M. C. PATHAK, J.:- These cases were heard by a Division Bench consist­ing of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and Hon'ble Goswami, J. and on the differ­ence of opinion, the cases have been re­ferred to me. 2. The above nine applications were filed by the petitioners challenging the State Government's order rejecting their prayer for exemption from payment of bonus under the provisions of the Pay­ment of Bonus Act, 1965, hereinafter re­ferred to as the Bonus Act. The facts leading to these petitions are similar and the points that arise for decision' also are same and therefore these are heard as analogous and the same judgment will cover all the above cases. 3. The facts of Civil Rule No. 198/67. which are similar to the other cases, are briefly as follows: The peti­tioner is the proprietor of the Tea Estates known as Lahorijan and Nirmal Kumar Tea Estates situated in the United North Cachar and Mikir Hills District. The said Tea Estates are uneconomic which is evi­denced by the findings of the Minimum Wages Committee, appointed under Sec­tion 5 (1) (a) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 under the Government of Assam Notification No. GLR-126/58/20 dated 18th October, 1958. An extract from the said report has been quoted in the petition. In 1965 the Payment of Bonus Ordinance 1965, was promulgated by the President of India which was replaced by the Pay­ment of Bonus Act 1965 which came into force with effect from 25-9-65. In the said Act provisions have been made for compulsory payment of bonus to both workers and employees at the rates speci­fied by the said Act. Under Section 36 of the said Act, the State Government is empowered to exempt any establishment or class of establishments from all or any of the provisions of the said Act having regard to financial position and other relevant circumstances of the establish­ment concerned. Relying on the find­ings of the Minimum Wages Committee, the petitioner applied to the respondents on 13-9-1965 for exemption under Sec­tion 36 of the Payment of Bonus Ordi­nance 1965. On 11-1-1967 the petitioner made a further representation to the res­pondents for exemption under Section 36 of the Payment of Bonus Act. By letter No. GLR-418/66/3 dated the 1st May. 1967 the respondents rejected the petitioner's prayer for exemption under Section 36 of the said Act. The petitioner has chal­lenged this order of the State Govern­ment. On 11-1-1967 the petitioner made a further representation to the res­pondents for exemption under Section 36 of the Payment of Bonus Act. By letter No. GLR-418/66/3 dated the 1st May. 1967 the respondents rejected the petitioner's prayer for exemption under Section 36 of the said Act. The petitioner has chal­lenged this order of the State Govern­ment. The impugned order is quoted below t "GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM LABOUR DEPARTMENT;! LABOUR BRANCH, No. GLR-418/66/3, Dated Shillong, the 1st May, 1967. From: Shri A. Ahmed, I. A. S., Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of Assam. To: The Proprietor, Lahorijan and Nirmal Kumar Tea Estate, P. O. Manipur Road. Assam. Sub.: Payment of Bonus for the year 1964 - Application for exemption. Rel: Application No, 1085/L-63 dated 13-9-65 and subsequent letter No, 1366/L-63 dated 7-10-66. Sir, With reference to your application mentioned above for exemption from pay­ment of bonus for the year 1964 I am directed to say that Government after due consideration have rejected your pra­yer. However, time is allowed upto 30-9-67 and payment may be made in two equal instalments, if you so desire. I am therefore to request you to pay the wor­kers due accordingly with intimation to Government. Yours faithfully, Sd/- A. Ahmed Dy. Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Labour Department." The substance of the impugned orders in the other petitions, is same except that the concession for payment in instal­ments is not in the other orders and in Civil Rule No. 90/68 the petition for ex­emption was rejected as time barred. 4. Mr. R. Chaudhuri, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Civil Rule No. 198/67 submitted that - (1) an order passed u/s. 36 of the Payment of Bonus Act 1965. is a quasi-judicial order and not purely administra­tive and as such the impugned order of the State Government is liable to be quashed inasmuch as the petitioner was not given a hearing nor was the order a speaking order; and (2) even assuming that the order was an administrative order the Government failed to perform its duty assigned under the Act and there­fore a mandamus would lie to perform their duty. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. B. C. Barua, the learned Advocate-General, appearing for the res­pondents, submitted on the other hand that- (1) the order passed u/s. 36 of the Payment of Bonus Act was purely an administrative order and not a quasi-judicial order and (2) the Government rejected the petitioner's prayer for ex­emption after having duly considered the materials placed before it and therefore no writ of certiorari or mandamus as prayed for would lie. 6. From a perusal of the Impugn­ed order, which has been quoted above, it is found that the order is not a speak­ing order. It has been simply stated therein that Government rejected the petition after due consideration. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsel of both the parties, the main point that arises for consideration is whe­ther an order passed under Section 36 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 is an administrative order or a quasi-judicial order. 7. In the case of 'Mis. Jalan Trad­ing Co.. Private, Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha', AIR 1967 SC 691 the vires of the Bonus Act was considered by the Supreme Court which held that Sections 33, 34(2) and 37 were ultra vires but it held that the remaining provisions of the Act were valid and intra vires. 8. Section 10 and Section 36 of the Bonus Act which will require parti­cular consideration for deciding the above case are quoted below:- "Section 10. Payment of minimum bonus.- Subject to the provisions of Sections 8 and 13 every employer shall be bound to pay to every employee in an accounting year a minimum bonus which shall be four per cent of the salary or wage earn­ed by the employee during the account­ing year or forty rupees, whichever is higher, whether there are profits in the accounting year or not: Provided that where such employee has not completed fifteen years of age at the beginning of the accounting year, the provisions of this section shall have effect in relation to such employee as if for the words "forty rupees", the words "twenty-five rupees" were substituted." "Section 36. Power of exemption.- If the appropriate Government, having regard to the financial position and other relevant circumstances of any establish­ment or class of establishments, is of opinion that it will not be in public inte­rest to apply all or any of the provisions of the Act thereto, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt for such period as may be specified therein and subject to such conditions as it may think fit to impose, such establishments or class of establishments from all or any of the provisions of this Act." 9. In the case of 'M/s. Jalan Trad-Ing Co., AIR 1967 SC 691 (supra). Shah, J. (for self and Wanchoo and Sikri, JJ.) in the majority judgment, observed as follows regarding Section 36 of the Pay­ment of Bonus Act:- "By S. 36 the appropriate Govern­ment is invested with power to exempt an establishment or a class of establishments from the operation of the Act, provided the Government is of the opinion that having regard to the financial position and other relevant circumstances of the establishment, it would not be in the public interest to apply all or any of the provisions of the Act. Condition for exercise of that power is that the Gov­ernment holds the opinion that it is not in the public interest to apply all or any of the provisions of the Act to an establishment or class of establishments, and that opinion is founded on a consi­deration of the financial position and other relevant circumstances. Parliament has clearly laid down principles and has given adequate guidance to the appropri­ate Government in implementing the pro­visions of S. 36. The power so conferred does not amount to delegation of legisla­tive authority. Section 36 amounts to conditional legislation and is not void. Whether in a given case, power has been properly exercised by the appropriate Government would have to be considered when that occasion arises." In the same case in the minority judgment Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) (for self and Ramaswami, J.) observed as follows: "Similarly S. 36, which gives further power to the Central Government to exempt in the public interest an establish­ment or class of establishments for some period subject to such condition as the Central Government might deem neces­sary to impose, does not per se augur dis­crimination. There may be special cases which may require immediate relief and but for such provision there would be no means of affording the relief. The exist­ence of such a provision is not bad be­cause it merely gives a power. But the exercise of the power must, of course, bear the scrutiny of Art. 14. As no abuse of power is suggested, we cannot say that the section is by reason of a possibility of abuse discriminatory. The section cannot lightly be described as a piece of delegated legislation." 10. From the above observations of the Supreme Court it is quite clear that Section 36 of the Payment of Bonus Act is a valid legislation and it amounts to conditional legislation and not a piece of delegated legislation and the appro­priate Government, an whom the power is invested, must act according to the principles and guidance laid down in the section itself and the exercise of the power must bear the scrutiny of Art. 14 of the Constitution. 11. Regarding Section 10 of the Bonus Act, the Supreme Court observed in the case of Jalan Trading Co., AIR 1967 SC 691 (supra) that the plea that Section 10 infringes the fundamental free­dom under Article 31(1) of the Constitu­tion had no force. The question whether Section 10 by imposing unreasonable re­strictions infringes the fundamental free­dom under Article 19(1) (g) of the Con­stitution was however, left undecided by the Supreme Court in view of declaration of emergency by the President under Art. 352 which has, by virtue of Arti­cle 358, the effect of suspending protec­tion of Article 19 against any legislative measure or executive order which was otherwise competent. The emergency no longer exists. 