JUDGMENT 1. A short point arises for determination in this Rule. It is as to whether a respondent in an appeal filed under section 44 (3) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition act 1953, hereinafter referred to as the a. ct, has the right to file a cross objection. This point arises as follows : (2) The petitioners before us filed an application before the Assistant settlement Officer for correction of entries in regard to some plots including plot No. 275 claiming to be in exclusive possession of the same. The Assistant settlement Officer refused their prayer in respect of all the plots except plot No. 275. Thereafter some of the opposite parties before us preferred an appeal before the Tribunal in accordance with section 44 (3) of the Act making the present petitioners respondents thereto, in respect of Plot No. 2. THE present petitioners appeared in the appeal and filed also cross objection in respect of the Plots, other than plot No. 275. The learned Tribunal held that the cross-objection was not maintainable and rejected the same. On merits also, he found that the Assistant settlement Officer erred in recording the possession of the present petitioners exclusively in respect of Plot No. 275, and allowed the appeal. In this Rule the petitioners contend that the learned Tribunal erred in holding that the cross-objection was not maintainable and further that Plot no. 275 was not in their exclusive possession. 3. AS regards the first point, neither the Act, nor the Rules framed there under contain any provision empowering a Respondent to file cross-objections before the Tribunal. Section 44 (3) empowers an aggrieved person to file an "appeal in the prescribed manner to a Tribunal appointed for the purpose of this section and within such period and on payment of such court fees as may be prescribed. " under section 55 (2) of the Act, "the state Government may appoint one or more Tribunals for the purpose of section 44. Such Tribunal shall be composed of a single member who shall be a person, who is or has been a District Judge or Additional District judge and shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908". 4. Such Tribunal shall be composed of a single member who shall be a person, who is or has been a District Judge or Additional District judge and shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908". 4. RULE 31 enjoins that "(1) every appeal under sub-section (3) of section 44 shall be in writing and shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the order appealed against. (2) An appeal, before the Tribunal appointed for the purpose shall be made within one month from the date of the passing of the order of the appeal against. . . . " These are the main provisions regarding the filing of appeal in this act or the Rules. As we have already pointed out, there is no express provision either under the Act or under the rules empowering the respondent to file a cross objection. 5. MR. Joy Gopal Ghosh appearing on behalf of the petitioner urges that such a right has been impliedly granted by sub-section (2) of section 55, which we have quoted above, and under which the Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the code of Civil Procedure. He submits that as under the Code of Civil procedure the respondent has the right to file a cross-objection, he will have the same, right under this sub-section. 6. THERE is an inherent fallacy in this proposition. Sub-section (2) confers on the Tribunal to exercise all the powers of a Civil Court under the code of Civil Procedure, presumably when there is a proper appeal presented before it. The right to file a cross objection is distinct from the powers of the Tribunal. It is a right exercisable by a party to the proceeding and not the Tribunal. It must be conferred either expressly or impliedly, and there is no provision either under the act, or under the Rules, for a party to file such a cross-objection. The Act or rules speaks only of appeal and not of a cross-objection. If the legislature had intended to confer on an, aggrieved party the right to file a cross-objection, it could have stated so specifically, as it has done under the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Ghosh relies on the decision of this Court in (1) Sudhansu sankar Mukherjee v. Gafur Sk. reported in 63 CWN 354. If the legislature had intended to confer on an, aggrieved party the right to file a cross-objection, it could have stated so specifically, as it has done under the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Ghosh relies on the decision of this Court in (1) Sudhansu sankar Mukherjee v. Gafur Sk. reported in 63 CWN 354. The facts of that case are entirely different from those in the instant one. There also it was not laid down that all the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code would apply. In that case also this Court directed that the Tribunal below should act in accordance with the powers inherent in such Tribunal to remedy defects or rectify the errors. Therefore that decision does not help mr. Ghosh at all. The cross-objection, we are not in a position, to treat as a memorandum of appeal, inasmuch as it did not bear the proper court fees, nor was it filed, within the time allowed by Rule 31. In this view of the matter, we must held that the learned Tribunal was justified in holding that cross objection could not be maintained. The view which we have adopted appears to be in consonance with the view taken by the Madras High Court on a purportedly s'milar provision in the madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into ryotwari Act of 1948), reported in (2) Koil Kandadai chcndamarutham Vedanthachariswami v. Muthiah Chetti, AIR 1955 NUC 2133. As regards Plot No. 275 we must also point out that the decision of the learned Tribunal is based on proper evidence and it is not necessary for us to interfere. 7. THE result, therefore, is that this Rule fails and is discharged. Each party will bear its costs in this case. 8. ANIL K. Sen, J. : I agree with my Lord that this Rule should be discharged and I also agree with the order proposed by him. In view of the importance of the question raised as to whether a respondent in an appeal before the appellate Tribunal under Section 44 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition act 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) is entitled to file a cross-objection or not, I propose to give my own reasons. 