JUDGMENT K.K. Mathew, J. 1. The petitioner is a company incorporated under the Companies Act with its registered office in Calcutta. The petitioner has established a factory near Alwaye within the Kerala State for production of Aluminium and Aluminium products. The electrical energy required for the purpose is being supplied by the Kerala State Electricity Board, the 2nd respondent. The petitioner had entered into agreement with Travancore - Cochin State, the predecessor in interest of 2nd respondent, as regards the price to be charged for the electrical energy to be supplied to it. 2. The Government of Kerala ,in the exercise of their power under S.2 of the Kerala Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 (Act 3 of 1962), hereinafter referred to as the Kerala Act, declared by a notified order, Ext. P5, that electricity is an essential article, and by their Order, Ext. P1, dated 1.6.1968 passed under S.3 of the Kerala Act directed the 2nd respondent to levy a surcharge on the supply of electrical energy directly or through licensees. Clause (6) of Ext. P1 order provides that it shall not be lawful for the Kerala State Electricity Board or for the licensees receiving bulk supply from the Kerala State Electricity 8 Board to supply energy for a price which does not include the surcharge leviable by or under the order. 3. The petitioner has been asked to pay surcharge in accordance with the provisions in Ext. P-1, by Exs. P2 (a), P2(b), P2(c), P4 (a), P4 (b), and P4 (c) notices. 4. The petitioner prays for quashing Exts. P1 and P5 orders and the notices of demand by the issue of an appropriate writ, or order. 5. The petitioner contended that the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (Act 54 of 1948) was passed by the Federal Legislature in the exercise of their power under Entry 33 in List 1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, corresponding to Entry 44 in list I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, and that the State Legislature by enacting the Kerala Act cannot enable the Government to pass Ext. P1 order and interfere with the discretionary power of the Kerala State Electricity Board under S.49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act to fix the price of electricity by obliging the Board to levy a surcharge. 6. P1 order and interfere with the discretionary power of the Kerala State Electricity Board under S.49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act to fix the price of electricity by obliging the Board to levy a surcharge. 6. To appreciate this argument, it is necessary to consider the contention of the petitioner that the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 was passed by the Federal Legislature by virtue of Entry 33 in list I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act. If, in pith and substance, the provisions of that Act relate to "incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations", then, the Act is one passed by virtue of the power conferred by that Entry notwithstanding that some of its provisions incidentally encroach upon any subject in list II or III (See the decision in In re C. P. Motor Spirit Act) (AIR 1939 FC 1 ). In ascertaining the true nature and character of an Act, the preamble though relevant, is not conclusive. (See Rex v. Basudeva) (AIR 1950 FC 67) The purpose or object of the legislation, as distinguished from its indirect effect, should be ascertained. (See Attorney General for Saskatchewan v Attorney General for Canada (1949 AC 110), and Lefroy's Treatise on Canadian Constitutional Law, Page 98). It is the object from the point of view of the legislator that should be considered. The Word 'object' is used subjectively of the legislator rather than objectively of the matter legislated upon. (See Kishori Shetty v. The King (AIR 1950 FC 69). The nature of the subject matter is important to decide whether the alleged encroachment is incidental or not. The extent of the invasion into the subjects enumerated in another list has to be considered. That is important not because the validity of an Act can be determined by discriminating between degrees of invasions, but for the purpose of determining what is the pith and substance of the Act. (See Prafulla Kumar v. Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna) ( AIR 1947 PC 60 ). 7. The object of the Electricity (Supply) Act as seen from the preamble is to rationalise the production and supply of electricity and to take measures conducive to electrical development. (See Prafulla Kumar v. Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna) ( AIR 1947 PC 60 ). 7. The object of the Electricity (Supply) Act as seen from the preamble is to rationalise the production and supply of electricity and to take measures conducive to electrical development. In the Statement of objects and Reasons, it is stated that "there is necessity for the constitution of semi autonomous bodies like Electricity Boards to administer the "Grid Systems", and that in the view of the Government, it is bodies like these which are likely to be the most suitable organisations for working the Grid system on quasi commercial lines, and that such Boards cannot, however, be set up by provincial Government, under existing Constitutional Act, as they would be in the nature of trading Corporations within the meaning of Entry 33 of the Federal Legislative List". The statement of Objects and Reasons though not relevant for the purpose of interpreting the sections of the Act, will throw light upon the object of the legislator from the subjective view point. Chapter I is entitled introductory. S.3 in Chapter II provides for the constitution of a Central Electricity Authority. It says that the Central Government shall constitute a body called the Central Electricity Authority to exercise such functions and perform such duties and in such manner as the Central Government may prescribe or direct. Chapter III concerns the State Electricity Boards. S.5 in that Chapter provides for the constitution and composition of State Electricity Boards. S.6 says that the Government of any State may in lieu of constituting a Board under S.5 enter into an agreement with the Government of a contiguous state to provide that the Board constituted for the latter state shall exercise the functions of a Board under the Act in the former State. S.7 deals with the effect of inter state agreement as contemplated in S.6. S.8 provides for terms and conditions of appointment of the members of the Board. S.9 relates to the qualifications of the Members of the Board. S.10 deals with removal or suspension of the Members of the Board. S.10A gives power to the State Government to declare void certain transactions in connection with which a member has been removed under the provisions of S.10. S.12 provides that the Board shall be a body corporate. S.14 provides for the meetings of the Board. S.10 deals with removal or suspension of the Members of the Board. S.10A gives power to the State Government to declare void certain transactions in connection with which a member has been removed under the provisions of S.10. S.12 provides that the Board shall be a body corporate. S.14 provides for the meetings of the Board. S.15 deals with the appointment of the staff by the Board. S.16 states that the State Govt. shall constitute a State Electricity Consultative Council for the State and provides for constitution of that body. S.17 provides for the constitution of a Local Advisory Committee. Chap.4 relates to the powers and duties of State Electricity Boards. S.18 describes the general duties of the Board. S.19 says that the Board may supply electricity to any licensee or person requiring such supply in any area in which a scheme sanctioned under Chap.5 is in force. S.20 provides, for power of the Board to engage in certain undertakings. S.21 concerns the power of the Board in relation to water power. By S.22 the Board is invested with power to conduct investigations experiments and trials for the improvement of the methods of transmission, distribution and supply etc., of electricity. S.24 deals with the power of the Board to contribute to certain associations engaged in generation, distribution and supply of electricity. S.25 says that the Board may, from time to time, appoint qualified persons to be consulting engineers to the Board. S.26 says that the Board shall have all the powers and obligations of a licensee under the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. Chapter V deals with the Boards' works and trading procedure. S.28 concerns the preparations of Scheme for establishment of generating stations etc. S.29 provides for publication and sanctioning of schemes prepared under S.28. S.30 deals with the matters to be considered by the authority in recommending a scheme. S.31 and 32 also relate to schemes. S.34 deals with controlled stations. S.35 provides for the supply by the Board to licensees owning generating stations, while S.36 gives power to the Board to close down generating stations. S.37 provides for purchase of generating stations or undertakings or main transmission lines by the Board. S.38 makes provisions for establishing new generating stations by the Board. S.39 deals with the arrangements to be made with the licensee for operation of the Board's generating station. S.37 provides for purchase of generating stations or undertakings or main transmission lines by the Board. S.38 makes provisions for establishing new generating stations by the Board. S.39 deals with the arrangements to be made with the licensee for operation of the Board's generating station. S.40 makes provision regarding the connections with main transmission lines purchased by the Board. S.41 relates to the use by the Board of transmission lines. S.42 provides for power of the Board for placing wires, poles etc. S.43 describes the powers of the Board to enter into arrangements for purchase or sale of electricity under certain conditions. S.44 places certain restrictions on establishments of new generating stations or major additions or replacement of plant in generating stations. S.45 says that if any licensee fails to close down his generating station, pursuant to a declaration of the Board under S.36, or if any person establishes or acquires a new generating station, the Board may authorise any of its officers to enter upon the premises of such station and shut down the station. S.46 provides for Grid Tariff. It says that a tariff to be known as the Grid Tariff shall, in accordance with any regulations made in this behalf, be fixed from time to time by the Board in respect of each area for which a scheme is in force, and tariff's fixed under the section may, if the Board thinks fit, differ for different areas, and sub-s.(2) of that section provides that the grid tariff shall apply to sales of electricity by the Board to licensees when so required under any of the first, second and third schedules and shall also be applicable to sales of electricity by the board to licensees in other cases. S.47 vests power in the Board to make alternative arrangements with licensees. S.49 makes provision for sale of electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees. S.50 says that the Board should not supply electricity in certain circumstances. S.55 provides that licensees should comply with the directions of the Board. Chap.6 deals with the Board's finance, and accounts and the audit. S.63 says that the State Government may make sub ventions to the Board for the purpose of the Act. S.64 provides for loans by the State Government to the Board. S.65 gives power to the Board to borrow. Chap.6 deals with the Board's finance, and accounts and the audit. S.63 says that the State Government may make sub ventions to the Board for the purpose of the Act. S.64 provides for loans by the State Government to the Board. S.65 gives power to the Board to borrow. S.66 provides for guaranteeing of loans raised by the Board by the State Government. S.67 provides for priority of the liabilities of the Board. S.68 makes provision for depreciation reserve. S.69 deals with the accounts of the Board and their audit. S.76 provides for arbitration of all disputes arising between the State Government or the Board and a licensee or other person. S.78 vests power in the State Government to make rules. S.78A says that in the discharge of its functions, the Board shall be guided by such directions on questions of policy as may be given to it by the Government. S.79 vests power in the Board to make regulations. S.81 says that all members, officers and servants of the Board shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of S.21 of the Indian Penal Code. 8. From the summary of the main provisions of the Act, it would appear that the pith and substance of the legislation is relatable to "incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations". The provisions referred to above provide for the constitution of the Board and its powers, functions, duties, responsibilities and liabilities. The power of creating a corporation is not like the power of making war of levying taxes or of regulating commerce, a substantive and independent power, which cannot be implied as incidental to other powers or used as a means of executing them. As Marshall C. J. said in McCalloch v. State of Maryland: (4 L. Ed. 579) "It is never the end for which other powers are exercised, but a means by which other objects are accomplished. No contributions are made to charity for the sake of an incorporation, but a corporation is created to administer the charity; no seminary of learning is instituted in order to be incorporated, but the corporate character is conferred to subserve the purposes of education. No city was ever built with the sole object of being incorporated, but is incorporated as affording the best means of being well governed. No city was ever built with the sole object of being incorporated, but is incorporated as affording the best means of being well governed. The power of creating a corporation is never used for its own sake, but for the purpose of effecting something else........ But the power of incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations was one of the enumerated powers of the Federal legislature, and is now of parliament. 9. Although the constitution of the Board and the conferment of powers and duties are for rationalising the production and supply of electricity, the main object of the Act is the constitution of the Board and the conferment of D rights, powers and duties upon it. If, in pith and substance, this is a legislation referable to Entry 33 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, the fact that some of the provisions entrench upon Entry 38 in list III would not make the Legislation one relatable to Entry 38 in that list. If, then the Act is an existing law, relating to a matter not in the Concurrent List, Art.254 of the Constitution will p not be attracted, for, in order to attract that Article both the existing Central Law and the State Law must relate to a matter in the Concurrent List. "........the essential condition for the application of Art.254(1) is that the existing law must be with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list; in other words, unless it is shown that the repugnancy is between the provisions of a subsequent law and those of an existing law in respect of the special matters, the article would be inapplicable. (See F Prem Nath v. State of Jammu & Kashmir 1959 (2) SC Appeals 65 at 93). 10. In Bikram Kishore v. Tafazzal Hossain (AIR 1942 Calcutta 587 at p.591) Pal J. observed: "In order to fall within the mischief of S.107 (1), Government of India Act, 1935 both the provincial law and the existing Indian law must be with respect to the same matter and that matter must be 'one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List." 11. In Narayanaswami v. Inspector of Police (AIR 1949 Madras 307 at p. 314), Rajamannar C. J. approved the observations of Pal J, in Bikram Kishore v. Tafazzal Hossain (AIR 1942 Calcutta 587 at p.591.) , and said. "In my opinion, sub-ss.(1) & (2) of S.107 must be read together, and so read, they both deal with matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List, and inconsistency between Provincial Law on the one side and Dominion Law and existing law on the other with respect to such matters. In my view, the words "subject to the provisions of this section" which occur in Sub-s.(1) of S.107 support this construction. These words would have no meaning if sub-s.(2) is dealing with something completely different from sub-s.