JUDGMENT : C.K. Misra, J. - The facts narrated hereunder are with reference to the Civil Revision. Opposite party No. 2 is the decree-holder and opposite party No. 1 is the judgment debtor. The Petitioners are the auction purchasers in Ex. Case No. 231 of 1962 in the Court of the Munsif, Kendrapara. The total dues for which the execution case had been levied on 20-10-1962 were Rs. 243.07. Notice under Order 21, Rule 22 CPC was served on 14-11-1962. The decree had been passed on 26-10-1959. The original execution application was sought to be amended on 19-2-1963 by giving a completely new list of properties and deleting the old list in respect of which there was a prayer for attachment and sale. The amendment was allowed on the very (lay-No fresh' notice was issued under Order 21, Rule 22 Code of Civil Procedure. A notice u/s 14 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act was issued on 30-4-1963. The property was ultimately put to sale as a result of which 3.12 acres were sold for a sum of Rs. 390/- The sale was confirmed on 16-10-1963. The judgment-debtor filed an application under Order 21, Rule 90 CPC read with Section 47. The application was dismissed by the executing Court. The judgment-debtor carried an appeal. The application under Order 21, Rule 90 CPC was barred by limitation by about 37 days. The appellate Court held that the application purporting to be one under Order 21, Rule 90 CPC was barred by limitation, but that the application was maintainable u/s 47 CPC as the proclamation of sale bad not been served on the spot, and that the sale was a nullity on that account. If the application was treated as one u/s 47 Code of Civil Procedure., it was not barred by limitation and accordingly the appeal was allowed. Against the appellate order of the Additional District Judge, Cuttack, both the Misc. Appeal and the Civil Revision have been filed. 2. Mr. Ray for the judgment-debtor concedes that if the application is to be treated as one under Order 21, Rule 90 Code of Civil Procedure., it is barred by limitation. Section 5 of the Limitation Act., as per its terms, has no application to Order 21 Code of Civil Procedure. There cannot be any condonation of delay. 2. Mr. Ray for the judgment-debtor concedes that if the application is to be treated as one under Order 21, Rule 90 Code of Civil Procedure., it is barred by limitation. Section 5 of the Limitation Act., as per its terms, has no application to Order 21 Code of Civil Procedure. There cannot be any condonation of delay. He accordingly does not press the application under Order 21, Rule 90 Code of Civil Procedure. 3. The finding of the learned appellate Court that the sale was a nullity due to non-service of the sale proclamation on the spot cannot be supported. Mr. Ray very fairly accepted that position. Despite his concessions it would be profitable to deal with the law on the point. In Dhirendra Nath Gorai and Subal Chandra Shaw and Others Vs. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh and Others their Lordships laid down a workable test as to the distinction between an irregularity and illegality. The test is whether the party can waive the objection. If the statutory conditions were inserted for the security and benefit of the parties and no public interest if involved, such conditions will not be considered as indispensable and either party may waive them without affecting the jurisdiction of the Court. This view that the pale is not a nullity even where there is no service of sale proclamation has been consistently held by this Court. Ganja Satyavatamma Vs. Nima Chiti Appavyamma and Others Lal Gupteswaro v. Ramkrishna 32 (1916) C.L.T. 747, and Smt. Brajabala Das Vs. Radha Kamal Das and Others. A similar view has been taken in Narayanan Namboodiripad Vs. Thomakutty and Others. The view expressed in Venkateswara Ettu v. Ayyammal AIR 1950 Mad, and Kummathi Narayanappa Vs. Talari Akkulappa and Others cannot be held to be good law in view of the aforesaid pronouncement of the Supreme Court and the consistent authorities of this Court. The learned District Judge fell into an error in coming to the conclusion that the sale was a nullity and that the question fell within the scope of Section 47 CPC on that score. 4. The conclusion of the District Judge is also erroneous on another ground. Order 21, Rule 90 CPC as amended in Orissa, so far as relevant, runs thus: 90 (1). 4. The conclusion of the District Judge is also erroneous on another ground. Order 21, Rule 90 CPC as amended in Orissa, so far as relevant, runs thus: 90 (1). Where any immovable property has been Bold in execution of a decree, the decree-holder or any person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of assets, or whose interests are affected by the sale, may apply to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it. Proviso (i)(a) is to the effect that no application to set aside a sale shall be admitted upon any ground which could have been, but was not put forward by the Applicant before the sale was concluded. The objection taken before the District Judge was regarding the none-publication of the sale proclamation. So any material irregularity or fraud pertaining thereto comes within the ambit of Order 21, Rule 90 Code of Civil Procedure. By virtue of the aforesaid proviso a ground could have been put forward before the Court that the publication of the sale was not valid. It has been sometimes contended that the judgment-debtor being absent cannot know of the proclamation of the sale and cannot advance such an objection before the sale takes place, and it is for the decreeholder to