JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, J. - The suit is for realisation of arrear house rent. One of the houses of the Plaintiff had been rented out to the Defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. 15/-. Rent was being regularly paid till October 1960. No rent was paid from November 1960 till April 1903. The defence was that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, and that there was an agreement for sale of one gunth of land by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. This defence need not be elaborated as it was found to be frivolous by the trial Court and was ultimately abandoned before the lower appellate Court. The concurrent finding of both the Courts below is that the Defendant was inducted as a tenant in the suit house by the Plaintiff and the Defendant has not paid rent as claimed from, November 1960 till April 1963. This position was also conceded by the Defendant in the lower appellate Court. If this' finding were to determine the fate of the suit, the Plaintiff's suit was bound to succeed. In the lower appellate Court the Defendant however filed an application for amendment of the written statement and for leading additional evidence to the effect that the disputed site, which belonged to the Khasmahal and had been leased out to the Plaintiff, had been resumed prior to November 1960 since when there is non-payment of rent. It was accepted by both the parties before the lower appellate Court that there was a resumption order which was challenged in Title Suit No. 69/49 of 1965 in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuttack, wherein the resumption order was held to be valid and an order of eviction was granted against the Plaintiff. The judgment was confirmed in the High Court, and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused. It was verbally stated before the lower appellate Court that a writ application against the judgments in Civil Courts was pending in the High Court and an order of stay had been granted against the eviction of the Plaintiff. On the aforesaid statement, the factual position stands thus. The Plaintiff has lost his title by resumption on the part of the Government, but he is continuing in possession as before. 2. On the aforesaid statement, the factual position stands thus. The Plaintiff has lost his title by resumption on the part of the Government, but he is continuing in possession as before. 2. On these facts, the learned Subordinate Judge remanded the suit with a direction that the parties would be allowed to amend tine pleadings and the Government would be made a party for recovery of the rent from the Defendant. 3. Mr. Mohanty contends that the aforesaid order of remand is contrary to law. Mr. Patnaik also does not support the order of remand. The learned Subordinate Judge took a perverse view in giving a direction that the case should be remanded to give the Government a chance of becoming a party for realisation of rent. If the Government is entitled to rent from the Defendant, it is always open to it to file such a suit. There need not be any anxiety on the part of the' Court to look to the interest of the Government in that way. The order of remand must accordingly be quashed. 4. The real question for consideration is whether on the factual position, as it transpires, the Plaintiff is entitled to recovery of rent from the Defendant. Evidently by the resumption order confirmed by the judgments of the hierarchy of Civil Courts, the Plaintiff's title has been extinguished. The Plaintiff cannot therefore recover rent on the strength of the original title prior to the resumption. The Plaintiff can however plead the theory of estoppel, if it is tenable, to debar the Defendant from challenging the Plaintiff's title u/s 116 of the Evidence Act. This section came up for consideration in a series of decisions of the Privy Council. One of the leading authorities is to be found in AIR 1937 251 (Privy Council), where Sir George Rankin, in an indubitable language, gave a clear analysis of the scope of the section. His Lordship observed thus: The section postulates that there is a tenancy still continuing, that it had its beginning at a given date from a given landlord. It provides that neither a tenant nor anyone claiming through a tenant shall be beard to deny that that particular landlord had at that date a title to the property. His Lordship observed thus: The section postulates that there is a tenancy still continuing, that it had its beginning at a given date from a given landlord. It provides that neither a tenant nor anyone claiming through a tenant shall be beard to deny that that particular landlord had at that date a title to the property. In the ordinary case of a lease intended MI a present demise-which is the case before the Board on this appeal the section applies against the lessee, any assignee of the term and any sub-lessee or licensee. What an such persons are precluded from denying is that the lessor had a title at the date of the lease and there is no exception even for the case where the lease itself discloses the defect of title. The principle does not apply to disentitle a tenant to dispute the derivative title of one who claims to have since become entitled to the reversion, though in such cases there may be other grounds of estoppel, e.g., by attornment, acceptance of rent, etc. In this sence it is true enough that the principle only applies to the title of the landlord who 'let the tenant in' as distinct from any other person claiming to be reversioner. Nor does the principle apply to prevent a tenant from pleading that the title of the original lessor has since come to an end. The italic sentence clearly brings out the theory that neither Section 110 of the Evidence Act nor any analogous principle of estoppel stands in the way of the tenant to take up the plea that subsequent to the commencement of the tenancy there has been extinction of the title of the landlord. This is exactly what has happened in this case. The title of the Plaintiff has been extinguished by resumption subsequent to the commencement of the tenancy. The result is that the Plaintiff has no title to the disputed property, nor is the Defendant debarred by principle of estoppel in questioning the existence of title. Only on one of there grounds the Plaintiff's suit either for eviction or for realisation of rent could succeed. As both the grounds did not apply, the Plaintiff's suit for recovery of rent must fail. 5. Mr. Only on one of there grounds the Plaintiff's suit either for eviction or for realisation of rent could succeed. As both the grounds did not apply, the Plaintiff's suit for recovery of rent must fail. 5. Mr. Mohanty however very seriously contends on the basis of a series of other Privy Council decisions and on the allthority of Laxminarayan Gupta Vs. Durgadevi Thakurani that the expression 'during the continuance of the tenancy' in pith and substance means, so long as the tenant has not surrendered possession of the tenancy into which he was inducted. Doubtless that is the construction consistently given to that expression. But such a theory has no application to a case where there has been extinction of the title of the landlord subsequent to the commencement of the tenancy. The proposition laid down by the Privy Council directly militates against such a concept. If the tenant must surrender possession before resorting to the plea of extinction of title subsequent to the commencement of the tenancy, there would be no meaning for their Lordships to say that the theory of estoppel has no application to such a case. The aforesaid decisions are therefore distinguishable on facts. 6. My conclusion on an analysis of the Privy Council decisions is also supported by the observations of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Udaypratap Singh Deo and Others Vs. Krushna Padhano and Another. Chief Justice, Ray put the proposition in the shape of an illustration in paragraph 8 of the judgment. His Lordship observed thus: The entire question can be decided by citing the instance of a hypothatical event. Suppose, Nandamani or his successors-in-interest institute a suit to recover a sum from this tenant as compensation for use and occupation of his lands without his leave and license, the question that presents itself for solution is whether he is entitled to succeed. This hypothesis admits of one solution only, namely, that he should. To this also, Mr. Patnaik, in his usual fairness, does not advance any demur. If side by side we accept the Plaintiff's case and enforce his propounded lease against the tenant and if the tenant is debarred by rule of estoppel from disputing the Plaintiff's title, we must have to grant a decree to the Plaintiff. To this also, Mr. Patnaik, in his usual fairness, does not advance any demur. If side by side we accept the Plaintiff's case and enforce his propounded lease against the tenant and if the tenant is debarred by rule of estoppel from disputing the Plaintiff's title, we must have to grant a decree to the Plaintiff. In this contingency, the tenant will have to pay twice, that is to say, our view with regard to the rule of estoppel in its application to the facts of this particular case will land us in an absurd and inequitable position. The aforesaid cape directly applies to the facts of this case with the only distinction that in that case the mortgagor of the Plaintiff had no title prior to' the lease and this in case the extinction of title came into existence subsequent to the lease. 7 In this view of the matter, the Plaintiff's suit is bound to fail. The judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge remanding the suit, is set aside and the Plaintiff's suit is dismissed. The Civil Revision is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances there would be no order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed