( 1 ) THE source of this revision, petition is an application made by petitioner no. 2 in this revision petition (who was respondent No. 2 in the lower court) under S. 110a of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939 before the Motor Accidents claims Tribunal, Shimoga, which will hereinafter be referred as the claims Tribunal. In that application, petitioner No. 2 had claimed compensation of Rs. 2700 on the ground that due to the rash and negligent driving of the vehicle belonging to the B. D. O. Channagiri, he sustained injuries and also suffered damages. He claimed therein a sum of Rs. 500 as damages for expenses incurred by him during his treatment;. Rs. 500 was claimed by him for mental and physical suffering; a sum of Rs. 1500 was claimed for loss of earning for a period of six months; and a sum of rs. 200 was claimed as the value of the bicycle which had been damaged. The Claims Tribunal, on the evidence produced before it, awarded compensation of Rs. 1660 to petitioner No. 2. The Claims Tribunal was of the view that the claim of petitioner No. 2 in regard to loss of earnings in a sum of Rs. 1500 was not factually true, and the petitioner No. 2 was entitled to get only a sum of Rs. 660 on that count, at the rate of Rs. 110 per month for six months. The petitioner No. 2 had claimed at the rate of Rs. 250 per month. The Claims Tribunal further found that the register marked Ex. P-3 was a got up document which had been fabricated by petitioner No. 1 to support his evidence given before the Tribunal, which, according to the Claims Tribunal, was false evidence and accordingly, the district Judge, Shimoga, who was the Presiding Officer of the Claims Tribunal, recorded his finding against both the petitioners 1 and 2 under S. 479a crl. PC. ( 2 ) IT appears from the records that the District Judge who recorded that finding was transferred and he was succeeded by another District Judge. The succeeding District Judge directed that notice should be issued to the petitioners. The petitioners, thereafter. effected their appearance and submitted their objections. After hearine them the District Judge directed that a complaint should be lodged against petitioners 1 and 2 in the Court of competent jurisdiction. The succeeding District Judge directed that notice should be issued to the petitioners. The petitioners, thereafter. effected their appearance and submitted their objections. After hearine them the District Judge directed that a complaint should be lodged against petitioners 1 and 2 in the Court of competent jurisdiction. It is against that order that this revision petition is preferred in this Court. ( 3 ) THE learned Government Pleader raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the revision petition. He argued that the order in revision is made admittedly by the District Judge who has taken action under S. 479a Crl. PC. He submitted that this Court, as a Court of revision, has no power to interfere under S. 439 of Crl. PC. He urged that the order being one mads by the Claims Tribunal which is a Civil Court, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure should be made applicable to the case and not those of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He further contended in this connectio'n that it has been expressly laid down in S. 110 (c) of the Motor Vehicles Act that the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed , to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of S. 195 and Chapter XXXV of crl. PC. Therefore he urged that since the order in revision was made by the Civil Court, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are attracted to this case, and consequently this revision petition which is filed under Sec. 435 and Sec. 439 Cr. P. C. is maintainable. ( 4 ) THOUGH be has raised a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainabilty of this revision petition, he submits that to the instant case neither the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code could be made applicable and therefore this Court should have resort only to the inherent powers contained in S. 561a of Cr. P. C. , and by resorting to the inherent powers contained in S. 561a Cr. P. C. this Court can exercise revision jurisdiction and try this petition as one arising on the criminal side. ( 5 ) MR. Deshpande, the learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the order in revision though might have been passed by the Civil Court, the fact remains that it was passed under S. 479-A Crl. PC. P. C. this Court can exercise revision jurisdiction and try this petition as one arising on the criminal side. ( 5 ) MR. Deshpande, the learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the order in revision though might have been passed by the Civil Court, the fact remains that it was passed under S. 479-A Crl. PC. bearing upon a criminal matter and so tne provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code alone would be applicable to the case. He strenuously argued that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be attracted to a proceeding which is of a criminal nature. ( 6 ) THERE is no decision 011 the point either of this Court or of any other high Court nor of the Supreme Court. The matter had came up before the supreme Court once in Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR. 1956 SC. 391. wherein it was observed at page 399:"mr. Kapur's order went up to the High Court in revision and the next question we have to determine is whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the revision and the extent of its powers. Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen AIR 1953 SC 23 and may cases from the High Courts were cited which show that there is much difference o'f opinion about this taut we are fortunately not called upon to decide that question because this is not a case where a Court with jurisdiction has acted under S. 476 Crl. P. C. of its own motion or has acted as a Court of appeal under S. 476-B. " ( 7 ) THUS the point was left open by the Supreme Court. In the cases cited by the parties in support of their arguments, order was made under S. 476-B and the point for determination was whether such an order was an order, revisable by the High Court under S. 439 Cr. P. C. or else under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Ab a mater of fact both the learned Government pleader and the counsel for the petitioners Mr. Deshpande conceded during the course of arguments that there is no decision on the point, i. e. , with regard to an order made under S. 479-A Cr. P. C. either of any High court or of the Supreme Court. Ab a mater of fact both the learned Government pleader and the counsel for the petitioners Mr. Deshpande conceded during the course of arguments that there is no decision on the point, i. e. , with regard to an order made under S. 479-A Cr. P. C. either of any High court or of the Supreme Court. ( 8 ) IN the light of the arguments advanccd on behalf of the parties, the point for consideration is whether the order made by the Claims Tribunal (i. e. , District Judge) under S. 479-A of Crl. P. C. was an order mads by a civil Court so that the High Court's revisional powers are governed by s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or is an order made by a criminal court or a Court exercising criminal power, and the power to revise such an order arises under S. 439 Crl. P. C. ( 9 ) IT must be mentioned straightaway at this stags that there is much divergence of opinion between the different High Courts in India on this point. The view taken by the Calcutta, Madras and Allahabad High Courts is that the character of the Court which hears the appeal under S. 476-B cr. P. C. is governed by the character o'f the Court which lodges the complaint, that is to say, when the complaint is lodged by a civil Court, the court hearing the appeal must be regarded as a civil Court. On the other hand, the High Courts of Bombay, Punjab and the High Co'urt of Patna in recent decision Rampati Kuer v. Jadunandan Thakur, AIR. 1968 Pat. 100, FB. have taken a contrary view. These High Courts have held that the provisions of S. 439 of Crl. P. C. would apply and not the provisions of S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 10 ) AS rightly observed in the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Rampati Kuer v. Jadunadan Thakur, that such diametrically opposite view are expressed by some of the most distinguished Judges of the High courts only show how difficult the matter under consideration is. Since the matter has been fully considered by Full Benches Of the various High courts, it will serve no useful purpose to discuss and consider here the relative merits of the two opposing views. Since the matter has been fully considered by Full Benches Of the various High courts, it will serve no useful purpose to discuss and consider here the relative merits of the two opposing views. I may however deal with the matter which provides a basis for the conclusion which I have arrived at with regard to the point under determination. ( 11 ) THE view taken by the High Courts is to the effect that the character of the Court which hears the appeal under S. 476-B Crl. P. C. is governed by the character of the Court which locges the complaint and hence the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the case and therefore the High Court should exercise its revisional powers on the civil side. In other words, if the Court which made an order directing a complaint to be lodged is a Civil Court, the Court hearing the appeal under S. 476b must also be regarded as a Civil Court. I should observe here that this is not expressly provided " in that section viz. , 476b Crl. P. C. Although in S. 476b a reference is made to sub-sec. (3) of S. 195 Crl. P. C. , i think, that reference only determines the forum to which appeal lies and does not, in terms, determine the character of the Court. If the Court which hears the appeal is a Civil Court, it seems to me that its procedure should be governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. If it is held by the Court that the procedure to such a case is governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, that must be on the basis that the Court is acting as a criminal court and if it is acting as a criminal cout, I do not see any reason why the powers of revision should not be those conferred by S. 439 Cr. P. C. and not those conferred by S. I 15 of the CPC. Therefore, the determining factor, to my mind, should be the nature of the matter in which the order has been made. ( 12 ) IT was argued on behalf of the State that the order in revision, has been made by the claims tribunal in this case which is, according to the provisions of sub-sec. Therefore, the determining factor, to my mind, should be the nature of the matter in which the order has been made. ( 12 ) IT was argued on behalf of the State that the order in revision, has been made by the claims tribunal in