JUDGMENT : Patra, J. - These are 101 writ petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by temporary Railway servants, on whom notices have been served for terminating their services, praying for issue of appropriate orders to quash the orders of termination and for issue of writs of Mandamus directing the appropriate Railway authorities to continue the Petitioners in service. These' cases which involve common questions of law to which reference would shortly be made can be divided into three broad categories. In the first category of 11 cases comprising O.J. Cs. Nos. 95, 114 to 122 and 125 of 1966, the Petitioners were first appointed as casual labourers and thereafter were appointed as substitute Khalasis with effect from 25-7-1964. While so working, notices dated 16-2-1966 were served upon them to the effect that their services would be terminated with effect from 16-3-1966 as their posts were proposed to be filled up by empanelled candidates. It is contended that since the Railways is an industry, and the Petitioners are 'workmen', the termination of their services would amount to 'retrenchment' as that term is defined in the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and that as such their cases are governed by the provisions of the Act and as retrenchment compensation has not been paid to them as provided in Section 25F of the Act, they cannot be retrenched. It is further contended that if it is sought to retrench them, the procedure as laid down in Section 25G of the Act should be followed and that they are also entitled to the benefit of Section 25H in regard to their re-employment. In the counter affidavit filed by opposite parties, it is stated that the Indian Railways is not an industry, that the Petitioners are not workmen and that termination of their services is not retrenchment so as to attract the relevant provisions of the Act. These Petitioners were appointed purely on stop-gap basis and as the posts are required to be filled up by duly selected candidates, they were served with notices of termination of service as contemplated under Rule 149(1) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code. These Petitioners were appointed purely on stop-gap basis and as the posts are required to be filled up by duly selected candidates, they were served with notices of termination of service as contemplated under Rule 149(1) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code. Assuming that the provisions of the Act are applicable to the cases of the Petitioners, they ought to have availed themselves of the alternative remedy provided in the Act by moving the Central Government for referring the matter to the Industrial Tribunal u/s 10 of the Act, and that not having been done, the applications under Article 226 of the Constitution are misconceived and consequently they are not entitled to any relief. 2. The second category covers 61 cases, namely, O.J.Cs. Nos. 262, 263, 272 to 311, and 313 to 331 of 1966. The Petitioners in these cases are temporary employees in the Bridge section under the Assistant Engineer, South Eastern Railways, Cuttack since about the year 1963. Under Rule 149(1) of the Indian Railways Establishment Code, notices were served upon them on 24.6.1966 intimating that their services would be terminated with effect from the date of expiry of one month from the service of such notice on them. Their contentions are the same as those of the Petitioners in the first category referred to above and they contend that as about 200 workmen of that category had been appointed in Bridge section long after the Petitioners were appointed, it is the workmen who were later appointed that should have been retrenched earlier then the Petitioners and as this principle embodied in Section 250 of the Act has not been followed, the services of the Petitioners are not liable to be terminated. In reply the opposite parties contend as in the first category of cases that the Indian Railways is not an industry, that the Petitioners are not workmen and that their termination of service is not retrenchment, so as to attract the operation of the Act. They also take the plea that as the Petitioners have not availed themselves of the alternative remedy provided in the Act, the writ petitions are not maintainable. They also take the plea that as the Petitioners have not availed themselves of the alternative remedy provided in the Act, the writ petitions are not maintainable. Assuming however that the provisions of the Act are applicable, the opposite parties contend that as a matter of abundant calltion, the opposite parties have complied with the requirements of Sections 25F and 25G and that the provisions of Section 25H of the Act would be followed if necessity for re-employment would arise in future. 3. The third category of 29 cases comprise O.J.Cs. Nos. 449, 450, 458 to 465 and 475 to 493 of 1966. These Petitioners are in temporary employment since about the year 1944 engaged in work relating to maintenance of the Railway buildings and properties and on 24-11-1966 were served with notices under Rule 149 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code terminating their services with effect from the date of expiry of one month from the date on which notices are served on them. Their contentions are the same as those of the Petitioners in the second category and their case is that as the provisions of Sections 25F and 25G have not been followed by the Railway authorities, they are not liable to be retrenched. In reply the opposite parties submit that the normal maintenance work of the section is being done by permanent staff employed against the permanent sanctioned posts and by some casual labourers in which category the Petitioners fall. The term of appointment of Petitioners is for a fixed period of three months on a contractual basis and their position is not improved merely because they are appointed in such temporary posts for successive periods. As the posts of the Petitioners were proposed to be abolished for want of further sanction, notices were issued to them under Rule 149 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code. It is next contended that the Indian Railways is not an industry, that the Petitioners are not workmen and that the termination of their