9. THE proceedings out of which the appeal arises is one for preparation of record of rights under Chapter 5 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition act, 1953. 9. THE proceedings out of which the appeal arises is one for preparation of record of rights under Chapter 5 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition act, 1953. It is well recognised that the finality which is arrived at in such proceedings goes no further than raising a statutory presumption which can very well be rebutted in any subsequent litigation between the parties in a Civil Court; primarily therefore the provisions of Chapter 5 of the said act does not contemplate any final adjudication of rights of parties except for finalising the entry in the record of rights with its limited effect referred to hereinbefore; the scheme as provided under the Act contemplates initial preparation by a Revenue Officer with a right of objection by the parties leading to final publication after the disposal of the objections. The statute further provides for revision of the final entry by the Special Officer under the circumstances as set out therein and it further provides for an appeal in a prescribed manner by any person aggrieved to the Appellate Tribunal appointed for the purpose within such period and on payment of such court fees as may be prescribed. Section 55 (2) of the said Act provides for appointment of such Tribunal and it reads as follows :- "the State Government may appoint one or more Tribunals for the purpose of Section 44. Such Tribunal shall be composed of a single member who shall be a person, who is or has been a District Judge or an Additional District Judge and shall have all the powers of Civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908". 10. CHAPTER 5 of the Rules framed under the Act provides the procedure and other particulars relating to the preparation of the record of rights and rule 31 of the said Rules relates to the appeals to the Appellate Tribunal referred to hereinbefore. Rule 31 only provides that every appeal should be filed in writing and shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the order appealed against and that such appeals should be filed within a month from the date of the order appealed against; it also confers the power to the Tribunal to extend the time for filing the appeal. Except as above there is nothing else prescribed governing the procedure for entertaining or disposing of the appeal under the statute. Except as above there is nothing else prescribed governing the procedure for entertaining or disposing of the appeal under the statute. Now the question raised is-can in such an appeal a cross-objection at the instance of the respondent be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal? the right to file a cross-objection is a right of the party which like a right of appeal must be conferred upon him by the statute and the provisions of the said Act nowhere confer any such right. This proposition is, of course not disputed by Mr. Ghosh appearing; for the petitioner in this court whose cross-objection in the Tribunal below has been dismissed as not maintainable. But Mr. Ghosh contends that his client was entitled to prefer the cross-objection under the provisions of order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil procedure. Mr. Sen appearing for the state has rightly pointed out that a cross-objection under Order 41 Rule 22 can be taken to a decree under the code or to an order appealable under order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil procedure. According to Mr. Sen, as the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal was neither against a decree nor an order appealable under the Code, order 41 Rule 22 has no application. 11. WHEN there is no dispute that the cross-objection could be entertained by the Tribunal only if the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 are attracted, the answer to the question raised is to be found out by deciding whether the said provisions are at all attracted or not. In my view it could be attracted in either of two circumstances namely, if the statute providing for the appeal and its disposal makes the said provisions applicable or if the appeal provided by the statute is to an ordinary civil Court exercising its normal jurisdiction so that in disposing of the appeal, it would be doing so as an ordinary Civil Court under the Code of civil Procedure. In the absence of either of the two circumstances the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 would not be attracted. 12. IN my opinion, it is quite clear that the Statute under consideration has not made the provisions of order 41 Rule 22 applicable. In the absence of either of the two circumstances the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 would not be attracted. 12. IN my opinion, it is quite clear that the Statute under consideration has not made the provisions of order 41 Rule 22 applicable. Section 44 (3) of the said Act provides for an appeal to a Tribunal to be preferred in the manner prescribed and within such period and on payment of such court fees as may be prescribed. The manner prescribed under the Rules also does not invoke the provisions of order' 41 Rule 22 of the Code. Section 55 (2) of the Act provides for appointment of the Tribunal. Undoubtedly this sub-section also provides that the Tribunal so appointed shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. These provisions, in my opinion, only clothe the Tribunal with all the powers of a Civil Court, but that does not necessarily mean that because of such provisions the proceedings before the tribunal attract all the necessary provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure providing for entertainment and disposal of appeals and proceedings relating thereto. To construe Section 55 (2)to mean as such, is to extend the implications beyond the normal and ordinary meaning flowing from the words used. The next question therefore would be whether the learned District judge or the Additional District Judge constituting the tribunal really acts in the exercise of his normal jurisdiction as an ordinary Civil Court under the code of Civil Procedure or not in entertaining and disposing of an appeal under Section 44 (3) of the said Act. If he would be so doing then there will be no