Research › Browse › Judgment

Patna High Court · body

1969 DIGILAW 78 (PAT)

Tata Iron And Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union Of India (Uoi)

1969-04-18

MISRA, S.WASIUDDIN

body1969
Judgment 1. These thirteen applications which have been heard together arise out of the orders passed by the Assistant collector, Central Excise, Jamshedpur, in pursuance of Notification No. 30/60 dated 1st March, 1960, made in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The petitioner manufactured steel ingots in which it also used scrap ingot moulds and botton stools after payment of duty under item No. 25, Schedule 1, of the Central Excise Tariff. It is stated that these casting moulds become unserviceable after 55 to 60 heats. They are then scrapped and remelted for being manufactured into steel ingots. It is stated in the petition that this is done and, in the very nature of the manufacturing process, has to be done by mixing such scrap iron with non-duty-paid pig ore. In terms of this notification under item No. 25, Rs. 10 per metric tonne is the duty to be paid. Under item No. 26 steel ingots are subject to duty at the rate of Rs. 39.35 per metric tonne. The petitioners claim, which is subject-matter of all the 13 applications for various months from March, 1964, to March 1965, was that the petitioner was liable to pay duty at the rate of Rs. 30 per metric tonne in respect of the quantity of scrap iron used as aforesaid and at the rate of Rs. 39.35 in respect of pig iron for which no duty was paid before. The claim of the petitioner, however, in all the cases was rejected by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Jamshedpur ; and on appeal, by the Collector, Central Excise, Patna, as also by the Additional Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of India. The details of the claim may be stated as follows : __________________________________________________________________ C.W.J.C Period Claim No. Quantity Amount Date of order of Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Jamshedpur. Date of order of Collector, Centeral Excise, Patna with Case No. Date of order of Sri D.P. Anand, Addl. Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India, New Delhi. __________________________________________________________________ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 __________________________________________________________________ Rs. 618 March64 79 3110 M.T. 31,000 30-12-64 18 M.P. of 65 dt. 19-6-65 7-7-67 625 April64 80 5302 M.T. 1,59,060 30-12-64 22 M.P. of 65 dt. 19-6-65 621 May64 81 4703 M.T. 1,41,090 29-12-64 30 21 M.P. of 65 dt. Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India, New Delhi. __________________________________________________________________ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 __________________________________________________________________ Rs. 618 March64 79 3110 M.T. 31,000 30-12-64 18 M.P. of 65 dt. 19-6-65 7-7-67 625 April64 80 5302 M.T. 1,59,060 30-12-64 22 M.P. of 65 dt. 19-6-65 621 May64 81 4703 M.T. 1,41,090 29-12-64 30 21 M.P. of 65 dt. 19-6-65 617 June64 99 2623 M.T. 78,690 19-12-64 23 M.P. of 65 dt. 19-12-65 624 July64 100 1849 M.T. 55,470 23-12-64 20 M.P. of 65 dt. 19-6-65 623 August64 106 2235-82 M.T. 67,074.60 30-3-65 31 44 M.P. of 65 dt. 19-6-65 616 September64 110 1855 M.T. 55,650.00 29-12-64 30 19 M.P. of 65 dt. 19-6-65 620 October64 115 3513-700 M.T. 1,05,411 29-4-65 48 M.P. of 65 dt. 30-7-65 626 November64 117 2654-410 M.T. 79,632.30 Do. 49 M.P. of 65 dt. 30-7-65 622 December64 119 2117-313 M.T. 63,519.39 15-4-65 19 50 M.P. of 65 dt. 30-7-65 614 January65 121 3479-427 M.T. 1,04,682.81 29-4-65 51 M.P. of 65 dt. 30-7-65 615 February65 122 2370-678 M.T. 71,120.34 Do. 52 M.P. of 65 dt. 30-7-65 619 March65 126 3153-674 M.T 94,610.22 30-6-65 53 M.P. of 65 dt. 30-7-65 __________________________________________________________________ 2. Mr. Rajeshwari Prasad, appearing in support of the application, has urged that the interpretation put upon this Notification No. 30/60, dated 1st March, 1960, is erroneous. The correct interpretation should not be that the reduced rate of duty prescribed under the notification is payable only in respect of steel ingots manufactured exclusively out of the duty-paid pig iron but that account should be taken of the quantity of duty-paid pig iron used in the manufacture of steel ingots and to the extent of such quantity the benefit of the reduced rate prescribed under this notification should be available to the petitioner and that the usual rate in item No. 26 should be confined only to that quantity of pig iron in respect of which duty has not been already paid. The point involved is a simple one. The point involved is a simple one. Learned counsel has drawn our attention in this connection to the subsequent notification issued on 30th March, 1968, being G.S.R. 610, which runs as follows : "In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8, of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 , and in supersession of the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance (late Department of Revenue) No 30/60 Central Excises, dated the 1st March, 1960, the Central Government hereby exempts steel ingots [falling under item No. 26 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944)] in which duty-paid iron in any crude form including pig iron, scrap iron, molten iron or iron cast in any other shape or size, is used, from so much of the duty as has been paid on the said iron