JUDGMENT B. D. Gupta, J. - This is an application in revision against the conviction of the applicant for breach of Clause 3-B (b) of the Uttar Pradesh Food grains (Control, Requisition and Distribution) Order, 1963, hereinafter referred to as the Order, punishable under Clause (9) of Rule 125 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962. The sentence awarded to the applicant is fine in a sum of Rs. 500/- After hearing learned counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that this revision must be allowed. 2. The applicant Suryakant was proprietor of firm Suryakant Pooran Mai, which was a regular dealer in food grains. On the morning of 26th of September, 1364, one Sri Balwant Singh, a Food Officer, visited the shop of the applicant and found therein a total of 276 bags of food grains weighing about 260 quintals. The applicant was prosecuted on the assertion that the above quantity being far in excess of 100 quintals the applicant had contravened the restriction on the quantity of food grains in the possession of a dealer contained in Clause 3-B of the Order. 3. The applicant admitted a recovery but pleaded not guilty. The version set forward in defence, inter alia, was that the bags of food grains recovered from his shop on the morning of the 26th of September, 1964, included bags of gram which was part of a consignment of food grains received by the applicant from Kanpur on the 18th of September, 1964; that the applicant had already sold the above 201 bags of gram to Ashoka Dal Mill on the 24th of September, 1964; that delivery of the said bags to the purchaser was due to be effected on the 25th of September, 1964 but delivery could not in fact be effected on the 25th of September, 1964, because it rained heavily on the 25th of September, 196-1 and the rains continued upto the early hours of the morning of the 26th of September, 1964. The applicant led evidence in support of this defence. This evidence included, apart from entries in the account books maintained by the applicant, entries in the account books maintained by the buyer, the Ashoka Dal Mill, as also entries in the account books maintained by the broker Sri Ram Autar. The applicant led evidence in support of this defence. This evidence included, apart from entries in the account books maintained by the applicant, entries in the account books maintained by the buyer, the Ashoka Dal Mill, as also entries in the account books maintained by the broker Sri Ram Autar. Swarup Chand (D. W. 1) the Munim of the applicant, Bishambhar (D. W. 2) the proprietor of Ashoka Dal Mill and Ram Avtar (D. W. 3) the broker were also examined in defence. The applicant also examined, as the fifth defence witnesses, the Revenue Assistant of the Collectorate at Agra, who stated that on the morning of 26th September, 1964 at 8.30 a.m. the rain-fall, which had continued upto that time since the previous day, was recorded as 5.12 inches. There is nothing in the' judgment of the learned Magistrate to indicate that he doubted the above evidence led on behalf of the defence. The learned Magistrate recorded the view that though the applicant had got rid of title in regard to 201 bags he had not got rid of the grain itself, which continued to be in his possession till the time of the search and the seizure on the morning of the 26th of September, 1964. 4. In order to appreciate the relevance of the defence evidence referred to above, reference may now be made to the proviso in corroborated in Clause 3-B of the Order. The proviso to sub-clause (b) of Clause 3-B of the Order runs as follows : "Provided that if he receives any quantity of food grains exceeding one hundred quintals from any mandi other than the mandi in which he receives it, he may dispose of the quantity in excess of the maximum permitted under this para. within a week from such receipt." The purpose of the applicant in leading the evidence referred to above was to take the benefit of the above proviso. There was no controversy that if the 201 bags referred to above were excluded from consideration the weight of the remaining quantity of foodgrains recovered from the possession of the applicant was not in excess of one hundred quintals. There was no controversy that if the 201 bags referred to above were excluded from consideration the weight of the remaining quantity of foodgrains recovered from the possession of the applicant was not in excess of one hundred quintals. The shop of the applicant from which the recovery was effected was situate in Agra, whereas these 201 bags consisted of part of foodgrains received by the applicant's shop at Agra from Kanpur, which obviously was a mandi other than the mandi in which the applicant received it. The requirements of the earlier part of the proviso quoted above therefore stood satisfied. The contention of the prosecution, however, was that the applicant having been found in possession of those 201 bags, even though the period of one week contemplated by the proviso had expired on the mid-night between the 25th and 26th of September, 1964, contravention of the restriction placed by Clause 3-B of the Order had taken place, whereas the contention on behalf of the applicant was that his inability to 'dispose of' these 201 bags was the result of circumstances beyond his control, inasmuch as he had already sold off the above quantity to Ashoka Dal Mill which, in normal circumstances, would have removed it on the 25th of September, 1964, but could not do so on account of incessant heavy rain on the 25th of September, 1964. The learned Magistrate addressed himself to the meaning