this case which is, according to the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of S. 110c of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, deemed to be a Civil Court for purposes of S. 479a, Crl. P. C. It was urged therefore, that the Court acting under S. 479a Crl. P. C. is not a criminal court as mentioned in Ss. 6 and 6a of Crl. P. C. Although I am not prepared to say that Ss. 6 and 6a Crl. P. C. , are exhaustive, I am however, of the view that it is not essential to determine whether the Court which passes an order under S. 479a Crl. P. C. is technically a criminal court or not. Obviously, it is a Court which is exercising jurisdiction in a criminal matter. That being so, to my mind, an order passed by it can be revised by the High Court under S. 439 of Crl. P. C. ( 13 ) IT was submitted on behalf of the State that S. 439 ia controlled by s. 435 Crl. P. C. It was contended that the words "inferior criminal court" occurring in that section clearly show that in order to make the provisions of S. 439 Crl. P. C. applicable, the order which is sought to be revised must be an order of the inferior criminal court and since the order passed by the claims tribunal cannot be construed to be an order made by an inferior criminal court, the provision of S. 439 Crl. P. C. cannot be made applicable to the instant case. I agree with the view that S. 439, crl. P. C. must be read in connection with the sections which precede it. S. 439 Crlp. C. enables the High Court to interfere in revision, in the case of any proceeding, the record of which has been called for by itself or which has been reported for orders, or which otherwise comes to its knowledge. Although S. 439 Crl. P. C. must be read in connection with the sections which precede it. S. 439 Crlp. C. enables the High Court to interfere in revision, in the case of any proceeding, the record of which has been called for by itself or which has been reported for orders, or which otherwise comes to its knowledge. Although S. 439 Crl. P. C. should be read in connection with the sections preceding it, S. 439, in my opinion, goes further than S. 435 or other sections preceding S 439, because, it empowers the Court to call for record ' in an" preceding'. It was observed in the Full Bench decision in Rampati Kuer v. Jadunandan Thakur that :"1 am definitely of the view that the ambit and scope of the power under S. 489 Cr. P. C. are very much more comprehensive than the scope of Ss. 435 to 438 Cr. P. C. On a careful scrutiny and analysis of the provisions of Ss. 435 to 439, Cr. P. C. , it will appear that while under Ss. 435 and 436, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or of the other Courts mentioned therein 'extends over all inferior Criminal courts for the limited purposes of ordering further enquiry into the complaint which has been dismissed under S. 203 or sub- sec. (3) of S. 204, or into the case of any person accused of an offence who has been discharged, the powers of revision of th'e High Court under S. 439, Cr. P. C. extend over all Courts subordinate to it which either ordinarily or otherwise 'exercise jurisdiction in regard to criminal matters. To read the whole of the provisions of S. 435 Cr. P. C. , including the expression " inferior criminal court situate within the local limits of its jurisdiction" into S. 439 merely because the opening words of s. 439 (1) speak of the " case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself " is in my opinion, unduly restrictive of the large powers conferred on the High Court under S. 439, Cr. P. C. It is significant to notice that while under Ss. 435 and 436 Cr. P. C. It is significant to notice that while under Ss. 435 and 436 Cr. P. C. the sessions Judge and the District Judge have also been given powers along with that of the High Court to call for the records of any proceedines before any inferior Criminal Court for the purpose mentioned in S. 436 Cr. P. C. , it is only the High Court and no other Court which has been empowered to take action under S. 439 Cr. P. C. Further, though the legislature has expressly mentioned S. 435 in ss. 436, 437, 438 and 441, it is, in my opinion, not without any significance that it has omitted to mention S. 435 any where in S. 439 Cr. P. C. and the expression in S. 439 (1) to the effect that "in the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called fo'r by itself ", is only indicative of one of the methods by which the records of a prdceeding might have come before the High Court which might be called upon to exercise its revisional powers under the different sub-sections of s. 439, Cr. P. C. its insertion by no means, in my opinion, operates to restrict the amplitude of the revisional powers of the High Court under S. 439 Cr. P. C. , which powers are, however, restricted only by the restrictive provisions dealt with in the section itself. "with respect, I agree with the observations. Further, whether or not, in the present case, the order was technically made by an "inferior criminal court", I am clearly of the opinion that it was an order made by an "inferior criminal court" exercising jurisdiction under S. 479a Crl. P. C. in a criminal matter which can be revised by the High Court under s. 439 Crl. P. C. and the provisions of S. 115 of the CPC. do not apply to such a case. ( 14 ) THE order in this case, as already mentioned above, was made by the claims tribunals which is deemed to be a Civil Court under the provision of sub-sec. (2) of S. 110c of the Motor