(1). The relative rights and disabilities of provincial and Dominion Legislatures with respect to Lists I and II are dealt with in S.100 of the Act and S.107 deals only with conflicts which may arise in respect of matters in the concurrent list." 12. The learned Advocate General submitted that the Kerala Act is referable to Entries 26 and 27 in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Entries 26 and 27 read. "26. Trade and Commerce within the state subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of list III. 27. Production, supply and distribution of goods subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of list III". 13. Mr. M. K. Nambiar for the petitioner contended that since 'electricity' is specifically mentioned as Entry 38 in List III, 'goods' in Entry 27 List II must exclude 'electricity' as otherwise, there will be an overlapping. He said that since "Electricity" is a specific and particular Entry in List III, 'goods' in Entry 27 in List II should not be interpreted as comprehending 'electricity' and the Kerala Act cannot provide for levying surcharge on the supply of electricity as 'goods'. 14. He said that since "Electricity" is a specific and particular Entry in List III, 'goods' in Entry 27 in List II should not be interpreted as comprehending 'electricity' and the Kerala Act cannot provide for levying surcharge on the supply of electricity as 'goods'. 14. When the question arose about reconciling Entry 45 of List I, duties of excise, and Entry 18 in List II, taxes on the sale of goods, of the Government of India Act, 1935, Gwyer C. J. in re re C.P. Motor Spirit Act ( AIR 1939 ECI) observed: "A grant of the power in general terms, standing by itself, would no doubt be construed in the wider sense; but it may be qualified by other express provisions in the same enactment, by the implications of the context, and even by considerations arising out of what appears to be the general scheme of the Act." The learned Chief Justice proceeded to state: "........... .an endeavour must be made to solve it, as the Judicial Committee have said, by having recourse to the context and scheme of the Act, and a reconciliation attempted between two apparently conflicting jurisdictions by reading the two entries together and by interpreting, and, where, necessary, modifying the language of the one by that of the other. If indeed such a reconciliation should prove impossible, then, and only then, will the non obstante clause operate and the federal power prevail" The Federal Court in that case held that the entry "taxes on the sale of goods" was not covered by the entry "duties of excise" and in coming to that conclusion, the learned Chief Justice observed: "Here are two separate enactments each in one aspect conferring the power to "impose a tax upon goods; and it would accord with sound principles of construction to take the more general power, that which extends to the whole of India, as subject to an exception created by the particular power, that which extends to the province only. It is not perhaps strictly accurate to speak of the provincial power as being excepted out of the federal power, for the two are independent of one another and exist side by side. It is not perhaps strictly accurate to speak of the provincial power as being excepted out of the federal power, for the two are independent of one another and exist side by side. But the underlying principle in the two cases must be the same, that a general power ought not to be so construed as to make a nullity of a particular power conferred by the same Act and operating in the same field, when by reading the former in a more restricted sense effect can be given to the latter in its ordinary and natural meaning". 15. Counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Calcutta Gas Company Ltd v State of West Bengal (AIR 1962 SC 1045), and said that just as Entry 25 "Gas and works" in List II of the Seventh Schedule would stand excluded from the connotation of the term 'industry' in Entry 7 in List I, so also, electricity, being a particular Entry, should be excluded from the ambit of the general entries, 26 and 27, in List II. In State of Bombay v F.N.Balsara ( AIR 1951 SC 318 ) the Supreme Court held that the word 'import' in Entry 19, List I, Government of India Act must be given a restricted meaning in order to give effect to the very general words "intoxicating liquors and narcotic drugs" used in Entry 31, List II. In Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Rayon & Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. ( AIR 1963 SC 90 ) similarly, the Supreme Court held that Entry 48 List I which provides for 'future markets' being a specific entry must be excluded from the general entry 27 in List II which provides for trade and commerce within the State. 16. If the State Legislature have the power to regulate "trade and commerce within the State, and 'production and supply of goods' by virtue of Entries 26 and 27 in List II, I do not know why it is not open to them to regulate the price of electricity as an essential article. The ruling of the Division Bench of this Court in O.P. Nos. 4539 of 1966 and 5397 of 1967 makes it clear that electricity is an article and therefore 'goods'. The ruling of the Division Bench of this Court in O.P. Nos. 4539 of 1966 and 5397 of 1967 makes it clear that electricity is an article and therefore 'goods'. A legislation which in one aspect falls within an Entry in List II may in another aspect fall within an Entry in List III. Referring to S.91 and 92 of the British North American Act, the Privy Council said in Hodge v. The Queen (1883 (9) App. Cases 117). "subjects which in one aspect and for one purpose fall within S.92 may in another aspect and for another purpose fall within S.91." Explaining the distinction between 'aspect' and 'ancillary' doctrine, Dean Mac Donald said: "The distinction between the 'aspect' and 'ancillary' doctrine is that under the former the provision in question is validly within the scope of an enumerated Dominion power, the only peculiarity being that, from some other aspect or for some other purpose, similar legislation might also be enacted by a province; while under the latter doctrine, the provision in question is invalid per se as being legislation within an exclusive provincial head but in its particular context it derives validity because of its necessity to effective legislation under an admitted Dominion head". (See Judicial Interpretation of the Canadian Constitution, (1936) I.U. of TLJ 260 at p. 274. 17. Assuming that the State Legislature have no power to deal with electricity as 'goods', by virtue of Entry 27 in List II, the State Legislature have power to legislate as regards electricity by virtue of Entry 38 in list III. Where the legislative competence of a legislature to enact a law is in question, the law can be justified as falling within one or more entries of the relevant legislative Lists or parts of it may be justified under one entry and parts under another. 18. In Subrahmanyan Chettiar v Munuswami Goundan (AIR 1941 FC 47) Gwyer C. J. said that the provisions of the Madras Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1938, in their application to decrees obtained by the appellant could be justified by reference to entries 4 and 15 of List III and perhaps also to entry 2 in List II. 18. In Subrahmanyan Chettiar v Munuswami Goundan (AIR 1941 FC 47) Gwyer C. J. said that the provisions of the Madras Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1938, in their application to decrees obtained by the appellant could be justified by reference to entries 4 and 15 of List III and perhaps also to entry 2 in List II. In his concurring judgment, Varadachariar J held that the provisions of the impugned Act fell partly under one entry and partly under another entry in List II or List III and he referred to entry 27 in List II and to entries 10 and 14 in List III. This principle has been applied in several cases. But though a law can be justified by reference to two or more entries, the entries cannot provide the power to make a law on a topic not included in any single entry since the list of each entry is fixed by the words used. Thus the widest meaning put upon entry 10 in list III would show, that the existence of a trust alone gives the power to legislate upon trusts. Religious institutions can be controlled