to be assigned to the expression 'disposed of' and relying on certain observations made by this Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deo Dutt Lakhan Lail, 1965 A.L.J. 862 took the view that the mere fact of the applicant having been found in possession of the excess quantity was sufficient to bring about contravention of the restriction imposed by Clause 3-B of the Order. The reliance placed by the learned Magistrate on observations contained in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deo Dutt Lakhan Lail appears to be manifestly misplaced. Learned counsel for the State has very fairly confessed his inability to point out how, in view of the controversy which came up for decision before this Court in the above case, the observations made by this Court in that case had any relevance to the facts of the present case. Learned counsel for the State has very fairly confessed his inability to point out how, in view of the controversy which came up for decision before this Court in the above case, the observations made by this Court in that case had any relevance to the facts of the present case. The question which, therefore, requires consideration, is as to whether, in the above circumstances, the fact that the applicant was found in possession of an excess quantity was by itself sufficient to bring about contravention of the restriction contained in Clause 3-B of the Order. 5. The expression 'disposed of' appears to be somewhat wide in its connotation. In the Dictionary sense of the term, articles or goods may be disposed of by sale, by gift, by destruction or may be in some other ways also, which need not be detailed. This much, however, appears to be clear that the expression 'disposed of' must include disposing of by sale. It may very well be that what the legislature intended by using the expression 'disposed of' was that in a case of sale, the dealer must follow it up by parting with possession also within a period of one week. Without intending to express any final opinion on this, question I proceed to decide this case on the footing that the dealer in this case was bound to have parted with possession of 201 bags also by mid-night between the 25th and 26th of September, 1964. Even so, keeping in view the circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that the offence of contravention of Clause 3-B of the Order cannot be held to have taken place. I cannot conceive of any principle of criminal law by which a person may be convicted for non-performance of an act which is impossible of performance in the particular circumstances of that case. In the situation brought about by heavy incessant rains on the 25th of September 1964, the only manner in which the applicant could possibly have, nevertheless, disposed of the 201 bags of gram referred to above, was to throw those bags with their contents to the drains. I find it impossible to construe the intention of the legislature to have been to destroy foodgrains, when the expressed intention in passing the various Foodgrains Orders was to regulate awl control movements, sale etc. I find it impossible to construe the intention of the legislature to have been to destroy foodgrains, when the expressed intention in passing the various Foodgrains Orders was to regulate awl control movements, sale etc. of foodgrains in order to bring about equitable distribution, and not destruction. It is settled that mens rea forms an essential part of conduct punishable as an offence under the penal law of the land. Ia the circumstances of this case it must be held that mens rea was completely absent and, in my opinion, no contravention of the limitation imposed by Clause 3-B+ of the Order can be held to have taken place. 6. Before parting with this judgment I would like, briefly, to refer to certain observations made by the appellate court in the course of its judgment dismissing the appeal. Referring to the evidence led on behalf of the defence, the learned judge observed that the trial court had rightly held that "such formal sales" were not contemplated by Clause 3-B of the Order. At the end of the paragraph where the learned judge wrote the above expression he concluded by observing as follows : "The purpose of the law is that the property must keep moving and must not be allowed to remain at one place." In the course of his judgment the learned judge has ignored to consider the situation arising from the fact of the incessant rains referred to above and I fail to appreciate what, according to the learned judge, the applicant could or should have done to keep the foodgrains in stock moving instead of allowing it to remain in the stock room, notwithstanding the fact that incessant heavy rain appears to have made it impossible to remove the foodgrains in question without substantially destroying its value. As regards the learned judge's observation in one part of his judgment, that in his opinion the alleged sale of 201 bags to Ashoka Dal Mill was doubtful, I am constrained to say that the said observation was made in a superficial manner without considering, much less discussing, the evidence led on behalf of the defence in regard to which the trial court had made no adverse comments at all. For all these reasons I am of opinion that this revision must be allowed. 7. For all these reasons I am of opinion that this revision must be allowed. 7. Accordingly I allow this revision, set aside the conviction of the applicant and acquit him of the charge on which he was tried. The sentence of fine is also set aside. Fine, if realised, must be refunded to the applicant.