N. G. SHELAT, J. ( 1 ) * * * * ( 2 ) THE contention made out by Mr. Khambhatta the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the learned Magistrate has misconceived the position of laying stress on the ground of relevancy of documents and has also misread the two decisions of the Bombay High Court referred to in the judgment. According to him the same test as required to be fulfilled under sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to be applied for the purpose of production of any documents or things namely whether they were necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investgation inquiry trial or other proceeding. That test is fulfilled by showing that the documents records etc. have a bearing on the allegations leveled in the first information report and in the application and therefore there should not arise any question of relevancy in relation to those documents as it would not be possible to show without inspection thereof. Not to allow the same he contended would amount to interference by the Court with the investigation which it cannot do. On the other hand it was urged by Mr. Nanavati the learned counsel for the opponents that neither the Supreme Court nor the decision given by Mehta J. lays down that any such right is conferred on the investigating authorities to have all such documents which had come to be seized by them under sec. 165 produced or inspected and all that they say is that they have a right to approach the Court for production etc. and that way they were required to move the Court. The claim for inspection or looking into the same would have perhaps arisen to the prosecuting authorities if the seizure of documents etc. was validly effected under sec. 165 of the Code. In fact they had even time to look into the same if they so wished before any stay order was issued as they had remained in their custody for some time. He also pointed out that if any order was passed by them under sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code and if in compliance thereof the documents etc. were produced perhaps they would have been able to look into and as to the first part about their having or bearing or rather their being necessary or desirable could not have been challenged. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code and if in compliance thereof the documents etc. were produced perhaps they would have been able to look into and as to the first part about their having or bearing or rather their being necessary or desirable could not have been challenged. But according to him neither of these powers can be availed of by them the former by reason of the order of seizure found to be invalid by this Court and the latter by reason of the fact that no such order has been passed by them nor complied with by the opponents. They cannot therefore ipso facto in the name of the powers of investigation claim the same merely as they are in custody of the Magistrates Court obviously intended to be returned to the accused after carrying out certain directions set out in the order passed by the Supreme Court. According to him the applicant has therefore and in fact can be said to have invoked the aid of the Court for production and for delivery of the documents etc. for inspection and that has therefore to be regulated by the Court in accordance with law. He laid stress on the Full Bench decisions of the Bombay High Court followed by the learned Magistrate since they lay down correct view of the powers contained in sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code and once they apply to the facts of the present case this Court is bound to follow the same they being prior to 1-5-60. Unless therefore they were to show how and which of those documents records account books etc. were truly relevant to the charges alleged against them they cannot be given any right to make a roving or fishing inquiry by looking into all of them. ( 3 ) NOW there is no provision other than contained in secs. 165 and 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code which gives any power to a police officer investigating any matter to claim production or/and custody of any such documents from the possession or keeping of any person. Nor do we find any particular provision in the Criminal Procedure Code which entitles the police officer to claim inspection of documents records etc. if recovered from the accused in the case. That power also can be invoked either arising out of seizure of such material under sec. Nor do we find any particular provision in the Criminal Procedure Code which entitles the police officer to claim inspection of documents records etc. if recovered from the accused in the case. That power also can be invoked either arising out of seizure of such material under sec. 165 or obtained under sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was while exercising powers under sec. 165 of the Code that the documents etc. came to be seized by the investigating officer from the possession of the opponents. In a writ petition filed by the opponents in that respect the Division Bench of this High Court held that the action taken thereunder was invalid inasmuch as necessary requirements contained in sec. 165 of the Code were not complied with by the investigating officer and consequently the opponents were entitled to the restoration of these articles books and documents etc. (See New Swadeshi Mills v. S. N. Rattan IX G. L. R. 364) In the meantime at the request of the petitioner those books documents account books and other articles etc. were directed to be placed in effective custody of the Magistrate and were not returned to the opponents. In an appeal preferred against that decision by the petitioner to the Supreme Court an order based on consent terms of the parties was passed by the Supreme Court which I have set out here above. In effect the final order passed by the High Court came to be superseded by one contained therein and at the same time the appeal was dismissed. The preamble thereof does only appear to protect or rather save the rights of the parties to raise contentions such as relating to the validity of investigation or otherwise as also of the petitioner to approach the proper Court for such orders for production of documents etc. as they may be advised to take. In other words the invalidity of the seizure does not appear to have been disturbed and consequently having regard to the other terms set out therein the petitioner gets no right or authority as such to claim custody thereof so much so that he can inspect the same for the purpose of investigation of the matter. His right to move the Court for that purpose is safeguarded and it would follow therefrom that he cannot claim any benefit arising from sec. 165 of the Code. His right to move the Court for that purpose is safeguarded and it would follow therefrom that he cannot claim any benefit arising from sec. 165 of the Code. The effect of this order came to be considered by Mehta J. in Special Civil Application No. 660 of 1968 which as already pointed out above was that all these documents records account books etc. which were seized by the C. B. I. authorities were to remain in the custody of the learned Magistrate and the right was reserved to the C. B. I. authorities to approach the proper Court for orders for production of documents etc. He further observed that until such orders were passed by the competent Court which may be even the Magistrate himself after applying his mind to the requirements of law in that connection the next stage could not arise for giving