CHANDRASHEKHAR, J. ( 1 ) IN these petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the constitutionality of the provisions of the mysore Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1965, (Mysore Act 14 of 1965) (hereinafter referred to as the First Amendment Act) and of the mysore Land Reforms (Second Amendment) Act, 1967, (Mysore Act 11 of 1968) (hereinafter referred to as the Second Amendment Act), has been challenged. ( 2 ) THE petitioners are landlords in the Bombay Area of the new State of Mysore. They had filed statements under Sec. 14 of the Mysore Land reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) indicating the extents of lands which they intended to resume for cultivating personally. In W. Ps. Nos. 699, 703, 706 and 1049 of 1969, the appeals from the decisions of the Land Tribunals are pending before the Appellate Authorities. In WPs. Nos. 762, 777, 866, 922 and 1159 of 1969 the Appellate Authority has cancelled certificates issued by the Land Tribunals under Sec. 14 of the Act in favour of the landlords, and has remanded the cases to the respective land Tribunals for fresh disposal according to law. In rest of the petitions, the claims of the landlords for resumption of lands from their tenants, are pending before the Land Tribunals. ( 3 ) IN all these petitions we have been asked to declare as void the Second amendment Act while in most of these petitions we have been asked to declare as void the First Amendment Act also. In W. Ps. Nos. 762, 777 866, 922 and 1159 of 1969 the petitioners have, in addition, prayed for quashing the orders of the Appellate Authority and to restore the orders of the Land tribunals. In the rest of the petitions the petitioners have, in addition, asked us to direct the Land Tribunals or the Appellate Authorities, as the case may be, not to apply the provisions of sub-sec. (10-B) of Sec. 16 of the Act in determining the extents of lands the petitioners are permitted to resume. ( 4 ) THE Act was enacted by the Mysore State Legislature and has-received the assent of the President. The object of the Act, as stated in its preamble, is to bring a uniform law in the State of Mysore relating to agrarian relations, conferment of ownership on tenants, ceiling on land holdings and certain other matters. ( 4 ) THE Act was enacted by the Mysore State Legislature and has-received the assent of the President. The object of the Act, as stated in its preamble, is to bring a uniform law in the State of Mysore relating to agrarian relations, conferment of ownership on tenants, ceiling on land holdings and certain other matters. ( 5 ) THE Act as originally enacted (hereinafter referred to as the Principal act) was included in Sch. IX to the Constitution. Under Art. 31-B of the constitution the Principal Act and its provisions are immune from attack on the ground of their taking away or abridging any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under any of the Articles in Part-Ill of the Constitution. Even before the Principal Act came into force, it was amended by the first Amendment Act. The Principal Act as amended by the First amendment Act, came into force on 2-10-1965. Sec. 14 of the Act enables a landlord to resume the lands owned by him and in the possession of his tenants, if he bonafide requires the lands for cultivating personally. Sec. 16 of the Act contains conditions restricting resumption of lands under Sec. 14 of the Act. Sub-sec. (10-B) which was inserted in Sec. 16 of the Principal Act by the First Amendment Act, provides that notwithstanding the repeal of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the B. T. and A. L. Act), as in force in the Bombay Area of the new State of Mysore, the extent of land resumable by any landlord in the Bombay Area shall be subject to restrictions and conditions specified in the B. T. and A. L. Act as in force in the Bombay Area on 1-11-1956. Likewise sub-sec. (10-C) which was inserted in Sec. 16 of the principal Act by the First Amendment Act, provides that notwithstanding the repeal of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, as in force in the Hyderabad Area of the new State of Mysore, the extent of land resumable by any landlord in the Hyderabad Area, shall be subject to the restrictions and conditions specified in that Act as in force in the Hyderabad area on 1-11-1956. ( 6 ) SECTION 2 of the Second Amendment Act, which came into force on 28-3-1968, amended sub-sec. ( 6 ) SECTION 2 of the Second Amendment Act, which came into force on 28-3-1968, amended sub-sec. (10-B) of Sec. 16 of the Act by substituting the words "in sections 31-A, 31-B and 31-C of the Bombay Tenancy and agricultural Lands Act, 1948, as inserted by the Bombay Tenancy and agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1955 (Bombay Act 18 of 1956) notwithstanding the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy (Suspension of provisions and Amendment) Act, 1957 (Mysore Act 13 of 1957)" for the words " in the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, as in force in the Bombay Area on the 1st November 1956". The Amendment of sub-sec. (10-B) was made retrospective as if that sub-section always stood as amended. Sec. 5 of the Second Amendment Act provides that any certificate issued by a Land Tribunal or a Munsiff prior to coming into force of this act, in respect of any statement filed under Sec. 14 of the Act, without regard to the provisions of Ss. 31-A, 31-B and 31-C of the BT. and AL. Act, on the ground that those sections were not in force on 1-11-1956, shall not have effect. Sec. 5 of the Second Amendment Act further provides that such statements (filed under Sec. 14 of the Act) shall be deemed to be pending and shall be disposed of by such Tribunal or Munsiff in accordance with the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by this (the Second amendment) Act, that is, having regard to the provisions of Secs. 31-A, 31-B and 31-C of the B. T. and A. L. Act, also. ( 7 ) IT was contended by Mr. S. K. Venkatranga lyengar, learned Counsel for the petitioners in most of the petitions (whose arguments were adopted by learned Counsel for other petitioners), that sub-sec. (10-B) of Sec. 16 of the Act, both as it stood before it was amended by the Second amendment Act and as it stands after such amendment, is void as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution because it brings about discrimination between landlords in the Bombay Area and the landlords in areas other than the Bombay Area and the Hyderabad Area of the new State of Mysore. Elucidating this contention, Mr. Venkataranga lyengar argued that by the operation of sub-sec. Elucidating this contention, Mr. Venkataranga lyengar argued that by the operation of sub-sec. (10-B), the extent of land which a landlord can resume under Sec. 14 of the Act is subject to a lower ceiling in the bombay Area than the corresponding ceiling in the other areas of the state (excluding the Hyderabad Area), and such fixation of a lower ceiling for resumption in the Bombay Area, constitutes hostile discrimination against the landlords in the Bombay Area. It was also argued by Mr. Venkataranga lyengar that once the Principal Act brought a new and uniform legislation for the entire State, it was not permissible to enact a provision to treat different areas of the new State differently and that sub-sec. (10-B) which seeks to treat landlords in the Bombay Area differently from the landlords in the other areas, clearly offends Art. 14 of the Constitution. In order to appreciate the contention of Mr. Venkataranga lyengar, it is necessary to set out certain provisions of the Act and of the B. T. and a. L. Act. Sec. 14 of the Act provides, inter alia, that if a landlord bonafide requires land for cultivating personally or for any non-agricultural purpose, he may file with tha Land Tribunal a statement indicating the land or lands owned by him and which he intends to resume and such other particulars as may be prescribed. On such statement being filed the Tribunal shall, after hearing the landlord and such of his tenants and other persons as may be affected and having due regard to the contiguity, fertility and fair distribution of lands, determine the land or lands which the laggard, shall be entitled to resume and shall issue a certificate to the land- lord to the effect that land or lands specified in such certificate has been reserved for resumption. ( 8 ) SECTION 16 of the Act sets out conditions restricting resumption of land under Sec. 14. Among the conditions restricting resumption, there is a condition that the land resumed from all the tenants holding under the landlord together with the extent of land, if any, cultivated by the landlord personally and any non-resumable land held by him, shall not exceed three family holdings. 'family Holding' has been denned in Sec. 2 (13) of the Act as the land which is equal to six standard acres. 'standard Acre' has been denned in sec. 'family Holding' has been denned in Sec. 2 (13) of the Act as the land which is equal to six standard acres. 'standard Acre' has been denned in sec. 2 (32) of the Act as one acre of first class land or an extent equivalent thereto consisting of one or more classes of land specified in Part-A of Schedule-1 determined in accordance with the formula in Part-B of the said Schedule. In that formula one aere of first class land is equated, inter alia, with 8 acres of 7th (last) class of land. ( 9 ) THE Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1955 (Bombay Act 13 of 1956) inserted, inter alia, Ss. 31-A 31-B and 31-C in the parent Act, namely, in the B. T. and A. L. Act of 1948. Sec. 31 of the B. T. and A. L. Act provides for a landlord terminating the tenancy of any tenant (except a permanent tenancy), if the landlord bonafide requires the land for cultivating personally or for any non-agricultural purpose. Ss. 31-A to 31-C of the B. T. and A. L. Act set out the conditions restricting the right of the landlord to terminate the tenancy under sec. 31 of the B. T. and A. L. Act. Sec. 31-A provides, inter alia, that the total extent of land taken possession of by a landlord from his tenants together with the land cultivated by him personally, shall not exceed the ceiling area. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 5 of the B. T. and A. L. Act defines 'ceiling area' for the purpose of that Act as: (a) 48 acres of jirayat land; or (b) 24 acres of seasonaly irrigated land or paddy or rice land; or (c) 12 acres of perennially irrigated land. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 5 provides that where the land held by a person consists of two or more kinds of lands specified in sub-section (1), the ceiling area in such holdings shall be determined on the basis of one acre of perennially irrigated land being equal to two acres of seasonably irrigated land or paddy or rice land, or 4 acres of jirayat land. ( 10 ) THUS under the B. T. and A. L. Act the extent of land that can be resumed by a landlord from his tenants together with the extent of land already cultivated by him personally, is subject to a ceiling of 48 acres of jirayat land, or 24 acres of seasonaly irrigated land, or 12 acres of perennially irrigated land, while the corresponding ceiling under Sec. 16 of the Principal Act is 18 acres of first class land or 144 acres of seventh (last) class land. Thus for all classes of lands ceiling the area under the B. T. and a. L. Act is substantially lower than that under Sec. 16 of the Principal act. ( 11 ) ON the formation of the new State of Mysore, the B. T. and A. L. Act as amended by Bombay Act XIII of 1956, which was in force immediately before 1-11-1956 in the former State of Bombay, continued to be in force in the Bombay Area of the new State of Mysore under Sec. 119 of the states Re-organisation Act, 1956. ( 12 ) THE new State of Mysore promulgated the Bombay Tenancy (Suspension of provisions and Amendment) Ordinance, 1957, and later the Ordinance was replaced by the Bombay Tenancy (Suspension of Provisions and Amendment) Act, 1957, (Mysore Act 13 of 1957 ). Sec. 5 of this Act provided, inter alia, that the provisions of Ss. 31-A to 31-C of the B. T. and a. L. Act shall not have effect during the period of suspension i. e. , from 2-8-1956 till 31-12-1957. By subsequent amedments to this Act the period of suspension was extended from time to time till the B. T. and A. L. Act was repealed by Sec. 142 of the Act (The Mysore Land Reforms Act) which came into force on 2-10-1965. ( 13 ) AS stated earlier, sub-sec. (10-B) of Sec. 16 of the Act, as it stood before it was amended by the Second Amendment Act, provided that notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (1) to (10) or Sec. 142, the extent of land, if any, resumable by any landlord in the Bombay Area, shall be subject to the restrictions and conditions specified in B. T. and A. L. Act as in force in the Bombay Area on 1-11-1956. By Sec. 2 of the Second amendment Act, the reference to the entire B. T. and A. L. Act has been substituted retrospectively by the reference to specific sections namely, ss. 31-A, 31-B and 31-C of the B. T. and A. L. Act and it is added that the suspension of the operation of these sections by Mysore Act 13 of 1957 shall have no effect in construing the reference to these sections in this subsection. In sub-sec. (10-B) of S. 16 of the Act S. 5 of the BT. and AL. Act has not been specially referred to. Nevertheless, while construing S. 31a of bt. and AL. Act in sub-sec. (10b), the words 'ceiling area' occurring in s. 31a must have, in our opinion, the meaning assigned to it in S. 5 of the bt. and AL. Act in sub-sec. (10-B), the words 'ceiling area' occurring in tained. . . . . . . . S. 142", occurring in sub-sec. (10b) means notwithstanding the repeal of the BT. and AL. Act. Thus the repeal of the BT. and AL. Act, including S. 5 of that Act has no effect in construing S. 31-A that Act to which a reference has been made in sub-sec. (10-B) of S. 16 of the Act and for the purpose of that sub-section, the term, 'ceiling area', in S. 31-A will have the meaning as defined in S. 5 of the BT. and AL. Act as if that Act had not been repealed. ( 14 ) WHATEVER might have been the legal position before sub-sec. (10b) of s. 16 was amended by the Second Amendment Act, after such amendment the restrictions contained in Ss. 31a to 31c of the BT. and AL. Act, including the ceiling area as defined in S. 5 of the BT. and AL. Act are applicable in regard to the extent of land resumable by a landlord in the Bombay Area under S. 14 