JUDGMENT - These are the four criminal trials initiated by the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Nagpur, against the members of the Managing Committee of "Sidhartha Shikshan Sahayak Sanstha, Chandrapur". All the four prosecutions relate to the breach of sections 32 and 33 (2) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, that is not getting the accounts audited annually in the manner prescribed by the Rules from a Chartered Accountant within the meaning of the Chartered Accountants Act or such person as may be authorised in this behalf by the State Government. Each case relates to a different year. All the four prosecutions have been initiated on complaints filed by the Assistant Charity Commissioner at Nagpur. For filing these complaints, the Assistant Charity Commissioner relied upon a sanction granted by Joint Charity Commissioner, Bombay. 2. Prosecution led its evidence and the witnesses were cross-examined. The accused persons were also examined under section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code. At that stage, instead of pronouncing a judgment on merits, the learned trial Judge by his order dated 31st January 1968 dropped all these proceedings under section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code. He found that in all the cases, the sanction that was obtained was of the Joint Charity Commissioner. Section 83 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, lays down that no prosecution for an offence punishable under this Act, shall be instituted without the previous sanction of the Charity Commissioner. Construing the section literally to mean that the sanction of the Charity Commissioner alone is needed, the learned Magistrate felt that these were unauthorised prosecutions without proper sanction and they need not be finally decided. He thought that these were fit cases where the provisions of section 249, Criminal Procedure Code, could be invoked and the prosecutions could be just dropped. Being aggrieved by this order, the complainant Assistant Charity Commissioner filed four revision applications in the Court of the Sessions Judge. The learned Sessions Judge confirmed the orders by agreeing with the reasoning of the trial Court. Hence these four revision applications. Since they involve identical points of law, this common order will dispose of the four applications. 3. Two points arise for my consideration. One is whether the sanction of the Joint Charity Commissioner was enough under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. Hence these four revision applications. Since they involve identical points of law, this common order will dispose of the four applications. 3. Two points arise for my consideration. One is whether the sanction of the Joint Charity Commissioner was enough under the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The other is whether the sanction was valid or not and was the termination of the prosecution under section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code by dropping them a proper order to pass. I would take up the second point first as it is very easy to dispose of. So far as this question is concerned, the learned trial Magistrate has fallen into an obvious error and the learned Sessions Judge while confirming the order has not applied his mind at all, to the provisions of section 249 of the Code. This is obvious from the observation of the learned Sessions Judge that instead of dropping the prosecutions, the trial Magistrate should have quashed the prosecutions. Assuming that the prosecution was not properly started, the trial should end in acquittal, but it is difficult to understand how a Magistrate could quash the prosecution. This order of the learned Sessions Judge was not supported even by the defence counsel who appeared before me. 4. Section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code falls in Chapter 20, which deals with the trial of summons cases by Magistrates. This section authorises a Magistrate to stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgment either of acquittal or conviction, and to release the accused thereupon. This he could do after reasons are recorded by him. However, the main qualification for passing this order is that the case must be one which is instituted "otherwise than upon complaint". If the case before the Magistrate were to answer this description, he was undoubtedly authorised to stop the proceedings. Whether the reasons given by him are sufficient and legal would be otherwise examined, but his jurisdiction to stop the proceedings could not be challenged. In the four cases, in which the proceedings have been stopped by the Magistrate, they are all cases initiated of instituted on a complaint of the Assistant Charity Commissioner. What is a "complaint" has been defined by clause (h) of section 4 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In the four cases, in which the proceedings have been stopped by the Magistrate, they are all cases initiated of instituted on a complaint of the Assistant Charity Commissioner. What is a "complaint" has been defined by clause (h) of section 4 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. According to that definition, complaint means the allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but it does not include the report of a police-officer. Short of that any other information lodged with the Magistrate with a view to his taking action under the Criminal Procedure Code and in which an offence is complained of against known or unknown persons amounts to a complaint. The expression "report of a police-officer" in the above definition has not been defined anywhere in the Code. 5. In all the four cases before me, the Assistant Charity Commissioner has filed complaints. He could not he described as a police-officer and his complaint before the Magistrate could not be styled as a report of the police officer. In all the four cases, therefore, the writing submitted by the Assistant Charity Commissioner to the Magistrate complaining of an offence against the accused enumerated in that document and alleging an offence against them amounts to a complaint within the meaning of section 4 (1) (h) of the Criminal Procedure Code. These cases are not instituted "otherwise than upon a complaint", but are very much instituted upon the complaint of the Assistant Charity Commissioner. These cases are not covered by the provisions of section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code at all. Apart from the sanction, it was not for the Magistrate to stop the proceedings at all. He could conclude them either by acquitting the accused or convicting them depending upon the evidence led before him. The order of the Magistrate under section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code is thus liable to be set aside. 6. The decision of the other question which has been made a basis for taking action under section 249 of the Code, must now be considered. The order of the Magistrate under section 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code is thus liable to be set aside. 