inspection of such documents etc. Thus the first stage would be for the Magistrate to apply his mind to the question as to what documents should be first ordered to be produced out of those lying before him. However as he found that the application filed by the petitioner was not as clear as it ought to have been and since the learned counsel for him was willing to file a fresh application for having the documents produced and for the consequential directions for inspection of such documents as the Court deems fit he did not remand the matter and directed the Magistrate to pass orders for production of the documents and for their inspection even before these documents were returned to the opponents as contemplated under Clause 1 of the order passed by the Supreme Court. The order passed by Mehta J. does not even remotely suggest that inspection of these documents etc. should be allowed to be given as a matter of course without satisfying the test of their relevancy to the charges against the opponents. The position therefore is that the petitioner cannot claim their custody for the purpose of inspection as of right by reason of any orders passed by the Supreme Court or by this Court or under sec. 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code. There is no such inherent power vested or given by any provision of law to claim an absolute right to have all documents etc. 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code. There is no such inherent power vested or given by any provision of law to claim an absolute right to have all documents etc. taken over and examined or inspected by them irrespective of any conditions only on the ground that the investigation would suffer and that it cannot be interfered with by the Court. ( 4 ) THAT requires me to consider the petitioners claim arising out of sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code. That section is as under :-94 (1) Whenever any Court or any officer in charge of a police-station considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation inquiry trial or other proceeding under this Code by or before such Court or Officer such Court may issue a summons or such officer a written order to the person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be requiring him to attend and produce it or to produce it at the time and place stated in the summons or order. (2) Any person required under this section merely to produce a document or other thing shall be deemed to have complied with the requisition if he causes such document or thing to be produced instead of attending personally to produce the same. (3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the Indian Evidence Act 1872 secs. 123 and 124 or to apply to a letter postcard telegram or other document or any parcel or thing in the custody of the Postal or Telegraph authorities. Then comes sec. 95 (1) which lays down procedure for obtaining letters telegrams etc. from the Postal or Telegraph authorities. Sub-sec. (2) thereof gives authority to certain officers to cause search to be made or to detain such document parcel etc. if required for purpose of investigation inquiry or trial. It may be noticed here that no such power is given to any police officer as is done under sec. 94 of the Code and it is given to the-District Magistrate Chief Presidency Magistrate High Court or Court of Sessions only. Then comes sec. 96 (1) which provides for issuing search warrants under certain circumstances. It runs thus:-96 (1) Where any Court has reason to believe that a person to whom a summons or order under sec. 94 of the Code and it is given to the-District Magistrate Chief Presidency Magistrate High Court or Court of Sessions only. Then comes sec. 96 (1) which provides for issuing search warrants under certain circumstances. It runs thus:-96 (1) Where any Court has reason to believe that a person to whom a summons or order under sec. 94 or a requisition under sec 96 sub-sec. (1) has been or might be addressed will not or would not produce the document or thing as required by such summons or requisition or where such document or thing is not known to the Court to be in the possession of any person or where the Court considers that the purposes of any inquiry trial or other proceeding under this Code will be served by a general search for inspection it may issue a search-warrant; and the person to whom such warrant is directed may search or inspect in accordance therewith and the provisions thereinafter contained. On a plain perusal of sec. 94 (1) we find that there are two different authorities which can exercise the powers given to it under this provision viz. the Court and the other a police officer in charge of police station. That power can be exercised for the purpose of production of any document or other thing and as provided therein it must be considered necessary or desirable for the purpose of investigation inquiry trial or other proceeding under the Code. Then it shows the manner and method to be adopted. In case of Court it can issue a summons and so far as the police officer in concerned he can issue a written order against any such person in whose possession or power such document or thing is believed to be. That person is then required to attend or produce the same at the time and place stated therein. It may be stated that the police officer-the petitioner-has not exercised his right or authority to pass any such order and it is not under any such order that these documents records etc. ate produced before him by the opponents in the case. Now even if the Court were required to exercise its powers at the instance of the petitioner it could have done so under sec. 96 (1) of the Code and they are not 50 exercised. The documents etc. ate produced before him by the opponents in the case. Now even if the Court were required to exercise its powers at the instance of the petitioner it could have done so under sec. 96 (1) of the Code and they are not 50 exercised. The documents etc. are before the Court on account of illegal seizure by the petitioner under sec. 165 of the Code. The effect therefore is that the question of production as such of all these documents records etc. may not arise. It would therefore follow that the petitioner can claim assistance from the Court like any other complainant before him in any matter arising under the Code. That assistance is sought for and can only be had to the petitioner under sec. 94 and therefore there would not arise any question of interference by the Court in the investigation of any matter by the petitioner against the accused-opponents in this case. ( 5 ) IT is no doubt true as urged by Mr. Khambhala that the Court cannot interfere with the investigation that may have to be carried out by the petitioner in cognizable offences as observed in the case of Abhinandan Jha and others v. Dinesh Mishra A. I. R. 1968 Supreme Court 117. In that case the question was whether a Magistrate can direct the police to submit a chargesheet when the police after investigation into a cognizable offence had submitted a final report under sec. 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it was held that though the Magistrate may or may not accept the report and take suitable action according to law he cannot infringe upon the jurisdiction of the police by compelling them to change their opinion so as to accord with his view. 