This order will dispose of Civil Misc. petitions Nos. 82, 87, 88, and 92 to 94 filed by the Union of India under Arti­cle 133 of the Constitution since the points involved for decision in all of them are ex­actly identical and the Civil revision petitions to which they pertain were disposed of by a common judgment dated 23rd of December, 1967, by the then Judicial Commissioner Shri Jagannadhacharyulu. The dispute between the parties centred round the interpretation of an arbitration clause contained in the va­rious contracts of construction entered into by the Union of India with the respondents. That arbitration clause provided, in four out of the six cases we are to deal with, that if and when disputes of the nature mentioned therein arose between the parties they shall be referred to the arbitration of the Chief Engineer/Additional Chief Engineer, Central P. W. D., while in the other two cases such disputes were to be referred to the arbitra­tion of Additional Chief Engineer, Central P. W. D. The respondents herein, after the disputes arose between the parties, moved six independent applications under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act in the Court of Sub­ordinate Judge, Tripura, praying for appoint­ment of an arbitrator in each case of its own choice since the arbitration clause contained in the contracts was vague in the matter of choosing the arbitrator. The vagueness plead­ed qua the four contracts was that no method was provided to choose either the Chief Engineer or the Additional Chief Engineer to work as arbitrator, and respecting the other two contracts it was urged that there are large number of Additional Chief Engi­neers of the Central P. W. D. and so in the absence of any determining factor in the con­tracts it is not possible to say whom to ap­point as an arbitrator. The Subordinate Judge did not accept the contention that the arbitration clause was vague in any manner and so it gave the choice to the parties either to accept the Chief Engineer of the Central P. W. D. as the arbitrator or the Additional Chief Engineer, Zone II, of the Central P. W. D. Having felt aggrieved with the order of the Subordinate Judge, the respon­dents filed six revision petitions in this Courts My learned predecessor Shri Jagannadha­charyulu accepted the revision petitions on holding that the arbitration clause was clearly vague and so it was the function of the Court to name an arbitrator in each case. He con­sequently appointed Shri G. N. Dutta a (re­tired Chief Engineer) of Gauhati as the sole arbitrator in all the six cases. It is against that order that the Union of India has moved the instant six applications seeking certificates authorising it to file appeals in the Supreme Court. 2. Shri H. C. Nath, the learned Govern­ment Advocate, raised two points to support the contention that a good case has been made out for issuing certificate under cl. (c) of Article 133 (1) of the Constitution. Accord­ing to that clause, an aggrieved party can file an appeal in the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil pro­ceeding of a High Court in the Territory of India if the High Court certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. In the first place, Shri H. C. Nath submitted that the view taken by Shri Jagannadhacharyulu is directly opposed to the opinion expressed by Shri Tirumalpad, another Judicial Commissioner of this Court, in the case of R. D. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1964 Tripura 27. That case, it will be noted, was also between the parties which are arrayed against each other in the present petitions. Shri H. C. Nath emphasised that in view of conflict between two judgments of this Court it is necessary that the matter should go to the Supreme Court for autho­ritative pronouncement to avoid embarrass­ment to the Subordinate Courts. That case, it will be noted, was also between the parties which are arrayed against each other in the present petitions. Shri H. C. Nath emphasised that in view of conflict between two judgments of this Court it is necessary that the matter should go to the Supreme Court for autho­ritative pronouncement to avoid embarrass­ment to the Subordinate Courts. He stated further that arbitration clause of the nature at anvil is incorporated in a large number at contracts made between the Union of India and the Government contractors working in this Territory and so it is necessary that the legal question involved should be decided by the highest Court in the realm. There is no difference between the parties on the points. I may mention, that Shri Tirumalpad happened to interpret an arbitration clause which is exactly identical with that which came up for interpretation be­fore Shri Jagannadhacharyulu, and that the views expressed by the two Judicial Com­missioners are diametrically opposed to each other and are so wholly irreconcilable. Since, indisputably, such arbitration clause finds mention in a large number of contracts enter­ed into between the Union of India and Government contractors, it is fit and pro­per that the matter should be authoritatively decided. It is in order to point out that in two cases, decided by the Punjab High Court and reported in AIR 1955 Punj 172, Union of India v. New India Constructors, and AIR 1956 Punj 205, Delhi and Finance Housing and Construction Ltd. v. Brij Mohan Shah, an identical arbitration clause was incorpo­rated in the contracts out of which the dis­putes arose, and that in the first mentioned case the parties did not challenge the vali­dity of the clause on the ground of its being vague, while in the second case the clause |was declared to be vague and the arbitration agreement was held not binding on the par­ties, being void. In face of this conflict of authorities, I agree with Shri H. C. Nath that the present case is a fit case for going in appeal to the Supreme Court. The point in controversy is clearly of great public im­portance. 