12. Mr. Choudhury. the learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that if the legislature had not provided for Section 36, Section 10 would be ultra vires Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. His submission was that if the legislature had not provided for the provisions of Section 36, the compulsory nature of pay­ment of bonus at rate fixed under the Act would amount to, in certain cases, as in the present case, unreasonable restric­tions infringing the fundamental freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. The provisions of Section 36 have saved Section 10 from the vice of unreasonable restrictions infringing fun­damental right under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. The provisions of Section 36 have saved Section 10 from the vice of unreasonable restrictions infringing fun­damental right under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. This power under Section 36 was vested on the Government and hence from the very nature of the power and the authority on whom it is vested, the power under Section 36 must be treated as quasi-judicial and not purely administrative. 13. On the controversial question whether a particular power is an adminis­trative or quasi-judicial, the Supreme Court has observed in the case of 'A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262 = ( AIR 1970 SC 150 ) as follows:- "The dividing line between the admin­istrative power and quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obli­terated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is confer­red, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. Under our Constitution the rule of law pervades over the entire field of administration. Every organ of the State under our Constitution is regu­lated and controlled by the Rule of law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a re­quirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The pro­cedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are mere­ly those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent years the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being con­sidered as a quasi-judicial power." The Supreme Court then quoted as in­structive the following observations of Lord Parker, C. J., in Regina v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex Parte Lain (1967-2 QB 864):- "With regard to Mr. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being con­sidered as a quasi-judicial power." The Supreme Court then quoted as in­structive the following observations of Lord Parker, C. J., in Regina v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex Parte Lain (1967-2 QB 864):- "With regard to Mr. Bridge's second point I cannot think that Atkin, L. J., in­tended to confine his principle to cases In which the determination affected rights in the sense of enforceable rights. In­deed, in the Electricity Commissioners case, the rights determined were at any rate not immediately enforceable right since the scheme laid down by the Com­missioners had to be approved by the Minister of Transport and by resolutions of Parliament. The Commissioners never­theless were held amenable to the juris­diction of this Court. Moreover, as can be seen from Rex v. Postmaster-General Ex Parte Carmichel, (1928) 1 KB 291 and Rex v. Boycott Ex Parte Kessley, (1939) 2 KB 651 the remedy is available even though the decision is merely a step as a result of which legally enforceable rights may be affected. The position as I see It is that the exact limits of the ancient remedy by way of certiorari have never been and ought not to be specifically defined. They have varied from time to time being extended to meet changing conditions. At one time the writ only went to an inferior court, later its ambit was extended to statutory tribunals determining a lis inter parts. Later again it extended to cases where there was no lis in the strict sense of the word but where immediate or sub­sequent rights of a citizen were affected. The only constant limits throughout were that it was performing a public duty. Private or domestic tribunals have always been outside the scope of certiorari since their authority is derived solely from contract, that is/ from the agreement of the parties concerned. Finally, it is to be observed that the remedy has now been extended, see Reg. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee, Ex parte R. A. Brand & Co. Ltd., (1952) 2 KB 413 to cases in which the decision of an administrative officer is only arrived at after an inquiry or process of a judicial or quasi-judicial character. In such a case this court has jurisdiction to super­vise that process. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee, Ex parte R. A. Brand & Co. Ltd., (1952) 2 KB 413 to cases in which the decision of an administrative officer is only arrived at after an inquiry or process of a judicial or quasi-judicial character. In such a case this court has jurisdiction to super­vise that process. We have as it seems to me reached the position when the ambit of certiorari can be said to cover every case in which a body of persons of a public as opposed to a purely private or domestic character has to determine matters affecting sub­jects provided always that it has a duty to act judicially. Looked at in this way the board in my judgment comes fairly and squarely, within the jurisdiction of this court. It is. as Mr. Bridge said, 'a servant of the Crown charged by the Crown, by executive instruction, with the duty of distributing the bounty of the Crown.' It is clearly, therefore, perform­ing public duties." The Supreme Court then observed as follows: - * * "This Court in the Purtabpore Co., Ltd. v. Cane Commissioner of Bihar and others, held that the power to alter the area reserved under the Sugarcane (Con­trol) Order. 