This revision petition under, Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and Para 34 of the Tripura (Courts) Order, 1950, arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff-respondent No. 1. Mohan Bashi Dutta, against the present petition­ers, and is directed against the order, dated 16-9-1966 by which Shri S. C. Roy, Munsiff, Belonia, held that the suit had been properly valued and sufficiently stamped and that he had the pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. The principal point urged in the revision petition is that the value of the land involved being Rs. 25,000 the Munsiff at Belonia has no jurisdiction to try the suit as his jurisdic­tion is limited to suits of the maximum value of Rs. 4,000. 2. The plaintiff Mohan Bashi Dutta, his brother Rebati Mohan Dutta, who is now respondent No. 2, and the six petitioners, according to the allegations made in the plaint, are joint owners of the land mea­suring 1 drone and about 13 kanis and the share of the plaintiff and his brother therein is one-fourth each. The plaintiff's main prayer in the suit is for partition of the joint land and delivery of khas pos­session to him of the part corresponding to his share. It is definitely alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff is in possession of a part of the land in dispute in his capa­city as joint owner. Another allegation made in the plaint is that out of 6 kanis, 11 gandas. 3 karas and 15 dhurs in his occupation, the pre­sent petitioners had dispossessed him from 2 kanis, 4 gandas. 3 karas and 15 dhurs sometime before the institution of the suit. The alternative claim made in the suit is for a decree for possession of this latter land. Para 11 of the plaint on transla­tion in English would read as under: "For the purposes of jurisdiction and court-fees the suit has been approximate­ly valued at Rs. 500 and for partition a fixed court-fee of Rs. 15 has been paid." 3. The present petitioners raised an objection in their written statement that the suit had not been properly valued either for the purpose of court-fee or for jurisdiction, that the entire land is of the market value of Rs. 25,000, and that the court had consequently no jurisdiction to try the suit. 15 has been paid." 3. The present petitioners raised an objection in their written statement that the suit had not been properly valued either for the purpose of court-fee or for jurisdiction, that the entire land is of the market value of Rs. 25,000, and that the court had consequently no jurisdiction to try the suit. The trial court settled the following issue relevant to this objection of the petitioners: Has the suit been properly valued and sufficiently stamped and has the court pecuniary jurisdiction to try the present suit? 4. By the impugned order the court held that the suit is governed by Section 7(iv)(b) of the Assam Court Fees Act as extended to Tripura, and that in all suits falling under that provision of the Court Fees Act the plaintiff has the option, in terms of Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, to place his own valuation on the suit. In support of the latter conclusion reliance was placed on the Supreme Court case Sathappa Chettiar. v, Ramanathan, AIR 1958 SC 245 . 5. After examining the arguments ad­dressed at the bar and going through the authorities cited by the parties' counsel, I feel that the trial court was in error in holding that the present suit is of the nature mentioned in S. 7 (iv) (b) of the Court Fees Act. Clause (b) of Section 7(iv) reads. "To enforce the right to share In any property on the ground that it is joint family property". The heading of the clause Is: "To enforce a right to share in joint family property". Firstly, it is not mentioned in the plaint that the various co-owners of the land in dispute are members of joint family. The petitioners, it was admitted during the course of arguments, do not belong to the family of the plaintiff Mohan Bashi Dutta, In the second place, there is complete consensus of judicial opinion in India on the point that Section 7(iv)(b) applies only to those cases where the plaintiff happens to be out of possession of the joint property and prays in the suit filed by him that he should be restored to pos­session of his share in that property. In this connection, I invite attention to the case reported in Durga Bux v. Ambika Bux, AIR 1940 Oudh 47 and this authority,, I may point out, was relied upon by Shri B. B. Gupta, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent No. 1, though for a different purpose. It is equally well settled that a suit for partition by a co-sharer in possession of even a part of the joint property is gov­erned for the purposes of court-fee, by clause (vi) of Article 17 of Schedule II of the Court-Fees Act. Hence it is not pos­sible to sustain the finding of the trial court that the present suit is governed by Section 7(iv)(b) for the purpose of court-fee. In fact, the court-fee had not been paid by the plaintiff under that provision of the law. Under that provision it is for the plaintiff to state the amount at which he values the relief sought. However, as Is evident from para 11 of the plaint reproduced above, the plaintiff had not valued the suit for the purpose of court-fee but had paid a fixed court-fee of Rs. 15. This he appears to have done on the assumption that the case falls under Article 17(vi) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. On no other basis pay­ment of fixed court-fee of Rs. 15 can be explained. The suits mentioned in Arti­cle 17(vi), I may emphasise, have to be stamped with court-fee of the value of Rs. 15. 