in other ways than by making them into trusts if they are not so. 19. Now let me examine the question as to what will be the result if the Kerala Act is passed solely by virtue of entries 26 and 27 in List II. In Subrahmaniayan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan,(AIR 1941 FC 47) the question was as to whether the Madras Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, IV of 1938 which was within the exclusive competence of the provincial legislature under Entries 20 and 21 in List II was ultra vires, insofar as it related to promissory notes executed by agriculturists by reason of the fact that Under Entry 28, List I, "cheques, Bills of Exchanges, Promissory Notes and other like instruments" were matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre. The court held that the legislation was intra vires. The court held that the legislation was intra vires. Gwyer C. J. stated the reasons in these terms: "It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation, though purporting to deal with a subject in one List touches also on a subject in another list, and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely intertwined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the Legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee where by the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its 'pith and substance' or its 'true nature and character', for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation in respect of matters in this list or in that.............." 20. The question directly came up for consideration before the Privy Council in Prafulla Kumar v. Bank of Commerce Ltd. Khulna ( AIR 1947 PC 60 ). There, the question was whether the Bengal Moneylenders Act, 1940, which limited the amount recoverable by a money lender for principal and interest on his loans, was valid in so far as it related to promissory notes. Money lending is within the exclusive competence of the provincial legislature under item 27 in List II, but promissory note is a topic reserved for the Centre, vide: List I item 28. It was held by the Privy Council that the pith and substance of the impugned legislation being money lending, it was valid notwithstanding that it incidentally encroached on a field of legislation reserved for the Centre under Entry 28. After quoting with approval, the observations of Gwyer C. J., in Subramanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan (AIR 1941 FC 47 ), Lord Porter said: "Their Lordships agree that this passage correctly describes the grounds upon which the rule is founded, and that it applies to Indian as well as to Dominion Legislation". 21. In Lakhi Narayan Das v Province of Bihar (AIR 1950 FC 59), the question related to the validity of Ordinance IV of 1949 promulgated by the Governor of Bihar. It was attacked on the ground that as a legislation in terms of the ordinance would have been void, under S.107(1) of the Government of India Act, the Ordinance itself was void. It was attacked on the ground that as a legislation in terms of the ordinance would have been void, under S.107(1) of the Government of India Act, the Ordinance itself was void. The object of the Ordinance was the maintenance of public order, and under Entry I of List II, that is a topic within the exclusive competence of the province. Then the Ordinance provided for preventive detention, imposition of collective fines, control of processions and public meetings, and there were special provisions for arrest and trial for offences under the Act. The contention was that though the sections of the ordinance relating to maintenance of public order might be covered by Entry I in List II, the sections constituting the offences and providing for search and trial fell within items 1 and 2 of the Concurrent List and they were void as being repugnant to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. In rejecting this contention Mukherjea J observed: "Thus all the provisions of the ordinance related to or are concerned primarily with the maintenance of public order in the province of Bihar and provide for preventive detention and similar other measures in connection with the same. It is true that violation of the provisions of the Ordinance or of orders passed under it have been made criminal offences but offences against laws with respect of matters specified in List II would come within item 37 in list II itself, and have been expressly excluded from item (1) of the concurrent list. The ancillary matters laying down the procedure for trial of such offences and the conferring of jurisdiction on certain courts for that purpose would be covered completely by item (2) of List II and it is not necessary for the Provincial Legislature to invoke the powers under item (2) of the Concurrent List." He accordingly held that the entire legislation fell within entries 1 and 2 of list II, and that no question of repugnancy under S.107 (1) arose. 22. The decision of the Judicial committee in Meghrai v. Allarakhia ( AIR 1947 PC 72 ) is clear that when a province acts solely within the powers under the provincial List without relying on any power conferred by the Concurrent list, no question of repugnancy under S.107, Govt. of India Act would arise. 22. The decision of the Judicial committee in Meghrai v. Allarakhia ( AIR 1947 PC 72 ) is clear that when a province acts solely within the powers under the provincial List without relying on any power conferred by the Concurrent list, no question of repugnancy under S.107, Govt. of India Act would arise. The point raised in that case was whether the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act (Act IV of 1938) was void under S.107(1), Government of India Act to the extent that it conflicted with certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and other existing Indian Law. What that statute enacted in substance, was to set aside the normal procedure for redemption in the case of mortgages of land with possession and empower the Collection on an application by the mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage in certain circumstances or declare it extinguished and restore possession. The matter came upon appeal to the Federal Court and that Court held that the Act was not void inasmuch as there was no repugnancy between its provisions and those of the Civil procedure Code or the Contract Act by reason of the exceptions expressly provided for in the later enactments. Against this judgment there was an appeal taken to the Privy Council and their Lordships of the judicial committee affirmed the decision of the Federal Court but on different grounds. Their Lordships held that the impugned Act was by its very language confined exclusively to agricultural lands, and mortgage of agricultural lands, as well as the procedure for its enforcement were wholly within the competence of the Provincial Legislature being covered by items (21) and (2) of list II. As agricultural land was expressly excluded from (7), (8) and (10) of List III, the whole of the Act fell within the powers given to the Province by the Provincial List without any necessity to invoke powers from the Concurrent List. In these circumstances, no question of repugnancy under S.107 of the Government of India Act did arise at all or fall for consideration. In these circumstances, no question of repugnancy under S.107 of the Government of India Act did arise at all or fall for consideration. It will be seen that while the Federal Court based its decision in Meghraj v. Allarakhia ( AIR 1947 PC 72 ) on the ground that there was no real conflict between the provisions of the impugned Act and those of any existing Indian Law and kept open the question as to whether the impugned Act extended to properly other than agricultural lands, the Judicial Committee held definitely that the Act related to agricultural lands and that the question of repugnancy was not material at all. The same view was taken by the question of repugnancy was not material at all. The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in A.S. Krishnan v Madras State ( AIR 1957 SC 297 ) where, Venkatrama Iyer J said that Madras prohibition Act is entirely within the competence of the Madras Legislature, notwithstanding that some of its ancillary provisions entrenched upon the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, an