1966, is a quasi-judicial power. With the increase of the power of the administrative bodies it has become neces­sary to provide guidelines for the just exercise of their power. To prevent the abuse of that power and to see that it does not become a new despotism, courts are gradually evolving the principles to be observed while exercising such powers. In matters like these, public good is not advanced by a rigid adherence to prece­dents. New problems call for new solu­tions. It is neither possible nor desirable to fix the limits of a quasi-judicial power Section 10 has provided that the minimum bonus will have to be paid by the em­ployer to the employee whether there are profits in the accounting year or not. The section does not however mention loss as such. Hence the question may arise whether bonus is to be paid if an establishment has been incurring loss. To obviate this difficulty the legislature has enacted Section 16 to provide special safe­guard for newly set up establishments in respect of payment of bonus under the Bonus Act. 20. The section does not however mention loss as such. Hence the question may arise whether bonus is to be paid if an establishment has been incurring loss. To obviate this difficulty the legislature has enacted Section 16 to provide special safe­guard for newly set up establishments in respect of payment of bonus under the Bonus Act. 20. On a consideration of the scheme of the Bonus Act it appears that an establishment has to pay bonus whe­ther it earns profit or not or whether it incurs loss in the accounting year. The Supreme Court while holding that Sec­tion 10 is not hit by Article 14 of the Constitution, observed in the case of M/s. Jalan Trading Co., AIR 1967 SC 691 (supra) as follows:- * * * "Section 10 undoubtedly places in the same class of establishments which have made inadequate profits not justifying payment of bonus, establishments which have suffered marginal loss, and esta­blishments which have suffered heavy loss. The classification so made is not unintelligible, all establishments which are unable to pay bonus under the scheme of the Act, on the result of the working of the establishment, are grouped together. The object of the Act is to make an equi­table distribution of the surplus profits of the establishment with a view to main­tain peace and harmony between the three agencies which contribute to the earning of the profits. Distribution of profits which is not subject to great fluc­tuations year after year, would certainly conduce to maintenance of peace and harmony and would be regarded as equi­table, and provision for payment of bonus at the statutory minimum rate, even if the establishment has not earned profit is clearly enacted to ensure the object of the Act." Article 43 of the Constitution provides as follows:- "The State shall endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation or economic orga­nisation or in any other way, to all wor­kers, agricultural, industrial or other­wise, work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities and, in parti­cular, the State shall endeavour to pro­mote cottage industries on an individual or co-operative basis in rural areas." The Supreme Court in the case of All India Reserve Bank Employees' Associa­tion v. Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1966 SC 305 . observed as follows: "The concept of fair wages involves a rate sufficiently high to enable the worker to provide "a standard family with food, shelter, clothing, medical care and education of children appropriate to his status in life but not at a rate ex­ceeding the wage earning capacity of the class of establishments concerned". A fair wage is related to a fair workload and the earning capacity. The concept of living wage is one or more steps higher than fair wage ............ It has now been generally accepted that living wage means that every male earner should be able to provide for his family not only the essen­tials but a fair measure for frugal com­fort and an ability to provide for old age or evil days. Fair wage lies between the concept of minimum wage and the concept of living wage." 21. The concept of bonus Is link­ed up with wages and the Bonus Act is a step towards providing for a living wage for workers. With this end in view the legislature has enacted Section 10 which has created an obligation on the part of the employer to pay bonus to workers as provided under the Bonus Act whether there is profit or no profit, or even in case of loss. We are therefore required to consider the question whether in some cases of establishments. Section 10 of the Bonus Act is tantamount to the negation of the fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. If in a given case, an establishment is running loss for a number of years even beyond the period of protection as pro­vided by Section 16 for new establish­ments and if such an establishment is compelled to pay bonus to the employees under the Bonus Act, and the employer consequently is compelled to close down the