6. The trial court was also wrong to. holding that in the present suit it was open to the plaintiff to fix its value for the purposes of jurisdiction at his sweet will. t In support of his conclusion the court placed reliance on Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act and the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Sathappa Chettiar, AIR 1958 SC 245 (supra). Section 8 of the Suits Valua­tion Act runs as under: "Where in suits other than those re­ferred to in the Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), Section 7, paragraphs (v), (vi) and (ix) and paragraph (x), clause (d), court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Court Fees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of juris­diction shall be the same". A plain reading of the section indicates that it relates to those cases where the court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Court Fees Act. However, since in the present suit a fixed court-fee of Rs. 15 had been paid under Art. 17(vi), Schedule II, of the Court Fees Act, it can­not be said that the court-fee had been paid on ad valorem basis. Therefore, the applicability of Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act is not attracted. I have gone through the Supreme Court report In the case of Sathappa Chettiar but have found no support there from for the view of the trial court that the present suit falls under Section 7(iv)(b) of the Court Fees Act or that it Is governed by Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act for purposes of jurisdiction. The only relevant pro­positions enunciated by the Supreme Court were that in respect of suits fall­ing under section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act a departure has been made by giving liberty to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposes of court-fees, and that the effect of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act is to make the value for the purposes of jurisdiction depend upon the value as determined for computation of court-fees in respect of suits mention­ed therein. Since the basic approach of the trial court, namely, that the present suit falls under section 7 (iv) (b) of the Court Fees Act, is wrong, and since sec­tion 8 of the Suits Valuation Act in terms covers those cases where court-fee is payable on ad valorem basis, the Supreme .Court case is clearly distinguishable. 7. Before proceeding to determine whether the suit has been properly valu­ed for the purposes of jurisdiction, I would like to dispose of one point which was persistently pressed by Shri B. B. Gupta. Respecting suits mentioned in first four clauses of section 7 of the Assam Court Fees Act as extended to Tripura, it is mentioned, "In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought". Shri Gupta urged that these reproduced words give unfettered authority to the plaintiff to fix the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction. I regret my inability to accept that contention. Shri Gupta urged that these reproduced words give unfettered authority to the plaintiff to fix the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction. I regret my inability to accept that contention. The reproduced words, in my opinion, give discretion to the plaintiff to fix the value of the suit for the purposes of court-fee and not jurisdiction. The value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction has to be determined with reference to Suits Valuation Act. In substance Shri Gupta's argument was that the fixed court-fee of Rs. 15/- could be paid under Article 17 (vi), Schedule II, of the Court Fees Act, while the value for the purposes of juris­diction could be assessed by the plaintiff at his pleasure in terms of the reproduced words occurring beneath the first four clauses of section 7 of the Court Fees Act. That would amount to putting out of consideration altogether the provisions of the Suits Valuation Act while fixing the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction. Nay, more. It would also mean that one provision of Court Fees Act can be utilised for the purposes of court-fee and another for determining the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction. The proposition canvassed by Shri Gupta, to say the least, is fanta­stic and not supported by any authority. A plain reading of the Supreme Court authority, in the case of Sathappa would bring out that respecting suits falling under section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act, the plaintiff has to fix the value of the suit for the purposes of court-fee, and that value is also to be considered as the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction in terms of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. However, noth­ing said in section 7 of the Court Fees Act can be interpreted to support the proposition that the value of a suit for the purposes of jurisdiction is to be de­termined under that provision of law completely divorced from the provisions of the Suits Valuation Act. Hence, the proposition canvassed by Shri B. B. Gupta has to be negatived. 