Buddinath Mishra v. State Of Bihar — 1969 DIGILAW 84 (PAT)

Judgment B.N.Jha, J. 1. The Banaili Raj was the proprietor of touzi No. 503 village Gorhimal and Touzi No. 372 of village Routara in Godda town. The land of Khata No. 74 of Plot No. 6 of village Gorhimal along with other lands of the village belonged to one Gajadhar Prasad and others. The proprietors of Banaili Raj acquired them under Sec.25A of Regulation II of 1872 in case No. 1/6 of 1918-19 for erection of buildings and extension of cutchery compound. The land of Plot No. 6 of Village Gorhimal appertaining to Touzi No. 503 and of Plot No. 360 appertaining to Touzi No. 372 of village Routara was the basauri land of the Raj. In partition of the estate, the aforesaid mahal of Gorhimal and Routara fell in the share of the petitioners who were proprietors of Banaili Raj to the extent of three annas share and thereafter the petitioners came in exclusive possession of the aforesaid lands of Plots Nos. 6 and 360. The estate of the petitioners completely vested by the 30th January, 1954 in the State of Bihar. The State of Bihar also took possession of the cutchery and the land appertaining to it and the petitioners remained in possession of the remaining portions of Plots Nos. 6 and 360. According to the case of the petitioners, the rent of the aforesaid land has been settled by the State of Bihar and the petitioners have been paying rent of the same to the State. 2. According to the case of the petitioners, they are basauri tenants of the aforesaid land under Sections 5 and 7 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. The petitioners, therefore, had full right to make transfer of the aforesaid land as basauri tenants. In the alternative, they asserted that even if they be deemed to be the raiyats in respect of the aforesaid land under Sec. 6 of the Land Reforms Act, they were not the raiyats within the meaning of the Santhal Parganas Tenany Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and Sec.20 of the Act, putting restrictions on the powers of transfer of the land of a raiyat, could not be applied in the case of the petitioners. The Banaili Raj had settled a portion of the aforesaid land acquired under Regulation II of 1872 with various tenants for homestead purposes who had constructed their buildings over the same. After the vesting, the petitioners sold a portion of the land by a registered kebala at the rate of Rs. 4,000 per katha sometime in the year 1966. Thereafter, they sold some more portions of the land but the Registration Officer, Godda, refused to register the documents at the instance of the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Godda, on the ground that Sec.20 of the Act applied in the case of the transfer made by the petitioners also. The matter was referred to the Deputy Commissioner by the Registration Officer, Godda, at the instance of the petitioners but it has not been decided as yet. The petitioners have characterised this action of the Registration Officer as mala fide because the State of Bihar wanted to acquire the land and did not like to pay proper compensation. According to the petitioners, the valuation of the land would not be less than Rs. 2,500 per katha. They referred to certain correspondence between the local authorities and the Commissioner, Bhagalpur, in which it was mentioned that the land of the petitioners and others measuring 9.32 acres should be acquired for the purposes of shifting the Godda Hatia from the present site and approximate compensation would be paid at Rs. 8,550 i. e. at the rate of less than Rs. 1,000 per acre. The residents of Godda town filed objection to the shifting of the Hatia but it was ignored. The petitioners came to know that the Commissioner of Bhagalpur Division recommended to the Government for acquiring the said land at the aforesaid rate. 8,550 i. e. at the rate of less than Rs. 1,000 per acre. The residents of Godda town filed objection to the shifting of the Hatia but it was ignored. The petitioners came to know that the Commissioner of Bhagalpur Division recommended to the Government for acquiring the said land at the aforesaid rate. Thereafter, the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Godda, filed an application along with the Kanungos report for the acquisition of the land mentioned in the report before the Sub-divisional Officer, Godda, who started a proceeding for acquisition of the land measuring 8.62 acres or mouza Gorhi-mal and 0.70 acre of mouza Routara which include 3.45 acres of aforesaid plot No. 6 of village Gorhimal and 0.70 acre of plot No. 360 of village Routara belonging to the petitioners, on the 25th September, 1967 (Annexure F), being Land Acquisition Case No. 3 of 1967-68 under Sec. 53 (1) (a) of the Act for shifting of Godda Hat for better management and increased income and notice was ordered to be issued to the raiyats of the aforesaid two villages and to the tenants whose lands were going to be acquired for the purpose of filing objections. The petitioners having learnt about the land acquisition proceedings and the previous correspondence for the acquisition of the land have filed this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for quashing the land acquisition proceeding (annexure F) and restraining the opposite party from acquiring the lands of the petitioners after declaring that the lands of the petitioners are homestead and not raiyati lands, they are liable to be sold and the opposite party have no right to withhold and refuse registration of transfer deeds etc. 3. The State of Bihar has shown cause in which it has been asserted that the status of the petitioners in respect of the disputed lands is that of raiyats under the Act and, therefore, they have got no right to sell under Sec.20 of the Act. In such circumstances, the lands of the petitioners could be acquired under the provisions of Sec. 53 (1) (a) of the Act on payment of proper compensation which could be determined afterwards. 4. In such circumstances, the lands of the petitioners could be acquired under the provisions of Sec. 53 (1) (a) of the Act on payment of proper compensation which could be determined afterwards. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that Sec. 53 of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949, is unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that it contravenes Sec.299 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Article 31 (2) of the Constitution of India and also as it violates Article 14 of the Constitution. He further submitted that even if it be held that Sec. 53 of the Act is valid and constitutional, the provisions of the section are not attracted to the lands of the petitioners for the acquisition of which the proceeding (annexure F) has been started and, therefore, he urged that the entire proceeding should be quashed. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submitted that Sec. 53 of the Act is valid and constitutional and does not infringe either Sec.299 (2) of the Government of India Act or any provision of the Constitution. He also submitted that the status of the petitioners is that of raiyats within the meaning of Section 53 of the Act and, therefore, their land could be acquired under this provision of the Act. 5. In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties, it is necessary to quote the relevant portion of the provisions of Sec. 53 of the Act: "53 (1) (a) The landlord of a village who is desirous of acquiring the holding or part of the holding of any raiyat in such village or any land over which the inhabitants of such village have any common right for any reasonable and sufficient purpose having relation to the good of the holding, village or estate or for the erection of buildings or for any religious, educational or for the purpose of mining, manufacture or irrigation or effecting any agricultural or horticultural improvement or giving effect to any national policy of the Government, may apply to the Deputy Commissioner for sanction to acquire the same. (c) On receipt of such application as is referred to in Clauses (a) and (b) the Deputy Commissioner shall scrutinise it with a view to see that it satisfies the conditions of acquisition prescribed by the State Government in this behalf. (c) On receipt of such application as is referred to in Clauses (a) and (b) the Deputy Commissioner shall scrutinise it with a view to see that it satisfies the conditions of acquisition prescribed by the State Government in this behalf. If on such scrutiny the Deputy Commissioner considers the application to be not maintainable on the face of it, he may reject the application summarily. (4) If the applicant landlord, village headman, mulraiyat or raiyat, as the case may be, tenders to the raiyat whose land is acquired or other interested persons such sum as the Deputy Commissioner has approved under Sub-section (3) as compensation and the latter refuses to receive the same, the Deputy Commissioner may, on the landlord, village headman, mulraiyat or raiyat, as the case may be, depositing the said sum with the Deputy Commissioner give possession of the land to him in the prescribed manner and may execute a lease in the prescribed form in his favour." The Act is a pre-Constitution Act when the Government of India Act, 1935 was in force. It was enacted in 1949 and received assent of the Governor and was published in the Bihar Gazette on the 13th April, 1949. It came into force on the 1st November, 1949. This fact appears from the Government publication of the Santhal Pargauas Manual, 1911 (3rd Edition) at page 11. The aforesaid provision clearly shows that the land of a raiyat could be acquired by the Deputy Commissioner on the application of the landlord, both for private purposes of the landlord, as well as for public purposes mentioned in the section. The landlord has been defined in the Act under Sec. 4 (x) as follows:- - ""Landlord means a person other than the village headman, or mulraiyat entitled to receive rent and includes a proprietor, a tenure-holder, a ghatwal and the Government," The word "Government" has been substituted for the "Crown". After vesting of the estate of the intermediaries, the Government have become the landlords. Therefore, Government also could resort to the provisions of Sec. 53, if they intend to acquire land for the purposes mentioned in the section. Annexure E shows that the State of Bihar through the Additional Collector, Santhal Parganas, applied for the acquisition of 9.32 acres of land which include 4.15 acres of the land of the petitioners. Therefore, Government also could resort to the provisions of Sec. 53, if they intend to acquire land for the purposes mentioned in the section. Annexure E shows that the State of Bihar through the Additional Collector, Santhal Parganas, applied for the acquisition of 9.32 acres of land which include 4.15 acres of the land of the petitioners. The purpose of the acquisition sought for is the shirting of Godda Hat for better management and increased income. Hence, learned counsel for the petitioners Submitted that Sec. 53 of the Act contravenes the provision of Sec.299 (2) of the Government of India, Act, 1935 and Article 31 (2) of the Constitution as the provisions of Sec. 53 of the Act which relate to acquisition of immovable property does not fix any compensation nor the basis for determination of compensation. Sec.299 of the Government of India Act provides as follows:- - "299 (1) -- No person shall be deprived of his property in British India save by authority of law. (2) Neither the Federal nor a Provincial Legislature shall have power to make any law authorising the compulsory acquisition for public purposes of any land, or any commercial or industrial undertaking, or any interest in, or in any company-owning any commercial or industrial undertaking unless the law provides for the payment of compensation for the property acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, it is to be determined." This provision puts restrictions on the powers of the Federal and Provincial Legislature to pass laws for the compulsory acquisition for public purposes of any land or any commercial or industrial undertaking etc. unless the law for acquisition made provision for the payment of compensation for the property acquired and either fixed the amount of compensation or specified the principles on which and the manner in which it was to be determined. It is now well settled that compensation means the amount equivalent to the loss which a person suffers on account of such acquisition. It is clear from the provisions of Sec. 53 of the Act that the law does neither fix the amount of compensation nor specify the principles on which and the manner in which it is to be determined. It is clear from the provisions of Sec. 53 of the Act that the law does neither fix the amount of compensation nor specify the principles on which and the manner in which it is to be determined. The Sub-divisional Officer is the Judge for the determination of compensation to be paid for the acquisition of the land under this section. It is true that the provisions for appeal, revision and review have been made in the Act, but under the Act, appeal or revision could be filed by the person aggrieved before the Executive Officers who are to decide the matter as they may think fit. There is no standard or basis laid down in the Act for the determination of such compensation. 