doubt that the provisions of order 41 Rule 22 would be attracted. That follows from the decision of the privy Council in the case of (3) Adai kappa Chettiar v. Chandra Sekhara, 74 LA. 264 and as approved by the supreme Court in the case of (4) N. S. Thread Co. v. Jamaes Chadwrick, AIR 1953 Supreme Court 357. This Court in upholding a party's right to file a cross-objection in the case of an appeal under Section 38 of the Bengal Money lenders Act, 1940 really proceeded upon the said basis vide (5) Ramasray v. Ibhisan AIR 1950 Cal. 372 . v. Jamaes Chadwrick, AIR 1953 Supreme Court 357. This Court in upholding a party's right to file a cross-objection in the case of an appeal under Section 38 of the Bengal Money lenders Act, 1940 really proceeded upon the said basis vide (5) Ramasray v. Ibhisan AIR 1950 Cal. 372 . But in my view the appeal provided under the Act is not one before the District judge or the Additional District Judge exercising his normal jurisdiction of an ordinary Civil Court, It is true that the law provides that the Appellate tribunal must be composed of a single member who shall be a person, who is or has been a District Judge or an Additional district Judge. But that by itself does not lead to the conclusion that appeal is to the District Judge or the Additional District Judge exercising his ordinary jurisdiction as sudh. The District Judge or the Additional district Judge in disposing of the appeal disposes of as a Tribunal appointed by the State Government and he need not be the District Judge or the additional District Judge of the particular district at all; further it must be remembered that the appeal which the District Judge or the Additional district Judge, appointed as the Appealate tribunal, disposes of, is nothing but a continuation of the original proceedings before the Settlement Authorities taken up for preparing or revising the entries in the settlement record; the effect of the order that may be passed by the Tribunal so constituted would be assailable in any future litigation before any Civil Court even of an authority subordinate to the District judge or the Additional District Judge and the character of the proceedings is in no way changed because of the appeal or the order made therein. On the provisions of the statute it is not difficult to conclude that when the proceedings before the Settlement authorities were undisputedly not before an ordinary civil court it remains as such in its centinuance before the Appellate tribunal. It is now well recognised that simply because the obligation to dispose of the dispute in the appeal is on a District Judge or an Additional district Judge that would not necessarily mean that he would be doing so in the exercise of his normal and ordinary jurisdiction as a Civil Court. It is now well recognised that simply because the obligation to dispose of the dispute in the appeal is on a District Judge or an Additional district Judge that would not necessarily mean that he would be doing so in the exercise of his normal and ordinary jurisdiction as a Civil Court. Even in case of such assignment to a Court, it has often been held that it is not necessarily intended to be disposed by the court discharging its functions as a Civil court. The guiding principle has now been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of (6) Huns Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 947. It has been held "it is not every decision given by a court that could be said to be a judgment, decree or order within the provisions of the Code of Civil procedure or the Letters Patent. Whether it is so or not will depend on whether the proceedings in which it was given came before the court in its normal civil jurisdiction or dehors it as a person designate. Where the dispute is referred to the court for determination by way of arbitration as in 39 la. 197 or where it comes by way of appeal against what is steadily an award. . . . then the decision is not a judgment, decree or order under either the Code of Civil Procedure, or the letters Patent. " The Supreme Court came to the above conclusion in deciding an appeal to the Supreme Court to be incompetent in law from a judgment of a High Court passed in an appeal under Section 19 (1) (f) of the Defence of India Act, 1939. In my view the same principles are equally applicable in deciding whether there could be a right to file a cross-objection on behalf of the respondent in a proceeding of the like nature. I have no doubt that the nature of the proceedings both before the original tribunal as also before the appellate Tribunal under Section 44 of the said Act are such that it cannot be said that it called for any judgment or order within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure. This view, in my opinion, is well supported by the principles underlying the decisions of this court in the cases of (7) Mamata Ghosh v. Mrs. This view, in my opinion, is well supported by the principles underlying the decisions of this court in the cases of (7) Mamata Ghosh v. Mrs. Charu Chandra Mandal, 60 CWN 1032 and (8) Sudhansu Kumar Aych v. Kangal Ch. Malty, 69 CWN 908. The question of applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to a proceeding specifically provided under a statute was considered by this court in the case of (9) Sahadat Khan v. Md. Hossain AIR 1954 Cal. 347 although this court in the said case held that the court of Small Causes trying a suit under Section 16 of the West Bengal premises Rent Control (Temporary provisions) Act, 1950 was really acting in exercise of its normal jurisdiction of a Civil Court and as such these proceedings before it are governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil procedure. The Supreme Court has again decided in the case of (10) Ebrahim v. Tek Chand, AIR 1953 Supreme Court; 298 that the provisions of the Code are not applicable to the proceedings before the Custodian under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 19504, though such proceedings were of a quasi-judicial nature. Mr. Sen has relied upon an unreported decision of the madras High Court notes whereof are to be found in (2) AIR 1955 NUC (Mad. 2133) which of course supports his contention and the view that I have just taken. 13. IN my view therefore the Appellate tribunal was correct in its decision that the cross-objection at the instance of the present petitioner was not maintainable in law.