ORDER V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. 1. S.5 of the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act, (Act 9 of 1967) ordains that "all suits, applications, proceedings in execution of decrees or orders and other proceedings pending in Courts or Land Tribunals" pending at the commencement of that Act "for recovery of ....... arrears of rent or damages shall be stayed" The question in this revision is as to whether the above provision will apply to a case where a decree is obtained by the plaintiff for having discharged arrears of rent due by the defendant. The brief facts are as follows: The deceased Chathukutty Nambiar, whose legal representatives are the respondents, had undertaken in a partition deed to discharge arrears of rent due by his tarwad to its landlord in respect of a property which was set apart to the plaintiff's share. Thus the liability for arrears of rent was that of the tarwad of Chathukutty Namibar and the plaintiff decree holder. This liability was set apart to be discharged by the said Chathukutty Nambiar and thereafter the arrears of the rent were no longer due from the plaintiff although the property from which the arrears arose had been set apart to him. Since the late Chathukutty Nambiar did not pay the arrears and the landlord had obtained a decree for the said arrears, the plaintiff was constrained to discharge that decree to protect his own property. This non gratuitous discharge of the late Chathukutty Nambiar's liability gave rise to a cause of action in favour of the plaintiff which he enforced in O. S. No. 351 of 1965 and the Court passed a decree in his favour and against the deceased Chathukutty Nambiar. This decretal liability might have originated in the arrears of rent payable by Chathukutty Nambiar to the land lord of his tarwad. But once those arrears of rent had been discharged by the plaintiff, one could not predicate the existence of arrears of rent at all. The decree passed in favour of the plaintiff and against Chathukutty Nambiar is not one for arrears of rent, although the genesis of that liability may be traced to a rental liability cast by the partition deed upon Chathukutty Nambiar and payable to the landlord of that property. The plaintiff decree holder is not the landlord of Chathukutty Nambiar and in the absence of any landlord tenant relationship between the two. The plaintiff decree holder is not the landlord of Chathukutty Nambiar and in the absence of any landlord tenant relationship between the two. it is not possible to hold that the present decree is one for arrears of rent. It is doubtful if one can say that it represents arrears of rent. The most that one can say is that in the history of this liability, we may go back to the root liability of Chathukutty Nambiar under the partition deed for discharging arrears of rent to the landlord of the tarwad. But S.5 does not stay proceedings which have distant kinship with rental liabilities. Only proceedings "for recovery of .......... arrears of rents" are liable to be stayed. For this reason, the lower court's view that "Even though there is no landlord and tenant relationship between them, the nature of the claim as rent does not disappear from the manner in which the decree has been passed" is wrong. The observation by the lower court that "therefore the claim has to be construed as one for recovery of rent and hence it comes within the purview of Act 9 of 1967 and all proceedings for recovery of rent have to be stayed" is clearly wrong. 2. In the decision reported in 1962 KLT 3 , an allied question was considered. A promissory note was executed in lieu of arrears of rent and the question was whether the liability under the promissory note would stand discharged by virtue of S.34 of the Agrarian Relations Act, (Act 4 of 1961) on the footing that the pronote liability was rent liability. Madhavan Nair J., dealing with this question, observed: "Accounts were settled between the parties at the time of the execution of the promissory note, and for what was then found due from the petitioners to the respondent the promissory note came to be executed. The result was that, thereafter, the liability for the arrears of rent covered by the promissory note ceased to subsist, and in its place a new liability for money under the promissory note arose. ....... It is only to liabilities for arrears of rent as such, whether decreed or not, that S.34 of the Agrarian Relations Act applies. To arrears of rent already discharged it has no application". This reasoning will apply to the present case also. ....... It is only to liabilities for arrears of rent as such, whether decreed or not, that S.34 of the Agrarian Relations Act applies. To arrears of rent already discharged it has no application". This reasoning will apply to the present case also. The other decisions cited at the bar are AIR 1932 Madras 436; AIR 1941 Madras 116; AIR 1941 Madras 638; 1960 KLJ 681 ; and 1967 KLT 10 . These rulings make one point clear. If rents have undergone metamorphosis, they cannot be treated as rent thereafter unless the statute uses words wide enough to include rental liability which has taken a new shape altogether by use of words like "represents" or "in respect of". Such apt words of wider amplitude are absent in Act 9 of 1967 and only proceedings for recovery of arrears of rent stand stayed. It is not enough if the decretal liability, in its source, had something to do with rents. It must show on its face that it is for rent. In this view, the present proceedings by the decree holder, who has got a decree for reimbursement is entitled to execute his decree unhampered by S.5. The Civil Revision has, therefore to be allowed. 3. However, Counsel for the petitioner very fairly pointed out that in the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings, (Amendment) Act 1969 (Act 5 of 1969) there is a slight change in phraseology. Even proceedings "incidental or ancillary" to those dealt with in S.5 of Act 9 of 1967 are liable to be stayed under the new Act. I am not prima-facie persuaded that the present proceedings can be caught in the coils of the additional words used in S.7 of Act 5 of 1969. However. I do not want to pronounce on it one way or the other because it is perfectly open to the judgment debtors respondents to try their "luck" in the executing court under Act 5 of 1969. I leave open that question, but allow the Civil Revision Petition. In the circumstances there will be no older as to costs.