Judgment :- 1. The appeal is by the 1st defendant in a suit for possession he has lost in the Courts below. The only question for consideration in the appeal is whether the suit is barred by limitation under the Limitation Act of 1908 that is the statute applicable, the suit having been instituted when the said Act was in force. The plaintiff, who is the daughter of one deceased Manni, claimed title to the plaint properties on the basis of a lease, Ext. Al of 1928, obtained by the deceased Manni, Manni's sisters and her brother, the second defendant, from the Kanam-kuzhikanamdar of the property. The other co-tenants transferred their right to Manni under Ext. A2 dated 17 51935 whereafter according to the plaintiff, the deceased Manni was in possession and enjoyment; and on her death, the tenancy rights devolved on the plaintiff. The 1st defendant, who is one of the sisters of Manni, was allowed to reside in the building in plaint item 1 even during the life time of Manni; and according to the plaintiff, she continued to be residing therein. Item 2 of the plaint property was leased to one Ramunni in 1942 by the deceased Manni, who attorned to the plaintiff after the death of Manni, and later surrendered the property to the plaintiff. The plaintiff also alleged that subsequently plaint item No. 2 was leased to one Kavunkal Krishnan on 12 31950, and that Krishnan surrendered the same after the expiry of the term. According to the plaintiff, she was in possession of the plaint properties till 1958, but was obstructed from enjoying the property by defendants 1 and 2 in 1958. Therefore, the plaintiff sued the defendants alleging that she discontinued possession of the property from 1958 due to the conduct of defendants 1 and 2. 2. The 1st defendant, in answer to the claim for eviction, set up an oral lease of the plaint properties alleged to have been granted to her by the deceased Manni in the year 1940. This lease was denied by the plaintiff. The courts below have found the case of oral lease set up by the 1st defendant to be not true. This lease was denied by the plaintiff. The courts below have found the case of oral lease set up by the 1st defendant to be not true. All the same, a decree has been granted to the plaintiff for recovery of the property on the ground that the 1st defendant having failed to prove the tenancy set up by her the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of possession. The decision of the courts below is based on the decision of this court in Marimuthu Goundan v. Thampi (1960 KLJ.1304). 3. The allegation of the plaintiff in the plaint is one of prior possession and discontinuance of possession. Recovery is claimed on the basis of anterior title of the plaintiff. The averments in the plaint squarely attract Art.142 of the Limitation Act of 1908. It is well settled that a plaintiff, who is suing for possession of property in the occupation of another, cannot rest his case on title alone. He must show that he has exercised rights of ownership by being in possession within 12 years of suit. Would this principle apply in a case where in answer to the claim for possession, the defendant sets up a tenancy, which is disputed by the plaintiff? It is this question that engages our attention in this appeal, in view of the reliance placed by the lower appellate court on the decision in 1960 KLJ.1304. 4. In this suit for possession the defendant has set up a tenancy, which has been found by the courts below to be not true. All the same, the fact that the defendant set up a tenancy and thereby admitted the plaintiff's title and that his own possession was under the plaintiff has been considered by the learned judge as sufficient answer to the plea of limitation raised by the defendant. As we have seen, reliance is placed by the lower appellate court on the decision in Marimuthu Gounden v. Thampi (1960 KLJ.1304); and based on that decision, the learned judge has found that where the 1st defendant has not denied the title of the plaintiff, but, however, pleads his right to be in possession under an instrument by the plaintiff's predecessor, it is for her to establish the right so asserted as entitling her to continue in possession. It is assumed that such possession is as much the possession of the plaintiff. It is assumed that such possession is as much the possession of the plaintiff. We do not think that the decision in Marimuthu Goundan v. Thampi (1960 KLJ.1304) is authority for the proposition that when the defendant sets up possession under a lease from the plaintiff and fails to prove the lease, the plaintiff, in no case, is called upon to prove anything m6re. On the facts of that case, such an assumption would be correct, since the leases set up by the 1st defendant in that case were within 12 years of suit and the defendant having failed to prove the said leases, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed. This principle, we are afraid, cannot be extended