prove that the judgment-debtor has the knowledge of the non-publication of the sale proclamation prior to the sale being held. This contention is fantastic. After the service of notice under Order 1, Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure, it is the duty of the judgment-debtor to all through appear in the case and whenever be does not appear and any act done by the Court in due discharge of the duties does not come to his notice on account of his absence, he must suffer for it. It is not the duty of the decree-holder to prove his knowledge at each stage. A consistent view has been taken in a series of decisions of this Court that if the judgment-debtor does not raise any objection to the non-service of the proclamation before the sale takes place, he cannot raise such objection in an application under Order 21, Rule 90, CPC by virtue of the proviso. See Lal Gupteswaro v. Ram Krishna 32 (1916) C.L.T. 747 and Damodar v. Raghunath 35 (1969) C.L.T. 139. See Lal Gupteswaro v. Ram Krishna 32 (1916) C.L.T. 747 and Damodar v. Raghunath 35 (1969) C.L.T. 139. There is single Judge decision of this Court reported in Krushna Mohan Mohanty Vs. Govinda Chandra Sahu laying down a contrary view. This can no longer be treated as good law in view of the Division Bench decision of this Court in Lal Gupteswaro v. Ramkrishna 32 (1916) C.L.T. 747. 5. On either view, the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge cannot be supported. The sale was not a nullity. The non-publication of the sale proclamation did not render the sale a nullity. It was a mere irregularity in the publication of the sale. Mr. Ray also fairly conceded this position of law. 6. Mr. Ray now advances altogether a new contention in support of the case of the judgement-debtor. His argument is that the original execution application was filed on the last date of limitation on 26-10-1962. The properties mentioned therein for attachment and sale were completely substituted by a new list on 19-2-1963 by an amendment application. According to Mr. Ray, the amendment application constituted a fresh application in execution and as there was no further service of notice on the judgment-debtor under Order 21, Rule 22, CPC and the judgment-debtor has sustained substantial injury, the sale is a nullity and the application lies u/s 47, CPC for setting aside the sale. This contention necessitates answers on t be following questions: (1) Whether the amendment application filed on 19-2-1963 giving an entirely new list of properties constitutes a fresh execution application; (2) If it is a fresh execution application, whether further notice under Order 21, Rule 22, CPC is to be served on a judgment-debtor; (3) If such a notice is to be served, whether non-service of such a notice affects the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with the execution and if the sale would be a nullity. 7. The aforesaid contentions are fully academic in the facts and circumstances of this case. Assuming that the application to amend the execution petition by deleting the list of properties mentioned therein and substituting altogether a new list of property is a fresh application, all that is necessary is that a notice under Order 21, Rule 22, CPC is to be served. That application was filed on 19-2-1963 and the amendment was allowed on the same date. That application was filed on 19-2-1963 and the amendment was allowed on the same date. But though no notice under Order 21, Rule 22, CPC was served, a notice u/s 14 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act was issued on 13-4-1963 and was duly served. The object of a notice under Order 21, Rule 22, CPC is to furnish an opportunity to the judgment-debtor to advance objections, if any, to the maintainability of the execution application and to prevent him from being taken by surprise and to enable him to satisfy the decree before execution is issued against him. The identical purpose was served when a notice u/s 14 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act was served. By that notice the judgment-debtor necessarily came to learn that an execution case was pending against him. Merely because a notice u/s 14 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act relates to fixing the valuation of the property, the judgment-debtor cannot complain that he had no notice of the execution case. Order 21, Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in Orissa, says that proceedings held in execution of a decree shall not be invalid solely by reason of any omission to issue or failure to serve a notice under Sub-rule (1) or to record reasons where such notice is dispensed with under sub-rule (2) unless the judgment-debtor has sustained injury thereby. In this case notice u/s 14 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act was served and it was open to the judgment-debtor to come up at that stage to pay up the entire decretal dues and satisfy the execution. In this view of the matter, all the new contentions raised by Mr. Ray are, as I have already said, wholly academic. Despite getting notice of the execution case the judgment-debtor took no further steps and even if the injury is substantial the objection is not maintainable. For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment of the learned Additional District Judgecannot be sustained. The Misc. Appeal is not maintainable and is dismissed. The Civil Revision is allowed. The judgment of the learned Additional District Judge is Bet aside. The sale held already must stand. In the circumstances, parties to bear their own costs throughout. Final Result : Allowed