6. The petitioners have alleged that though they have sold the adjoining land even at the rate of Rs. 4,000 per katha but the Circle Officer, Godda, the sub-divisional Officer, Godda, the Additional Collector, Dumka, the Deputy Commissioner, Dumka and the Commissioner of Bhagalpur Division have written to the Goverment that the land could be acquired only at the rate of about Rs. 1,000 per acre. Therefore, they allege that there was no guarantee that proper compensation would be paid to the petitioners when the authorities concerned who might hear the appeal or revision have already decided that the land could be acquired at Rs. 1,000 per acre. The petitioners have also further alleged mala fide motive on the part of the authorities as the sale deeds as executed by the petitioners in favour of the purchasers which showed the valuation of the land at about Rs. 4,000 per katha were refused registration by the Registration Officer and when the matter was referred to the Deputy Commissioner, he kept the matter pending and did not decide it. The petitioners contended that they had every right to sell and execute sale deeds in respect of the land which were acquired by the petitioners predecessors under Sec.25A of the Santhal Parganas Regulation of 1886. They have also prayed in this petition for a declaration that the laud of the petitioners could be sold and the opposite party had no right to withhold the transfer and refuse registration of the deeds etc. They have also prayed in this petition for a declaration that the laud of the petitioners could be sold and the opposite party had no right to withhold the transfer and refuse registration of the deeds etc. But this relief could not be granted along with other reliefs prayed for in the same petition as this relief is quite different and distinct from other reliefs. In this writ application, in my opinion, it is not necessary to decide the question of mala fide on the part of the authorities and the rights of the petitioners to sell the land, as the application could be disposed of on other grounds. 7. Reading the provisions of Sec. 53 of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy Act, 1949, it is clear that they do not fulfil the requirements of Sec.299 (2) of the Government of India Act, as regards the fixation of the amount of compensation or specification of the principles on which and the manner in which it was to be determined. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Provincial Legislature was not competent to enact Sec. 53 of the Act and as such it is void ab initio and the proceeding taken in pursuance thereof could not be allowed to continue. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the provisions of Section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, were bodily lifted and incorporated in Article 31 of the Constitution which were in the following words:- - "31 (1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. (2) No property, movable or immovable, including any interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given." Sec.299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, gave a constitutional guarantee to the private property of a person. It provided that nobodys property would be acquired except through the process of law. It provided that nobodys property would be acquired except through the process of law. It also provided that the law for acquisition made by the Federal or the Provincial Legislature must fulfil two conditions: (i) that the acquisition must be for public purposes and (ii) that it must provide for the payment of compensation for the property acquired fixing the amount of compensation or specifying the principles on which and the manner in which it is to be determined. Therefore, after the enforcement of the Government of India Act, 1935, if the law did not fulfil the conditions laid down under Sec.299 of the Government of India Act, the law must be struck down as unconstitutional and could not be regarded as a law on the statute book. The framers of the Constitution, while guaranteeing fundamental right to the citizens of India, also guaranteed this right of property under Article 31 of the Constitution and if the law for acquisition does not fulfil the conditions as laid down in Article 31 of the Constitution as in Sec.299 of the Government of India Act, the law must be struck down as unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that it is violative of Article 31 of the Constitution. 9. Sec.3 of the Land Acquisition Bombay Amendment Act (24 of 1948) was struck down by the Supreme Court in N. B. Teejeebhoy V/s. Assistant Collector, Thana, AIR 1965 SC 1096 , as it offended Sec.299 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935. It was held in that case that such an Act which was not in consonance with the provisions of Sec.299 of the Government of India Act and did not fulfil the conditions laid down therein, could not be regarded as an Act on the Statute book as it was a nullity. Provisions of Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948 (West Bengal Act 21 of 1948) were held unconstitutional and invalid as they did not fulfil the requirements of Sub-section (2) of Sec.299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Supreme Court in the State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bela Banerjee, 1954 SCR 558 = ( AIR 1954 SC 170 ). Bela Banerjee, 1954 SCR 558 = ( AIR 1954 SC 170 ). In that case Section 8 of the impugned Act limited the compensation payable so as not to exceed the market value of the land as on December, 1946, though the land might be acquired long thereafter and the value of the land might have been increased. It