existing law. 23. These rulings are clear authorities for the proposition that if a state law falls in pith and substance in List, II, mere incidental encroachment of that law upon the provisions of an existing Central law in relation to matters mentioned either in List I or in list III would not affect the validity of the State law. 24. So, whether the Electricity (Supply) Act is an existing law relatable to Entry 33 in List I or to Entry 31 in List III of the Government of India Act, or both, that would not in any way affect the validity of the Kerala Act, even if some of its provisions entrench upon the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act. 25. Will it make any difference if it is assumed that the Kerala Act is passed both under entries 26 and 27 in List II and under Entry 38 in List III? If the Electricity (Supply) Act was passed under Entry 33 in list I of the Government of India Act, corresponding to Entry 44 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, then, as already stated Art.254 will not be attracted; and so no question of repugnancy under that Article will arise. If the Electricity (Supply) Act was passed under Entry 33 in list I of the Government of India Act, corresponding to Entry 44 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, then, as already stated Art.254 will not be attracted; and so no question of repugnancy under that Article will arise. But, if the Electricity (Supply) Act is assumed to be passed under Entry 31 of List III of the Government of India Act, namely, 'electricity' or under that entry and entry 33 in list I of that Act, then in the event of repugnancy between its provisions relatable to the concurrent matter and those of the Kerala Act relating to the same matter Art.254 will be attracted, but since the Kerala Act has received the assent of the President, the Kerala Act would be valid under clause (ii) of Art.254. The provisions of Act XXX of 1966 amending the Electricity (Supply) Act, being deemed to be incorporated in the Electricity (Supply) Act from the date of commencement may not be a later law; and even if it is a later law, it does not have the effect of repealing the Kerala Act. And unless parliament amends or modifies or repeals the Kerala Act, the Kerala Act will remain in force. 26. It was contended by Mr. Nambiar that even if in pith and substance the Kerala Act is referable to an Entry or Entries in list II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, its incidental or ancillary provisions, if they come into conflict with the Electricity (Supply) Act, or its provisions, would be invalid. His argument was that since the field was occupied by an existing Central law, the incidental or ancillary provisions in the Kerala Act relating to the electricity as an article would be invalid as they are in conflict with S.49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. He relied on the doctrine of occupied field to support this contention. 27. His argument was that since the field was occupied by an existing Central law, the incidental or ancillary provisions in the Kerala Act relating to the electricity as an article would be invalid as they are in conflict with S.49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. He relied on the doctrine of occupied field to support this contention. 27. The Privy Council said in G. T. R. v. Attorney General, Canada ( 1907 AC 65) "There can be a domain in which provincial and Dominion legislation may overlap in which case neither legislation will be ultra vires if the field is clear and secondly that if the field is not clear, and in such a domain the two legislations meet then the Dominion legislation must prevail." A number of questions arise in connection with this proposition. Is it enough that the two legislatures deal with the same subject (although in different aspects) ? Is similarity of treatment of the same subject the test of whether the Central Legislation does or does not prevail? "There cannot be two statutes determining in different ways any one of the legal relations which is bound to arise from any given state of facts. If there be two statutes purporting so to do, one of them must be of no legal effect, either because repealed by the other or by some rule of law made subordinate thereto as to the particular legal relations (See Clement, the Canadian Constitution, page 465)." 28. In Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan (AIR 1941 FC 47) Sulaiman J, had occasion to consider the doctrine of occupied field. He said: "It seems to me that the principles of interpretation laid down by their lordships in the Canadian cases cannot be brushed aside by simply saying that they relate to a different Constitution. Those principles are not only of the greatest weight but must be a guide to us even in interpreting the Indian Constitution. Of course, we cannot interpret the language of any section in the Indian Act in the light of the interpretation of the corresponding section in the Canadian Constitution. That has to be avoided; but the principles of interpretation that have been established cannot be ignored. At the same time, it would be dangerous to import only a part of the doctrine and exclude another part. That has to be avoided; but the principles of interpretation that have been established cannot be ignored. At the same time, it would be dangerous to import only a part of the doctrine and exclude another part. Partial application may frustrate the very object for which the rule of law was deduced. The two doctrines of incidental encroachment and unoccupied field are closely related. I would go further and say that they are indissolubly connected. We cannot import the doctrine of incidental encroachment in favour of the provinces, and refuse to import the doctrine of unoccupied field which is in favour of the Centre. The two must go hand in hand. To allow Provincial Legislature to encroach upon the exclusive Federal Field, even though in an indirect way, when there is a Central legislation already occupying the field, would be to give the former a free hand in nullifying Central Acts relating to matters in the Federal list. Such a carte blanche could hardly have been contemplated. The scheme of S.100 of the Act is to exclude completely from the authority of the Provincial Legislature the power to legislate with respect to subjects in List I. If in consequence of certain difficulties that Provincial Legislature would experience by a rigid enforcement of such an exclusion we must in interpreting the words "with respect to" import the Canadian doctrine of permissibility of incidental encroachment, we must then at the same time import the other allied doctrine also that such an encroachment is permissible only when the field is actually unoccupied. It is only in this way that actual clash between the Centre and the Provinces can be avoided, which I think we must. This will also explain the apparent gap in S.107(1) of the Act, that gap being filled in by the provisions of S.100." The doctrine has been applied in no Privy Council case arising out of the Government of India Act, 1935. The implied holding in Prafulla Kumar v. Bank of Commerce Ltd. (AIR 1957 PC 60) Khulna is against the application of the doctrine here. Assuming that the doctrine is applicable here, if the Electricity (Supply) Act is relatable only to Entry 33 in List I of the Government of India Act and the Kerala Act to Entry 26 and Entry 27 of List II of the Constitution of India, they may not be legislations in pari materia. Assuming that the doctrine is applicable here, if the Electricity (Supply) Act is relatable only to Entry 33 in List I of the Government of India Act and the Kerala Act to Entry 26 and Entry 27 of List II of the Constitution of India, they may not be legislations in pari materia. There is also no irreconcilable conflict between them. 29. Lefroy, in his 'Canada's Federal System' says: "But the Rule as to predominance of dominion legislation, it may be confidently said can only be invoked in cases of absolutely conflicting legislation in pari materia when it would be an impossibility to give effect to both the Dominion and the Provincial enactments." There must be a real conflict between the two Acts, that is, the two enactments 'must come into collision (A.G. Ont. v A.G. Can (1896 