Vehicles Act. But the fact remains that the petitioner in this case has at no time been proceeded against under the civil law. The finding reco'rded against him by the court is for perjury viz. (2) of S. 110c of the Motor Vehicles Act. But the fact remains that the petitioner in this case has at no time been proceeded against under the civil law. The finding reco'rded against him by the court is for perjury viz. , for intentionally giving false evidence in a judicial proceeding and for intentionally fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in the said proceeding which is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. . That, being so, the proceeding against him would be under the provisions of the Crl. P. C. and not under the CPC. Merely because a civil court (claims tribunal) has been empowered to take action, the provisions of CPC cannot be attracted to the case. It is in reference to th3 nature of the proceeding that it must be determined whether there was an order made in a criminal cause or matter. ( 15 ) IT is the nature and the character of the proceeding which provides the test. "if the master is one tbe direct outcome of which may be the trial of the petitioner is punishable for an alleged offence by a Court claiming iurisdiction to do so, the matter is criminal". This is the true effect of the two conditions formulated by Viscount Cave in Re. Clifford v. O'sullivan, 2 App. Cas. 570. Applvine this decision, I have no doubt, that the recording of finding was in a criminal cause or matter. ( 16 ) LORD Wright observed in the case of Amend v. Secretary of State for home Afffairs, (1942) 2 All. E. R. 381, 382. as follows: "the principle which I deduce from the authorities which I have cited and the other relevant authorities which I have considered is that, if the cause or matter is one which, if carried to its conclusion, may result in the conviction of the person charged and in a sentence of some punishment, such as imprisonment or fine, it is criminal cause or matter. " ( 17 ) I respectfully agree with that view. But it was argued on behalf of the state that it is expressly laid down in sub-clause (2) of Sec. 110c of the motor Vehicles Act, that the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to a civil court for all purposes of S. 479a of the Crl. " ( 17 ) I respectfully agree with that view. But it was argued on behalf of the state that it is expressly laid down in sub-clause (2) of Sec. 110c of the motor Vehicles Act, that the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to a civil court for all purposes of S. 479a of the Crl. P. C. It was urged that in view of the express provision of sub-sec. (2) of the S. 110c of the Motor vehicles Act the order made by the claims tribunal (in revision) cannot, therefore, attract the provisions rf the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 110c of the Motor Vehicles Act reads :"the claims tribunal shall have all the powers o'f a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil court fo'r all the purposes of S. 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Criminal Procedure, 1898. " ( 18 ) IT is true that S. 439a is found in Chapter XXV, Crl. P. C. But if the construction is placed on the later portion of the sub-sec. (2) of S. 110c of the motor Vehicles Act, as I am asked to place upon it by the learned Government Pleader, the earlier portion of the said sub-clause would become useless. If according to him, the claims tribunal is construed to be a civil court, then it was not necessary to confer powers on the claims tribunal for enforcing the attendance of witnesses and o'f compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects, as envisaged in the first portion of sub-sec. (2) of S. 110c of the Motor Vehicles Act. Each part of the section should be so construed as to be consistent with the other part, removing if necessary, all pertinent inconsistency so far as it is possible and making the section or the purport of the whole section coherent and intelligible. The construction so put must be such as not to render the other part of the section absurd or superfluous. Therefore, i find it difficult to place such a construction on the language used in the later part of sub-sec. The construction so put must be such as not to render the other part of the section absurd or superfluous. Therefore, i find it difficult to place such a construction on the language used in the later part of sub-sec. (2) of S. 110c of the Motor Vehicles Act, as I am asked to, by the learned Government Pleader. It is clear from the language of the section that the deeming clause has been inserted in the later part of sub-sec. (2) of the S. 110c of the Motor Vehicles Act, in order to enable the tribunal to take action for the acts committed by a person as mentioned in S. 479a Crl. P. C. In other words, the claims tribunal gets jurisdiction to take action for the acts stated in S. 479a Crl. P. C. , by virtue of the deeming provision in the later part of sub-sec. (2) of s. 110c of the Moto'r Vehicles Act. That appears to me to be the intention of the legislature in inserting the deeming provision in that sub- clause. It was next submitted by the learned Government Pleader relying upor order 39, sub-rule (3) of Rule (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure that the action contemplated therein, results in penal consequences. Therefore, if the principle that it is the nature and character of the proceeding which would attract the provision