was observed as follows:- - "... .While it is true that the Legislature is given the discretionary power of laying down the principles which should govern the determination of the amount to be given to the owner for the property appropriated, such principles must ensure that what is determined as payable must be compensation, that is, a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of. Within the limits of this basic requirement of full indemnification of the expropriated owner, the Constitution allows free play to the Legislative judgment as to what principles should guide the determination of the amount payable. Whether such principles take into account all the elements which make up the true value of the property appropriated and exclude matters which are to be neglected, is a justiciable issue to be adjudicated by the court. ....." In that view it was held that the fixing of an anterior date for the ascertainment of value may, in certain circumstances, be a violation of the constitutional requirement as, for instance, when the proposed scheme of acquisition becomes known before it is launched and prices rise sharply in anticipation of the benefits to be derived under it, but the fixing of an anterior date, which might have no relation to the value of the land when it is acquired, may be, many years later, cannot but be regarded as arbitrary. After the decision of the Bela Banerjees case, 1954 SCR 558 = ( AIR 1954 SC 170 ) and the other cases by the Supreme Court, Article 31 (2) of the Constitution was amended which now runs in the following words:- - "31 (2): No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given; and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate." Though it was held that in terms of Sec.299 of the Government of India Act and Article 31 of the Constitution the Legislature could make law for the acquisition of a private property only for the public purposes meaning thereby that not for private purposes; but the language used therein was not so explicit. The Supreme Court in Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil V/s. State of Bombay, (1955) 1 SCR 691 at p. 695 = ( AIR 1955 SC 47 at p. 49) pointed out that one of the rights secured to a person by Part III of the Constitution is a right that his property shall be acquired only for public purposes and under a law authorising such acquisition and providing for compensation which is either fixed by the law itself or regulated by principles specified by the law. That is also the very right which was previously secured to the person under Sec.299 of the Government of India Act. The amended Article 31 has made this clear by inserting that no property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose. The amendment has also provided whether the compensation provided by the law is adequate or not is not a justiciable issue before the Court. 10. The amended Article 31 has made this clear by inserting that no property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose. The amendment has also provided whether the compensation provided by the law is adequate or not is not a justiciable issue before the Court. 10. On the basis of the aforesaid authorities, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that Sec. 53 of the Act which was enacted and published in the Bihar Gazette on 13th April, 1949, and came into force on 1st November, 1949, was beyond the competency of the Provincial Legislature to enact on the ground because firstly, it provided for the acquisition of a private property both for the private and public purposes, and secondly, it did not fix the amount of compensation or specify the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation was to be determined and given as laid down in Section 299 (2) of the Government of India Act and, as such, it must be struck down. Section 53 provides that the landlord of a village could acquire a raiyati right for any reasonable and sufficient purpose or for the erection of buildings or for any religious, educational or charitable purpose or for the purpose of mining, manufacturing or irrigation or effecting any agricultural or horticultural improvement or giving effect to any national policy of the Government. Therefore, the law contemplates acquisition both for private and public purposes in terms of Sec.299 (2) of tbe Government of India Act, 1935. After its enforcement, the Provincial Legislature could not certainly enact law for the acquisition of a land for private purposes. No doubt, it is true that there are some provisions both in the Bihar Tenancy Act and the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act which empower the landlord to acquire raiyati land for his private purposes but those enactments are pre-Government of India Act, 1935. We are not concerned here with such enactments. The impugned enactment has been passed by the Provincial Legislature after the enforcement of the Government of India Act, 1935 and, therefore, the validity of the Act has got to be judged in the light of the provisions of Sec.299 of the Government of India Act, 1935. We are not concerned here with such enactments. The impugned enactment has been passed by the Provincial Legislature after the enforcement of the Government of India Act, 1935 and, therefore, the validity of the Act has got to be judged in the light of the provisions of Sec.299 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Though Sec. 53 of the Act provides for the payment of compensation but they do not fix the amount of compensation or specify the principle on which and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given as laid down in Sec.299 (2). The amount of compensation has got to be determined by the Deputy Commissioner or other superior Executive authorities to whom the appeal or the revision could be filed whose decisions may be arbitrary and the desired end may not be achieved as no principles or manner of determination of compensation are given in the Act. Therefore, judging the provisions of Section 53 of the Act in the light of the conditions laid down in Sec.299 (2) of the Government of India Act, it is clear that they do not fulfil the requirements of Sec.299 and the Provincial Legislature had no power to enact them and, as such, they could not be held valid and constitutional. 