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it was held that though the Magistrate may or may not accept the report and take suitable action according to law he cannot infringe upon the jurisdiction of the police by compelling them to change their opinion so as to accord with his view. In that connection after considering the effect of relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code it was observed that under the Code investigation consists generally of the following steps:- (1) Proceeding to the spot (2) Ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case (3) Discovery and arrest of the suspected offender (4) Collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence which may consist of (a) the examination of various persons (including the accused) and the reduction of their statements into writing if the officer thinks fit (b) the search of places or seizure of things considered necessary for the investigation and to be produced at the trial and (5) Formation of the opinion as to whether on the material collected there is case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and if so taking the necessary steps for the same by filing of a charge-sheet under sec. 173. In other words as observed in King Emperor v. Nazir Ahmed A. I. R. 1945 P. C. IX the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function always of course subject to the right of the Court to intervene in are appropriate case when moved under sec. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without any authority from the judicial authorities and it would as Their Lordships think be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. To almost the same effect we find similar observations made in the case of State of West Bengal v. S. N. Basak A. I. R. 1963 Supreme Court 447. To almost the same effect we find similar observations made in the case of State of West Bengal v. S. N. Basak A. I. R. 1963 Supreme Court 447. As observed therein the statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under sec. 439 or under the inherent power of the Court under sec. 561a when there was no case pending at the time excepting that the person against whom the investigation has started had appeared before the Court had surrendered and had been admitted to bail. The effect of these decisions no doubt is that in all cognizable offences there is a statutory right to investigate conferred on the police officers and that right cannot ordinarily be interfered with by the Courts. So far there does not appear to be any dispute. This is not a case where any such interference can be said to have been caused in considering the question whether all those documents etc. or any of them were necessary or desirable or whether they are relevant for the purpose of investigation for the purpose of having inspection thereof. That would be the province of the Court once powers of the Court are invoked even by the investigating officer under sec. 94 (1) of the Code. If any valid order was passed under sec. 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code and if those documents records etc. were seized in pursuance thereof the investigating officer would have perhaps a right to look into the same for the purpose of investigation of the case. He could have perhaps been able to do so under sec. 94 (1) of the Code if they were produced before him in compliance of any order passed by him. Whether that right to inspect or look into all those documents etc. is absolute or not it is not necessary to consider here as no such question arises. ( 6 ) THE position thus is that there are documents records account books etc. before the Court and the petitioner claims custody or/and inspection thereof under sec. 94 (1) of the Code. The powers of the Court under sec. 94 (1) make no distinction between a private party or the police officer investigating any such case. It has to exercise the same under sec. before the Court and the petitioner claims custody or/and inspection thereof under sec. 94 (1) of the Code. The powers of the Court under sec. 94 (1) make no distinction between a private party or the police officer investigating any such case. It has to exercise the same under sec. 94 (1) of the Code keeping in mind that they are required by the petitioner for the purpose of investigation of the case against the opponents. To what extent those powers should be exercised we have some decisions to guide. In fact sec. 94 as already stated above speaks of having to be satisfied about the necessity or desirability of such documents for the purpose of investigation and no further. It does not at the same time say that once they are produced before the Court the person seeking that assistance is entitled to inspect every one of them regardless of relevancy in the matter. Mr. Khambhata claims an absolute right to look into and that has therefore to be examined in the light of decisions on the point cited before me. The first decision referred to was In re Lakhmidas Naranji 5 Bom. L. R. 980 where while considering the effect of sec. 94 of the Court it was held as under:-THE question whether the production of a particular document or book is necessary or desirable for the purpose of any trial is one which must be decided by the Magistrate before he orders the production and in determining that question he has to exercise his discretion judicially in the sense that he must satisfy himself that the document or book has a bearing upon and is relevant in the case. When he has so satisfied himself his jurisdiction to order its production comes into play and that carries with it the jurisdiction to allow the prosecution the right of inspection. In the course of the judgment the following observations appear:-FURTHER if the Legislature did not intend by sec. 94 that the right to inspection should follow as a necessary consequence of the production ordered under it the production of such document or book before the Court at any trial must cease to have any value. If it was not for inspection for what other purpose could the Legislature have intended the power to compel the production to be used by a Criminal Court ? If it was not for inspection for what other purpose could the Legislature have intended the power to compel the production to be used by a Criminal Court ? then again it is observed thus:-NO doubt other purposes than the purposes of inspection may be easily conceived but then we must construe the section so as to give effect to all the words in it and the necessary implication of the words for the purpose of any investigation inquiry trial or other proceeding which occur in it is that when the document or book is produced before the Court the Court can allow it to be looked into and used for the purposes of the case. This is the construction put upon the section by the Calcutta High Court in Mahomed Jackriah and Co. v. Ahmed Mahomed (1. L. R. 15 Calcutta 109) and it is significant that though the Code now in force was amended several years after that decision had been passed the Legislature has allowed the section to remain as it was when that case was decided. There appears no doubt some force in view of sec. 94 (1) as it stands for the reason that the Court may decide first the bearing or rather the necessity or desirability for production of any document and then there is no further test of relevancy contemplated for giving inspection thereof to the person calling for the same. In other words taking this decision as a whole the earlier stage is considered more significant. This Bombay decision followed the Calcutta decision referred to therein and as urged before us once the documents are before the Court the only question that requires to be considered by the Court is to allow inspection thereof for unless that is allowed it