Judgment B.P.Sinha, J. 1. These two Criminal Revisions Nos. 1558 and 2051 of 1963 arise out of the same judgment and as such they have been heard together and they will be governed by this order. 2. Satyadeo Sah petitioner in Criminal Revision No. 1558 of 1968 has a fair price grain shop in village Shitalpore, Police-Station Manjhi in the district Saran. On 24-10-1965 a petition was filed before the Additional District Magistrate by some of the villagers alleging that in the previous night at about 10 p.m. a bullock cart with seven bags of imported wheat was apprehended near Lal Gachi, about a mile away from Shitalpur Bazar. The cart was being driven by one Sukhdeo Singh, the petitioner in Criminal Revision No. 2051 of 1968. Satyadeo Sah was also going along with the cart. When the villagers flashed their torch light towards the cart, both the petitioners fled away leaving the loaded cart. The Additional District Magistrate forwarded the above petition to the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Chapra Sadar with the following notes:- - "Immediate. S. D. O. Sadar. please take immediate action in this case and let me know". The Sub-Divisional Magistrate ordered the Sub-Inspector of Manjhi Police Station to seize the grains and institute a case. Accordingly a case was instituted and after completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was submitted against these two petitioners under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act for contravention of Clause 3 of the Imported Food Grains Order. Cognizance was taken and the petitioners were put on trial. The defence was that the petitioners were falsely implicated due to enmity. 3. The trial court found the prosecution story to be correct. It held that the two petitioners were in conscious possession of the imported wheat and they were not able to explain such possession. Accordingly the learned Magistrate found both the accused guilty of the offence charged with and sentenced Satyadeo Sah to undergo rigorous imprisonment for eight months and Sukhdeo Singh to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. The order was upheld on appeal. Hence these revisions have been filed. 4. The first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the whole trial is vitiated inasmuch as cognizance in this case was taken on a complaint by private person in contravention of the provisions of Sec.11 of the Essential Commodities Act. The order was upheld on appeal. Hence these revisions have been filed. 4. The first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the whole trial is vitiated inasmuch as cognizance in this case was taken on a complaint by private person in contravention of the provisions of Sec.11 of the Essential Commodities Act. He has submitted that when the Sub-divisional Magistrate, on receipt of the complaint forwarded to him by the Additional District Magistrate, passed an order directing the Sub-Inspector of Police to seize the grains, it would mean that he took cognizance of the offence on that very date and that was on the basis of the petition filed by the villagers before the Additional District Magistrate. There is no substance in this contention. The expression taking cognizance of an offence has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code. It has, however, been held in Gopal Das Sindhi v/s. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 986 that when a Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under the various sections of Chapter XVI then he takes cognizance of the offence, but if he does so for taking action of some other kind, e. g., ordering investigation under Sec.156 (3) or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, he cannot be said to be taking cognizance of the offence. That is to say, taking cognizance means taking notice of an offence by applying mind for the purpose of proceeding to take action under the provisions of Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, when the Magistrate passed an order directing the Sub-Inspector of Police to seize the grains, it was in the nature of executive order and not for the purpose of proceeding under Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it did not amount to taking cognizance of the offence. Cognizance of the offence was taken in this case only after the submission of charge-sheet by Police. 5. Cognizance of the offence was taken in this case only after the submission of charge-sheet by Police. 5. Next it has been contended that if it be assumed that the cognizance was taken on a charge-sheet submitted by the Police, then, though the requirements of Sec.11 of the Essential Commodities Act that the cognizance can be taken only on a report by a Public servant may be taken to be complied with, it is not a case instituted on a report of Police under Sec.173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure so as to attract the application of the provisions of Section 251-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and as such the whole trial adopted in that way is vitiated. Sec.11 of the Essential Commodities Act provides that no cognizance of any offence punishable under the Act could be taken except on a report in writing of facts constituting, the offence made by a person who is a public servant. It is not disputed that a police officer is a public servant as denned in Sec.21 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, when cognizance was taken on the report of a Police Officer the requirement of Sec.11 was com-plied with. What the learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted is that the report of the police is not a report under Sec.173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but only a report under Sec.11 of the Essential Commodities Act and as such application of Sec.251-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not attracted. That is to say, according to him procedure as engrafted In Sec.251-A has to be followed only in a case instituted on a charge-sheet submitted by the police under Sec.173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There does not appear any substance