8. This brings us to the consideration of the question whether the suit had been properly valued at Rs. 500/- for the purposes of jurisdiction. Hence, the proposition canvassed by Shri B. B. Gupta has to be negatived. 8. This brings us to the consideration of the question whether the suit had been properly valued at Rs. 500/- for the purposes of jurisdiction. According to Shri A. K. Shyam Choudhury, appearing for the petitioners, the suit being for possession by partition, its jurisdictional value would be the market price of the entire land in dispute, and he added that the market value of that land is nothing short of Rs. 25.000/-. He pointed out that the petitioners had led copious and con­vincing evidence, oral and documentary, to prove that the market price of the land, on the date the suit was filed, was Rs. l.000/- per kani and that the total area of the land in dispute is more than 25 kanis. Shri B. B. Gupta, on the other hand, urged that since the plaintiff had asked for khas possession of about 21/2 kanis and that the value of the land in dispute, according to plaintiff, is not more than Rs. 200/- per kani, the suit had been pro­perly valued at Rs. 500/- for the purposes of jurisdiction. Apart from the fact what is the market value of the land in dis­pute, the argument of Shri B. B. Gupta is altogether unconvincing because besides the alternative claim of khas pos­session of about 2 1/2 kanis the primary relief sought by the plaintiff is for pos­session by partition of his one-fourth share out of a total land measuring about 11 acres. It is on that basis that the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdic­tion shall have to be determined, and not on the footing of the alternative claim made for khas possession of about 21/2 kanis. 9. Shri A. K. Shyam Choudhury claim­ed on the authority of Rajani Kanta v. Raja Bala Dasi, AIR 1925 Cal 320. that the valuation of such a suit for purposes of jurisdiction will be the value of the entire property and not of the share which the plaintiff claims in the pro­perty. However, there is complete un­animity amongst the other High Courts in India that in partition suits the pro­per valuation for the purposes of juris­diction is the value of the plaintiff's share and not of the entire property. However, there is complete un­animity amongst the other High Courts in India that in partition suits the pro­per valuation for the purposes of juris­diction is the value of the plaintiff's share and not of the entire property. Shri A. K. Shyam Choudhury when asked by the Court to cite any other authority in sup­port of the contention raised above was unable to do so. I may refer to page 832/ 26 of Sanjiva Row's Commentary on Court Fees and Suits Valuation Acts, 7th Edition, where it is mentioned that "There is a consensus of opinion in all the High Courts except Calcutta that the valuation of partition suits will be the value of the plaintiff's share and not the entire pro­perty". The learned Author has men­tioned in the footnote a large number of authorities of the other High Courts in India as also of the Judicial Commissioners' Courts including that of Tripura. In the case of Jogesh Chandra v. Amulya Kumar, AIR 1957 Tripura 7, this Court held that in a suit for partition valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction is to be determined according to the value of the plain­tiff's share in the property, and that the plaintiff is not bound to fix the value of such a suit on the basis of the value of the whole of the property. The view expressed by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Rajani Kanta (supra) was dis­sented from in Jogesh Chandra's case. I am bound to follow_ the previous judg­ment of this Court in preference to that of Calcutta High Court unless I reach the conclusion that the view expressed by this Court is not sound in law. However, I feel satisfied that the view taken by this Court in the case of Jogesh Chandra is correct and it is also in accord with the view of the other High Courts in India (excepting Calcutta). Hence, repell­ing the contention raised by Shri A. K. Shyam Choudhury I hold that the pro­per value of the present suit for the pur­poses of jurisdiction would be the value of plaintiff's share in the land in dispute. 10. Hence, repell­ing the contention raised by Shri A. K. Shyam Choudhury I hold that the pro­per value of the present suit for the pur­poses of jurisdiction would be the value of plaintiff's share in the land in dispute. 10. The trial court did not bother to determine either the rate of the land in dispute or its total value or the value of the share of the plaintiff in that land, and this despite the fact that both the par­ties had led evidence to establish the market value of the land in dispute. Pro­bably, it was for the reason that in the opinion of the trial court it was open to the plaintiff to place such value on the suit as he deemed fit. However, since the parties were not agreed about the mode of assessing the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction, the Court should have, in fairness to the parties, adjudged the rate of the land in dispute or its total value. If that course had been adopted, the necessity for remand would have been obviated and some delay in the disposal of the suit got over. As at present I have no option but to remit the case to the trial court for determin­ing the value of the land in dispute on the date the suit was instituted. 