would not be possible to know which of the documents or records etc. ; would have the relevance to the charges to be investigated by the prosecution. The decision in In re Lakhamidas (supra) came to be followed by the case of the Central Bank of India Limited v. P. D. Shamdasani in reported in 39 Bom. L. R. page 1 87. The petitioner in this cases was prosecuting the auditors of the Central Bank of India for offences under secs. The decision in In re Lakhamidas (supra) came to be followed by the case of the Central Bank of India Limited v. P. D. Shamdasani in reported in 39 Bom. L. R. page 1 87. The petitioner in this cases was prosecuting the auditors of the Central Bank of India for offences under secs. 191 193 197 and 199 of the Indian Penal Code in respect of alleged false statements contained in the balance-sheet of the Bank for the year 1925 certified by them as being correct. By an application of December 5 1935 the complainant asked for a witness summons to be issued against the Managing Director of the Bank for the production of various documents and books specified in a list attached to the application. The application purported to be made under sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Magistrate made an ex-parte order for compliance. Then on February 7 1936 a second application was made for the production of further books. The Court did not issue formal summonses but letters of request were written and the Secretary of the Bank appeared with a van-load of books which were apparently produced and reproduced in Court at a large number of hearings. On various dates between February 1 and September 1 1936 the complainant called on the secretary to produce specified documents and books out of the collection which had been brought to Court and three of them were produced. As the documents were already in Court these specific requests for production were obviously made with the object of using the documents as evidence in the case subject of course to proof if necessary. Then on September 2 1926 the complainant made an application under sec. 6 of the Bankers Books Evidence Act XVIII of 1891 for inspection of a particular document and that came to be rejected and then again on October 2 1936 the complainant applied under sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code for inspection of all the books and documents set out therein. That application came to be rejected. An application in revision was filed against that order and reliance for the complainant was placed on two decisions just referred to here above. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code for inspection of all the books and documents set out therein. That application came to be rejected. An application in revision was filed against that order and reliance for the complainant was placed on two decisions just referred to here above. Both the decisions came to be considered by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court and Broomfield J. speaking on behalf of the Division Bench said that the principles laid down in those two decisions apply and the prosecution cannot be denied the right of inspection of documents the production of which has been held to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of the trial and which have been held to be relevant after considering the objections of the party producing. This decision was challenged by the Central Bank of India and a Special Bench was constituted for considering the said decision. Beaumont C. J. speaking for the Bench observed that there is no justification whatever for the suggestion that when a Magistrate makes an order for production under sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code which he can do whenever he thinks such an order necessary or desirable for the purposes of the proceedings before him he thereby commits himself to the proposition that inspection of all the documents production of which is ordered must necessarily follow. Usually inspection should only be given of particular documents shown to be relevant and not of documents in bulk. ( 7 ) IT was however urged by Mr. Khambhata the learned counsel for the petitioner that certain principles laid down in this case would not be applicable as they arose on different considerations. Firstly it was pointed out that the applicant-Bank was not a party to the proceeding and it was in a case against a third party that those observations had come to be made. Besides the order was taken to be one under the Bankers Books Evidence Act and the observations in so for as they relate to sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code were obiter dicta. Lastly they were said to be in a case already before the Court and not in one at the stage of investigation as is in the present case. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code were obiter dicta. Lastly they were said to be in a case already before the Court and not in one at the stage of investigation as is in the present case. As to the third ground I do not think it can be of any consequence whether the Court has a case before it or has to deal with a matter relating to investigation in a case. Sec. 94 of the Code makes no such distinction as to the stage it is called upon to pass order under sec. 94 of the Code. But the two other grounds to distinguish the case from the one we have before us and if the matter were to rest at that perhaps certain observations set out therein may not be said to amount to a direct authority for the propositions laid down therein even in respect of sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Nanavati invited a reference to the other observations made in that judgment and they run thus:-THE Legislature has endowed the Courts with wide powers of ordering production of documents necessary for the determination of matters before the Courts and for directing inspection of those documents; but it must always be borne in mind that an order directing a person to produce or give inspection of his books in a dispute to which he is not a party involves a serious inroad upon his normal rights as a citizen and the Courts have always set their faces against giving anything in the nature of a roving or fishing commission to inspect documents. The Court does not allow a man to say I make such an such a charge against my opponent and now If you will let me look into his books I will see whether 1 can find some evidence to support it. If the Courts were to make orders for inspection of books merely on an allegation that certain facts are true the practice would be open to very serious abuse and the Court might easily become something of a menace to a mercantile community. It would be open to an unscrupulous person to make a false charge possibly against a business rival and then get inspection of that business rivals books. It would be open to an unscrupulous person to make a false charge possibly against a business rival and then get inspection of that business rivals books. But we have however another decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Hussenbhoy Abdoolabhoy Lalji and another v. Rashid B. Vershi A. I. R. 1941 Bombay 259. In this case the accused were charged with criminal breach of trust in relation to certain charitable funds which were said to have been improperly applied in their business. On 23rd September 1940 the learned Magistrate issued a search warrant and also issued a summons for production of documents which were specified in the complainants application and include various accounts relating to this charity and also the books of