service is not retrenchment so as to attract the operation of the different provisions of the Act. It is next contended that the Indian Railways is not an industry, that the Petitioners are not workmen and that the termination of their service is not retrenchment so as to attract the operation of the different provisions of the Act. However, as a matter of abundant calltion, the opposite parties were prepared to follow the provisions of Sections 25G and 25 H of the Act pertaining to the procedure of retrenchment of workmen, but for the fact that in view of the stay orders passed by this Court, these temporary posts were further sanctioned and the services of the Petitioners are being continued. It is lastly contended that even if the provisions of the Act are applicable to the cases of the Petitioners and even if there is in existence any industrial dispute relating to their employment, they having not availed themselves of the alternative remedy available to them under the Act, the present petitions are not maintainable. 4. Despite the stand taken in the counter affidavits filed by opposite parties, their learned Advocate Mr. B.K. Pal concedes for the purpose of these cases that the Railways is an industry and that the Petitioners are all workmen. In fact, Rule 2514 of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual says that casual labourers employed under Railway projects and in Railway factories come within the purview of the term 'workmen' u/s 2(8) of the Act. So far as the second and third categories of cases are concerned, the opposite parties also concede that they are prepared to follow the provisions of Sections 25G and 25H of the Act thereby implying that these are cases of retrenchment as defined in the Act. No such concession however has been made in respect of the first category of cases. It is therefore necessary to decide whether the termination of service of the 11 Petitioners in the first category would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of the Act. The other question which is common to all the three categories relates to the maintainability of the Petitioners, the argument being that since in the case of an industrial dispute an alternative remedy is provided for in the Act u/s 10, an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable. 5. The other question which is common to all the three categories relates to the maintainability of the Petitioners, the argument being that since in the case of an industrial dispute an alternative remedy is provided for in the Act u/s 10, an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable. 5. Section 10 of the Act empowers the appropriate Government to refer an industrial dispute which may,be either existing or apprehended (a) for settlement to a Board; or (b) to a Court for inquiry; or (c) for adjudication of Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal. The expression 'industrial dispute' has been defined u/s 2(k) of the Act. It means a dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person. In keeping with the object and the scope of the Act it had been held that the definition includes within itself only collective disputes and not an individual dispute. An individual workmen who had been thrown out of employment had to rely for redress only through the instrumentality of the union or where there is no such union of his co-workers. Some-times he found it hard to persuade his co-workers or the union to take up his case. This unsatisfactory position in law was remedied by the inclusion of a new section, i.e. 2-A by the Act 35 of 1965. Under the new Section 2-A, where an employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workmen, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute. The resultant position therefore is that an industrial workman whose services are terminated can now raise an industrial dispute and take his case to conciliation machinery or approach the Government for a reference of the dispute to adjudication. The resultant position therefore is that an industrial workman whose services are terminated can now raise an industrial dispute and take his case to conciliation machinery or approach the Government for a reference of the dispute to adjudication. But the power given to Government u/s 10 of the Act to refer an industrial dispute for settlement, inquiry or adjudication, as the case may be is discretionary and cannot be questioned in any Court of law, except to the extent, that the High Court can enquire whether the Government did apply its mind in determining the question of reference of the dispute u/s 10. If the Government has not applied its mind, it can certainly be asked to do so but it cannot be compelled to refer the dispute excepting in to cases, namely, (1) in cases of an industrial dispute relating to public utility service and (2) where the parties to the dispute apply for reference and the persons applying represent the majority of each party. It is thus clear from the scheme of the Act relating to reference of dispute for adjudication by tribunals that the power to make reference vests in the appropriate Government and subject to certain limitations the exercise of the power is completely discretionary by the Government and that it is not open to a workman to approach the tribunal direct. 6. It is contended by Mr. B.K. Pal that each of the Petitioners had the right to move the Government to refer the dispute arising out of the proposed termination of service for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal and that as admittedly the Petitioners have not availed themselves of the remedy provided in the Act, it is not open to them to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court in writ proceedings and that consequently these applications are not maintainable. In support of this contention, he has relied on several decisions to which no detailed reference is necessary. It is sufficient to quote what their lordships of the Supreme Court had to say on the subject in Thansingh Nathmal and Others Vs. A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes, which is a case under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947. In support of this contention, he has relied on several decisions to which no detailed reference is necessary. It is