of the Act. ( 15 ) WE think Mr. Venkataranga lyengar is right in his apprehension that the effect of sub-sec. (10b) of S. 16 of the Act is to treat the landlords in the Bombay Area differently from the landlords in other areas of the state, in regard to the extent of land resumable by them and that a lower ceiling limit is fixed for such resumption of lands by landlords in the bombay Area. (10b) of S. 16 of the Act is to treat the landlords in the Bombay Area differently from the landlords in other areas of the state, in regard to the extent of land resumable by them and that a lower ceiling limit is fixed for such resumption of lands by landlords in the bombay Area. The learned Advocate-General who appeared for the state, also did not dispute this position. In fact, in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State, the stand taken by the State, is that the intention of the Legislature in introducing sub-sec. (10b) was that so far as the bombay Area is concerned, the resumption should be governed by the provisions of the bt. and AL. Act as in force in the Bombay Area on 1-11-1956. ( 16 ) THE learned Advocate-General contended that neither the First amendment Act nor the Second Amendment Act can be assailed on the ground of any violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution as both the Amendment acts which received the assent of the President, are protected by art. 31a of the Constitution from any such attack. ( 17 ) IT was also urged by the learned Advocate-General that the question of constitutionality of the First Amendment Act is no longer res Integra in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in W. P. Nos. 202 and 206 of 1966 which were decided by a common judgment along with Golak nath v. State of Punjab, AIR. 1967 SC. 1643. As stated at page 1651, W. P. No's. 202 and 206 of 1966 were filed by different petitioners under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a declaration that the Mysore Land Reforms Act (Act 10 of 1962) as amended by Act 14 of 1965, which fixed ceilings on land holdings and conferred ownership of surplus lands on tenants, infringed Arts. 14, 19 ad 31 of the Constitution and, therefore, was unconstitutional and void. Subba Rao, C. J. , who delivered the leading judgment of the majority, said at pages 1669 and 1670 that as the Constitution (Seventeenth Amdt.) holds the field, the validity of the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1962, as amended by Act XIV of 1965 cannot be questioned on the ground that it; offends Arts. 13, 14, or 31 of the Constitution. 13, 14, or 31 of the Constitution. ( 18 ) HIDAYATULLAH, J. , (as he then was) in bis separate judgment concurring with the majority view, said at page 1718 that the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1962, as amended by Act XIV of 1965, is valid under the Constitution not because it is included in Schedule IX to the Constitution but because it is protected by Art. 31-A and the President's assent. Following the decision of the Supreme Court, a Bench of this Court consisting of Govinda Bhat and Sadanandaswamy, JJ. dismissed a batch of writ Petitions (W. P. Nos. 2069 and 2543 of 1965; 127, 289, 758, 759, 614 to 616 and 621 of 1966) in which the Principal Act as amended by the First amendment Act, was challenged as unconstitutional on the ground that its provisions contravene the fundamental rights guaranteed under arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. ( 19 ) HENCE, it is no longer open to the petitioners to assail the constitutionality of sub-sec. (10b) of S. 16 as it stood before it was amended by the Second Amendment Act. We shall now consider whether the Second Amendment Act is likewise protected by art. 31a of the Constitution from any attack on the ground of its infringing Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. To ascertain the true purpose of the Second Amendment Act, it is useful to refer to the legislative history and to consider what was the state of law before the making of this Act, and what was the defect in the preexisting law which is sought to be remedied by this Act. ( 20 ) IN the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State, it is stated that the intention of the Legislature in introducing sub-sec. (10b) in S. 16 of the Act was that so far as the Bombay Area is concerned, the resumption of lands should be governed by the provisions of the BT. and AL. Act as in force in the Bombay Area on 1-11-1956; that some of the Land Tribunals established under the Act took the view that the provisions of the BT. and al. and AL. Act as in force in the Bombay Area on 1-11-1956; that some of the Land Tribunals established under the Act took the view that the provisions of the BT. and al. Act which were kept under suspension were not in force on 1-11-1556 and that therefore the restrictions