PATHAK, J.: This writ petition is directed against the order dated 30-1-67 passed by the Executive Committee, Dis­trict Council, United Khasi-Jaintia Hills and the order dated 3-2-67 passed by the Chief Executive Member, District Coun­cil, United Khasi-Jaintia Hills. Shillong. 2. The petitioner's case is that in the year 1954 the office of the Myntri from the Lyngdoh Nongum clan fell vacant and the Durbar of Nongkhlaw Syiemship issued a parwana dated 15-2-54 to the said clan to elect a Myntri from it. The election was held on 21-5-56 and the petitioner secured 23 votes as against 7 votes secured by his nearest rival U Siton Lyngdoh Nongum and accordingly the petitioner was duly elected as a Myntri from the Lyngdoh Nongum clan and the election was confirmed by the Syiem of Nongkhlaw and his Durhar and this fact was reported to the Executive Committee, District Council United Khasi-Jaintia Hills (Respondent No. 1) on 29-5-56. In the said election, U Hedri Lyngdoh Non-gum (Respondent No. 3) was not a can­didate. Thereafter, U Siton Lyngdoh Nongum filed an application to the Exe­cutive Member, District Council against the election and confirmation of the peti­tioner as Myntri of the Durbar of Nongkhlaw Syiemship. The Executive Mem­ber, by his order dated 18-9-57 held that the petitioner was not qualified to be a candidate in the election and that U Siton Lyngdoh Nongum secured 17 votes and that 13 of the 23 votes secured by the petitioner were invalid. The peti­tioner thereafter filed a civil suit being Title Suit No. 1/58 in the Subordinate District Council Court, praying for a declaration inter alia that he was duly elected Myntrionthe result of the elec­tion held by the Syiem of Nongkhlaw. Issue No. 10 in that suit was as follows: "Whether the Executive Committee of the District Council has jurisdiction to entertain appeal against the order of the Siem regarding the election of the Myntri in the Nongkhlaw Syiemship?". The learned Presiding Officer of the Subordinate District' /Council Court by his order dated 9-5-59 decided the issue in favour of the petitioner and declared the impugned order dated 18-9-57 pass­ed by the Executive Member to be with­out jurisdiction on the ground that there was no provision for appeal against the election held by the Syiem. The learned Presiding Officer of the Subordinate District' /Council Court by his order dated 9-5-59 decided the issue in favour of the petitioner and declared the impugned order dated 18-9-57 pass­ed by the Executive Member to be with­out jurisdiction on the ground that there was no provision for appeal against the election held by the Syiem. U Siton Lyngdoh preferred an appeal before the District Council Court against the said order and the learned Judge, District Council Court, by his order dated 8-9-59 dismissed the appeal and directed the suit to proceed as expeditiously as poss­ible. The petitioner then filed a revi­sion petition before the High Court against the said order of the learned Judge of the District Council Court and the case was numbered as Civil Revi­sion No. 29 (H)/59. The High Court by a common judgment and order dated 17-8-60 passed in Civil Revision Nos. 27 (H)/ 59, 28(H)/59 and 29(H)/59 dismissed the petition. Title Suit No. 1 of 1958 was however ultimately dismissed by the Presiding Officer of the Subordinate Dis­trict Council Court in view of the com­ing into force of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Appoint­ment and Succession of Chiefs and Head­men), Act, 1959 (United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Act No. II of 1959), hereinafter call­ed 'the Act'. That thereafter the peti­tioner was holding the office of a Myntri in the Durbar of Nongkhlaw Syiem-ship. The respondent No. 3, U Hedri Lyngdoh Nongum, reported to the Dis­trict Council that the petitioner was act­ing as a Myntri in spite of the order dated 18-9-57 of the Executive Mem­ber in Political Case No. 2/56 and the District Council sent the matter for deci­sion by the Syiem of Nongkhlaw. U Siton in the meantime died. Respondent No. 3 U Hedri Lyngdoh Nongum substi­tuted himself to the position of the deceas­ed U Siton. The Syiem of Nongkhlaw and his Durbar by their order dated 9-9-66 confirmed the election of the peti­tioner as Myntri on consideration of all the relevant facts and on the basis of the aforesaid order dated 9-5-59 passed in Title Suit No. 1 of 1958. The Syiem of Nongkhlaw and his Durbar by their order dated 9-9-66 confirmed the election of the peti­tioner as Myntri on consideration of all the relevant facts and on the basis of the aforesaid order dated 9-5-59 passed in Title Suit No. 1 of 1958. The deci­sion of the Syiem and his Durbar dated 9-9-66 was conveyed to the District Coun­cil but the Chief Executive Member of the District Council issued an order dated 3-2-67 holding that the petitioner was not a Myntri according to the pre­vious order dated 18-9-57 passed by the Member, Executive Committee, and that fresh election should be held for elect­ing a new Myntri in the vacancy. In the said order dated 3-2-67, reference was made to an order dated 30-1-67 of the Executive Committee of the District Council, 3. The petitioner has filed this appli­cation under Article 226 of the Consti­tution of India for quashing the order dated 30-1-67 passed by the Executive Committee of the District Council and also the order dated 3-2-67 passed by the Chief Executive Member of the District Council. 