11. I am now left only to dispose of the objection of Shri B. B. Gupta that a revision petition against the impugned order is not competent. Basing himself on the provisions of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, Shri Gupta submitted that the case does not fall within the ambit of either of the clauses (a) to (c) of that section and as such the only course open to this Court is to reject the revision petition. However, section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, it may be pointed out, is not applicable to the Union Territory of Tripura. In sub-para (3) of para 34 of the Tripura (Courts) Order, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Order), it is clearly provided that S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not apply to Tripura. The revision petition was filed under section 115 of the Code and under para 34 of the Order. In sub-para (3) of para 34 of the Tripura (Courts) Order, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Order), it is clearly provided that S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not apply to Tripura. The revision petition was filed under section 115 of the Code and under para 34 of the Order. Clause (b) of sub-para (1) of para 34 of the Order permits this Court to call for the record of any case decided by a civil court subordinate to it and in which no appeal lies to it if, on an application made to it, the Court is of the opinion that there is an important question of law or custom involved and such question requires fur­ther consideration. On receipt of such an application, proviso (iv) to clause (b) enjoins, the Court will treat the matter of the application as if it were an appeal and then make such order in the case as it thinks fit. The question under which provision of Suits Valuation Act the pre­sent suit falls for the purposes of juris­diction is undeniably an important ques­tion of law, as is evident from the elaborate arguments addressed by the parties' counsel, and that question of law does require consideration at the hands of this Court because of conflict of judi­cial opinion as mentioned above. Hence, the revision petition filed by the defen­dants is clearly maintainable in law. 12. Article 227 of the Constitution can also be availed of by this Court, in exer­cise of the power of general superinten­dence given to it over all courts and tri­bunals within the Territory of Tripura, for revising the order made by the trial court that the suit had been properly valued for the purposes of jurisdiction. It is well settled that the power of superin­tendence conferred on the High Court by Article 227 involves a duty to keep all courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do what the duty requires, and further that they do it in a legal manner. There-f6re, the High Court can interfere if there is an error apparent on the face of the record. The error committed by the trial Court in holding that the plaintiff can evaluate the present suit for the pur­poses of jurisdiction at a figure he thinks appropriate is clearly an error apparent on the face of the record. There-f6re, the High Court can interfere if there is an error apparent on the face of the record. The error committed by the trial Court in holding that the plaintiff can evaluate the present suit for the pur­poses of jurisdiction at a figure he thinks appropriate is clearly an error apparent on the face of the record. The trial Court, as held above, was clearly wrong in holding that Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act applies to the suit. That section applies only when the Court-fee in respect of specified suits is payable ad valorem. In the present suit a fixed court-fee of Rs. 15/- had been paid and the parties are at one in stating that that is the proper court-fee payable. It is correct that the revision petition had not been filed under Article 227 of the Con­stitution, but it is settled that the power under Article 227 may, in proper cases, be exercised suo motu by the Court. In this connection I invite attention to the authorities reported in AIR 1962 Punj 117, Faqir Chand v. Gopi Chand, and AIR 1958 All 154 , S. Barrow v. State of U. P. 13. As a result. I accept the revision petition, set aside the order of the trial Court that the suit had been properly valued for the purposes of jurisdiction, and remand the case to that court with the direction that it should proceed to deter­mine the value of plaintiff's share in the land in dispute. If the value of the plain­tiff's share is determined at more than Rs. 4,000/-, the court shall report the mat­ter to the District Judge for transferring the suit to the court having jurisdiction to try it. The petitioners shall get costs from the plaintiff-respondent. Advocate's fee Rs. 32/-. Case remanded.