11. From the aforesaid discussion it is also clear that Sec. 53 of the Act makes naked encroachment on the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under the Constitution to hold their properties and their properties could not be acquired save for public purposes under the process of laws which are in conformity with the provisions of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. It was argued that the alleged purpose of acquisition is not public purpose as by no stretch of imagination the shifting of Godda Hat for better management and increased revenue could be regarded as public purpose. As Sec. 53 of the Act does not fulfil the requirements of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution, it is unconstitutional and void and no action could be taken under this provision for acquisition even for public purposes. It is needless to consider whether the alleged purpose is private or public. 12. Learned counsel for the State submitted that Sec. 53 of the Act provides for payment of compensation for the land so acquired under the aforesaid Act. It is needless to consider whether the alleged purpose is private or public. 12. Learned counsel for the State submitted that Sec. 53 of the Act provides for payment of compensation for the land so acquired under the aforesaid Act. Ac-cording to him, compensation, as was held in Bela Banerjees case, 1954 SCR 558 = ( AIR 1954 SC 170 ) means a just equivalent of what the owner has been deprived of. The compensation would be determined after the land is ordered to be acquired and the petitioners would not suffer in any way. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however submitted that the authorities, who would be deciding the amount of compensation had already decided to acquire the land at the rate of Rs. 1,000 per acre while the market value of the land could not be less than R.s. 2,500 per katha on the average. It is true that the Act has provided for the payment of Compensation but it does not fix either the amount of compensation or specify the principles and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given as laid down in Sec.299 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Article 31 (2) of the Constitution. This provision is intended to safeguard the interest of the person whose land was going to be acquired by the Executive Authorities from the arbitrariness and whims of the authorities. Therefore, it cannot be held that the provisions of Sec. 53 of the Act fulfil the conditions laid down in Sec.299 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935. 13. Learned counsel for the State further contended that the provisions of Section 53 of the Act are saved under Article 31(5) as existing law and the validity of the Act could not be questioned in courts of law. The existing law is defined under Article 366 (10) of the Constitution which reads as follows:- - " Existing law means any law, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation passed or made before the commencement of this Constitution by any Legislature, authority or person having power to make such a law, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation." The Constitution commenced from 26th January, 1950. The impugned Act was passed before this date and hence, the validity of the Act is saved by the provisions of Clause (5) of Article 31 of the Constitution. The impugned Act was passed before this date and hence, the validity of the Act is saved by the provisions of Clause (5) of Article 31 of the Constitution. This argument is misconceived. Article 31, Clause (5) only saves those existing laws as defined in the Constitution which are not governed by the provisions of Clause (6) of the Article which reads as follows:- - "31 (6): Any law of the State enacted not more than eighteen months before the commencement of this Constitution may within three months from such commencement be submitted to the President for his certification; and thereupon, if the President by public notification so certifies, it shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of Clause (2) of this Article or has contravened the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Sec.299 of the Government of India Act, 1935." 14. The impugned Act was passed within eighteen months of the commencement of the Constitution. Therefore, the provisions of Sec. 53, though offending Sec.299 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Article 31 (2) of the Constitution could be saved only if the Act was submitted to the President for his certification within three months from the commencement of the Constitution. It was definitely asserted in paragraph 18 (h) of the petition that to the knowledge and information of the petitioners either Sec. 53 of the said Act or the Act itself was not sent to the President for certification nor the President certified the same nor such notification was made. In the counter-affidavit filed by the State this fact has not been denied asserting therein that Sec. 53 of the Act was so certified under Article 31 (6) of the Constitution. We made enquiries from learned counsel for the State as to whether the impugned Act was certified or not under the provisions of Article 31 (6) of the Constitution. He took time to ascertain this fact from the Secretariat but he showed his inability to state that the Act was so certified. The Santhal Parganas Manual, 1911 (Third Edition) which is a Government publication also does not mention that either the Act or Sec. 53 of the Act was certified by the President. He took time to ascertain this fact from the Secretariat but he showed his inability to state that the Act was so certified. The Santhal Parganas Manual, 1911 (Third Edition) which is a Government publication also does not mention that either the Act or Sec. 53 of the Act was certified by the President. Therefore, we presume that the Act was not certified as laid down in Article 31 (6) of the Constitution and the provisions of Sec. 53 of the Act as they offend Sec.299 (2) of the Government of India, Act, 1935 and Article 31 (2) of the Constitution, could not be saved from being struck down as unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that it was beyond the competency of the Provincial Legislature to enact it. 15. For the reasons stated above, it must be held that the provisions of Section 53 of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949, are violative of the provisions of Sec.299 (2) of the. Government of India Act, 1935 as well as Article 31 (2) of the Constitution and, as such, they are void and unconstitutional and could not be regarded as a law on the Statute book and the acquisition proceeding started under such invalid enactment could not be sustained on this ground alone. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners next urged that the provisions of Section 53 of the Act are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution which gives a person equality before the law and affords equal protection of the law within the territory of India. He submitted that Regulation No. 3 of 1872 (The Santhal Parganas Settlement Regulation, 1872) provides that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 will also apply in the Santhal Parganas and, therefore, for the acquisition of a land, the State can take recourse to either Sec. 53 of the Act or the Land Acquisition Act. It is for the authorities concerned to take recourse to either. If a land is acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, a person will have the advantage of determination of compensation by a Judicial Officer constituting an independent tribunal and not only by the Executive Officer who will be acquiring the land. It is for the authorities concerned to take recourse to either. If a land is acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, a person will have the advantage of determination of compensation by a Judicial Officer constituting an independent tribunal and not only by the Executive Officer who will be acquiring the land. He will also have the benefit of an appeal before the High Court and the Supreme Court but if a land is acquired under Sec. 53 of the Act, the amount of compensation will be determined only by the Executive Officer and an appeal or a revision will lie before the Executive Officers. Therefore the determination of compensation in this case may depend on the whims and arbitrariness of the Executive Officers. It is alleged that in this case the Executive Officers who will be determining the compensation have already made up their mind and written to the Government that the land could be acquired at the rate of Rs. 1,000 per acre. Secondly, he submitted that principles of compensation and mode of determination of such compensation are laid down under the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, while deciding the appeal, the appellate Court will be in a position to examine whether the compensation has been determined according to the principles laid down in the Land Acquisition Act or not, whereas there is nothing like that under Sec. 53 of the Act for the guidance of the Officers for the purposes of determination of the valuation. Thirdly, he submitted that under the Land Acquisition Act, a solatium of 15 per cent is given for compulsory acquisition whereas under Sec. 53 no such provision is made. Hence, he contended that if a persons land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act he will be getting more than a person whose similarly situated land is acquired under Sec. 53 of the Act. Therefore, learned counsel submitted that Sec. 53 of the Act is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. There is a good deal of force in the submission of learned counsel. In that connection, he drew our attention to several decisions of the Supreme Court which I shall presently refer. 17. In P. Vajravelu Mudaliar V/s. Spl. Dy. Therefore, learned counsel submitted that Sec. 53 of the Act is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. There is a good deal of force in the submission of learned counsel. In that connection, he drew our attention to several decisions of the Supreme Court which I shall presently refer. 17. In P. Vajravelu Mudaliar V/s. Spl. Dy. Collector for Land Acquisition, West Madras, AIR 1965 SC 1017 , the Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment) Act (23 of 1961) was struck down on the ground that if the land was acquired for housing scheme under the amending Act, the claimant got a lesser value then he would get for the same land or a similar land if it was acquired for a public purpose like hospital under the Land Acquisition Act (Principal Act). It is now well settled that the Legislature could make a reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation but that classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which, distinguishes persons and things left out of the group and the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Statute in question. It was pointed out that there was no such reasonable classification in making amendment in the Land Acquisition Act. 18. In Northern India Caterers (Pvt.) Ltd. V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1581 Section 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act (31 of 1959) was struck down on the ground that it was discriminatory and violative of Article 14 because the State was competent to proceed both under ordinary law of the land and Sec. 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act which was more drastic in nature and if the Government proceeded under Sec. 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, the tenant will not have the advantage of his case being tried by judicial officers though there was provision for appeal under the Act but the appeals were to be heard by the Executive Officers. In such circumstances, it was urged that the Act was discriminatory because amongst the same class of persons occupying Government property and premises the law made discrimination because the proceeding under Sec. 5 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act (34 of 1959) was more drastic and prejudicial than one under the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the Act was struck down. 19. In the case of the Deputy Commissioner and Collector, Kamrup V/s. Durganath Sharma, AIR 1968 SC 394 the Assam Acquisition of Land for Flood Control and Prevention of Erosion Act (6 of 1955) was struck down on the ground that for the acquisition of the land the State could proceed both under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as well as under Act 6 of 1955. If the State proceeded under the Assam Act 6 of 1955, a nominal compensation was to be paid for the acquisition of a land but if the proceeding was taken under the Land Acquisition