would have no jurisdiction to decide this issue which was raised before him that the petitioner was a tenant or not. ( 4 ) MR. Shah also argued that sec. 84 is a provision of the very Act and therefore in this the remedy of summary eviction the Prant Officer can incidentally decide this question. Once we held that the authority under sec. 70 (b) has exclusive jurisdiction as per the settled legal position there is no escape from the conclusion that no other authority under the Tenancy Act even incidentally could go into this question and this issue wherever raised before any authority must be referred to the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) who alone had jurisdiction to decide this issue and who can give a finding on this question. In fact the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Shelat C. J. as he then was and Shah J. in Abdul v. State VI Gujarat Law Reporter p. 730 took the same view as regards the competency of the Agricultural Lands Tribunal to decide this question. At page 739 it was pointed out that under sec. 32g the Agricultural Lands Tribunal has to go through various stages necessitating the making of different orders before passing an order as to the purchase price. After notices have been issued under sec. At page 739 it was pointed out that under sec. 32g the Agricultural Lands Tribunal has to go through various stages necessitating the making of different orders before passing an order as to the purchase price. After notices have been issued under sec. 32 (1) if the landlord challenges that a particular person claiming to be his tenant is not his tenant and therefore not entitled to be treated as a deemed purchaser in that event the Lands Tribunal would have to direct such a landlord to obtain the necessary decision from the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 and pass the necessary order when such a decision is obtained. Therefore even this independent authority viz. Agricultural Lands Tribunal cannot go into this incidental question before it determines purchase price without getting a decision of competent Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) as to the question whether the person concerned is a tenant or not. ( 5 ) MR. Shah however vehemently relied upon the decision of the Division Bench consisting of Gajendragadkar J. as he then was and Gokhale J dated April 10 1956 in Special Civil Application No. 278 of 1956 in Siddappa v. Mallappa. In that case the petitioner was summarily evicted as he was found to be not entitled to use and occupation of land under the provisions of the Act and because the provisions of the Act did not provide for eviction under sec. 29. It is true that the decision of the Division Bench in terms held that in such a case where the application cannot be made against the trespasser either by the tenant or the landlord under sec. 29 (1) and (2) there would be no occasion for the Mamlatdar to consider as to whether a person like the petitioner is a trespasser or not and therefore the question as to whether the petitioner was a trespasser would not have fallen within the jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) of the Act. The Division Bench in fact proceeded on the footing that it is only in an application made under sec. 29 that the status of the petitioner would fall to be examined by the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b ). 70 (b) of the Act. The Division Bench in fact proceeded on the footing that it is only in an application made under sec. 29 that the status of the petitioner would fall to be examined by the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b ). This decision of the Division Bench was followed again by the Division Bench in Special Civil Application No. 3207 of 1958 by Mudholkar J as he then was and Patel J. on February 10 1959 in Smt. Anjalibai v. Shankar Bala Patil. These two authorities are in direct conflict with the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. These two Division Bench rulings proceed on the footing that even an authority under sec. 84 which was the only competent authority under the Act before whom such a proceeding for eviction on the allegation that the person was a trespasser could be maintained could go into the question and decide this issue whether a person was a tenant or a trespasser and eviction could be ordered by the Prant Officer under sec. 84 if ultimately it was found that he was a trespasser. The Supreme Court has in terms held that exclusive jurisdiction to determine this issue is only of the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) whether a person is a tenant or not and even a competent Civil Courts jurisdiction would be excluded to determine this issue once this plea was raised before it. Once the jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) is held to be exclusive jurisdiction no other authority under the Act or even the Civil Court or a Mamlatdars Court would have jurisdiction to decide this issue and they would have to direct the parties to obtain the decision of the competent Mamlatdar on this question when such an issue arises in a proceeding otherwise competent before them. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court the aforesaid two decisions of the Division Bench must be held clearly overruled and should no longer be treated as good law. It appears that the Division Bench could not accept this startling proposition that a bare plea about the tenancy excluded the jurisdiction of a Court of an authority which is otherwise competent to entertain proceedings for eviction on the allegation of the petitioner or the plaintiff to the effect that the opponent or the defendant was a trespasser. It appears that the Division Bench could not accept this startling proposition that a bare plea about the tenancy excluded the jurisdiction of a Court of an authority which is otherwise competent to entertain proceedings for eviction on the allegation of the petitioner or the plaintiff to the effect that the opponent or the defendant was a trespasser. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court however have in terms held that historical reasons justify this view howsoever startling it is. In view of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) to decide this question it must be held that no Court or any other authority under the Act except the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 would have jurisdiction to decide this question whether a person is a tenant or not. That is why in Suleman Hasam v. Kashiram Bhau 60 Bombay Law Reporter p. 1119 the Division Bench consisting of Chainani and Tarkunde JJ. distinguished the decision in Shiddappa Bhimappa Ullagadi v. Mallappa Mennappa at page 1120 by pointing out that the judgment shows that the attention of the learned Judges was not invited to the words under the said provisions contained in cl. (c) of sec. 84 of the Act and on facts also the case was clearly distinguishable. This Division Bench therefore in terms held that the Collector had no jurisdiction to decide a question of title as to whether a person is a protected tenant or not in a proceeding under sec. 84. Even the Full Bench decision in Nivrutti Laxman v. Shivdayal by Chainani C. J. Mudholkar J. and Patel J. in 61 Bom. L. R. p. 957 has in terms held at page 959 that the Mamlatdar can decide a question under sec. 70 (b) whether a person was a tenant or not even if such a question arises in Civil Court in a proceeding other than a proceeding under the Tenancy Act. He would also have jurisdiction to decide it before it arises in the Civil Court. The Full Bench in terms followed the decision in Dhondi Tukarams case which was relied upon by the Supreme Court for the purpose of legislative history which led their Lordships to hold that the Mamlatdar under sec. He would also have jurisdiction to decide it before it arises in the Civil Court. The Full Bench in terms followed the decision in Dhondi Tukarams case which was relied upon by the Supreme Court for the purpose of legislative history which led their Lordships to hold that the Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) has exclusive jurisdiction to determine this question whether a person was a tenant or not that is to say whether a person was a tenant or a trespasser. ( 6 ) IN view of the settled legal position Mr. Shahs contention can never be accepted that the observations made by my learned brother Divan J. were merely obiter. It was the considered opinion of my learned brother Divan J. after interpreting the Division Bench ruling cited before him and even the decisions which are now relied upon by Mr. Shah do not require me to take a different view from my learned brother Divan J. especially when now the whole question has been finally decided by the Supreme Court. The Revenue Tribunal had therefore committed a jurisdictional error by deciding the question whether the petitioner is a tenant or not as it should have left this question for decision of the competent Mamlatdar. In the result this petition is allowed and a certiorari is issued quashing the order of the Revenue Tribunal as well as the order of the Prant Officer evicting the petitioner. A mandamus is issued directing the Prant Officer to stay the matter and give time to the concerned respondent to obtain a decision of the competent Mamlatdar under sec. 70 (b) of the Act on the question whether the petitioner is a tenant or not and thereafter when the final decision of the Mamlatdar is received that the petitioner is not a tenant if the proceedings are competent under sec. 84 to dispose of the application in accordance with law. Rule is accordingly made absolute with costs. ( 7 ) MR. Shah made a request to stay the operation of the order of mandamus issued against the Prant Officer in order that the respondent landlord can file an appeal before the Supreme Court. Mr. Shah undertakes not to disturb the possession of the petitioner and therefore the remand order is stayed for a period of two months from today. .