3. The second point urged by Shri H. C. Nath was that the previous decision by Shri Tirumalpad operates as res judicata between the parties. The point in controversy is clearly of great public im­portance. 3. The second point urged by Shri H. C. Nath was that the previous decision by Shri Tirumalpad operates as res judicata between the parties. He submitted further that the present respondent had moved the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution for special leave to appeal against the-judg­ment of Shri Tirumalpad but that prayer was rejected. Shri R. D. Gupta, the res­pondent herein and who argued the case per­sonally in this Court, admitted at the bar that he had gone to the Supreme Court against the judgment of Shri Tirumalpad seeking special leave to appeal but his prayer was not allowed. Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, it will be noticed, contem­plates the bar of res judicata not only res­pecting the suit as a whole but also con­cerning an issue decided in a suit, and it is well settled that an issue of law can also be barred by the principles of res judicata. Hence, the second point urged by Shri H. C. Nath is also quite substantial and weighty. 4. A legal question of far-reaching con­sequences that appears to have escaped at­tention so far, on all hands, is that if the arbitration agreement is vague, as contended by the respondent and as held by Shri Jagan-nadhacharyulu, then that agreement in terms of Section 29 of the Contract Act would be void. That section provides in unambiguous language that agreements, the meaning of which is not certain, or capable of being made certain, are void. The Punjab High Court held in the case of Delhi and Finance Housing and Construc­tion Ltd., AIR 1956 Punj 205 (supra) that the arbitration agreement of the nature in­volved in the present cases is vague because of uncertainty and as such void and not bind­ing on the parties. It is on that finding that the High Court dismissed the application made by the defendant under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act for stay of the suit filed against it (the defendant). In support of that conclusion, the Punjab High Court placed reliance on the cases of Ganpatrai Gupta v. Moody Bros. Ltd., (1950) 85 Cal LJ 136, and Luxmi Chand v. Kishanlal, AIR 1955 Cal 588 . In support of that conclusion, the Punjab High Court placed reliance on the cases of Ganpatrai Gupta v. Moody Bros. Ltd., (1950) 85 Cal LJ 136, and Luxmi Chand v. Kishanlal, AIR 1955 Cal 588 . In each of these two cases the arbi­tration agreement was found to be vague and uncertain and the arbitration clause in consequence was declared to be invalid. If, therefore, the arbitration agreement conclud­ed between the parties before this Court is actually vague and uncertain respecting the choice of the arbitrator, then nothing out of it survives to be binding on the parties. In that event, the order of this Court appoint­ing Shri G. N. Dutta as the sole arbitrator would become unsustainable, and the res­pondent shall be left with no alternative but to file a regular suit for appropriate relief in the Civil Court having jurisdiction in the matter. 5. Shri R. D. Gupta raised two objections against the maintainability of the petitions filed by the Union of India. In the first in­stance, he urged that Shri G. N. Dutta, the sole arbitrator, having died during the pen­dency of the present petitions, the petitions have become infructuous. To reinforce that contention, he relied on the authority of AIR 1955 Cal 257 , Union of India v. Nalini Ranjan. That case is clearly distinguishable on facts. Bachawat, J., of the Calcutta High Court had by an order appointed an arbitra­tor between the parties in an application made under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, and the Union of India petitioned the High Court for certificate of fitness of appeal to the Supreme Court against that order. It transpired, when that application came up for hearing, that the arbitrator appointed by Bachawat, J., had died in the meantime. A Division Bench of the High Court held that the petition for leave to appeal was not maintainable in view of clause (d) of Arti­cle 133 (1) of the Constitution which provides that no appeal shall, unless Parliament by law otherwise provides, lie to the Supreme Court from the judgment, decree or final order of one Judge of a High Court. Das Gupta, J., one of the fudges constitut­ing the Division Bench, observed in addition that as a result of the death of the arbitrator the parties are relegated to the same position which prevailed when the application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act was made and that the order appointing the arbitrator had consequently become infructuous. Ob­viously, there the dispute did not relate to the exact scope of the arbitration agreement but the difference between the parties cen­tered round the point as to who should be appointed an arbitrator. As against that, the dispute that arises for determination in the cases in hand is more deeper. It is whether one of the officers mentioned in the arbitra­tion clause is to work as an arbitrator, or that clause is void because of vagueness and some arbitrator other than those officers has to be named by the Court. Therefore, with the death of Shri G. N. Dutta the parties are not relegated to their original position. Un­like the Calcutta case, the dispute between the parties is not about naming the arbitrator but the manner in which he should be named, apart from two other serious con­tentions which require determination, name­ly (1) whether the dispute is barred by res judicata, and (2) whether the arbitration agreement would survive if it is really vague as contended by the respondent in each of the six cases. Consequently, I reject the first objection raised by Shri R. D. Gupta. 