account that is to say ledgers rojmels and nondh books for five years of the firm of Abdoolabhoy Lalji and Co. which was the accused firm. Subsequently the complainant wrote to the accuseds attorneys claiming inspection of a large number of these documents and an application was then made to the learned Magistrate asking him to order that the complainant has a right to such inspection. The learned Magistrate took the view that he was bound by a decision of this Court in a revision application on a complaint filed by Shamdasani against the auditors of the Central Bank reported under 39 Bom. L. R. 1187 (judgment of Broomfield and N. J. Wadia JJ. on p. 1192) to give such inspection without considering the relevance of the particular documents. The matter came up before the Full Bench of the High Court and it considered the true effect of sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code and held as under:-WE think the true view is that when an application is made to a Court or to a police officer in the mofussil under sec. 94 for production of documents the Court is bound to consider whether there is a prima facie case for supposing that the documents are relevant. Obviously if the accused is charged with a crime of violence it is very unlikely that his business books Will have any relevance in the matter on the other hand if he is charged with criminal breach of trust in matters relating to his business it is probable that a considerable number of his business books will be relevant. Obviously if the accused is charged with a crime of violence it is very unlikely that his business books Will have any relevance in the matter on the other hand if he is charged with criminal breach of trust in matters relating to his business it is probable that a considerable number of his business books will be relevant. But all that the Magistrate or the police officer can do when an application for production of books is made which is usually et-parte is to consider whether books of a particular type are likely to have a bearing on the matter. If he thinks they are then he can order production; and of course his decision may be influenced by a desire to prevent the books being taken away or tampered with. But I am quite unable to agree that such an order for production involves an obligation on the Court to give inspection of all the books produced to the complainant though I do not doubt that the Court has power to order such inspection. The Magistrate must consider that question at a later stage of the proceeding either at the trial or inquiry or on a special application in which he can hear the accused as well as the complainant and he should only order inspection of those books which the complainant satisfies him are really relevant. In the last part of the order Beaumont C. J. speaking for the Bench clearly said that the decision of the Court in 39 Bom. L. R. 1187 against the auditors of the Central Bank above referred to if it went so far as that was wrong and must be overruled. The learned Magistrate was then directed to apply his mind to the question whether the documents of which inspection is sought are relevant or not. An attempt was made by Mr. Khambhata to distinguish this case by saying that it was in respect of a case pending before the Court and therefore not at the stage of investigation in the case as it is in the present case. An attempt was made by Mr. Khambhata to distinguish this case by saying that it was in respect of a case pending before the Court and therefore not at the stage of investigation in the case as it is in the present case. That no doubt appears to be so for the reason that we find than the complaint was before the court and on an application made on behalf of the complainant the learned Magistrate has issued a search warrant and also issued a summons for production of documents which were specified in the complainants application. That in my view hardly makes any difference for as already pointed out here above sec. 94 contemplates two authorities. One is the Court and the other is the police officer. If the matter had arisen before a Court in respect of the exercise of powers by the police officer under sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code it may have perhaps some justification in saying that the Court cannot go behind the order already passed by the police officer during the course of the investigation of the matter namely that the production of certain documents was necessary or desirable. But that has not been the case here. The police officer is required to go to the Court and invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code. That assistance can be invoked by the private party on a complaint filed before the Court or by the investigating officer if he is so required to take assistance of the Court for the purpose of investigation. Once the police officer seeks any such assistance both in the matter of production as also inspection of documents records etc. now lying before the Court the Court has to consider the extent to which it can exercise its powers under sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code. When that is so it makes no difference as to who seeks the assistance of the Court-whether a private party or a police officer in the circumstances of the matter. Nor would it make any difference as to at what stage of the proceedings such assistance of the Court is invoked by any such party under sec. 94. When that is so it makes no difference as to who seeks the assistance of the Court-whether a private party or a police officer in the circumstances of the matter. Nor would it make any difference as to at what stage of the proceedings such assistance of the Court is invoked by any such party under sec. 94. Sec. 94 makes no distinction between one party or the other and as already pointed out here above it covers all stages of a proceeding either at the stage of investigation inquiry or trial or in any proceeding before it. This decision has considered sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code and when it has laid down the true view in respect thereof after overruling the earlier decision in 39 Bom. L. R. 1187 it can be said to lay down the law which binds this Court in view of the decision of the special Full Bench in the case of State of Gujarat Gordhandas Keshavji Gandhi reported in III G. L. R. 269 which says that the decisions of Bombay High Court prior to 1st May 1960 have to be taken as law in force immediately before the appointed day and are therefore binding on the Gujarat High Court. In my view therefore the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Hussenbhoy Abdoolabhoy Lalji and another v. Rashid B. Vershi reported in A. I. R. 1941 Bombay 259 covers the present case and this Court is bound to follow the same. The principles laid down therein held good and they have neither been weakened by any subsequent decisions of the same High Court or by the Supreme Court nor overruled so far. ( 8 ) RELIANCE was however placed by Mr. Khambhata on a decision of Kailash Chandra Sharma v. The Superintendent of Post Offices New Delhi and others reported in A. I. R. 1960 Punjab 412 where Grover J. as he then was while considering the effect of sec. 95 sub-secs. (1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code held as under:-WHEN an order has to be made under sec. 95 (1) the document parcel or thing must be specified but as regards sec. 95 sub-secs. (1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code held as under:-WHEN an order has to be made under sec. 95 (1) the document