and conditions contained in those provisions were not applicable for resumption of lands in the Bombay Area; and that sub-section (10-B) was, therefore, amended by the Second amendment Act to make the intention of the Legislature clearer and to avoid ambiguity in the matter. It is also contended in the counter- affidavit that no provision of the Act must be treated in isolation and that the Principal Act as well as the Amendment Acts are designed to extinguish or modify the rights in an estate and that they are protected by art. 31a of the Constitution. ( 21 ) WE think the purpose of Ss. 2 and 5 of the Second Amendment Act is the same as that of S. 14 of the First Amendment Act by which sub-secs. (10-B) and (10-C) were inserted in S. 16 of the Principal Act, and that of S. 16 of the Principal Act, namely, to regulate resumption of lands by landlords from tenants. Such regulation amounts to modification or extinguishment of the rights in agricultural lands which come within the definition of 'estate' in Art. 31-A of the Constitution. Ss. 2 and 5 of the Second Amendment Act seek to carry out the same object by making clear the intention of the Legislature and by removing any doubt as to the applicability of Ss. 31a, ~31b and 31c of the BT. and AL. Act inspite of these sections being temporarily under suspension. If S. 14 of the first Amendment Act comes within the protection of Art. 31a of the Constitution as held by the Supreme Court, we think, Ss. 2 and 5 of the Second amendment Act are equally protected by Art. 31a. ( 22 ) IN Sri Ram Ram Narain v. State of Bombay, AIR. 1950 SC. 459. , the Supreme Com. held that Ss. 31a to 31d of the BT. and AL. Act are protected by Art. 31a from attack against their constitutionality on the score of their having violated Arts. 14; 19 and 31 of the Constitution. It follows that sub-sec. 1950 SC. 459. , the Supreme Com. held that Ss. 31a to 31d of the BT. and AL. Act are protected by Art. 31a from attack against their constitutionality on the score of their having violated Arts. 14; 19 and 31 of the Constitution. It follows that sub-sec. (10b) of S. 16 of the Act as amended by the Second Amendment Act, which makes Ss. 31a to 31c of the BT. and AL. Act applicable for regulating the extent of land resumable in the Bombay Area, is likewise protected by art. 31a of the Constitution. ( 23 ) HOWEVER, it was urged by Mr. Venkataranga lyengar that any restriction on the extent of land resumable by a landlord, does not amount to modification or extinguishment of rights in an estate, in the context of any agrarian reforms, and that protection under Art. 31a does not extend to such restrictions as do not form part of any agrarian reforms. Mr. Venkataranga lyengar strongly relied on the majority decision of the Supreme court in Kochuni v. States of Madras and Kerala, AIR. 1960 sc. 1080. to support his contention that the protection under Art 31a does not extend to modification or extinguishment of rights in an estate which i9 not in the context of agrarian reforms. ( 24 ) WE are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Venkataranga lyengar that restrictions as to the extent of land a landlord can resume from his tenants, do not form part of agrarian reforms. As pointed out by Bhagavati, J. , who spoke for the Court in Sri Ram Ram Narain's case (2), while explaining the scope of the BT. and AL. (Amendment) Act, 1955, the ceiling limit placed on holding of land by a landlord or a tenant, is intended to prevent concentration of the means of production in the hands of a few persona and to see that land is widely distributed among the actual cultivators. In the absence of such ceiling limit, a large number of tenants who have been cultivating lands for many years, will be evicted from their holdings by landlords who want to resume the lands on the ground of personal cultivation and there will be concentration of lands In the hands of a comparatively small number of land-holders to the common detriment. The ceiling on landholding which is applicable to landlords as well as tenants is, in our opinion intended to effectuate agrarian reforms. Sub-sec. (10b) of S. 16 of the Act which regulates the inter-se rights between landlords and tenants in regard to resumption of lands, cannot be said to be outside the scope of agrarian reforms. ( 25 ) MOREOVER, in view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court that Ss. 31a to 31d of the BT. and AL. Act come within the protection of art. 31a, it is no longer open to the petitioners to contend that sub-sec. (10b) of S. 16 of the Act, which makes S. 31a to 31c of the BT and AL. Act applicable to resumption of lands in the Bombay Area, has no relation to agrarian reforms and is not protected by Art. 31a. However, Mr. Venkataranga Iyengar argued that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Sri Ram Ram Narain's