6. The second point urged by Shri R. D. Gupta was that the order dated 23rd of December, 1967, of this Court is neither a judgment nor a decree nor a final order with­in the meaning of Article 133 (1) of the Constitution, and as such the certificate claimed by the Union of India cannot be issued. He cited the cases of Nalini Ranjan, AIR 1955 Cal 257 (supra) and Mohmood Hasan v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 All 457 (FB), to support that conten­tion. The Allahabad High Court outlined the conditions which must be satisfied be­fore an order can be described as a final order within the meaning of Article 133 (1). He cited the cases of Nalini Ranjan, AIR 1955 Cal 257 (supra) and Mohmood Hasan v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 All 457 (FB), to support that conten­tion. The Allahabad High Court outlined the conditions which must be satisfied be­fore an order can be described as a final order within the meaning of Article 133 (1). Those conditions are, (1) that the order should not be an interlocutory order, (2) that even though it is an order which disposes of the proceeding before a Court finally, it should not be an order which leaves the ori­ginal proceeding in the Court below alive, and (3) that there should be a final deter­mination of the rights of the parties or the order must of its own force dispose of the rights of the parties. I think all these three conditions are satisfied in the present case. Without doubt, the .impugned order is not an interlocutory order. Further, that order finally disposes of the case filed before the Subordinate Judge. And, lastly, the rights o£ the parties which were debated firstly before the trial Court and then before this Court were finally determined. Shri R. D. Gupta argued that since only the question of ap­pointment of an arbitrator has been decided between the parties and not the main dispute arising from the execution of the contract which the arbitrator is yet to determine, it cannot be urged by the Union of India that the disputes between the parties have been finally determined. I regret I cannot accept that contention as valid. The final order contemplated by Arti­cle 133 (1) is an order which finally deter­mines the dispute thrown up by the civil pro­ceeding filed in the Court and not the dispute which will arise out of a civil proceeding which may be filed in the Court in future. In the applications moved by the respon­dent in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Agartala, the only matter in controversy was whether the arbitrator had to be ap­pointed in terms of the arbitration clause or whether that clause was vague in the matter of selection of the arbitrator and so it was for the Court to name as arbitrator. That dispute between the parties was finally determined by this Court by its order dated 23rd of December, 1967. That dispute between the parties was finally determined by this Court by its order dated 23rd of December, 1967. Therefore, that order, in my opinion, is a final order within I the meaning of Article 133 (1). 7. The Calcutta authority is also of no help to Shri R. D. Gupta. There it was held, in a case filed under Section 8 of the Arbi­tration Act, that an order appointing an arbi­trator decides no question of right between the parties and as such it is not a final order appealable under Article 133. As stated ear­lier, the dispute had arisen between the par­ties in that case because they could not agree on an individual to work as an arbitrator and so the Court had been approached under Section 8 of the Act to appoint an arbitrator. However, in our case the dispute is of an al­together different nature. It relates to the exact scope of arbitration agreement entered into between the parties. The respondent, I may appropriately mention, had moved the applications under Section 20 of the Arbitra­tion Act. Such an application had to be and was registered as a suit, and that suit, it is obvious, has been finally disposed of by this Court's order. A final order, in the sense that expression is used in Article 133 (1), is an order which finally determines the points in dispute in the civil proceeding and brings it to an end. This test is fully satisfied respect­ing the order in dispute. Hence, I repel the second submission made by Shri R. D. Gupta as well. 8. The last point urged by Shri R. D. Gupta, though in a luke-warm manner, was that the dispute between the parties is not respecting a civil proceeding. The expres­sion "civil proceeding" used in Article 133 (1) is wide enough to cover any proceeding of a civil nature decided by the High Court, whether in its original, appellate or revisional jurisdiction. Further, if the proceeding in­volves the assertion or enforcement of a civil right, it is a civil proceeding. Judged by those tests, I feel no difficulty in holding that the impugned order was made in a civil proceeding. 9. As a result, I accept all the six peti­tions and direct that a certificate do issue in each one of them under clause (c) of Arti­cle 133 (1) of the Constitution. Judged by those tests, I feel no difficulty in holding that the impugned order was made in a civil proceeding. 9. As a result, I accept all the six peti­tions and direct that a certificate do issue in each one of them under clause (c) of Arti­cle 133 (1) of the Constitution. However, I make no order as to costs of these petitions. Certificates issued.