4. The point that falls for determina­tion in the case is whether the order dated 30-1-67 passed by the Executive Committee and the order dated 3-2-67 passed by the Chief Executive Member of the District Council were within their jurisdiction and were legally valid. 5. Mr. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner sub­mitted that the Act, namely Act II of 1959, had no application to the instant case inasmuch as the election took place In 1956 and as such the jurisdiction that had been conferred by the said Act upon the Executive Committee regarding the election matters was not with it and therefore the impugned orders were with­out jurisdiction. The second submission made by the learned counsel was that even assuming that the Act was appli­cable, the impugned orders dated 30-1-67 and 3-2-67 were contrary to the pro­visions of the said Act. 6. In order to deal with the first point raised by the learned counsel, we have_ to consider the fact whether the election of the petitioner took place prior to the coming into force of the said Act and his election continued and stood as valid. 6. In order to deal with the first point raised by the learned counsel, we have_ to consider the fact whether the election of the petitioner took place prior to the coming into force of the said Act and his election continued and stood as valid. There is no dispute regarding the fact that an election of a Myntri from the Lyngdoh Nongum Clan took place in pur­suance of a parwana dated 15-2-54 issu­ed by the Durbar of Nongkhlaw Syiem-ship. The election was held on 21-5-56. The petitioner's case is that he secured 23 votes and U Siton secured 7 votes and as such he was elected as Myntri. It is also admitted in the petition itself that U Siton filed an application to the Execu­tive Member of the District Council against the election and confirmation of the petitioner as a Myntri and the Exe­cutive Member by his order dated 18-9-57 set aside the order of Syiem of Non­gkhlaw and his Durbar confirming the election of the petitioner and ordered that U Siton should be appointed as a Myntri in place of late U Insingh. Against this order, the petitioner filed the Title Suit No. 1/58 in the Subordinate District Council Court. Issue No. 10 as mentioned above in that suit was heard as a preliminary issue and the learned Presiding Officer of the Subor­dinate District Council Court held that the District Council was not an election tribunal, nor a civil court and the Dis­trict Council acted illegally in entertain­ing the appeal of U Siton and its order was without jurisdiction and he held that the order passed in Political Case No. 2/56 was void. Thus, the issue No. 10 in that suit was decided in favour of the plaintiff (petitioner). On appeal, the learned Judge, District Council Court, held that it was not necessary to decide issue No. 10 and therefore he remanded the case to the learned trial Court to proceed with the suit. Against this order of the learned Judge, District Council Court, Civil Revi­sion No. 29 (H)/59 was filed in the High Court wherein the High Court held as follows: "As regards Civil Revision No. 29 (H)/ 59, filed on behalf of the plaintiff, we are of the opinion that there is no sub­stance in this petition also. Against this order of the learned Judge, District Council Court, Civil Revi­sion No. 29 (H)/59 was filed in the High Court wherein the High Court held as follows: "As regards Civil Revision No. 29 (H)/ 59, filed on behalf of the plaintiff, we are of the opinion that there is no sub­stance in this petition also. The deci­sion of the lower appellate Court was In favour of the plaintiff inasmuch as the suit was held to be maintainable and the case was sent back for trial on merits by the court below. The applicant, therefore, can have no grievance against the order of the appellate Court. The contention of the petitioner, how­ever, is that the decision of the trial Court was conclusive so far as the suit itself was concerned, and, therefore, the appellate Court was not right in not going into that issue and holding that it was not material to decide that issue. The decision of the trial Court on that issue was that the decision of the District Council was without juris­diction and therefore, the suit was maintainable. To that extent the decision of the trial Court was in favour of the present petitioner. That decision is still there, and it cannot be said that that decision has been wiped out by the decision of the appellate Court! If the petitioner wants to con­tend that the decision of the trial Court on that point is conclusive, in so far as the suit is concerned, it is open to him to raise that point before the trial Court; but it cannot be said that the petitioner has in any way been affected by the order of the appellate Court. There is, therefore, no force in this revision either." The High Court sent back the case to the trial Court for its disposal on merits. 