establishment due to loss overburden­ed with the obligation of payment of bonus under the Bonus Act, would it not mean unreasonable restriction infringing fundamental right under Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution? In my opinion this aspect of the matter was considered by the Legislature while enacting the Bonus Act and Section 36 of the Act was pro­vided to meet the difficulty. Section 36 appears to be a complete answer to the question of vires of Section 10 on the ground of infringement of fundamental right under Article 19(1) (g) of the Con­stitution. Section 36 appears to be a complete answer to the question of vires of Section 10 on the ground of infringement of fundamental right under Article 19(1) (g) of the Con­stitution. We have to keep in clear view this aspect of the legislation while inter­preting whether the power conferred on the appropriate Government under Sec­tion 36 of the Bonus Act is administrative or quasi-judicial. 22. The Supreme Court has held as quoted above that Section 36 of the Bonus Act amounts to conditional legisla­tion and the power conferred by it does not amount to delegation of legislative authority; that there may be special cases which may require immediate relief and if there were no provisions like Section 36 there would be no means of affording such relief. 23. The power has been conferred on the Government who necessarily bear the responsibility of acting justly and fairly under our Constitution. 24. Section 36 provides that if the appropriate Government having due re­gard to the financial position and other relevant circumstances of any establish­ment or class of establishments, is of the opinion that it will not be in public inte­rest to apply all or any of the provisions of the Act, then it may exempt the esta­blishment or class of establishments by an appropriate order under this section from all or any of the provisions of the Bonus Act. The formation of the opinion whether the exemption will be or will not be in public interest, no doubt, is an administrative action. But Section 36 provides that the formation of this opinion is subject to due consideration of the financial position and other relevant cir­cumstances of the establishment or class of establishments. The financial position and other relevant circumstances may be placed before the appropriate Govern­ment by the establishment or class of establishments seeking exemption under Section 36. The Bonus Act has created a legal obligation on the part of the esta­blishment or class of establishments to pay minimum bonus as provided under the Act. A duty has been cast upon all the establishments covered by the Bonus Act to pay the minimum bonus in accord­ance with the provisions of the Bonus Act. If any establishment finds that it is not able to pay the minimum bonus due to its financial position and other rele­vant circumstances, it is open to it to make a representation under Section 36 of the Bonus Act. If any establishment finds that it is not able to pay the minimum bonus due to its financial position and other rele­vant circumstances, it is open to it to make a representation under Section 36 of the Bonus Act. When any establish­ment finds itself unable to comply with the requirements of the Section 10. it may approach the appropriate Govern­ment for an appropriate order under Sec­tion 36. If the appropriate Government in compliance with Section 36 passes any order either rejecting the application for exemption or allowing it, it will affect either the establishment or the employees as the case may be. If the appropriate Government makes an order of exemp­tion as provided under Section 36 it will necessarily have civil consequences as to the rights of the employees and if it rejects the application for exemption it may affect the establishment vitally. An order made under Section 36 would entail civil consequences either to the establish­ment or to the employees. In this con­nection the following passage from the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss.) Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 , may be usefully quoted:- * * * "It is one of the fundamental rules for our constitutional set-up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would, therefore, arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed i it need not be shown to be superadded. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particu­lar case." In the case of M/s. Jalan Trading Co., AIR 1967 SC 691 (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that condition for exercise of the power under Section 36 is that the Government holds the opinion that it is not in the public interest to apply all or any of the provisions of the Act to an establishment or class of esta­blishments, and that opinion is founded on a consideration of the financial posi­tion and other relevant circumstances of the establishment or class of establish­ments. Parliament has clearly laid down the principles and has given adequate guidance to the appropriate Government in implementing the provisions of Sec­tion 36. Whether in a given case, power has been properly exercised by the ap­propriate Government or not may be considered when occasion arises. 