AC 348 ) or 'come into conflict.......over a field of jurisdiction common to both' (City of Montreal v. Montreal Street (1912 AC 333, 334) so that while dealing with similar transactions or subject matters they yield a different result (Royal Bank of Canada v. Larue (1928 AC 187) 30. The repugnancy test formulated by Dixon J in Ex Parte Mclean (1930 (43) CLR 472) that if the intention of the paramount Legislature to express by its enactment, completely exhaustively, or exclusively, what shall be the law governing a particular conduct or matter, then, any other law by a province would be inconsistent may not be applicable in this context to decide whether there is actual conflict, as that test has been applied only where both legislations deal with a matter in the concurrent list. 31. In Fordes v A. G. Man (1937 AC 260 at 274) (involving the question, inter alia whether Dominion and Provincial income tax Legislation could coexist), the Privy Council said: "The doctrine of the 'occupied field' applied only where there is a clash between Dominion legislation and provincial legislation within an area common to both. Here there is no conflict. Both income taxes may coexist and be enforced without clashing. The Dominion reaps part of the yield of the Manitoba citizen's income. Here there is no conflict. Both income taxes may coexist and be enforced without clashing. The Dominion reaps part of the yield of the Manitoba citizen's income. The province reaps another part of it." The Kerala Act is an Act to control the production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, certain articles: S.2 says that "essential article" means any article (not being an essential commodity as defined in the Essential Commodities Act, 1955) which may be declared by the Government by notified Order to be an essential article; S.3 says that if it is necessary in the opinion of the Government "for maintaining or increasing the supplies of essential article or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, they may, by notified order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein, and that without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s.(1) an order made thereunder may provide (a) for regulating by licences, permits or otherwise the production of or manufacture of any essential article and (b) for controlling the price at which any essential article may be sold". 32. I am not able to see how the provisions in the Kerala Act are in conflict with any of the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. S.3 of the Kerala Act under which Ext. P1 order has been passed is not in conflict with any of the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. If there is no conflict, then the only question will be whether Ext. P1 is ultra vires S.3. If electricity is an article, I do not think that Ext. P1 is ultra vires the section. It was argued that Ext. P1 has the effect of interfering with the discretionary power of the Kerala State Electricity Board under S.49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act in the matter of charging the price of electrical energy by the compulsory requirement in Ext. P1 to levy a surcharge, and so, Ext. P1 is in conflict with the provisions of S.49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. S.49 reads. "49. P1 to levy a surcharge, and so, Ext. P1 is in conflict with the provisions of S.49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. S.49 reads. "49. Provision for the sale of electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees: Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any regulations made in this behalf, the Board may supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board may from time to time fix having regard to the nature and geographical position of the supply and the purposes for which it is required." As already indicated, if S.3 of the Kerala Act is not in conflict with S.49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, its potentiality to generate an order like Ext. P.1 would not make the section repugnant to S.49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. Ext. P1 by obliging the Board to levy a surcharge does not interfere with its discretionary power under S.49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, in the matter of charging the price of electrical energy. If the Board thinks that the levy of surcharge would affect adversely the consumers or the consumption of electrical energy in general, it is open to the Board to reduce pro tanto the price to be charged, and thus maintain the price of supply at the proper level. 33. In V.S.R. & Oil Mills v State of A.P. ( AIR 1964 SC 1781 ), the question was whether the two notified orders passed under S.3 of the Madras Essential Article Control and Requisitioning (Temporary Powers) Act, 29 of 1949, were valid. The court said: "Section 3(1) is obviously intended to secure supplies of essential articles and to arrange for their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. If electrical energy is one of the essential articles mentioned in the schedule, there can be no difficulty in holding that a notified order can be issued under S.3(1) for regulating the supply of the said energy and making it available at a fair price." The court further said: "The power to regulate can be exercised for ensuring the payment of a fair price, and the fixation of a fair price, would inevitably depend upon a consideration of all relevant and economic factors which contribute to the determination of such a fair price." The court also observed: "That is why we do not think Mr. Setalvad is right in contending that even though the respondent may have the power to regulate the price to which electrical energy should be supplied by it to the appellants, it had no power to enhance the said price.' 34. It was argued by Mr. Nambiar that if a corporation is created by a statute, the powers and duties of the Corporation have to be determined with reference to the provisions of the statute, that no alien body can confer additional Powers or impose duties on the Corporation or derogate from the powers and duties conferred or imposed by the statute. His argument was that S.49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act conferred an absolute discretionary power on the Board to fix the price of electricity supplied to consumers and an interference with that power by the State Government by directing the Board to charge surcharge as specified in Ext. P.1 will sterilize the operation of the Board and affect its status. 35. In John Deere Plow Co. v Wherton (1915 (84) Law Journal (PC) 64 at p. 71 - 72), referred to by counsel, the facts were: A Provincial Legislature passed an Act prohibiting companies which have not been incorporated in the Province from taking proceedings in the Courts of the Province in respect of contracts made within the Province and also imposed penalties if the company carried on business in the Province without obtaining a licence. The question that had to be determined was whether the particular legislation in the province was valid under the British North America Act. Viscount Haldane said: "But their Lordships think that the power to regulate trade and commerce at all events enables the Parliament of Canada to prescribe to what extent the powers of companies, the objects of which extend to the entire dominion, should be exercisable and what limitations should be placed on such powers. For, if it be established that the Dominion Parliament can create such companies, then, it becomes a question of general interest throughout the Dominion in what fashion they should be permitted to trade. Their Lordships are therefore of opinion that the Parliament of Canada had power to enact the sections relied on in this case in the Dominion Companies Act and the Interpretation Act. Their Lordships are therefore of opinion that the Parliament of Canada had power to enact the sections relied on in this case in the Dominion Companies Act and the Interpretation Act. They do not desire to be understood as suggesting that, because the status of a Dominion Company enables it to trade in a Province and thereby confers on it Civil rights to some extent, the power to regulate trade and commerce can be exercised in such a way as to trench, in the case of such