parcel or thing must be specified but as regards sec. 95 (2) in the very nature of things it is not possible to specify those documents parcels or things that should be detained by the Postal and Telegraph Department because unless the investigating officer makes some prima facie examination it is not possible for him to determine whether any particular document parcel or thing would be wanted for the purpose of investigation and with regard to which orders may be obtained under sec. 95 (1 ). On that basis it was said that unless inspection was given of those documents it would be impossible to say which of them were relevant in this case. I have already referred to secs. 94 95 and 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code here above and it would appear therefrom that the words used in sec. 95 (2) which came to be considered in that case do not appear in sec. 94 or sec. 96 and at any rate sub-sec. (3) of sec. 94 takes out of its purview the postal mail etc. and for which a separate provision under sec. 95 is enacted. Both stand differently and any decision in considering that sec. 95 (2) of the Code cannot apply in considering the effect of sec. 94 of the Code. That decision has not considered sec. 94 of the Code and the decisions referred to here above and in my view it does not affect the principles laid down in the Full Bench decision in A. I. R. 1941 Bombay 259 referred to here above. ( 9 ) IN those circumstances it appears clear that the Court has to consider in the first instance that the documents sought to be produced as set out in the application out of the large bulk of the documents recorded etc. which had come to be seized and now lying before the Court have a general bearing for the purpose of investigation of the charges leveled against the accused-Mills. That general bearing would mean that the Court has to be satisfied that they are both necessary and desirable for that purpose as required under sec. 94 of the Code. which had come to be seized and now lying before the Court have a general bearing for the purpose of investigation of the charges leveled against the accused-Mills. That general bearing would mean that the Court has to be satisfied that they are both necessary and desirable for that purpose as required under sec. 94 of the Code. This after bearing the prosecuting authorities the Court has to find that all or any of those documents and records etc. are essential to be taken out for that purpose. It has further to apply its mind whether all or any of them are relevant for the purpose of investigation of this case. That relevancy need not be as is considered at the inquiry or trial before a Court in respect of any case already filed but it has to be determined keeping in mind the allegations made against the accused in the complaint or even in relation to other evidence already collected by the prosecuting agencies in respect of the offences with which the opponents are sought to be charged. In doing s it has to bear the other side in the matter. These two-fold tests are contemplated in the decision in A. I. R. 1941 Bombay 259 (supra) and they have to be followed before inspection of any documents is allowed to be given to the petitioner. It may well be that the relevancy can well be considered simultaneously while considering the first test if the Court so considers useful or convenient at that stage. However that is left to his discretion. ( 10 ) IT was next urged by Mr. Khambhata that an application was given to the Court for looking into the diaries maintained by the investigating officer with regard to the investigation already done if it so desired to have and they were kept with the Public Prosecutor in charge of the case duly sealed. It was said that while he has no objection to the learned Magistrate looking into the same for satisfying himself about the necessity or the desirability of the documents required for the purpose of investigation in the case but on condition that they cannot be allowed to be looked into by the accused as they have no right to do so under sec. 172 of the Code. 172 of the Code. The learned Magistrate had declined to look into the same saying that there is no provision of law which permits him to see the same. Now sec. 172 of the Criminal Procedure Code was referred to in that respect and it runs thus:-172 (1) Every police-officer making an investigation under this Chapter shall day by day enter his proceedings in the investigation in a diary setting forth the time at which the information reached him the time at which he began and closed his investigation the place or places visited by him and a statement of the circumstances (2) Any Criminal Court may send for the police-diaries of a case under inquiry or trial in such Court and may use such diaries not as evidence in the case but to aid it in such inquiry or trial. Neither the accused nor his agents shall be entitled to call for such diaries nor shall he or they be entitled to see them merely because they are referred to by the Court; but if they are used by the police officer who made them to refresh his memory or if the Court uses them for the purpose of contradicting such police-officer the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 sec. 161 or sec. 145 as the case may be shall apply. It would appear therefrom that while sub-sec. (1) contemplates the requirement of a police-officer making an investigation to enter his proceedings in the investigation in a diary sub-sec. (2) entitles a Criminal Court to send for the police-diaries of a case under inquiry or trial in such Court and to use such discretion not as evidence in the case but to aid it in such inquiry or trial. It appears clear that such word as investigation is used along with inquiry or trial The term inquiry includes every inquiry other than a trial conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court as defined in sec. 4 (k) of the Code and then in clause (1) the term investigation is defined as including all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police-officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf. Both are not the same. One refers to the Magistrate the other refers to the police officer. Both are not the same. One refers to the Magistrate the other refers to the police officer. The stage at which and the purpose for which the Court is to exercise powers under sec. 94 of the Code may not justify the learned Magistrate to look into these diaries as there is no inquiry before him. If therefore the police or the investigating officer finds it necessary to show any such diaries maintained by him for satisfying the Court that particular documents are essential and are relevant for the purpose of investigation of the charges leveled against these accused be may make use thereof and satisfy the Court by showing the same. But that would certainly entitle the other side to claim to have a look at the as otherwise they would not be able to meet the ground of necessity bearing or relevancy of the documents etc. sought to be produced and by the petitioner. That is however for the petitioner to consider to how he should act in relation thereto. The Court cannot of its own demand or claim to look into the same for determining the relevancy of documents. ( 11 ) A contention was raised by Mr. Nanavati the learned counsel for the opponents that once the first information report is lodged to the station under sec. 