case, AIR. 1959 SC. 459. has been modified by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in Kochuni v. States of Madras and Kerala, AIR. 1960 SC. 1080. , Vajravelu v. Special Deputy Collector, AIR. 1965 6c. 1017. and ramanlal v. State of Gujarat AIR. 1969 SC. 168. In particular, Mr. Venkataranga lyengar relied on the following observations of Subba Rao, J. , (as he then was) who spoke for the majority of the Bench in Kochuni's case (3) at p. 1087:"the broad contention that a law regulating inter se the rights of a proprietor in his estate and the junior members of his family is also covered by the phraseology used in clause (2) (b) (of Art. 31a) may appear to be plausible but that argument cannot be sustained if that clause is read along with the other provisions of Art 31a. . . . . . . . . . . . Art. 31a deprives citizens of their fundamental rights and such an article cannot be extended by interpretation to over-reach the object implicit in the article. " ( 26 ) IN Kochuni's case (3) the validity of the Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955, came up for consideration. The avowed object of that Act wag to declare particular sthanams to be Marumakka- thyam tarwads and the property pertaining to such sthanams as the property of the said tarwad. " ( 26 ) IN Kochuni's case (3) the validity of the Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955, came up for consideration. The avowed object of that Act wag to declare particular sthanams to be Marumakka- thyam tarwads and the property pertaining to such sthanams as the property of the said tarwad. That Act did not effectuate any agrarian reform and regulate the rights inter se between landlords and tenants. Hence it was held by the majority of the Bench that that Act was not covered by art. 31a of the Constitution. ( 27 ) THAT the above observations of his Lordship have no application to an enactment for agrarian reforms, has been made clear by the following further observations of his Lordship with reference to the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court in Sri Ram Ram Narain's case (2) and in Atmaram v. State of Punjab AIR. 1959 SC. 519. "this Court has, therefore, recognised that the amendments inserting art. 31a in the Constitution and subsequently amending it, were to facilitate agrarian reforms and in that case (in Atmaram v. State of Punjab AIR. 1959 SC. 519) it was held that the impugned act affected the rights of the landlords and tenants. Neither of the two decisions, (Sri Ram Ram Narain's case (2) and atmaram's case (6)), therefore, supports the contention that Art. 31a comprehends modification of the rights of an owner of land without reference to the law of land tenure. " ( 28 ) THE decision of the Supreme Court in Kochuni's case (3) has been explained in the later decision of the Supreme Court in Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab AIR. 1965 SC. 632. There, the constitutionality of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) (Second Amendment and Validation) Act, 1960, came up for consideration. Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) who spoke for the Court, said at page 638:"no doubt Kochuni' case (AIR. 1960 SC. 1080) considered a bare transfer of the rights of the sthanec to the tarwad without alteration of the tenure and without any pretence of agrarian reform, as not one contemplated by Art. 31a however liberally construed. Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) who spoke for the Court, said at page 638:"no doubt Kochuni' case (AIR. 1960 SC. 1080) considered a bare transfer of the rights of the sthanec to the tarwad without alteration of the tenure and without any pretence of agrarian reform, as not one contemplated by Art. 31a however liberally construed. But that was a special case and we cannot apply it to cases where the general scheme of legislation is definitely agrarian reform and under its provisions something ancillary thereto in the interests of rural economy, has to be undertaken to give full effect to the reforms. In our judgment the high Court was right in not applying the strict rule of Kochuni's case (3) to the facts here. " ( 29 ) IN Vajravelu v. Special Deputy Collector (4), the constitutional validity of the land Acquisition (Madras) Amendment Act, 1961, came up for consideration. What the Supreme Court said in that decision is that art. 31a would apply to a law made for acquisition by the State of any 'estate' or any right therein or for extinguishment or modification of such rights if such acquisition, extinguishment or modification is connected with agrarain reform. ( 30 ) IN Ramanlal v. State of Gujarat (5) the constitutional validity of s. 65 (1) of the BT. and AL. Act as amended by S. 35 of the Bombay Act 13 of 1956, came up for consideration. That sub-section empowered the government to take over the