companies, on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Provincial Legislatures over civil rights in general. No doubt this jurisdiction would conflict with that of the province if civil rights were to be read as an expression of unlimited scope. But, as has already been pointed out, the expression must be construed consistently with various powers conferred by S.91 and 92 which restrict its literal scope. It is enough for present purposes to say that the province cannot legislate so as to deprive a Dominion company of its status and powers. This does not mean that these powers can be exercised in contravention of the laws of the province restricting the rights of the public in the province generally. What it does mean is that the status and powers of a Dominion Company as such cannot be destroyed by provincial legislation . This conclusion appears to their Lordships to be in full harmony with what was laid down by the Board in Citizens Insurance Co v Parsons (7 App. Cas 96) Colonial Building and Investment Association v ATT. Gen. of Quebec. (9 App. Cas 157) and Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (12 App. Cas. 575)" 36. In Great West Saddlery Co. Ltd. v. King (1921 (2) AC 91), also referred to by counsel, the facts were: A company was incorporated under the Dominion law with power to trade in any province. A provincial law required that such companies should not carry on their business of trade in the province unless registered or licensed therein. The legislation of the Province was held invalid and ultra vires. Viscount Haldane explained the decisions in John Deere Plow Co. A provincial law required that such companies should not carry on their business of trade in the province unless registered or licensed therein. The legislation of the Province was held invalid and ultra vires. Viscount Haldane explained the decisions in John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton (1915 (84) Law Journal (PC) 64 at p. 71-72) and said: "If therefore in legislating for the incorporation of companies under Dominion law and invalidly endowing them with powers, the Dominion Parliament has by necessary implication given these companies a status which enables them to exercise these powers in the Provinces, they cannot be interfered with by any provincial law in such a fashion as to derogate from their status and their consequent capacities, or as the result of this restriction, to prevent them from exercising the powers conferred on them by Dominion law. Their Lordships however, observed that when a Company has been incorporated by the Dominion Government with powers to trade in any Province it may not the less, consistently with the General scheme, be subject to Provincial laws of general application, such as laws imposing taxes, or relating to mortmain, or even requiring licensees for certain purposes, or as to the forms of contracts; but they were careful not to say that the sanctions by which such Provincial laws might be enforced could validly be so directed by the Provincial Legislatures as indirectly to sterilize or even to effect, if the local laws were not obeyed, the destruction of the capacities and powers which the Dominion had validly conferred. To have said so would have been to mis read the scheme of the British North American Act, 1867 which is one which establishes interlacing and independent legislative authorities. Within the spheres allotted to them by the Act the Dominion and the provinces are rendered on general principle coordinate Governments. As a consequence where one has legislative power the other has not, speaking broadly, the capacity to pass laws which will interfere with its exercise. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly, This is a principle which has to be kept closely in view in testing the validity of the Provincial legislation under consideration as affecting Dominion companies." 37. These two decisions were explained and distinguished by Lord Atkin in Lymburn v. Mayland (1932 AC 318). What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly, This is a principle which has to be kept closely in view in testing the validity of the Provincial legislation under consideration as affecting Dominion companies." 37. These two decisions were explained and distinguished by Lord Atkin in Lymburn v. Mayland (1932 AC 318). The action in that case was brought by the plaintiffs to challenge the powers sought to be exercised by the Attorney General of Alberta under S.9 of the Security Frauds Prevention Act, 1930 (Alberta). Under S.9 of the Act, the Attorney General or any delegate appointed by him has power to examine any person or company at any time in order to ascertain whether any fraudulent act as defined by the statute or any offence against the Act or the regulations has been, is being, or is about to be, committed. The Attorney General Mr. Lymburn had appointed the defendant Mr. Frawley, to hold the examination in question, and Mr. Frawley had summoned the plaintiff, Mr. Mayland to attend him for examination on an enquiry amongst other things into items appearing in the balance sheet of the other plaintiff, Mercury Oils Ltd., as at 31st December 1930. Mr. Frawley also gave notice that he intended to inquire into a transaction between Solloway Mills & Co. Limited and the plaintiff, Mayland respecting the exchange of certain shares, and the assumption by Mayland of an underwriting agreement entered into between Solloway Mills & Co., Ltd., and Mill City Petroleums Ltd. All the companies mentioned were incorporated under the provisions of the Dominion Companies Act and Lord Atkin said: "It is said that these provisions so far as they affect Dominion Companies are ultra vires according to the principles adopted by this Board in John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton; Great West Saddlery Cov. v. The King; and Attorney General for Wanitoba v. Attorney General for Canada. In those cases there was a general prohibition to companies either to trade at all or to issue their capital unless the company was registered. The legislation was held ultra vires because the legislative powers of the Province are restricted so that "the status and powers of the Dominion company as such cannot be destroyed" (John Deree Plow Co. In those cases there was a general prohibition to companies either to trade at all or to issue their capital unless the company was registered. The legislation was held ultra vires because the legislative powers of the Province are restricted so that "the status and powers of the Dominion company as such cannot be destroyed" (John Deree Plow Co. case), and legislation will be invalid if a Dominion Company is "sterlized in all its functions and activities" or "its status and essential capacities are impaired in a substantial degree". (Great West Saddlery Co. case). It appears to their Lordships impossible to bring this legislation within such a principle. A Dominion company constituted with powers to carry on a particular business is subject to the competent legislation of the Province as to that business and may find its special activities completely paralysed, as by legislation against drink traffic or by the laws as to holding land. If it is formed to trade in securities there appears no reason why it should not be subject to the competent laws of the province as to the business of all persons who trade in securities. As to the issue of capital there is no complete prohibition, as in the Manitoba case in 1929; and no reason to suppose that any honest company would have any difficulty in finding registered persons in the province through whom it could lawfully issue its capital. There is no material upon which their Lordships could find that the functions and activities of a company were sterilized or its status and essential capacities impaired in a substantial degree." 38. In A.G. Man v. A.G. Can (1929 AC 260 SC 980), where provincial legislation was held ultra vires in so far as it prohibited Dominon company from selling its shares without obtaining a licence, Lord Sumner said "The capacity of a Dominion Company to obtain capital by the subscription or so called sale, of its shares, is essential in a sense in which holding particular kinds of property in a province or selling particular commodities, subject to provincial conditions or regulations, is not. Neither is the legislation which is in question saved by the fact that all kinds of companies are aimed at and that there is no special discrimination against Dominion companies. The matter depends upon the effect of the legislation not upon its purpose." 