of either Criminal Procedure Code or Civil procedure Code is accepted, then the consequences of the action contemplated in sub-rule (3) of Rule (2) of Order 39, being penal, the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be attracted to such a proceeding. ( 19 ) IT is not possible to accede to the contention advanced. The action envisaged in sub-rule (3) of Rule (2) of Order 39, is purely of Civil nature, the words 'civil prison' occurring in the said sub-rule is clearly indicative of the fact that the action contemplated is of civil nature. Further, it is expressly laid-down in clause (r) of Rule 1, Order 43 of the Code of Civil procedure, that an appeal shall lie fro'm an order under rule 1, rule 2, rule 4 or rule 10 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Further, it is expressly laid-down in clause (r) of Rule 1, Order 43 of the Code of Civil procedure, that an appeal shall lie fro'm an order under rule 1, rule 2, rule 4 or rule 10 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the action taken under sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was of a criminal nature, the provision for its appeal would not have been found in the Civil Procedure Code itself. It is clear that the provision of the code of Civil Procedure will govern civil matters only and they are not applicable to criminal matters. The learned Government Header was unable to point out any reference to the provision of the Criminal procedure Code anywhere in Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This by itself furnishes a reasonable basis for a conclusion that the action contemplated by sub-rule (3) of rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is of civil character. Further-more, if a civil Court passes an order under sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it cannot be said that such an order was made by the Court exercising jurisdiction under the said clause in a criminal matter. Thus the contention advanced on behalf of the State seems to be unsustainable. That apart, any breach envisaged in sub-rule (3) of Rule 2 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil procedure is not an offence punishable under any of the provisions of the indian Penal Code so as to make the provision of the Criminal Procedure code applicable. ( 20 ) THE last contention advanced on behalf of the State by Mr, Havanur was that except the provisions contained in S. 561a Cr. P. C. , no other provision could be made applicable to the case. In other words his argument amounts to this, viz. for exercising its revisional jurisdiction under s. 439 Cr. P. C. , this Court should invoke its inherent powers recognised under S. 561a Cr. P. C. But the obstacle in the way of the learned Govt. Pleader is that having come to the conclusions that the provisions of the code of Criminal Procedure are applicable to the case, the question of the applicability of S. 561-A cannot arise. P. C. , this Court should invoke its inherent powers recognised under S. 561a Cr. P. C. But the obstacle in the way of the learned Govt. Pleader is that having come to the conclusions that the provisions of the code of Criminal Procedure are applicable to the case, the question of the applicability of S. 561-A cannot arise. The reason for enacting the provisions of S. 561-A Cr. PC. by the Amending Act of 1923 was that no legislative enactment dealing with the procedure could provide for all cases that may arise. Further, the maintainability of this revision petition under s. 439 Cr. P. C. is challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It is well settled that S. 561a Cr. P. C. does not and cannot authorise a Court to assume any new jurisdiction. ( 21 ) THE Madras High Court in Rajah Parthasaradhi Appa Row v. Rajah rengiah Appa Row, ILR 27 Mad. 168, 175 observes: "it has to be borne in mind that there is an essential distinction between a Court's inherent power and its jurisdiction. I am not aware df any authority which supports the view that the inherent power of a Court could be invoked except for the limited purpose of preserving and enforcing order, securing efficiency and preventing abuse of process in the exercise of a jurisdiction which the Court otherwise possesses. I respectfully agree with the view expressed by Subrahmania Ayyar, J. in that decision. Therefore, on the reasons stated above, it is held that this revision petition from an order under S. 479a Cr. P. C. passed by a Civil Court (i. e. , the Claims Tribunal) to this Court should be heard and decided in accordance with the provisions of S. 439, Cr. P. C. and hence it is maintainable. On the merits, Mr. Deshpande the learned counsel for the petitioner concentrated his argument only on one contention. He strenuously argued that the learned Sessions Judge who made the order in revision has not applied his mind at all to the objection that had been put forth before him by the petitioners. His grievance was that reading the order in revision as a whole, it becomes clear that the learned Sessions Judge found himself fettered by the findings recorded by his predecessor in office in the previdus order. His grievance was that reading the order in revision as a whole, it becomes clear that the learned Sessions Judge found himself fettered by the findings recorded by his predecessor in office in the previdus order. He contended that after considering the objections raised by the petitioners the learned Sessions Judge ought td have come to the conclusion whether the complaint should be filed as envisaged under Section 479-A criminal Procedure Code. ( 22 ) ON the other hand, it was argued on behalf df the State that it is true that notice had been issued by the Sessions Judg'e to the petitioners, the object being to afford an opportunity to the petitioners to rebut the findings recorded against them. S. 