in any crude form." 3. Mr. Prasads contention is that the subsequent notification contains the real meaning of the notification even on 1st March, 1960, referred to above, and this subsequent notification has been issued substantially to explain the meaning of the notification of 1st March, 1960, with some difference in the sense that, instead of laying down a general rate of Rs. 30 per metric tonne, it has now to be calculated in proportion to the amount of duty paid upon ihe quantity of iron which is used for the manufacture of steel ingots, learned counsel for the department, however, has urged that the contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is no doubt in consonance with. the notification issued on 30th March, 1968, but this cannot be regarded as explanatory of the notification of March, 1960, where the department intended only to exclude from the general rate steel ingots only such part as was manufactured exclusively out of scrap iron as referred to in the order of the revenue authorities including the Additional Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of India. It is true, no doubt, that the language of the notification of 1st March, 1960, does contain in it a certain amount of ambiguity and the department has endeavoured to construe the notification in a literal manner. It is true, no doubt, that the language of the notification of 1st March, 1960, does contain in it a certain amount of ambiguity and the department has endeavoured to construe the notification in a literal manner. It has, however, to be borne in mind that even on the literal approach to the construction of that notification the department has introduced into it the term "only" which does not occur in the notification as it stands. The Additional Secretary has observed as follows in paragraph 6 of his order : "On a plain reading of the language used in the notification, this notification can apply to such steel ingots which have been manufactured out of only duty-pig iron." 4. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that if the department intended that this notification should have that meaning there was nothing to prevent it from using the expression "only" or "entirely". For instance, the notification should have then read as follows : "In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 , as in force in India and as applied to the State of Pondicherry, the Central Government hereby exempts only steel ingots in which entirely, exclusively or only duty paid-pig iron is used from so much of the duty leviable thereon as is in excess of Rs. 30.00 per tonne." 5. Since these words, "entirely", "exclusively" or "only" have not been used the departmental authorities were not correct in law to supply the word "only" as if to fill up the gap in the notification. Even on the literal approach, therefore, the construction adopted by the department is not justified. In our opinion, there is substance in the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner. 6. More than this, the intention of the notification can be gathered better with reference to the object of the notification. Under item No. 26 of Schedule I, the duty payable on steel ingots is Rs. 39.35 per metric tonne. Obviously the department intended to grant some relief to the manufacture of steel ingots in respect of materials which were already used. Under item No. 26 of Schedule I, the duty payable on steel ingots is Rs. 39.35 per metric tonne. Obviously the department intended to grant some relief to the manufacture of steel ingots in respect of materials which were already used. As such it could will be classed as duty-paid material, being duty-paid also in this case, otherwise there was no reason to make any kind of differentiation between two classes of steel ingots, one manufactured out of non-duty paid pig iron and the other duty-paid pig iron. If the construction adopted by the department and urged by the learned counsel for the department were to be accepted, then Notification No. 30/60 would be rendered obviously nugatory. It is because learned counsel has pointed out, and as has also been referred to in the order of the Additional Secretary himself, that serviceable casting moulds (ingot moulds and bottom stools) after being scrapped can be used for ihe manufacture of steel ingots only in conjuction with other non-duty-paid pig iron. If that be so and if the intention of the department were that the benefit under the notification of 1960 should be available only in respect of steel ingots manufactured exclusively out of non- duty paid pig iron, then this would obviously mean that no relief can be granted to any manufacturer. Since the intention was to grant relief and the interpretation accepted by the department amounts to rendering the notification itself nugatory for all practical purposes, such an interpretation cannot be accepted as valid and reasonable. 