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the Mills they become the accused in that proceeding. In support thereof he invited reference to some observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of M. P. Sharma and others v. Satish Chandra District Magistrate Delhi and others A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 300. In that case the information was recorded by the Special Police on 19-11-1958 as the First Information Report and on the basis thereof an application was made to the District Magistrate Delhi under sec. 96 Criminal Procedure Code for the issue of warrants for the search of documents and in the places as per schedules furnished. The searches were made on 25-11-1958 and subsequent days and a voluminous mass of records was seized from various places. That led those persons to claim a relief under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India and prayed that the search warrants may be quashed as being absolutely illegal and asked for return of the documents seized. The searches were made on 25-11-1958 and subsequent days and a voluminous mass of records was seized from various places. That led those persons to claim a relief under Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India and prayed that the search warrants may be quashed as being absolutely illegal and asked for return of the documents seized. One of the main contentions raised was one relating to Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India which provides that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself and the Supreme Court took the view that the guarantee under Article 20 (3) would be available to persons against whom a First Information Report has been recorded as accused therein. It would extend to any compulsory process for production of evidentiary documents which are reasonably likely to support a prosecution against them. In other words the two respondents can be said to be the accused in the matter no sooner the first information report has been filed against them under sec. 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On that basis a contention was raised by Mr. Nanavati that much though sec. 94 of the Code is worded in general terms so as perhaps to include even an accused person but as held in the case of State of Gujarat v. Shyamlal Mohanlal Choksi reported in A. I. R. 1965 Supreme Court 1251 (VI G. L. R. (S. C.) 698) he cannot be so covered thereby. The relevant observations referred to by him are as follows:-BUT there are indications that the Legislature did not intend to include an accused person. The words attend and produce are rather inapt to cover the case of an accused person. It would be an odd procedure for a Court to issue a summons to an accused person present in Court to attend and produce a document. It would be still more odd for a police officer to issue a written order to an accused person in his custody to attend and produce a document. Then they have observed thus:-IT might be that this construction of sec. 94 would render sec. 96 useless for no such warrant could be issued to search for documents known to be in the possession of the accused. This may be so but a general search or inspection can still be ordered. Then they have observed thus:-IT might be that this construction of sec. 94 would render sec. 96 useless for no such warrant could be issued to search for documents known to be in the possession of the accused. This may be so but a general search or inspection can still be ordered. As far as the police officer is concerned he can use sec. 165 Criminal Procedure Code. It was thus urged that the production of documents claimed by the investigating officer in respect of documents belonging to the accused cannot be permitted under sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The operation of sec. 94 excludes the accused person from its ambit and therefore the applicants cannot claim those documents which are held on behalf of the accused by the learned Magistrate. On the other hand it was urged that there is no question of calling upon the accused to produce any of these documents and no such question can consequently arise. It appears no doubt true that the order of the Supreme Court does provide for the return of the documents to the opponents after certain directions set out therein are carried out. But as provided therein even if they are to be returned that is subject to the undertaking given by the Secretary of the opponents to produce them whenever called upon to do so by the Magistrate. In fact it also provides in the last part of the order that the documents will be at the disposal of the Court in Court proceedings that may arise by the result of the application and the Court can give any directions as to the same documents when produced that it might deem fit. Even if therefore the opponents are entitled to return of those documents or papers if certain directions are carried out as set out in paras 1 and 2 thereof they would hold them subject to the authority of the Magistrate directing to produce the same in pursuance of an undertaking given by them to the Court. It cannot therefore be said to be a case where the investigating officer calls upon the opponents to produce the same so as to negative the claim to any such inspection as urged by Mr. Nanavati. It cannot therefore be said to be a case where the investigating officer calls upon the opponents to produce the same so as to negative the claim to any such inspection as urged by Mr. Nanavati. The question does not arise in the circumstances of this case for the reason that all the documents have been before the learned Magistrate and they are to remain in his custody subject to the directions given in the order of the Supreme Court passed in the matter. ( 12 ) I may lastly refer to two decisions of the Supreme Court cited by Mr. Verma the learned advocate for the petitioner in reply to the arguments by the other side. The first is a decision in the case of Mohammad Serajuddin v. R. C. Misra A. I. R. 1962 Supreme Court 759 and the other one is a decision in the case of Durga Prasad v. H. R. Gomez Superintendent (Prevention) Central Excise Nagpur and another reported in A. I. R. 1966 Supreme Court 1209. Both the cases arose out of the exercise of powers by the Customs authorities in execution of a search warrant for seizing certain goods or documents from the custody of the opponents. The question that arose to be considered was whether the Customs authorities were entitled to the custody of the records as seized by them. It was pointed out by Mr. Verma from these decisions that the Magistrate is entitled to satisfy himself about the belief of the Customs officer but is not required to make up his own mind independently of that belief. That was the only control of the Magistrate before he issues the order. According to him the same control can be with the Magistrate and since the documents etc. were seized by them they were entitled to look into the same. These cases relate to the powers of the Customs authorities given to them under the Sea Customs Act and the provisions contained therein do not appear to be so similar to those which we are called upon to consider namely in respect of sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code. As I said above this is not a case where the exercise of powers is by a police officer investigating a case under sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code. As I said above this is not a case where the exercise of powers is by a police officer investigating a case under sec. 94 as such and consequently these decisions cannot be of any help to the petitioner even by way of any analogy for what we are concerned in this case is whether the Court has