39. Neither is the legislation which is in question saved by the fact that all kinds of companies are aimed at and that there is no special discrimination against Dominion companies. The matter depends upon the effect of the legislation not upon its purpose." 39. The status or capacity of the Board is not in any way affected by the provisions of the Kerala Act or of Ext. P.1 . The Board is subject to the laws of the Kerala State passed in the exercise of its power to regulate commerce and trade, and production, supply and distribution of goods: The Additional surcharge is a levy over and above the price which the Board has fixed. The discretion of the Board to fix the price is not in any way interfered with, by the obligation to levy the surcharge. 40. The last argument of Mr. Nambiar was that there is no guidance given in S.2 of the Kerala Act for declaring an article an essential article, and thereof, the section is bad for the reason that there is excessive delegation of legislative power to Government. In this connection, counsel relied upon the ruling in Hamdard Dawarkhana v. Union of India ( AIR 1960 SC 554 ) In that case, the provisions of Cl. (d) of S.3 of the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954 (XXI of 1954) were struck down as having conferred uncanalised and uncontrolled power on the executive. In that case, the whole Act had been challenged as having infringed the fundamental rights of a citizen under Art.19(1)(a) and (g). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act as a whole, in view of the scope and object of the Act, which was not to interfere with the right of freedom of speech but had reference to trade and business. The Supreme Court held the provisions attacked on those grounds were reasonable restrictions on the rights of citizen to carry on any trade or business. But the Supreme Court further held that the words "or any other diseases or condition which may be specified in the rules made under this Act" in cl.(d) of s.3, which empowered the Central Government to add to the list of diseases falling within the mischief of S.3 suffered from the vice of excessive delegation. But the Supreme Court further held that the words "or any other diseases or condition which may be specified in the rules made under this Act" in cl.(d) of s.3, which empowered the Central Government to add to the list of diseases falling within the mischief of S.3 suffered from the vice of excessive delegation. The Supreme Court struck down that portion of the sub-section, as in its opinion, the words impugned were vague and Parliament had not established any criteria nor laid down any standard nor prescribed any principles on which a particular disease or condition was to be specified in the schedule. 41. This case was considered in Mohmedali v Union of India (AIR 1964). There the question was whether S.1(3)(b) of the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952, which provided: "Subject to the provisions contained in S.16, it applies x x x x (b) to any other establishment employing twenty or more persons or class or such establishments which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf: provided that the Central Government may, after giving not less than two months' notice of its intention so to do, by notification in the official gazette, apply the provision of this Act to any establishment employing such number of persons less than twenty as may be specified in the notification." conferred an uncanalised power upon Government and was, therefore, bad. Sinha C. J., speaking for the Court after referring to the decision in Hamdard Dawarkhana v. Union of India ( AIR 1960 SC 554 ) said: "It is clear that the last mentioned case illustrates the rule that the question whether or not a particular piece of legislation suffers from the vice of excessive delegation must be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances in the background of which the provisions of the statute impugned had been enacted. If, on a review of all the facts and circumstances and of the relevant provisions of the statute, the court is in a position to say that the legislature had clearly indicated the underlying principle of the legislation and laid down criteria and proper standards but had left the application of those principles and standards to individual cases in the hands of the executive, it cannot be said that there was excessive delegation of powers by the legislature. On the other hand, if a review of all those facts and circumstances and the provisions of the statute, including the preamble leaves the court guessing as to the principles and standards, then the delegate has been entrusted not with the mere function of applying the law to individual cases, but with a substantial portion of legislative power itself. Applying those principles which are now well established by quite a number of decisions of this court, can it be said in the instant case that the legislature had not indicated clearly the principles underlying the legislation and the standards to be applied. In our opinion, the answer must be an emphatic "no". 42. In Edward Mills Ltd. v State of Ajmer ( AIR 1955 SC 25 ), the Supreme Court upheld a delegation similar to one in the instant case, i.e., of power to add to the schedule attached to the Minimum Wages Act any employment in respect of which the Government thought that minimum wages should be fixed under the Act. The ground for holding the delegation valid was that the object of the Act was to fix the minimum wages which would make to the exploitation of labour, less likely; and that was a sufficient guide to the executive in the selection of employments to be included in the schedule. Similarly in Western India Theatres v Municipal Corporation, Poona ( AIR 1959 SC 586 ), the Supreme Court had upheld the grant of a general power to municipalities to impose "any other tax" and one of the reasons for accepting it as valid was that general power could be exercised only "for the purposes of the Act". It is fairly clear that so long as a policy, principle or standard, is indicated or prescribed, delegation will be treated as only relating to matters of non essential legislative function. "It is open to the Legislature to formulate the policy as broadly and with as little or as much detail as it thinks proper and it may delegate the rest of the legislative work to a subordinate authority who will work out the details, within the framework of that policy'.. (Mukherjea J. in In re - Art.143, Constitution of India ( AIR 1951 SC 332 at p. 400). 43. (Mukherjea J. in In re - Art.143, Constitution of India ( AIR 1951 SC 332 at p. 400). 43. The policy of legislation can be found from its provisions, the preamble the previous history of the enactment or the affidavit submitted by Government. 44. The social and economic conditions which call forth State regulation are so varied and complex that the legislature can often do no more than define the subject and lay down the policy in general terms and delegate to the executive the power to achieve the legislative purposes. If the standards to govern the discretion conferred on the administrative authority by delegation are articulate they may, owing to changing and unforeseen conditions, prove inadequate to cure the evil sought to be remedied by the legislature. Prescribing legislative policy in broad terms is essential also because when government enters upon a new field of regulation, it needs scope to experiment. When the ways of controlling the evil are found out, the legislature may then, in revised legislation, curtail the administrative discretion by adopting those ways as definite standards. (See Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 1858 Vol. I p. 154 and 156.) 45. In the light of the discussion above, I do not think the power given to Government to declare certain goods as essential goods suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power. I think Exs. P.1 and P.5 are valid orders and that the notices of demand are not liable to be quashed. I dismiss the petition. No costs.