Act for the adjoining land, adequate compensation had to be paid. It was pointed out in that case that the Constitutional guarantee of Article 14 requires that all persons shall be treated alike in like circumstances and conditions. The Article permits reasonable classification and differential treatment based on substantial differentia having reasonable relation to the objects sought to be achieved. It was held in that case that there was no such reasonable relation to the object of acquisition by the State under Assam Act 6 of 1955 and the Act was held discriminatory and, therefore, the Act was struck down. 20. In the case of Ralammal V/s. State of Madras, AIR 1968 SC 1425 the provisions of Section 73 and Clause 6 (2) of the Schedule of the Madras City Improvement Trust Act (37 of 1950) were struck down on the ground that they deprived the person whose land was acquired under Act 37 of 1950 of the solatium of 15 per cent on account of compulsory acquisition as provided under Sec.23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act and the provisions thus violated Article 14 of the Constitution. 21. 21. On a careful consideration of the authorities and the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the provisions of Sec. 53 of the Act are discriminatory and are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and must be struck down on this ground also. 22. For the reasons stated above, the provisions of Sec. 53 of the Act are violative of both Articles 14 and 31 (2) of the Constitution and also Section 299 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and have got to he struck down and the proceeding for acquisition taken under Sec. 53 of the Act (annexure E) must be quashed. 23. The alternative argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners is also of some importance and, therefore, it has got to be noticed. The submission was that even assuming Sec. 53 to be constitutionally valid, the provisions of this section are not attracted so far the lands of the petitioners are concerned. Under Sec. 53 of the Act, the holding or part of a holding of a raiyat in a village can be acquired. The raiyat has been defined under Sec. 4 (xiii) of the Act as follows:- - "raiyat means a person not being a landlord who has acquired a right to hold land for the purpose of cultivating it by himself or by members of his family or by hired servants; and includes the successor in interest of a person who has acquired such a right. Explanation -- A village headman shall be deemed to be a raiyat in respect of his private holding if any." Learned counsel contended that the petitioners did not acquire the right in the land to hold it for the purpose of cultivating it. The land was acquired under Sec.25A of Regulation 2 of 18S6. As annexure A shows, originally the land belonged to Ganga-dhar Sahai and others and the proprietors of Banaili Raj acquired the land for erection of buildings and extension of Cutchery compound some time in 1918. This position is not denied. After the acquisition some buildings on the land were constructed and the Cutchery compound was also extended. The petitioners were also landlords of the village. This position is not denied. After the acquisition some buildings on the land were constructed and the Cutchery compound was also extended. The petitioners were also landlords of the village. Therefore, the status of the petitioners in respect of the land which the proprietors of the Benaili Raj acquired in 1918 and which fell in the share of the petitioners and is the subject matter of the acquisition under Sec. 53 of the Act was that of a landlord and not of a raiyat within the meaning of the Act Therefore, learned counsel submitted that the State was not competent to take recourse to Section 53 of the Act for the acquisition of the land of the petitioners. The distinction between a raiyati land and the land acquired under Sec.25A of Regulation 2 of 1886 was obvious. The land of a raiyat was not transferable under the Santhal Parganas Regulation or under the Act whereas the lands acquired under Sec.25A of Regulation 2 of 1886 were transferable. In that connection, learned counsel referred to certain passages both in the Gantzer Settlement Report and Macpherson Settlement Report according to which such lands were basauri of the malik and were transferable. In fact, the Banaili Raj settled a portion of the land with tenants for building purposes and their houses stand on the land. It is not necessary to deal with this aspect of the case in detail because it was conceded that before the vesting of the estate in the State of Bihar, the status of the petitioners in respect of the land proposed to be acquired was not that of a raiyat. Therefore, a question arises as to what is the status of the petitioners after the vesting of the estate of the petitioners in the State of Bihar sometime in 1954. 24. It is admitted in this case that the rent of the land of the petitioners has been fixed under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, and rent receipts have been also issued by the State of Bihar. Annex-ures 2 and 3 to the reply of the counter-affidavit of the State of Bihar show that Plot No. 360 of village Rautara was assessed as homestead land. Annex-ures 2 and 3 to the reply of the counter-affidavit of the State of Bihar show that Plot No. 360 of village Rautara was assessed as homestead land. So far the lands of Gorhimal are concerned, assessments have been made on the basis of the lands being bakasht lands of the malik which is apparent from the receipts filed by the petitioners in this case. Though the lands were acquired by the proprietors of Banaili Raj under Sec.25A of Regulation 2 of 1886, but in the record of rights the lands of Gorhimal were recorded as bakasht malik. The State of Bihar asserted in paragraph 19 (r) of the counter-affidavit that the status of the petitioners in respect of the lands which were acquired under Sec.25A is that of a raiyat under Sec. 