7. The matter may also be approached from another angle. This notification has the effect of imposing burden for payment of tax and to this the principle of interpretation of taxing statutes must apply. It is a well settled principle that a law court will not interpret a taxing statute in such a manner that its effect will be to cast a burden twice over for payment of tax on the taxpayer, unless the language of the statute is so compellingly certain that the law court has no other alternative than to accept it. It is a well settled principle that a law court will not interpret a taxing statute in such a manner that its effect will be to cast a burden twice over for payment of tax on the taxpayer, unless the language of the statute is so compellingly certain that the law court has no other alternative than to accept it. Maxwell at page 578, On the interpretation of Statutes (11th edition) has made the following observation : "A construction, for example, which would have the effect of making a person liable to pay the same tax twice in respect of the same subject-matter would not be adopted unless the words were very clear and precise to that effect. In a case of reasonable doubt the construction most beneficial to the subject is to be adopted. Still less is the language of a section to be strained in order to tax a transaction which, had the legislature thought of it, would have been covered by appropriate words." 8. (This is with reference to the case of Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Wotfson, [1949] 1 All E.R. 865. (H.L) per Lord Simonds, at page 868.) We have already stated that, at the highest the notification can be said to give rise to a reasonable doubt because *it cannot be contended to the contrary that the notification was not intended to grant some kind of relief to the manufacturer. If the effect of the construction adopted by the department is to deny such relief to 1he manufacturer, it is at the highest a case of reasonable doubt upon the language of the notification. It is, therefore, difficult for a law court to accept the contention which will have the effect of making the manufacturer liable to tax twice over in respect of the same subject-matter. It is also noticeable that it was intended, as we have already indicated, that even duty- paid scrap iron, once used for the manufacture of steel ingots mixed with non- duty-paid iron must be converted at the rate prescribed for steel ingots manufactured exclusively out of non-duty paid pig iron, there was nothing to stop the department from putting this in appropriate words in the notification itself. The same not having been done, to accept the construction put forward on behalf of the department would be patently unjust and would work unwarranted hardship to the subject which cannot have the approbation of this court. 9. We have already referred to the nature of this notification. Although the words used in the subsequent notification are " in supersession " of the previous notification, it is clear that this is substantially in the nature of an explanatory notification so as to avoid the ambiguity which was discovered in interpreting the notification of 1960. The meaning of the notification of 1960 can well be gathered with reference to the subsequent notification which is permissible in regard to determining the character of a subsequent Act or rule or regulation or notification and a law court has to decide whether it is an explanatory measure or it is intended to introduce some, thing new of a remedial nature. In the present case, it is difficult to hold that the desire was to remedy an evil, but the intention was to explain except in regard to the rate of duty. In such circumstances, if it was necessary to read something more into the notification, even that would not be incorrect, because this will amount to slight modification, of the language of the statute to carry out the clear object and intention of the legislature, as Maxwell has discussed at great length under various headidgs in Chapter 9, Which begins with "Modification of the language to meet the intention". Since we have already discussed the matter in detail it is not necessary to go into this aspect of the question, but we may only refer to the various sub-headings under which this method can be resorted to and which would be appropriate in the context of this case. The sub-headings are : (1) Honest intention to act within powers, (2) Obvious oversights, (3) Common sense, (4) The conjunctions "or" and "and", (5) "May" "Must", (6) "It shall be lawful", (7) "If they shall think fit", and (8) Omissions. It is not necessary to refer to Section 2 of the chapter which deals with "Equitable construction" since the intention of the legislature was to grant relief ; if it were necessary to read something more into this to carry out the intention, this too would be permissible. It is not necessary to refer to Section 2 of the chapter which deals with "Equitable construction" since the intention of the legislature was to grant relief ; if it were necessary to read something more into this to carry out the intention, this too would be permissible. We ds not want to speculate oh this aspect of the matter, and supply words which could easily be supplied in order to to arrive at the conclusion at which we have arrived. (Vide also Craies on Statute Law, 146-148, latest edition). 10. For the reasons stated above, we are satisfied that the orders passed by the revenue authorities are not supportable and they are quashed. The stand of the petitioner must be accepted. We may, however, make it clear that the burden will lie on the petitioner in every case to satisfy the department by placing on record reliable material that in fact a certain quantity of scrap iron which would be liable to duty at the rate mentioned in item No. 25, Schedule I, is payable so that the department may make correct ejaculation in the light of such material. On calculation of the amount of duty payable by the petitioner in the light of this decision, if any amount already realised is found to be in excess, it must be refunded.