management of land which was not put to full and efficient use. The Supreme Court held that such taking over management cannot be said to be acquisition by the State or extinguishment of rights of the holder or modification of such rights within the meaning of art. 31a (1) (a ). ( 31 ) WE do not find it possible to accede to the contention of Mr. Venkata- ranga lyengar that the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Sri Ram ram Narain's case (2) as to the scope of Art. 31a, has been modified in any way by the later decisions of the Supreme Court in Kochuni's case (3), vajaravelu's case (4) and Ramanlal's case (5 ). ( 32 ) IT was next contended by Mr. Venkata- ranga lyengar that the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Sri Ram ram Narain's case (2) as to the scope of Art. 31a, has been modified in any way by the later decisions of the Supreme Court in Kochuni's case (3), vajaravelu's case (4) and Ramanlal's case (5 ). ( 32 ) IT was next contended by Mr. Venkataranga lyengar that most of the petitioners for whom he appeared, were holders of lands which were resumed by the government and regranted to them under the provisions of the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watans Abolition Act, 1950, that such lands do not come within the definition of 'estate' in Art. 31a of the Constitution, and hence the protection under that article is not available to sub-sec. (10b) of S. 16 of the Act as amended by the Second Amendment act, in respect of such lands. No such plea was put forward by any of the petitioners in their affidavits in support of their writ Petitions. This plea involves also investigation o'f facts. Hence it cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time during the course of the arguments when the State had no opportunity to meet those allegations of facts. ( 33 ) MOREOVER, the definition of 'estate' in sub-clause (a) of Clause (2) of art. 31a is so wide as to include any land held or let for the purpose of agriculture. It is not the case of any of the petitioners that the lands in question are not held or let for the purpose of agriculture. So long as any land is held or let for agriculture, such land is not taken out of the ambit of definition of 'estate' in Art. 31a, even if such land had been resumed by the Government and regranted to the erstwhile Kulkarni or Watandar under the provisions of the Bombay Paragana and Kulkarni Watans abolition Act, 1950. ( 34 ) MR. K. S. Savanur, learned Counsel for some of the petitioners, contended that the modification or extinguishment of rights in an estate, referred to in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Art. 31a, must be in an estate which is acquired by the State, and that as sub-sec. ( 34 ) MR. K. S. Savanur, learned Counsel for some of the petitioners, contended that the modification or extinguishment of rights in an estate, referred to in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Art. 31a, must be in an estate which is acquired by the State, and that as sub-sec. (10b) of S. 16 of the act does not provide for acquisition of lands the resumption of which is sought to be restricted by that sub-section, the modification or extinguishment of rights in such lands by that sub-section, does not come within the ambit of Art. 31a. ( 35 ) WE see no substance in this contention of Mr. Savanur. In sub-cl (a) of clause (1) of Art. 31a, the words, acquisition, modification and extinguishment, are used dis-junctively and not conjunctively. Either modification or extinguishment alone of any right in an estate, is sufficient to attract the operation of Art. 31a. It is not the requirement of sub-cl. (a) of clause (1) of Art. 31a that acquisition, modification and extinguishment should concurrently exist in order to attract Art. 31a. Once the State acquires any estate, or rights therein, such rights therein are taken away from the owner and there can be no question of any further modification or extinguishment of those rights. Our view finds support from the following observations of the Supreme Court in Ajit Singh v. State of punjab AIR. 1967 SC. 858, 859-60. :"it would be noticed that Art. 31a (1) (a) mentions four categories; first acquisition by the State of an estate; second, acquisition by the State of rights in an estate; third, the extinguishment of rights in an estate; fourthly the modification of rights in an estate. These four categories are mentioned separately and are different. . . . . . . . . . It seems to us that there is an essential difference between ' acquisition by the State' on the one hand and ' modification or extinguishment of rights' on the other, that in the first case the beneficiary is the State while in the latter case the beneficiary of the modification or the extinguishment is not the State. " ( 36 ) MR. Savanur next advanced an alternative contention