a right to determine the question as to the necessity and relevancy for the purpose of both production and inspection of the documents and records etc. which have come up before the Court and which remain with it subject to certain directions of the Supreme Court. The question has to be considered on the basis and the extent to which the investigating officer is entitled to claim when he has invoked the assistance of the Court by making a special application under sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code. We are not therefore considering the powers of the Court in respect of any acts of the police officers done under sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code. If that were so various considerations might have perhaps arisen and we are not called upon to decide the same in these proceedings. ( 13 ) THIS would take us to the consideration of the request made by the investigating officer to the Court in regard to the documents etc. which have been lying before the Court. The application has set out in paragraph 4 the nature of the offences said to have been committed by the opponents and in the list given there below they ask for certain documents or articles for which reasons have been given in the last column. They claim not only production thereof but inspection thereof since they are said to be essential for the purpose of investigation. During the course of hearing of these applications I made an attempt to harmonise and make it simple enabling the Court below to apply its mind and arrive at some conclusion as to the desirability and necessity of certain documents records etc. as also relevancy for the purpose of inspection therefore. It must be said that Mr. Nanavati was quite helpful in that direction and he went to the length of expressing his willingness to produce certain forms such as C forms C-1 forms E. B. 4a registers etc. as also relevancy for the purpose of inspection therefore. It must be said that Mr. Nanavati was quite helpful in that direction and he went to the length of expressing his willingness to produce certain forms such as C forms C-1 forms E. B. 4a registers etc. on the footing that they were filled in and sent to the Textile Commissioners office in pursuance of the statutory requirements which the opponents were required to obey and in case the petitioner was not able to trace any correspondence in relation thereto. But the attempt of the other hand was to claim the inspection of all the documents account-books etc. on the basis that they cannot say anything unless they look into the same and any such suggestions made by Mr. Nanavati would not help the cause of their investigation in the case. The learned Magistrate has however rejected the applications and not gone into those questions by considering them in serial order as set out in the application. That is also not proper. In those circumstances the only proper course for this Court is that we should give certain directions to the learned Magistrate to ascertain the necessity or desirability of having certain documents records etc. produced in the first instance out of the bulk that has been lying in his custody and if necessary simultaneously or later on determine the relevancy or otherwise thereof so as to enable the investigating officer to inspect the same. It is difficult to lay down any directions exhaustively for after all that would be the part of the duty of the learned Magistrate to do so applying his mind after hearing the learned advocates for the parties and if necessary looking into the document etc. himself. ( 14 ) THE order passed in Misc. Application No. 121 of 1968 is set aside and the matter is sent back to the learned Magistrate for considering the necessity or desirability for the purpose of production out of the documents etc. set out by the investigating officer in the application and at the same time or thereafter as he thinks proper and convenient determine the relevancy thereof for the purpose of investigation of the charges leveled against the opponents keeping in mind at the same time the first information report lodged by them against the accused Mills. set out by the investigating officer in the application and at the same time or thereafter as he thinks proper and convenient determine the relevancy thereof for the purpose of investigation of the charges leveled against the opponents keeping in mind at the same time the first information report lodged by them against the accused Mills. The learned Magistrate shall consider the reasons set out by them as also those that may be advanced before him at the time and shall also hear the other side before directing inspection of any of those documents etc. to the prosecuting agencies. The relevancy however has to be considered by the Court not in the manner as is required to be considered at a trial or inquiry but that it has to be considered for the purpose of investigation of the case. ( 15 ) THE prosecuting agencies shall also specify properly if not so very accurately the documents records account-books etc. that they require in a general manner touching the charges and at any rate they shall not be allowed to have an inquiry of a fishing or roving character. In case the prosecuting agencies desire to produce police diaries or any part thereof with a view to satisfy the Court about the relevancy in relation to any of the documents etc. already allowed to be produced it can do so subject to their agreeing to allow the other side to have a look into the same and have the matter heard and decided by the Court as it deems proper. That would be however a matter entirely within the discretion of the investigating officer to produce or not before the Court for this purpose. In case the investigating officer is not able to secure original records of forms etc. submitted by the opponents in accordance with law to the Textile Commissioners Officer the copies thereof if shown to be there can be given if they are otherwise necessary and relevant for the purpose of investigation of the case. In case the investigating officer is not able to secure original records of forms etc. submitted by the opponents in accordance with law to the Textile Commissioners Officer the copies thereof if shown to be there can be given if they are otherwise necessary and relevant for the purpose of investigation of the case. These directions are not intended to be exhaustive and as I said above it would be entirely within the judicial discretion of the learned Magistrate to consider the necessity or desirability for the purpose of production of the documents out of the bulk that has been lying with him and at the same time or later considering the relevancy of all or any of them in relation to the charges leveled against the accused both in the first information report as also in the Miscellaneous Application No. 121 of 1968 and after hearing the other side on being so satisfied may allow inspection thereof to them. ( 16 ) THE orders passed in the other two Applications Nos. 118 and 119 9 1968 shall stand subject however to the directions set out mere - above in this application. ( 17 ) THE matter may be expedited and if possible must be disposed off within two months from the date these papers reach the Court and if necessary leaving aside the other work of the Court. Facilities may however be given to the opponents if they require any of the records such has account books vouchers or invoices etc. for the purpose of auditing. That however be done in the presence of the prosecuting agencies. Interim stay issued by this Court stands vacated. .