in this contention as well. That is to say, according to him procedure as engrafted In Sec.251-A has to be followed only in a case instituted on a charge-sheet submitted by the police under Sec.173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There does not appear any substance in this contention as well. Sec.251-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure runs as follows:- - "When, In any case instituted on a police report, the accused appears, or is brought before a Magistrate at the commencement of the trial, such Magistrate shall satisfy himself that the documents referred to in Sec.173 have been furnished to the accused, and if he finds that the accused has not been furnished with such documents or any of them, he shall cause them to be so furnished......" That is to say, the procedure under Sec.251-A is applicable to a case instituted on a police report which need not be a charge-sheet under Sec.173 of tbe Code of Criminal Procedure. Cognizance is taken by a Magistrate either on receipt of a complaint of facts constituting an offence or upon a report in writing of such facts made by a Police Officer or upon information received from any person other than a Police Officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed. Sec.190 does not speak of a report under Sec-;ion 173 which is technically called a charge-sheet. The whole meaning of Sec.190 (1) (b) is that the report of the facts must be in writing made by any Police Officer. When a Police Officer submits a charge-sheet stating the facts relating to the commission of an offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act it is a report of the Police Officer within the meaning of Clause (b) of Sec.190 (1) at the same time fulfilling the condition laid down in Sec.11 of the Essential Commodities Act. If a charge-sheet fulfils the condition of Sec.11 of the Essential Commodities Act it does not cease to be a report by a Police Officer. There is no contradiction in terms. A report by a public servant can at the same time be a report by a Police Officer if that public servant happens to be a police officer. It cannot be considered as a complaint as defined in Sec.2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is no contradiction in terms. A report by a public servant can at the same time be a report by a Police Officer if that public servant happens to be a police officer. It cannot be considered as a complaint as defined in Sec.2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The prosecution in this case is therefore, on a police report, as such the requirement of Sec.251-A is also fulfilled. The requirement of that section is that the case should be instituted on a police report. Therefore, in my opinion the procedure which was to be followed In this case should have been under Sec.251-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that has been done. Therefore, the trial is not vitiated. In support of this view a reference can be made to an observation of this Court in a Bench decision in A. K. Jain v/s. Govt. of India, 1968 BUR 197, which is as follows :- - "If it is a case instituted on a police report within the meaning of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.190 fulfilling at the same time the conditions laid down in the 11th section of Act 10 of 1955, the procedure prescribed in Sec.251-A of the Code has to be followed. If it is a case instituted otherwise than on a police report within the meaning of Clause (a) or (c) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.190 again fulfilling at tbe same time the requirement of Sec.11 of Act 10 of 1955, procedure prescribed in Section 252 of the Code will have to be followed". 6. In the case of Pravina Chandra v/s. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 1185 a contention was raised that by the words police report in Sec.251-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is meant the report under Sec.173 which the Police Officer makes to a Magistrate in respect of offences investigated by him under Chap. XIV and that by the police report in Sec.190 (1) (b) is meant the charge-sheet under Sec.173 of the Code and since the report in writing which the Police Officer makes under Sec.11 of the Essential Commodities Act is not a charge-sheet under Sec.173 of the Code it must be equated to a complaint of facts under Sec.190 (1) (a). XIV and that by the police report in Sec.190 (1) (b) is meant the charge-sheet under Sec.173 of the Code and since the report in writing which the Police Officer makes under Sec.11 of the Essential Commodities Act is not a charge-sheet under Sec.173 of the Code it must be equated to a complaint of facts under Sec.190 (1) (a). Repelling the contention the Supreme Court observed as follows:- - "In our judgment the meaning which to sought to be given to a police report is not correct. In Sec.190, a distinction is made between the classes of persons who can start a criminal prosecution. Under the three clauses of Sec.190 (1), to which we have already referred, criminal prosecution can be initiated (i) by a police officer by a report in writing, (ii) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon the Magistrates own knowledge or suspicion, and (iii) upon receiving a complaint of facts. If the report in this case falls within (i) above, then the procedure under Sec.251-A, Criminal Procedure Code, must be followed. If it falls in (ii) or (iii) then the procedure under Sec.252, Criminal Procedure Code, must be followed. We are thus concerned to find out whether the report of the police officer in writing In this case can be described as a "complaint of facts" or as "information" received from any person other than a Police Officer. That it cannot be the latter is obvious enough because the information is from a Police Officer. The term "complaint" in this connection has been defined by the Code of Criminal Procedure and it "means the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but it does not include the report of a police officer". "..... It, therefore, follows that Sec.252, Criminal Procedure Code, can only apply to those cases which are instituted otherwise than on a police report, that is to say, upon complaints which are not reports of a police officer or upon information received from persons other than a police officer ....." This decision is complete answer to the contention raised here that Section 251-A has no application because the case is not instituted on a police report as contemplated by that section. This decision has been followed in a Full Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ashiq Miyan v/s. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966 Madh Pra 1. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has, however, relied upon an un-reported decision of a Single Judge of this Court in Criminal Rev/s. No. 1235 of 1967 (Orissa). Basudeo Prasad v/s. State of Bihar. Facts of that case were similar to those of the instant case. A question as to validity of procedure adopted in the trial of that case was raised. While dealing with the point, the learned Judge referred to some discussion in a decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1965 SC 1185 mentioned above. The observation in that case was that a report of a Police Officer in such a case could not be taken as a charge-sheet under Sec.173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In view of such observation, the learned Judge held that the case under consideration before him should be treated as a complaint in writing by a public servant and not a real charge-sheet and that in such a case the trial should be conducted under Sections 252 to 259 of the Code and not according to the provisions of Section 251-A of the Code. The learned Judge has referred to the aforesaid observation made in the case of A. K. Jain, 1968 BLJR 197 . He has not relied upon the observation in that case on the ground that in his opinion this point was not in issue before the Court and it was only a casual observation. With respect, if I may say so, the learned Judge missed to take a note of the proposition of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the above quoted observations made in the case of Pravin Chandra, AIR 1965 SC 1185 . 8. In my opinion, therefore, the procedure followed in the trial of this case was quite correct and the trial is not vitiated on that account. 9. Next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that there is no proof that the bags contained imported wheat as defined in the Imported Food Grains (Prohibition of Unauthorised Sale) Order 1958. In my opinion, therefore, the procedure followed in the trial of this case was quite correct and the trial is not vitiated on that account. 9. Next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that there is no proof that the bags contained imported wheat as defined in the Imported Food Grains (Prohibition of Unauthorised Sale) Order 1958. Imported foodgrains" has been defined as follows:- - "2 (b) -- "Imported foodgrains" means foodgrains imported from outside India by the Central Government and supplied by that Government, either directly or through a State Government to authorised dealers for sale to the public". It has, therefore, been contended that there being no evidence that the wheat in question was imported from outside India by Central Government, it cannot be said that it was imported wheat so as to attract the application of Sec.3 of the aforesaid order. It is true that there is no evidence that the wheat in question was imported from outside India by Central Government. But the point is that the prosecution led evidence that it was imported wheat. It was so said in the evidence of witness No. 2 for the defence as well. He is the Block Development Officer. He has said that the wheat seized was the imported wheat. The statements of the prosecution witnesses in this connection were never challenged in the cross-examination. In view of such circumstances it cannot be said that the finding of the appellate Court that the wheat in question was imported wheat was without any evidence simply because the source of knowledge about the wheat being imported was not traced out. The finding that the wheat in question was imported wheat has, therefore, to be accepted. 10. The next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner Stayadeo Sah Is that he is an authorised dealer and therefore there has been no contravention of Clause 3 of the Imported Food Grains (Prohibition of Unauthorised Sale) Order 1958, That clause runs as follows: "Prohibition of unauthorised sale of Imported foodgrains -- No person other than an authorised dealer shall sell, or store or offer for sale, imported food-grains in any quantity, either split or unsplit or mixed with other grains". This clause, prohibits possession of imported foodgrains by any person other than the authorised dealer. This clause, prohibits possession of imported foodgrains by any person other than the authorised dealer. Therefore, if an authorised dealer is found in possession of imported foodgrains, this clause has got no application. It is not disputed that Satyadeo Sah is an authorised dealer as defined in Clause 2 of the aforesaid order. Therefore, Satyadeo Sah cannot be held liable for contravention of the provisions of Clause 3 of the aforesaid order. The charge against him is of possessing the imported wheat in contravention of Clause 3 of the aforesaid order. The charge is not for dealing with the imported wheat in contravention of the terms of the license given to him as an authorised dealer. Since as an authorised dealer he was not prevented from possessing any imported wheat, there is no question of contravention of Clause 3 of the aforesaid order. In this view of the matter the charge against Satyadeo Sah must fail. 11 So far Sukhdeo Singh is concerned, he was only a cart-man. There is neither any allegation nor any evidence to show that he was in conscious possession of this imported wheat. Therefore, the conviction of Sukhdeo Singh also for being in conscious possession of the imported wheat cannot stand. 12. The result is that both the revision applications are allowed and the order of conviction and sentence passed against both the petitioners are set aside.