This is a revision petition by the plaintiff, Satish Chandra Ghosh, of Money Suit No. 1 of 1964 against the order dated 2-3-1967, by which Shri S. M. Ali, the Sub­ordinate Judge, directed that that suit be consolidated with Title Suit No. 48 of 1960 pending between aforementioned Satish Chandra Ghosh and his brother Jyotish Chandra Ghosh. 2. To appreciate the controversy, the facts of the two cases may be shortly nar­rated. In the Title Suit No. 48 of 1960 Jyotish Chandra Ghosh happens to be the plain­tiff and that suit is for partition between him and his brother Satish Chandra Ghosh of a large number of immoveable properties. One of the properties included in that parti­tion suit is that which forms the subject of Money Suit No. 1 of 1964. In this Money Suit, the relief claimed is for payment of the arrears of rent respecting that property, and it is founded on the allegations that that property had been jointly leased out by Satish Chandra Ghosh and his brother Jyotish Chandra Ghosh to Sarba Mangala Dutta and the latter had committed default in the matter of payment of rent. 3. Shri S. M. Ali directed consolidation of the two suits on the basis that the evi­dence in both the cases shall be identical and "the judgment of one case will affect the other if they are tried separately". It is the contention of the petitioner's counsel that neither the evidence in the two suits shall be identical nor the judgment in one suit shall affect the decision in the other and that as such the consolidation was order­ed on altogether untenable grounds. 4. It is not disputed that consolidation of suits in appropriate cases can be ordered by the Court. However, the basic principles governing consolidation of suits are that there is similarity or identity of the matter in issue in the two suits and that the suits are between the same parties. The object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity be­tween the same parties when the matter in issue is substantially the same in the two suits. Let us examine if these tests are satisfied respecting the two suits we are to deal with. The Title Suit is only between the two brothers and Sarba Mangala Dutta is not a party thereto. The object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity be­tween the same parties when the matter in issue is substantially the same in the two suits. Let us examine if these tests are satisfied respecting the two suits we are to deal with. The Title Suit is only between the two brothers and Sarba Mangala Dutta is not a party thereto. Further, that suit is for partition of a large number of immoveable properties, while the Money Suit against Sarba Mangala Dutta arises out of an alleged lease agreement between her on one hand and Satish Chandra Ghosh and Jyotish Chandra Ghosh on the other. It is not disputed that the property alleged to have been leased out to Sarba Mangala Dutta is also the subject of the partition suit and that there is no dispute between the parties that that property is equally owned by the two brothers. Hence, neither two suits are between same parties, nor the matters in issue in the two suits respecting the demised pro­perty are identical. Again, the decision in the Title Suit respecting the demised pro­perty will not determine the dispute whether the demised property had been leased out by both the brothers, as contended by Satish Chandra Ghosh, or by Jyotish Chandra Ghosh all alone, as alleged by the latter. Hence, it is not possible to sustain the consolidation order made by the trial Court. Bhopo Fakir­bhai v. Bai Mani, AIR 1961 Guj 92 , is an authority for the proposition that where the issues in the two suits are different and the parties are not common, an order for the consolidation of the two suits for hearing evidence in common without the consent of the parties in both the suits is illegal. It was also observed in that case that an order to treat the evidence in one suit as the evi­dence in another suit cannot be passed with­out the consent of all the parties in the two suits. 5. Shri J. K. Roy, appearing for the res­pondents, urged vehemently that no revi­sion against the impugned order is maintain­able under Section 115 of the Civil Proce­dure Code. This point was specifically dealt with in the case of Bhopo Fakirbhai, AIR 1961 Guj 92 (supra). 5. Shri J. K. Roy, appearing for the res­pondents, urged vehemently that no revi­sion against the impugned order is maintain­able under Section 115 of the Civil Proce­dure Code. This point was specifically dealt with in the case of Bhopo Fakirbhai, AIR 1961 Guj 92 (supra). It was held that an application to consolidate the two suits re­presents a separate and independent pro­ceeding inasmuch as such an application has nothing to do with the matters to be decided in either of the suits. Nor, it was observed further, is such an application in the nature of an interlocutory application in a suit. I agree with these observations of the Gujarat High Court and hold that a revision peti­tion against an order directing consolidation of two suits is maintainable under Sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. However, it [remains to be stated that in face of para. 84 (3) of the Tripura (Courts) Order, 1950, Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply to Tripura. Clause (b) of sub-para (1) of para 34 provides that the Court of the Judicial Commissioner may call for the record of any case which has been decid­ed by a Civil Court subordinate to it and in which no appeal lies to it if, on an applica­tion made to it, the Court is of the opinion that there is an important question of law or custom involved and such question re­quires further consideration. In such a situa­tion, it is provided further, the Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit. I feel satisfied that determination of princi­ples governing consolidation of suits consti­tutes an important question of law and that such question does require consideration at the hands of this Court. There is no autho­rity of this court, I may add, on the point involved in this revision petition. 6. The trial Court cannot direct conso­lidation of suits in an arbitrary manner or in complete oblivion of the principles that govern the subject. In the instant case, the consolidation, I feel satisfied, was ordered in a purely capricious manner. Neither, as in­dicated above, will the evidence in the two suits be identical, nor the judgment of one suit will affect the decision in the other Suit. In the instant case, the consolidation, I feel satisfied, was ordered in a purely capricious manner. Neither, as in­dicated above, will the evidence in the two suits be identical, nor the judgment of one suit will affect the decision in the other Suit. Moreover, the principles governing the consolidation of suits, namely, (1)- there should be similarity or identity of the matters in dispute in the two suits, (2) that the dis­pute in the two suits should be between the same parties, and (3) that the evidence recorded in one suit cannot be read as evi­dence in the other suit without the consent of the parties, were neither considered nor applied by the trial Court. Hence, a clear case for interference in revision is made out under Para 34 of the Tripura (Courts) Order. 7. As a result, I allow the revision peti­tion and quash the order dated 2-3-1966 consolidating the two suits. The Court shall now proceed with the suits on their indivi­dual oasis. The petitioner shall get costs from the respondents. Advocate's fee Rs. 16. Revision allowed.