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act after the vesting of their proprietary rights whereas the case of the petitioners is that their status in respect of the lands proposed to be acquired is that of a homestead tenant under Sections 5 and 7 of the Land Reforms Act. Their alternative case is that even if their status is that of a raiyat under Sec. 6 of the Land Reforms Act, they could not be regarded as a raiyat within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, the provisions of Sec. 53 of the Act are not attracted and they have got every right to dispose of the property in the manner they liked, and the Registration Officer had no right to refuse registration of the sale deeds executed by them. Be that as it may, I shall proceed to decide this aspect of the case on the admitted position by the State that the status of the petitioners in respect of the land is that of a raiyat under Sec. 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. 25. The petitioners were the landlords of villages Gorhimal and Rautara. Therefore, before the vesting of the estates, they could not be raiyats in respect of the disputed lands. After the vesting of the estates of the intermediaries, the petitioners have become statutory raiyats under Sec. 6 of the Land Reforms Act. 25. The petitioners were the landlords of villages Gorhimal and Rautara. Therefore, before the vesting of the estates, they could not be raiyats in respect of the disputed lands. After the vesting of the estates of the intermediaries, the petitioners have become statutory raiyats under Sec. 6 of the Land Reforms Act. Sec. 6 of the Land Reforms Act provides that on and from the date of vesting all lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes, which were in khas possession of an intermediary on the date of such vesting shall be deemed to be settled by the State with such intermediary and he shall be entitled to retain possession thereof and hold them as a raiyat under the State having occupancy rights in respect of such lands subject to the payment of such fair and equitable rent as may be determined by the Collector in the prescribed manner. Raiyat has not been defined in the Land Reforms Act. Sec.2 (t) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act lays down as follows:- - "2 (t) -- All words and expressions used in this Act but not defined in this Act and defined in the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (8 of 1885) or the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (Ben. Act 6 of 1908) shall (i) in their application to the area to which the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (Ben. Act 6 of 1908) applies, have the same meanings as in that Act; (ii) in their application to the area to which the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (8 of 1885) applies, have the same meanings as in that Act; and, (iii) in their application to any area in the Santhal Parganas have the same meanings as in the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 (8 of 1885)." Therefore, even if the lands are situated in Santhal Parganas, the petitioners are raiyats of the lands which were in their khas cultivating possession within the meaning of the Bihar Tenancy Act. They will be entitled to hold the lands as raiyats with occupancy rights under the State of Bihar. It follows from this that the petitioners will have all the rights and liabilities which an occupancy raiyat under the Bihar Tenancy Act will have in respect of his lands. Chapter V of the Bihar Tenancy Act deals with the rights and liabilities of an occupancy raiyat. It follows from this that the petitioners will have all the rights and liabilities which an occupancy raiyat under the Bihar Tenancy Act will have in respect of his lands. Chapter V of the Bihar Tenancy Act deals with the rights and liabilities of an occupancy raiyat. Sec.23 of the Act lays down the rights of an occupancy raiyat in respect of the use of land according to which he may use the land in any manner which does not materially impair the value of the land or render it unfit for the purposes of the tenancy. Sec.23A of the Act gives the occupancy raiyat a right to plant trees and bamboos on such land and cut, cut down and appropriate the trees and bamboos, appropriate the flowers, fruits and other products of any trees or bamboos standing on such land etc. Sec.25 protects him from being evicted from his land except under certain circumstances. Sec.26 gives an occupancy raiyat the right of inheritance. Sec.26-A empowers him to transfer and bequest his holdings or a portion thereof together with a right of occupancy by sale, exchange or gift and all bequests made by an occupancy raiyat, if it is made by a registered document and the landlords registration fee is paid. Other provisions of Chapter V deal with the liabilities of an occupancy raiyat. It is not necessary to enumerate them here. If the petitioners would have been raiyats within the meaning of the Act, i. e. the Santhal Parganas Tenancy Act, 1949, they will have no power to make a transfer under Sec.20 of the Act. Therefore, the legislature has taken special care in laying down that after vesting of the estates, the outgoing intermediaries will acquire the status of a raiyat with occupancy rights within the meaning of the Bihar Tenancy Act and not of an occupancy raiyat within the meaning of a Santhal Parganas Settlement Regulation 3 of 1872 in respect of the land in his khas cultivation even though the land be situated in the district of Santhal Parganas. Sec. 53 contemplates the acquisition of the holding or a portion of the holding of a raiyat within the meaning of the Act. The petitioners not being raiyats under the Santhal Parganas Tenancy Act, 1949, their lands cannot be acquired under the provisions of Sec. 53 of the Act. Sec. 53 contemplates the acquisition of the holding or a portion of the holding of a raiyat within the meaning of the Act. The petitioners not being raiyats under the Santhal Parganas Tenancy Act, 1949, their lands cannot be acquired under the provisions of Sec. 53 of the Act. In that view of the matter also the acquisition proceeding (An-nexure E) so far the lands of the petitioners are concerned is invalid, and illegal, and, as such, it must be quashed. 26 For the reasons stated above, the application is allowed. The acquisition proceeding (Annexure E), being Land Acquisition Case No. 3 of 1967-68 pending before the Sub-divisional Officer Godda, Santhal Parganas, is hereby quashed. The respondents are restrained from taking possession of the lands of the petitioners mentioned in Annexure E by acquisition proceeding under Sec. 53 of the Santhal Parganas (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. K.B.N.Singh, J. 27 I agree.