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1969 DIGILAW 69 (SC)

Bindadin v. Pran Devi

1969-02-11

K.S.HEGDE, R.S.BACHAWAT, S.M.SIKRI

body1969
JUDGMENT : K.S. Hegde, J. The only question that arises for decision in this appeal is whether the notice to quit issued by the respondent is valid. 2. Admittedly the appellant was inducted into the suit premises under a written lease deed. But that document was not admitted in evidence as it was not properly stamped and the plaintiff-respondent refused to pay the prescribed stamp duty and penalty. The validity of the notice to quit was challenged on the ground that as the suit premises were leased for manufacturing purpose, there is a statutory presumption under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act that is a yearly lease. Consequently a month's notice to quit given in this case was insufficient. Hence the same in invalid. The trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit upholding the appellant-defendant's contention that the notice issued is invalid but the appellate Court reversed the decree of the trial Court and decreed the plaintiff's claim. It held that as the defendant himself had admitted in his written statement that he was paying rent month by month it could be presumed that the tenancy in question is monthly tenancy. Therefore the notice issued is valid. This decision was affirmed by the High Court. In this appeal by special leave the finding in question was challenged. It was urged that once it is established that the lease is for a manufacturing purpose, the presumption embodied in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act operates and the mere fact that the rent of the suit premises was paid month by month would not be sufficient to rebut that presumption. Further it was urged that the question whether the lease in question is monthly lease or a yearly lease is a term of the agreement reduced into writing and therefore the same cannot be proved by evidence aliunde, the written lease deed having not been brought in as evidence in the case, the statutory presumption under Section 106 should prevail. 3. During the pendency of this appeal, the respondent applied to admit in evidence the suit lease deed and offered to pay the stamp duty as well as the penalty payable. The said application was allowed by us on 10th January, 1969 subject to the condition that he would bear the costs of this appeal in any event. 3. During the pendency of this appeal, the respondent applied to admit in evidence the suit lease deed and offered to pay the stamp duty as well as the penalty payable. The said application was allowed by us on 10th January, 1969 subject to the condition that he would bear the costs of this appeal in any event. We also called for the original document and directed the office to ascertain the stamp duty as well as the penalty payable and collect the same from the respondent. We are informed that the stamp duty as well as the penalty payable on that document have been paid. Hence the same is marked as Exh. (S-1) as its genuineness was not disputed before us. There is no dispute that as per its terms the lease is from month, to month i.e., a monthly lease. Hence the impugned notice must be held to be a valid notice which means that the decision appealed against is correct. 4. This litigation has been prolonged because of the wrong stand taken by the respondent. As seen earlier we had allowed his application to bring on record the suit lease deed. At that time we had directed that he shall pay the costs of this appeal in any event which means that he shall pay the appellant's costs of this appeal and bear his own costs. The appellant will be given six months's time for vacating the suit premises. Subject to the above directions, the appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.