to cases where the defendant pleads arrangement of tenancy entered into more than 12 years prior to the date of suit and fails to prove such tenancy. It may be that when the defendant sets up a case that he has been put in possession under a lease by the plaintiff or his predecessors in interest, there is an implied admission that the plaintiff was in possession on the date when the defendant was so pat in possession. The plaintiff may rely upon this admission to prove his possession; but in cases where the lease set up by the defendant is not one which originated within 12 years of suit, such admission by itself may not avail the plaintiff to prove his possession within 12 years of the date of suit. We see no reason or logic in extending the principle that in a suit for possession if the defendant sets up a plea of possession as plaintiff's tenant and fails, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree without proving anything further, to all cases. The principle may apply where tenancy pleaded is within 1.2 years of the suit, the defendant in such a case being taken to have admitted the possession of the plaintiff within that period. We do not think that the decision in Marimuthu Goundan v. Thampi (1960 KLJ.1304) intended to lay down the principle canvassed by the learned Subordinate Judge. 5. Our attention has been drawn to the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Jaldhari v. Rajendra Singh (AIR 1958 Patna 386). We do not think that the decision in Marimuthu Goundan v. Thampi (1960 KLJ.1304) intended to lay down the principle canvassed by the learned Subordinate Judge. 5. Our attention has been drawn to the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Jaldhari v. Rajendra Singh (AIR 1958 Patna 386). That was a case where the plaintiffs claimed possession from defendants on the basis of title, alleging dispossession within 12 years of suit. The defendants resisted the suit and denied the case of dispossession set up by the plaintiffs. The defendants did not allege any independent title, but claimed to hold under the plaintiffs. The question posed in the case was whether the suit was barred by limitation and whether the Article applicable was Art.142 of the Limitation Act. An earlier Full Bench of the Patna High Court had held in the decision in Raja Siva Prasad Singh v. Hira Singh (AIR. 1921 Patna 237)that the "plaintiff in a suit for ejectment must prove not only his antecedent title but also his possession within 12 years of the suit". Considering this Full Bench case, the Patna High Court held that the rule propounded in the Full Bench decision of Raja Siva Prasad Singh is not of universal application and should not be extended beyond the facts of that case, and the case of landlord and tenant is entirely different and does not come within the ambit of the doctrine laid down. It further held that the Full Bench decision does not purport to lay down that, in a suit for ejectment on the ground of dispossession, the presumption of possession arising from admitted or proved title is not at all available. 6. Where the plaintiff alleges tenancy and the defendant admits the same or where the plaintiff or defendant allege tenancy and such tenancy is proved, the suit may, in essence, be one between landlord and tenant, and in such a case the plaintiff is not called onto prove possession within 12 years of suit he would nevertheless have to prove that the tenancy has been duly determined so as to entitle him to present possession, and, in view of Art.139 that this determination was within 12 years before the suit. But where one of the parties alleges a tenancy but it is not substantiated in evidence, the principle to be applied is not the one applicable to a suit between landlord and tenant in the matter of limitation. No doubt, the admission by the defendant in such a suit that he is a tenant may amount to an admission that when the tenancy was created the landlord was in possessession, so that he could put the tenant in possession. If the tenancy alleged happens to be one which commenced within 12 years of the suit, plaintiff may succeed on the strength of title, taking the admission of the defendant as proving the possession of the plaintiff within 12 years. We think this principle cannot be extended to cases where the admission implied in a plea of tenancy relates to a period more than 12 years prior to the date of suit. 7. We do not see anything in the decision of the Supreme Court in Aft. Murthi v. Mohammed Mirkhan (AIR. 1965 S.C. 875) that is against the view taken by us herein. That was a suit for declaration of title, the plaintiff claiming that he was in possession of the land and praying in the alternative that if he is deemed to have been dispossessed by reason of earlier proceedings under S.144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he may be given possession. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant alleged dispossession or discontinuance of possession of plaintiff. Their Lordships said in that case: "It seems to us that if a defendant not only admits title of the plaintiff but also admits that he derived possession from the plaintiff as a tenant, the case must proceed on the defendant's plea, and for the purpose of deciding whether Art.142 or Art.144 applied, it must bo assumed that the plaintiff has not been dispossessed or has not discontinued his possession within the meaning of Art.142, for neither the plaintiff nor the defendant alleges dispossession or discontinuation of possession." The question whether when the pleadings disclose a case of dispossession or discontinuance of possession by the plaintiff, Art.142 of the Limitation Act of 1908 will be attracted was not decided in the case before the Supreme Court. 8. We are, however, of the view that, on the facts of this case, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for eviction. 8. We are, however, of the view that, on the facts of this case, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for eviction. Though the courts below have found that the defendant has not succeeded in establishing the oral lease of the year 1940 set up by her, both the courts have failed to enter a finding on the question whether the plaintiff was in possession within 12 years of the suit. If the plaintiff was in such possession at any time within 12 years prior to the date of suit, the plaintiff would be entitled to get a decree irrespective of any finding on the question of oral lease. We have addressed ourselves to the evidence on this question. According to the 1st defendant, the oral lease was granted to her by the deceased Manni in the year 1940 and she has been in possession of the plaint property pursuant to such oral lease ever since. This case of the 1st defendant is disproved by the various circumstances evidenced in the case. The matters referred to by the Subordinate Judge in Para.6 of the judgment are relevant also in the matter of considering the possession of the plaintiff within 12 years of the suit. It is seen that in 1942 Manni leased item 2 of the plaint properties under a Marapat, Ext. A3, to one Ramunni in respect of the trees standing upon the property. Ewa swears that on the expiry of the period in Ext.A3 by this time Manni had died the plaintiff granted him a fresh lease for a further period. Ext. A17 evidences a surrender executed to him by the plaintiff at the end of the period. One of the plaint items is wet land, which is being cultivated with paddy. It is contended by the plaintiff that during the period from 1940-54 the actual cultivators of the properties were given Form No. 2, commonly known as Meru Form, by the authorities which form would indicate the cultivators of the wet lands concerned. It is pointed out that it was the plaintiff whose name was shown in such forms and that the 1st defendant was not able to show that in any form her name is noted as the cultivator. The conduct of the 1st defendant strengthens the case of the plaintiff in regard to possession. It is pointed out that it was the plaintiff whose name was shown in such forms and that the 1st defendant was not able to show that in any form her name is noted as the cultivator. The conduct of the 1st defendant strengthens the case of the plaintiff in regard to possession. In 1958 the 1st defendant is seen to have purchased the intermediary rights in the property under Ext. A20. If, as a matter of fact, she was in possession under an oral lease of 1940, as contended in the written statement in this suit, one would naturally expect mention to be made of this fact in Ext. A20, the document taken by the 1st defendant. Not only is there no mention of any such lease, but it is of significance that in Ext. A2 the 1st defendant's title is traced to Ext. Al lease obtained jointly in the name of herself, the 2nd defendant and deceased Manni and others, without referring to Ext. A2, the transfer of rights by defendants 1 and 2 and others to Manni. It is also seen that the 1st defendant has executed a Melpattom deed for the plaint property immediately before the suit in favour of the 3rd defendant. This is Ext. B14. No mention is made of the oral lease even in this document executed by the 1st defendant as late as in 1959. We are inclined to accept the evidence of Pwl on the question of possession. Under the circumstances, we think that the case of an oral lease of 1940 set up by defendants 1 and 2 is an after-thought. The plaintiff is seen to have been in possession all along and was exercising acts of possession. The plaintiff has proved that she was in possession within 12 years prior to the date of suit; and, as such, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for recovery of the plaint properties. 9. In the circumstances, we agree with the decree passed by the court below, though for different reasons. 10. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Dismissed.