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure which prescribes the procedure in certain cases df false evidence reads:"479a (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 476 to 479 inclusive, when any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court is of opinion that any person appearing before it as a witness has intentionally given false evidence in any stage of the judicial proceeding or has intentionally fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used to any stage of the judicial proceeding, and that, for the eradication of the evils of perjury and fabrication of false evidence and in the interests of justice it is expedient that such witness should be prosecuted for the offence which appears to have been committed by him, the Court shall at the time of the delivery of the judgment or final order disposing of such proceeding, record a finding to that effect stating its reasons therefor and may, if it so thinks fit, after giving the witness an opportunity of being heard, make a complaint thereof in writing signed by the presiding officer of the Court setting forth the evidence which, in the opinion of the Court, is false or fabricated and forward the same to a magistrate of the first class. " ( 23 ) IT is thus clear from S. 479-A that it is not incumbent on the Court to issue notice to the witness and the Court may record a finding straightaway, but however, after recording its finding, if the Court thinks fit, it may issue a notice to the witness affording him an opportunity of being heard with regard to the filing of the complaint, meaning thereby that the Court, after considering the objections if any put forth by or oh behalf of the petitioner, will make an order whether an appropriate complaint should be filed against him in the Court of competent jurisdiction or not. Now, in the instant case it is clear that the learned Sessions Judge has depended mainly upon the finding recorded by his predecessor. The order made by him gives an impression, as rightly contended on behalf of the petitioners by Mr. Deshpande, that the Sessions Judge all through in his order found himself fettered by the finding recorded by his predecessor. ( 24 ) IN para 5 of his order, the learned Sessions Judge states:"my learned predecessor has expressed the opinion feat the evidence tendered by these two respondents is false and fabricated and that the document Exhibit P-3 is fo'rged and it is produced before Court as evidence. . . . . . . . . . "again in para 6 of his order, it is stated:"in the present case, my 'learned predecessor has in fact found that the document Ex. P-3 is fabricated and it is a forged document, it is produced before Court to show that P. W. 7 the present 2nd respondent was getting a higher salary. Thus it appears that my learned predecessor has found that both P. Ws. 6 and 7 that is the present respondents 1 and 2 have colluded with each other and fabricated the document Ex. P-3 and have produced it before Court knowing that the document was a forged document or a false document. " ( 25 ) THESE passages go in support of the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners to the effect that the learned Sessions Judge did not apply his mind and solely depended upon the finding recorded by his predecessor. P-3 and have produced it before Court knowing that the document was a forged document or a false document. " ( 25 ) THESE passages go in support of the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners to the effect that the learned Sessions Judge did not apply his mind and solely depended upon the finding recorded by his predecessor. It is true, as argued on behalf of the Stat, that in para 7 of the order the learned Sessions Judge has stated:"therefore, I find that in the present case it is expedient to make a complaint against the respondents 1 and 2 before the competent court. "but the word 'therefore' is full of meaning. It is suggestive of the fact that on the reasons stated by his predecessor, the Sessions Judge found that a complaint should be filed. Therefore the finding of the Sessions Judge is qualified by the word 'therefore' and consequently it cannot be construed to be an independent finding. ( 26 ) THE next question for determination is what should be the proper order in this case in view of the circumstances stated above. The contention that has been raised before me was to the effect that the order made by the Sessions Judge was in contravention of the provisions of S. 479-A crp. C. and this Court was called upon to set aside the said order. In the light of the argument advanced, obviously, the case cannot be remanded to the Court below for giving an opportunity of being heard to the petitioners. All that has happened in this case is that the Sessions Judge has made an order in breach of S. 479a Cr. P. C. That being so the proper order would be to set aside the order of the Sessions Judge. What further action could be taken in accordance with law, it is for the Sessions Judeg to decide. In the result, this revision petition is allowed and the order passed by the Sessions Judge on 25th March 1969 is set aside. --- *** --- .