7. Accordingly the case went back to the Presiding Officer, Subordinate District Council Court, who by his judgment and order dated 7-7-61 held that in view of Act II of 1959, namely the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Ap­pointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen), Act, 1959, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and the suit was therefore liable to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The learned Presiding Officer of the Subordinate District Council Court held that the suit also abated as the main defendant was dead and the plaintiff waived his right to substitute the deceased defendant and had voluntarily allowed the suit to stand abated. The suit was thus dismissed for want of jurisdiction and for abatement. The petitioner did not move any higher Court or authority against the judgment and decree dated 7-7-61 passed by the Presiding Officer, Subordinate District Council Court In the result, the order that was passed by the Executive Member on 18-9-57 setting aside the election of the petitioner and declaring U Siton as a Myntri stood as it was. The finding of the Subordinate District Coun­cil Court on issue 10 in the suit that the District Council had no jurisdiction to pass the order lapsed and became in­effective when the suit itself was dis­missed finally for want of jurisdiction and abatement, In the circumstances, I hold that what­ever might have been the position prior to 7-7-61 but with effect from that date the petitioner must be bound by the order dated 18-9-57 passed by the Exe­cutive Member, District Council declar­ing his election invalid and as such the petitioner could not have continued to hold the office of Myntri. I therefore hold that when the said Act II of 1959 came into effect the election of the peti­tioner did not continue as valid and the Executive Committee of the District Council had jurisdiction to pass the impugned orders dated 30-1-67 and 3-2-67 which were passed in a case that arose out of a petition dated 23-3-63. 8. Mr. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even though the finding on issue No. 10 in the above suit might not exist after the dismissal of the suit, the order dated 18-9-57 passed by the Executive Com­mittee was without jurisdiction inasmuch as there was no custom or customary law providing an appeal to the Executive Committee or the District Council from the order of the Syiem and the Durbar of Nongkhlaw, 9. Mr. Mr. Lahirl, the learned counsel ap­pearing for the respondents submitted that even prior to Independence these elections of Syiem and Headmen were approved and confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner, representing the Crown and that was the custom prevalent and after the Constitution came into force the power and jurisdiction that was exer­cised by the Deputy Commissioner vest­ed in the District Council and as such the District Council had the jurisdiction to deal with these matters concerning elections and that custom in fact had been recognised under the said Act II of 1959, by which jurisdiction had been vested in the Executive Committee, re­presenting the District Council and as such the order dated 18-9-57 passed by the Executive Member on behalf of the District Council was in accordance with the existing custom and was within jurisdiction. He further submitted that no competent court had set aside that order and it stood as valid and consequently the petitioner's election stood set aside with the dismissal of T. S. 1/58. 10. In this connection Mr. Lahirl referred to the case of T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem, AIR 1961 SC 276 . In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the District Coun­cil is both an administrative as well as a legislative body and the District Coun­cil is in charge of administration of autonomous district which carried with it the power to appoint officers to carry on administration. Under para 3 (1) (g) of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitu­tion it has power to make laws with res­pect to the appointment or succession of Chiefs or Headmen and this would natu­rally include the power to remove them, but it does not follow from this that the appointment or removal of Chief is a legislative act or that no appointment or removal could be made without there being first a law to that effect. Para 2 (4) of the Sixth Schedule provides that the administration of an autonomous dis­trict shall vest in the District Council and this is comprehensive enough to in­clude all such executive powers as are necessary to be exercised for the pur­poses of the administration of the Dis­trict. Para 2 (4) of the Sixth Schedule provides that the administration of an autonomous dis­trict shall vest in the District Council and this is comprehensive enough to in­clude all such executive powers as are necessary to be exercised for the pur­poses of the administration of the Dis­trict. That the authority concerned would at all relevant times have the power to appoint or remove administra­tive personnel under the general power of administration vested in them by the Sixth Schedule before laws are framed under para 3 (1) of the Sixth Schedule. 