sufficient to quote what their lordships of the Supreme Court had to say on the subject in Thansingh Nathmal and Others Vs. A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes, which is a case under the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947. That Act provides a hierarchy of taxing tribunals competent to decide question or questions as to the liability of the tax-payer under the Assam Sales Tax Act with a right to have questions of law arising out of the order decided by the High Court. Primarily it is the Superintendent of Taxes who assesses the liability to pay tax. An appeal against the order of the Superintendent lies to the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes and against the order of the Assistant Commissioner a revision application lies to the Commissioner. Against the order of the Commissioner a reference may be demanded on questions of law to the High Court and if reference is refused the High Court may be moved to call for a reference. The High Court has however no power to decide questions of fact which are exclusively within the competence of the taxing authorities. In that case being aggrieved by the revisional order passed by the Commissioner, the Assessee instead of asking for an order of reference to the High Court invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution Challenging the competence of the provincial Legislature to extend the concept of sale. The High Court declined to interfere and this view of the High Court was upheld in appeal by the Supreme Court where their Lordships observed: The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary : it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the Petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore act as a Court of appeal against the decision of a Court or Tribunal, to correct errors off Act, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved Petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be by passed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up. Mr. Pal has drawn our attention to recent decision of a Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Abani Bhusan Biswas Vs. Hindusthan Cables Ltd., Burdwan and Others where his Lordship declined to entertain an application under Article 226 for alleged violation of certain Standing Orders by the management. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act is a self-contained Code and Section 134 thereof provides that if any question arises as to the application...of a Standing Order...an employer or workman may refer the question to anyone of the Labour Courts and the said Labour Court shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide the question and such decision shall be final and binding on the parities. In view of this specific provision in the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act which provides an effective remedy for adjudication of the disputes arising under this Act, his Lordship declined to grant any relief under Article 226 when the Petitioner did not avail himself of the remedy provided under the Act. In view of this specific provision in the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act which provides an effective remedy for adjudication of the disputes arising under this Act, his Lordship declined to grant any relief under Article 226 when the Petitioner did not avail himself of the remedy provided under the Act. It may be noticed that in this case as well as in the Supreme Court case referred to above the Petitioner had an effective remedy available to him under the respective statutes which he could have availed of but which he did not. 7. In the present case before us the position is entirely different. It is not, as pointed out earlier, open to any of the Petitioners to approach the Industrial Tribunal direct for adjudicating the disputes. All that they could do was to approach the appropriate Government to refer the dispute for adjudication and it is entirely discretionary with the Government concerned to refer or not to refer the dispute to the Tribunal. The alternative remedy the existence of which would disentitle relief under Article 226 referred to by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Thansingh's case is one which without being unduly onerous is equally efficacious. The very fact that the remedy u/s 10 of the Act depends for its exercise on the discretion of the appropriate Government is enough to show that the remedy is neither effective nor efficacious. The learned Advocates appearing for the Petitioners have relied on certain decisions in which High Courts have entertained applications under Article 226, although alternative remedies under the relevant statutes were available to the Petitioners on the ground that the alternative remedies so open were either inefficacious or onerous. One such case is M.G. Abrol Vs. Shantilal Chhotalal and Co.. It was a case under the Sea Customs Act where the Customs Collector directed the seizure of certain goods u/s 178 of the Act, but ultimately allowed them to be exported after imposing a fine in lieu of confiscation and also imposing a personal penalty on the firm. On writ petition being filed in the Bombay High Court, the learned Single Judge modified the personal penalty but on appeal the Division Bench quashed the order on the ground that the Customs Collector bad no jurisdiction to pass the orders. On writ petition being filed in the Bombay High Court, the learned Single Judge modified the personal penalty but on appeal the Division Bench quashed the order on the ground that the Customs Collector bad no jurisdiction to pass the orders. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court it was inter alia contended that the High Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 as the Respondents bad an effective remedy by way of appeal to the higher customs authorities. But their Lordships took the view that the remedy which the Respondents had was not effective because they could not file an appeal without depositing as a condition precedent the large amount of penalty imposed on them. It was further observed that the existence of an effective remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court but it is only one of the circumstances that the Court should take into consideration in exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226. In Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Another. Their Lordships held that one of the exceptions to the rule that where alternative remedy is open, a party is not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is where action is being taken under an invalid law or arbitrarily without the sanction of law in which case the High Court may interfere to avoid hardship to a party which would be unavoidable if the quick and more efficacious remedies envisaged by Article 226 were not allowed to be invoked. 8. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Municipal Committee Vs. Shah Raisi Hirji and Co. and Others, considered that the provision for a reference u/s 83(2) of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act is not a convenient, beneficial and effective remedy because such a reference cannot be demanded as of right and their Lordships held in that case that the existence of such a remedy is' no bar to the issue of a writ of certiorari when circumstances call for issue of a writ. A similar view was taken by another Division Bench of the same High Court in Biharilal Chaurasia Vs. Regional Transport Authority and Another. A similar view was taken by another Division Bench of the same High Court in Biharilal Chaurasia Vs. Regional Transport Authority and Another. u/s 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act which provides for revision, the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction is entirely discretionary with the revising authority and that being so the Petitioner's failure to avail of this remedy was not considered to be a bar for relief being granted to him under Article 226. A similar view had also been taken by Punjab High Court in Bhagirath Singh Vs. The State of Punjab and Others and The Surgical Dressings Manufacturing Co. Private Ltd. v. The Punjab State and Anr. ILR 1967 P&H 747. 9. After a careful consideration of the several submissions made at the Bar and the pronouncements of their Lordships of the Supreme Court and of the various High Courts in India, we are satisfied that the existence of an alternative remedy does not per se operate as an absolute legal bar to the exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, although that should be a relevant circumstance which Courts have to bear in mind in deciding whether relief under the extraordinary jurisdiction should or should not be granted. Where the alternative remedy provided is neither effective nor efficacious, dictates or justice demand that in appropriate cases the remedy under Article 226 should not be denied to the aggrieved person. The question as to whether or not the alternative remedy in a given case is equally adequate, efficacious and speedy must naturally depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case and no rigid and inflexible rule can be formulated to cover every case. If the matters in controversy would require investigation of questions of fact, such an investigation cannot obviously be undertaken in a proceeding under Article 226. Judged by these tests we are satisfied that the writ petitions are maintainable and that such relief as can be given to the Petitioners without embarking on an enquiry into disputed questions of fact should be granted to them. 10. The next point for consideration is whether the termination of service of the 11 Petitioners in the first category of cases would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of the Act. The expression 'retrenchment' is defined in Section 2(oo) of the Act as follows: 2. 10. The next point for consideration is whether the termination of service of the 11 Petitioners in the first category of cases would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of the Act. The expression 'retrenchment' is defined in Section 2(oo) of the Act as follows: 2. (oo) 'retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workmen for any reason whatsoever, otherwise then as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, hut does not include. (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health. It is not disputed that the present case does not come within the exceptions enumerated in Sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) above and admittedly the termination of the services of the employees is not sought to be brought about as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. It is therefore contended in the circumstances on behalf of the Petitioners that the termination of their services would amount to retrenchment. Mr. Pal for the opposite parties contends that 'retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(00) has no wider meaning then the accepted connotation of the word which means the discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer and that as to these cases the Petitioners were appointed purely on temporary basis and they are not candidates duly selected by the Selection Board, all that is intended to be done now is to replace them by duly selected candidates and that in these circumstances the termination of their services would not amount to retrenchment. In support of this contention Mr. Pal relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla v. A.D. Divelkar AIR 1957 S.C. 121 . Their Lordships in that decision were concerned with two cases-one in which the services of all workmen had been terminated by the Proprietors of Shri Dinesh Mills, Ltd. on a real and bona fide closure of their business, and the second where the services of all the workmen had been terminated by a Railway Company on the business or undertaking being taken over by the Union Government. The employees in both the cases contended relying on the wide definition in Section 2(00) that those were cases of retrenchment and they were entitled to retrenchment compensation as provided u/s 25F of the Act. Their Lordships held that 'retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(00) and as used in Section 25F has no wider meaning than the ordinary connotation of the word: it means the discharge of surplus labour by the employer for any reason whatsoever, otherwise then as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, and it has no application where the service's