which is inconsistent with his earlier contention. He argued that the restrictions and conditions imposed by sub-sec. " ( 36 ) MR. Savanur next advanced an alternative contention which is inconsistent with his earlier contention. He argued that the restrictions and conditions imposed by sub-sec. (10b) of S. 16 of the Act, as amended by the second Amendment Act, for resumption of a land by a landlord, has the effect of acquiring that land. Mr. Savanur referred to the second proviso to clause (1) of Art. 31 A, which states that it shall not be lawful for the state to acquire any portion of a land held by a person under his personal cultivation within the ceiling limit unless the law providing for such acquisition also provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value. It was contended by Mr. Savanur that as sub-sec. (10b) of S. 16, as amended by the Second Amendment Act, does not provide for payment of any compensation, that sub-section is void. ( 37 ) A similar contention was urged by Mr. Venkataranga lyengar also. This contention of Mr. Savanur and Mr. Venkataranga lyengar is also devoid of any substance. Sub-sec. (10b) of S. 16 of the Act merely regulates the rights inter-se between the landlord and the tenant and such regulation cannot amount to transfer of ownership in any land to the State nor does the State get under that Sub-section the right to possession of any land. Clause (2a) of Art. 31 of the Constitution dearly declares that where a law does not provide for any transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a Corporation owned or controlled by the state, it shall not be deemed to provide for compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it deprives any person of his property. Sub-see. (10b) of S. 16 of the Act does not provide for acquisition of any property by the State and the question of payment of compensation does not arise at all. Lastly, It was contended by Mr. Venkataranga lyengar that sub-sec. (10b) of S. 16 of the Act is in fraud of the powers of the State Legislature. Elucidating this contention, Mr. Venkataranga lyengar submitted that the preamble to the Act states that the object of the Act is to enact a uniform law in the State of Mysore and that sub-sec. Venkataranga lyengar that sub-sec. (10b) of S. 16 of the Act is in fraud of the powers of the State Legislature. Elucidating this contention, Mr. Venkataranga lyengar submitted that the preamble to the Act states that the object of the Act is to enact a uniform law in the State of Mysore and that sub-sec. (10b) far from bringing uniformity throughout the State, has actually brought about diverse laws in different Areas of the State. ( 38 ) THE expressions, 'fraud of the legislative powers ' and ' colourable legislation 'are used when the Legislature has purported to act within its limits of powers but has, in substance and reality, transgressed those limits, such transgression being veiled by what appears on proper examination to be a mere pretence or disguise. As stated by the Supreme Court in K. Kunhiraman v. State of Kerala AIR 1082 SC 723, the question whether a law is in fraud on the legislative powers or is a colourable legislation and as such void, does not depend on the motive or bonafides of the Legislature in passing that particular law but upon the competency of the Legislature to pass that law. ( 39 ) IT is not the case of Mr. Venkataranga lyengar that the State Legislature had no competency to enact the First Amendment Act which introduced sub-sec. (10b) in s. 16 of the Act or the Second Amendment Act which amended that sub-section. That the enacting portion of a statute is inconsistent with its preamble, does not make the enacting portion a fraud on the legislative power. It is well settled that the preamble of an act cannot control the meaning or scope of any section in that Act and that where there is conflict between the two the enacting portion should prevail. The mere fact that there may not be uniformity in some of the provisions as to the extent of land resumable by a landlord from a tenant, in different areas, would not justify the criticism that the Act is not a uniform law when the other provisions of the Act provide for uniform regulation of other matters covered by the Act. Even assuming that there is some inconsistency between the preamble to the Act and the result brought about by sub-sec. Even assuming that there is some inconsistency between the preamble to the Act and the result brought about by sub-sec. (10b) of S. 16 of the Act, the validity of that sub-section is in no way affected by such inconsistency and full effect has to be given to the clear meaning of that sub-section. ( 40 ) ALL the contentions of the petitioners fail and we dismiss these petitions. But in the circumstances of these petitions, we make no order as to costs. --- *** --- .