6. The decision of the other question which has been made a basis for taking action under section 249 of the Code, must now be considered. Both the Courts have come to the conclusion that the sanction to prosecute awarded under section 83 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, by the Joint Charity Com• missioner, is not a legal and valid sanction. Section 83 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, which is a very short one, is as follows: "No prosecution for an offence punishable under this Act, shall be instituted without the previous sanction of the Charity Commissioner." On the basis of the above section, it has been held that a valid sanction could be given only by the Charity Commissioner and by no other person under the Act. It was brought to the notice of the learned Judges of the Courts below that the Joint Charity Commissioner who has given sanction is an officer appointed under the provisions of section 3-A of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, and that section vests him with all the powers of the Charity Commissioner and authorises him to perform all or any of the duties and functions, of the Charity Commissioner. Both the learned Judges think that the provisions relating to prosecution must be strictly construed and in the absence of the reference to a Joint Charity Commissioner in section 83 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, the sanction would not be valid. They have referred to certain judgments which deal with strict construction of Penal Statute. It is not necessary to examine that case law. On a plain reading of section 3-A of the Act, it is obvious that the Joint Charity Commissioner has all the powers and he is entitled to perform all or any of the duties and functions, of the Charity Commissioner. It is not necessary to examine that case law. On a plain reading of section 3-A of the Act, it is obvious that the Joint Charity Commissioner has all the powers and he is entitled to perform all or any of the duties and functions, of the Charity Commissioner. The provisions of section 3-A, under which the officer is created, are as follows: "The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette appoint one or more officers to be called Joint Charity Commissioners who shall, subject to the control of the Charity Commissioner, and to such general or special orders as the State Government may pass, exercise all or any of the powers and perform all or any of the duties and functions, of the Charity Commissioner." This section was inserted by Bombay Act No.6 of 1960. The learned Sessions Judge while confirming the order of the trial Magistrate that the Joint Charity Commissioner is subject to the control of the Charity Commissioner and also subject to the control of such general or special orders as the State Government may pass. He, therefore, thinks that the Joint Charity Commissioner is an officer subordinate in the rank to the Charity Commissioner and such an officer could not be considered as a Charity Commissioner for the purpose of awarding sanction under section 83 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act." 7. It appears to me that section 3-A of the Act has been so drafted by the Legislature as to avoid repeated reference to Joint Charity Commissioner as and where the words Charity Commissioner appear in the Act. The Charity Commissioner is authorised to perform several functions and is vested with powers in that behalf. The Joint Charity Commissioner is created for the purpose of performing all those functions and for the purpose of exercising all those powers. However, as there could be only one Charity Commissioners Office, the Joint Charity Commissioner could not be created as another parallel officer without any control by the Charity Commissioner. So far as the exercise of all powers and performing of all duties and functions under the Act, is concerned, the Joint Charity Commissioner has the same authority and status in this Act. So far as the exercise of all powers and performing of all duties and functions under the Act, is concerned, the Joint Charity Commissioner has the same authority and status in this Act. However, he is subject to the general control of the Charity Commissioner and also to the control of the State Government, if any orders in that behalf are passed whether general or special. The real meaning of this clause is that unless the Charity Commissioner directs otherwise where a matter has been entrusted to the Joint Charity Commissioner, he has all the powers of the Charity Commissioner under the Act, and his order is the order of the Charity Commissioner himself. 8. The learned Sessions Judge has referred to section 8 (1) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, which enables the State Government to delegate any of its own powers and functions to the Charity Commissioner or any other officer subject to such conditions as it thinks fit. By reference to this provision, it is observed that the Charity Commissioner is a delegate of the State Government. This is clearly erroneous. The Charity Commissioner is an officer created under the Act and is vested with such powers and functions as are enumerated in the Act. This Act also authorises the State Government to perform certain functions. So far as those functions are concerned and those powers are concerned, the State Government could delegate them to the Charity Commissioner or such other officer under the Act. To the extent to which the State Government is given powers and functions under the Act, it is also given an authority to delegate these powers and functions to the Charity Commissioner or any other officer under the Act. This does not mean that the Charity Commissioner is a delegate of the State Government for the purpose of performing any or every duty under the Act. 9. This, to my mind, being the real meaning and the purpose of section 3-A of the Act, the Joint Charity Commissioner who is authorised to exercise all or any of the powers or to perform any of the duties of the Charity Commissioner is entitled to award sanction for prosecution under section 83 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. 9. This, to my mind, being the real meaning and the purpose of section 3-A of the Act, the Joint Charity Commissioner who is authorised to exercise all or any of the powers or to perform any of the duties of the Charity Commissioner is entitled to award sanction for prosecution under section 83 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. By enacting section 3-A of the Act, in the manner it is done, the Legislature has avoided a repeated reference at each place in the Act where Charity Commissioner is mentioned. Otherwise, wherever the Charity Commissioners powers, duties and functions are enumerated, it would have been necessary to add the expression "or the Joint Charity Commissioner, subject to the control of the Charity Commissioner, and to such general or special orders as the State Government may pass". To avoid such a clumsy drafting at each place, by a separate section, it is pointed out that the Joint Charity Commissioner will have all the powers and will perform all the duties and functions of the Charity Commissioner, subject to the general control of the Charity Commissioner as also subject to the control of the State Government to the extent of general or special orders that may be passed from time to time. In this way, I am satisfied that the sanction awarded by the Joint Charity Commissioner is a valid sanction under section 83 of the Act. 10. As a result of these conclusions, I must set aside the order passed by the Courts below. As a matter of fact, the order of the trial Magistrate stopping the proceedings is one without jurisdiction as these cases do not fall within the ambit of section 249 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the eyes of law, therefore, there are still four prosecutions pending on his file and the only position is that the Magistrate is refusing to proceed forward. I would, therefore, direct that the record and proceedings he sent back to the trial Magistrate who is further directed to dispose of the four pending cases on his file according to la w. Orders set aside and cases directed to be decided.