11. As the Syiem is an officer under the District Council, as held by the Supreme Court, a Myntri, which is in­cluded in the term 'Headmen', also must be deemed to be an officer under the Dis­trict Council to carry on the administra­tion of the autonomous district. In this view, I hold that prior to Act II of 1959, namely the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) Act, 1959, which came into force in October 1959, the District Council had jurisdic­tion to appoint a Myntri and to remove him. This is also clear from the fact that after election of the petitioner in 1954, his election was reported to the Executive Committee of the District Council before whom the defeated can­didate U Siton also filed an application and the matter was decided by the Exe­cutive Committee by its order dated 18-9-57. The executive functions of the Dis­trict Council are vested in the Executive Committee under Rule 28 of the Assam Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 1951 and under R. 31 (1) of the said Rules, each Member of the Executive Committee is entrust­ed with specific subjects. Rule 31 (1) runs as follows: "Each member of the Executive Com­mittee shall be entrusted with specific subjects, the allocation of the subjects being made by the Chief Executive Member. The Executive Committee shall be collectively responsible for all execu­tive orders issued in the name of the District Council in accordance with these rules, whether such orders are authoris­ed by an individual Member of the Exe­cutive Committee on a matter appertain­ing to his subject or as a result of dis­cussion at a meeting of the Executive Committee, or howsoever otherwise." The order dated 18-9-57 was passed by the Executive Member in charge of Elec­tion, District Council, United Khasi-Jaintia Hills. It is not disputed that the particular member was in charge of Election. It must therefore be held that the order dated 18-9-57 was the order pass­ed on behalf of the Executive Committee of the District Council and it was within its jurisdiction. 12. From the counter affidavit filed by the Chief Executive Member of the District Council, it is found that the orders dated 3-2-67 and 30-1-67 were passed in a case which started before the Syiem of Nongkhlaw and his Durbar on the representation dated 23rd March 1963 of U Jrang Singh and other members of the Lyngdoh Nongum Clan praying for confirmation of their nominee namely, U Hedri Lyngdoh Nongum as Myntri re­presenting the Lyngdoh Nongum Clan of Nongkhlaw Syiemship. That U Hedri never approached the Syiem and his Dur­bar or, for that matter, the Executive Committee, in the capacity of a substi­tute in place of late U Siton. That the office of a Myntri was a personal right and neither U Hedri nor U Prellyshon nor anybody else for that matter could claim the right of succession. 13. From the order of the Syiem ol Nongkhlaw and his Durbar dated 9-9-66 (Annexure 5 to the petition), it is found that the case arose out of the peti­tion filed by U Hedri Lyngdoh Nongum in the District Council. In that petition, Q Hedri Lyngdoh Nongum' claimed that U Prellyshon Lyngdoh Nongum was no longer a Myntri and secondly he claim­ed that he should be a Myntri in the place of U Prellyshon. The District Council sent the matter to the Durbar of the Syiem of Nongkhlaw for disposal, i Both U Prellyshon and U Hedri were - heard and the Syiem and his Durbar held as follows: "In the judgment of the High Court in the Civil R-vision No. 29(HI of 1959 it is stated that the above judgment of the District Council Court still stands. So the order of the Durbar regarding appointing U Prellyshon as Myntri still stands." "About the claim made by U Hedri Lyngdoh that he should be declared a Mvntri in the place of U Prallyshon the Durbar hereby reiects because U Prel-lysbon is still a Myntri, and even if U Prellvshon is no longer a Myntri there should be fresh election for a Myntri in his place." From this order of Syiem of Nongkhlaw and his Durbar, it appears that U Prellyshon, the petitioner, was deemed to be a Myntri because of the finding of the High Court in Civil Revision No. 29(H)/ 59. They, of course, rejected the prayer of U Hedri to be declared as Myntri in place of U. Prellyshon. The finding of the Syiem and his Durbar that U Prellyshon continued as Myntri was really passed on the decision of issue No. 10 in T. S. 1/58. But when the T. S. 1/58 was it­self dismissed, the trial court's finding that the District Council had no juris­diction to pass the order dated 18-9-57 could not stand. In the circumstances the order of the Syiem of Nongkhlaw and his Durbar to the effect that the ap­pointment of the petitioner, U Prellyshon still stood could not stand in the eye of law. 14. By their order dated 30-1-67, the Executive Committee had pointed out that U Prellyshon, the petitioner, was never a Myntri from the Lyngdoh-Non-,gum clan in view of the order dated 18-9-57\of the Executive Committee and there­fore the Executive Committee ordered fresh election of the Myntri by the Dur­bar of Nongkhlaw clan Syiemship. By his order dated 3-2-67, the Chief Execu­tive Member of the District Council also had referred to the order dated 18-9-57 and held that U Prellyshon, the present petitioner, was not a Myntri. By the two impugned orders, the Executive Committee only referred to the earlier order dated 18-9-57 and that order as discussed above has not been set aside by any competent court and must be held to be effective. 15. Under para 2 (4) of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, the admi­nistration of an autonomous district has been vested in the District Council for such district, subject to the provisions of the Sixth Schedule. 