25. It is thus clear that the appro­priate Government while exercising the power under the provisions pf Section 36 must be guided by the principles and guidance provided in the section itself. In exercising this power the appropriate Government must act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The provisions of Section 36 require that while forming its opinion as to the public inte­rest, the appropriate Government must have due regard to the financial position and other relevant circumstances of any establishment or class of establishments. This would necessarily mean that the order under Section 36 should be a speak­ing order. 26. Though the formation of opin­ion as to public interest by itself may be an administrative action, Section 36 re­quires that the Government before form­ing such an opinion must have an objec­tive view regarding the financial position and other relevant circumstances of the establishment or class of establishments concerned. The order passed under Sec­tion 36 must be passed justly and fairly and for that purpose the order should show that the Government have consider­ed the financial position and other rele­vant circumstances of the establishment or class of establishments concerned. The order passed under Sec­tion 36 must be passed justly and fairly and for that purpose the order should show that the Government have consider­ed the financial position and other rele­vant circumstances of the establishment or class of establishments concerned. The order, on the face of it, should not appear to be arbitrary or capricious. Thus, ap­plying the test as laid down by the Supreme Court for finding out whether a particular power is administrative or quasi-judicial, I am clearly of the opinion that the power to be exercised under Section 36 of the Bonus Act is a quasi-judicial power and the appropriate Gov­ernment has to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The order should be a speaking order showing that the requirements of Section 36 have been duly complied with. In the instant case from the impugned order it is not clear whether Government had due regard to the financial position and other relevant circumstances, which were placed before the Government by the establishments concerned. 27. I, therefore, hold that while exercising the power under Section 36 of the Bonus Act, the State Government should duly consider the financial posi­tion and other relevant circumstances of the establishment concerned that may be produced before it, hear the affected parties and pass a speaking order. This was not done in any of the above cases. The impugned orders of the State Gov­ernment in all the above nine cases are, therefore, liable to be quashed. 28. Mr. Choudhury, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, submitted that on the admitted facts in Civil Rule No. 198/67 a mandamus should be issued directing the State Government to pass an appropriate order under Sec­tion 36 granting exemption. I am unable to accept this submission. The impugned order does not clearly show that the State Government gave due consideration to the financial position and other rele­vant circumstances as required under Sec­tion 36. The Government's order allow­ing payment of bonus in instalments does not amount to granting of exemption under Section 36. At best it may be an action under Section 19 of the said Act. 29. In Civil Rule No. 90/68 the petition for exemption was rejected as time barred. The Government's order allow­ing payment of bonus in instalments does not amount to granting of exemption under Section 36. At best it may be an action under Section 19 of the said Act. 29. In Civil Rule No. 90/68 the petition for exemption was rejected as time barred. The impugned order in Civil Rule No. 90/68 runs as follows:- "With reference to your application mentioned above, I am directed to say that Government regret their inability to entertain your application for exemption from payment of Bonus for the year 1965 as the time for receiving applications has long expired." The application was made on 23-10-67. Section 19 of the Bonus Act provides that the payment of bonus under the Bonus Act shall be paid in cash within a period of eight months from the close of the accounting year. But there is no period I of limitation prescribed by the Act for exercise of the power under Section 36 and this power may be exercised in appro­priate case by the State Government if bona fide representation is made by the establishment concerned within reason­able time. I, therefore, hold that the petition should not have been rejected on the ground of limitation, but it should have been disposed of as required under Section 36. 30. In Civil Rule 231/67 it appears from the petition that a hearing was given, but the order does not appear to be a speaking order. In the circumstances, in this case also the impugned order has to be quashed. 31. In the result the impugned orders of the State Government in all the above nine cases are quashed and the cases are remanded to the State Govern­ment to be disposed of as required under Section 36 of the Bonus Act on the lines indicated above. All the nine petitions are allowed and the rules are made abso­lute. There will be no order as to costs. ORDER OF DIVISION BENCH (DUTTA, C. J. AND GOSWAMI, J.): 32. In view of the majority deci­sion, the impugned order of the State Government is quashed and the case is remanded to the State Government to be disposed of as required under Section 36 of the Bonus Act on the lines indicated- Petitions allowed.