of all workmen have been terminated by the employer on a real and bona fide closure of business or on the undertaking being taken over by another employer. It was made clear that there can be no retrenchment in any case unless there is discharge or surplus labour or staff in a continuing or running industry. The contention of the Petitioners on this point comes to this: it does not matter under what circumstances the termination of service is brought about. The moment there is termination of service for any reason whatsoever it amounts to retrenchment. The meaning which the Petitioners want to give to the expression 'for any reason whatsoever' would be wide enough to include termination of service either due to closure of business or due to transfer of business-an interpretation which is negatived by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to above in the following words: It has been argued that by excluding bona fide closure of business as one of the reasons for termination of the services of workmen by the employer, we are cutting down the amplitude of the expression 'for any reason whatsoever' and reading into the definition words which do not occur there. We agree that the adoption of the ordinary meaning gives to the expression 'for any reason whatsoever' a somewhat narrower scope; one may say that it gets a colour from the context in which the expression occurs; but we do not agree that it amounts to importing new words in the definition. What after all is the meaning of the expression 'for any reason whatsoever'? What after all is the meaning of the expression 'for any reason whatsoever'? When a portion of the staff or labour force is discharged as surplusage in a running or continuing business, the termination of service which follows may be due to a variety of reasons; e. g., for economy, rationalisation in industry, installation of a new labour-saving machinery, etc. The legislature in using the expression 'for any reason whatsoever' says in effect: 'It does not matter why you are discharging the surplus; if the other requirements of the definition are fulfilled, then it is retrenchment. 11. Applying the ratio of the above decision to the facts of the present cases we find that here is an industry which is a continuing business. Whatever might be the terms of appointment of the Petitioners and whatever might be the justification for replacing them by selected personnel, they become surplus labour or staff when the selected candidates are appointed and this surplus staff is sought to be discharged. These are therefore cases where a portion of the staff is discharged as surplusage in a continuing business. There is therefore (a) termination of the services of workmen, (b) by the employer, (c) for any reason whatsoever and (d) otherwise then as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action and consequently these are cases of retrenchment as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Act. 12. Having regard to our finding above that the 11 Petitioners in the first category of cases have been retrenched and in view of the concession made on behalf of the opposite parties that the cases of the second and third categories of Petitioner are cases of retrenchment, it follows that the Petitioners in all the three categories of cases are entitled to all the retrenchment benefits under the Act. Section 25-F of the Act lays down the condition precedent to retrenchment of workmen and it says that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less then one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until (a) the workman has been given one month's notice indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of notice ; provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the termination of service. It is not seriously disputed that in all these cases a month's notice has been given to all the Petitioners. Sub-section (b) of Section 25F requires that at the time of retrenchment the workmen concerned should be paid compensation at rates mentioned therein and admittedly no such compensation has been paid to the first and the third categories of Petitioners. It is not disputed that such compensation has been paid to the second category of Petitioners. Section 25-F(c) requires that no such employee shall be retrenched until notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the official Gazette. There is nothing on record to indicate that such notice has been served on the Government. We are not here concerned with Sections 25 FF and 25-FFF. Section 25-G which prescribes the procedure for retrenchment lays down that where any workmen in an industrial establishment, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular Category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman. Section 25-H does not lay down any condition precedent for retrenchment but relates to re-employment of retrenched workman a matter with which we are not concerned here. Section 25-H does not lay down any condition precedent for retrenchment but relates to re-employment of retrenched workman a matter with which we are not concerned here. So far as the procedure for retrenchment referred to in Section 25-G is concerned, it involves investigation into question of fact regarding the particular category to which the Petitioners belong and whether in retrenching them the provisions of Section 25-G have been strictly followed. These are matters which cannot possibly be investigated in a proceeding under Article 226 and therefore are left to be agitated he fore the appropriate authorities. 13. By virtue of stay orders passed by this Court the Petitioners in first and third categories are continuing in service. As all these Petitioners are workmen employed in a running industry and are sought to be retrenched and our finding being that some or all of the conditions prescribed in Section 25-F have Dot been complied with, we would quash the orders of retrenchment passed against all these Petitioners and direct that in case they are sought to be retrenched the opposite parties should strictly comply with the conditions required under Sections 25-F and 25-G of the Act. In the circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear their own costs in these proceedings. Barman, C.J. 14. I agree.