JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The petitioner was the tenant of the accommodation in dispute, of which respondent No. 4, Prabhu Dayal, was the landlord. The landlord applied for permission to sue the petitioner in ejectment under Section 3 of the Rent Control Act. The application was fixed for hearing on 17th August, 1967. The landlord was not present on that date. The Rent Control Officer ordered that the application be filed in default. On 11th September, 1967 the landlord moved an application praying that the order dated 17th August, 1967 be recalled, that the file of the case be ordered to be requisitioned, and that the matter be proceeded with in accordance with law. He explained that he had gone out of station where he could not attend the case on 17th August, 1967. The petitioner did not controvert the facts, upon which the restoration was asked for, but contested the application on the ground that the Rent Control Officer had no jurisdiction to review his order. The Rent Control Officer distinguished the various cases cited before him. He held that in all those cases, an attempt was made to set aside an order passed on the merits after hearing the parties. In this present case, the order passed on 17th August, 1967, did not decide anything, and was passed ex-parte. He also held that the proceedings under Section 3 of the Act were administrative in nature and the officer could modify his orders from time to time. On facts, he held that the cause shown was sufficient. He noticed that the tenant had not controverted the facts. He set aside the order, dated 17th August, 1967, and directed the parties to adduce evidence on 16.12.1967. 2. The tenant went up in revision, but the Additional Commissioner refused to interfere on the ground that the ends of justice would be met after the application of the landlord is heard on merits and a proper decisions taken in the case. The State Government also rejected the tenants representation under Section 7-F of the Act. 3. The submission on behalf of the petitioner was that a quasi-judicial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to set aside an order finally disposing of a case, unless an express power in that behalf is conferred by the statute. That is the position with respect to the review of quasi-judicial orders. 3. The submission on behalf of the petitioner was that a quasi-judicial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to set aside an order finally disposing of a case, unless an express power in that behalf is conferred by the statute. That is the position with respect to the review of quasi-judicial orders. As pointed out by the Rent Control Officer, the various cases cited before him were such where the orders sought to be set aside had been passed on the merits after hearing the parties. There is, in my opinion, a difference between reviewing such an order and setting aside an ex-parte order. Section 3 of the Act bars the institution of a suit for ejectment of tenant without the permission of the District Magistrate. It, therefore, confers power on the District Magistrate to grant permission to sue. But, the Act does not prescribe the procedure that may be followed by the District Magistrate in proceedings for grant of the requisite permission. There is no provision authorising him to dismiss an application for such a permission in default of prosecution or appearance. The question would be whether the District Magistrate has any inherent power to do so. Assuming that he has such a power, then the power to set aside such an order of dismissal would also inhere in him as a necessary appendage to the power of dismissal. In B.P. Maurya v. Election Tribunal, 1964 ALJ 155, a Division Bench of this Court read Order 9, Rule 8 as interlinked with Order 9, Rule 9, CPC. It held that Rule 8 cannot be read apart from Rule 9. The two have got to be read together and when a Tribunal passes an order under Rule 8 dismissing a petition in default, it does so in the belief and on the condition that on sufficient cause being made out, the order passed under Rule 8 will be set aside under Rule 9. The two rules are the inverse and reverse sides of the same power, and if the Tribunal had jurisdiction to pass an order under rule 8, it certainly had the jurisdiction under Rule 9 to set aside an order passed under Rule 8. 4. In my opinion, the same principle would apply where there is no prescribed procedure for a quasi-judicial proceedings. It may be that Order 9, CPC will not itself be applicable. 4. In my opinion, the same principle would apply where there is no prescribed procedure for a quasi-judicial proceedings. It may be that Order 9, CPC will not itself be applicable. But the principle that the power to pass and ex-parte order of dismissal for default was linked and integrated with the power to set aside such an order when sufficient cause for the default is shown, should govern all judicial proceedings; else the administration of justice will be retarded rather than achieved. So if a power to dismiss an application for default of appearance is deemed to be in the Rent Control Officer, the reverse power would go with it. From this point of view, the Rent Control Officer had the requisite authority to set aside his earlier order. 5. The order passed on 17th August, 1957, directed that the application of the landlord be filed for default. In my opinion this was not an order finally disposing of the application much less dismissing it after adjudication. No findings whatever were recorded. The Rent Control Officer did not say that he did not prove it. The order could in my opinion, be well construed to mean that the Rent Control Officer had merely consigned the file without fixing any further date. The application, therefore, could not be deemed to have been finally disposed of. The application made on 11th September, 1967, was merely one for revival of the proceedings. 6. Assuming in favour of the petitioner that the order passed on 17th August, 1967, was a final order and that the Rent Control Officer had no jurisdiction to set aside, yet for that reason, the orders passed by the Commissioner and the State Government under a discretionary jurisdiction conferred by Section 3(3) and Section 7-F of the Act, refusing to interfere in the interest of justice, would not be illegal or without jurisdiction; and as such their orders cannot be set aside. The proceedings being quasi-judicial the order passed by the Rent Control Officer would he deemed to have merged in the orders of the Commissioner and the State Government. Consequently, it will be inappropriate to set aside the order of the Rent Control Officer alone. The proceedings being quasi-judicial the order passed by the Rent Control Officer would he deemed to have merged in the orders of the Commissioner and the State Government. Consequently, it will be inappropriate to set aside the order of the Rent Control Officer alone. Furthermore, the order of the Rent Control Officer eminently advances the cause of justice and, for this reason also, this will not be a fit case for interference in exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. For the these reasons, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.