JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, J. - The decree in O.S. No. 63 of 1961 in the Court of the Munsif, Khurda is based on the ordering portion of the judgment which runs thus: It is declared that the Plaintiffs are the joint owners with the Defendants and they are entitled to possess jointly along with the Defendants. The decree was put into execution. The judgment-debtors filed an objection u/s 47, CPC that the decree is merely declaratory and is not executable and that for recovery of joint possession the decree-holders must file a separate suit. This contention was rejected b the Courts below. Against the appellate order this Miscellaneous Appeal has been filed. 2. The only question for consideration is whether the aforesaid decree is declaratory or has awarded consequential relief. In my view, the language of the decretal order is plain and it leads to unmistakable conclusion that not only joint title was declared, but also a relief for recovery of joint possession was granted. The expression "they are entitled to possess jointly along with the Defendants" means that the Plaintiffs were entitled to be put into possession jointly with the Defendants. The words "entitled to" do not make the relief declaratory. 3. There is no dispute over the proposition that where a decree merely declares the rights of parties and does not direct any act to be done in course of execution, the decree is declaratory. In such a case the decree is not executable and in order to get a consequential relief on the basis of such a decree a separate suit would lie. On the other band, if the decree gives a direction for doing or for refraining from doing a particular act the decree is executable. In this case the decree is clear that the Plaintiffs would be entitled to possess the disputed land jointly with the Defendants. Such a direction is a definite order to definite persons, namely, the Defendants to allow the Plaintiffs to jointly possess the disputed land with them. 4. Mr. Mohapatra very seriously contends that the order is ambiguous and read in conjunction with the judgment conclusion is irresistible that the decree is only declaratory. Such a direction is a definite order to definite persons, namely, the Defendants to allow the Plaintiffs to jointly possess the disputed land with them. 4. Mr. Mohapatra very seriously contends that the order is ambiguous and read in conjunction with the judgment conclusion is irresistible that the decree is only declaratory. I find no substance in this contention Law is well settled that if the decree is ambiguous, it is open to the Court to refer to the pleadings and the judgment with the objection of construing the decree. The judgment in this case leads to the unmistakable conclusion that the decree awarded the relief for recovery of joint possession. 5. The position can be, clarified by stating certain facts as transposes from the judgment. The Plaintiffs' suit was for declaration of title and recovery of possession on the averment that the disputed land consisting of 41 decimals was purchased by them in 1928, and ever since then they were in continuous, open, uninterrupted and peaceful possession. Some time near about 161 the Defendants obstructed construction of a house by them which culminated in a proceeding u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure and the final order was passed in favour of the Defendants on 24-7-1961. The Plaintiffs accordingly filed the suit on 3-8-1961. The defence case was that the sale deed in favour of the Plaintiffs was nominal and collusive and that they themselves were all through in possession and had acquired title by adverse possession. The learned trial Court held that, the Plaintiffs were an through in possession prior to the proceeding u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure. But as both the parties bad title in the disputed land and the Defendants did not acquire any title by adverse possession, the Plaintiffs and the Defendants were entitled to declaration of joint title and to joint possession. The findings in the judgment lead to the irresistible conclusion that the relief for recovery of joint possession was granted in favour of the Plaintiffs. 6. I am therefore clearly of opinion that on the plain language of the decretal order the relief for recovery of joint possession was granted to the Plaintiffs. Even if the decree is considered to be ambiguous, read with the judgment it means that the relief for recovery of joint possession was granted. 6. I am therefore clearly of opinion that on the plain language of the decretal order the relief for recovery of joint possession was granted to the Plaintiffs. Even if the decree is considered to be ambiguous, read with the judgment it means that the relief for recovery of joint possession was granted. Examined from either point of view there is no escape from the conclusion that the decree is executable. 7. Mr. Mohapatra cited S Syama Charan Das Vs. Satya Prosad Choudhury Meghraj Sah Vs. Rajbansi Lal and Others and (Pallampati) Lakshmi Narayana Vs. Iyanapurapu Suryanarayana and Others. No exception can be taken to the principles enunciated in those three decisions. They are however distinguishable on facts. Two of the cases, namely, the Calcutta and the Madras cases dealt with compromise decrees. The Patna Case was clearly a declaratory compromise decree. It was rightly held therein that it was not executable. In the Calcutta case the first compromise decree was considered to be executable and the second suit was held to be not maintainable. Similarly the Madras case is distinguishable on facts. 8. In the result, this appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 50/-. Final Result : Dismissed