15. Under para 2 (4) of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, the admi­nistration of an autonomous district has been vested in the District Council for such district, subject to the provisions of the Sixth Schedule. Under para 3 (1) (g) and (j) of the Sixth Schedule, the District Council has power to make laws with respect to the appointment or suc­cession of Chiefs or Headmen and social] customs. It has been held in the case of AIR 1961 SC 276 that the District Coun­cil is both an administrative as well as a legislative body. United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Act II of 1959 has been passed under para 3 (1) (g) of the Sixth Schedule and in the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court this Act has been held to be a valid law. In the circumstances, I hold that the said Act II of 1959 is applicable to the facts of the present case. 16. Under Rule 28(1) of the Assam Autonomous Districts (Constitution of Dis­trict Councils) Rules, 1951, the executive function of the District Council has been vested in the Executive Committee. The impugned order dated 30-1-67 was passed by the Executive Com­mittee, by which it ordered for fresh election of a Myntri by the Durbar of Nongkhlaw Syiemship as the office of the Myntri was lying vacant. By the order dated 3-2-67 passed by the Chief Executive Member of the District Council, he drew the attention of the Syiem of Nongkhlaw to the order dated 30-1-67 passed by the Executive Com­mittee and directed the Durbar of Lyngdoh Nongum Clan to hold the election of the new Myntri as soon as possible according to the rules and customs. On a consideration of the above provisions of law, I am clearly of the opinion that when the petitioner's election stood set aside and the vacancy occurred, the Executive Committee of the District Council had every jurisdiction to order for a fresh election of the Myntri. In the circumstances, I hold that the peti­tioner has no legal right to move this writ petition for declaring his election to be valid when his election had been set aside by the Executive Committee's order dated 18-9-57. In the circumstances, I hold that the peti­tioner has no legal right to move this writ petition for declaring his election to be valid when his election had been set aside by the Executive Committee's order dated 18-9-57. I further hold that the impugned order dated 30-1-67 pass­ed by the Executive Committee and the order dated 3-2-67 passed by the Chief Executive Member of the District Coun­cil are within their jurisdiction and are valid in law. 17. The next point urged by Mr. Bhattacharjee is that there was no appeal before the Executive Committee from the decision of the Syiem and his Durbar and as there was no such ap­peal, the orders passed by the Execu­tive Committee and the Chief Execu­tive Member of the District Council were without jurisdiction. Under section 7 of the said Act. there must be first an elec­tion of the Myntri which shall be con­firmed by the Syiem and his Durbar and the name of such Myntri shall forth­with be sent by the Syiem to the Exe­cutive Committee. If' any dispute arose regarding any matter relating to or con­nected with the election of Headmen, the disputes shall be referred by the party or parties concerned to the Syiem and his Durbar for decision. An appeal against such decision shall lie to the Executive Committee, whose decision shall be final. In the instant case, however, after the order of the Executive Committee pass­ed on 18-9-57, the office of the Myntri in question remained vacant. The other contestant U Siton, who was declared Myntri by the Executive Committee, in the meantime died. Consequently the office remained vacant, and the Execu­tive Committee's direction was to hold a fresh election for electing a Myntri. U Jrang Singh and other members of the Lyngdoh Nongum Clan filed a petition dated 23-3-63 praying for confirmation of their nominee, namely U Hedri Lyngodh Nongum as a Myntri representing the Lyngdoh Nongum Clan of Nongkh-law Syiemship. This petition was not filed by U Hedri in the capacity of a substitute in place of late U Siton. That petition was heard inter partes by the Syieir and his Durbar and they rejected the claim of U Hedri Lyngdoh and at the same time they held that U Prellyshon Lyngdoh Nongum still remained as a Myntri. This petition was not filed by U Hedri in the capacity of a substitute in place of late U Siton. That petition was heard inter partes by the Syieir and his Durbar and they rejected the claim of U Hedri Lyngdoh and at the same time they held that U Prellyshon Lyngdoh Nongum still remained as a Myntri. If it was found that U Prellyshon was no longer a Myn­tri, there should be a fresh election for a Myntri in his place. As discussed hereinabove, the fact remained that the office of Myntri fell vacant and there­fore the Executive Committee which was in charge of the executive functions of the District Council had the jurisdiction to direct for a fresh election and for this purpose no appeal need be preferred by anybody as contemplated under S. 7 of the said Act. 18. In the result, the petitioner is not entitled to any remedy in this writ peti­tion, which is accordingly dismissed. The Rule is discharged. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. 19. S. K. DUTTA, C. J.: I agree. Petition dismissed.