JUDGMENT : Acharya. J. 1. The unsuccessful Defendant-mortgagee in both the Courts below is the Appellant. 2. The Plaintiffs' case, in brief, is as follows : On 12-31947 they executed a mortgage deed of their house in favour of the Defendant mortgagee for a sum of Rs. 6,00/- and delivered possession of the said house to' him. The stipulation in the said deed is that if within a period of seven years from the date of mortgage the mortgage money of Rs. 6,00/- is not paid to the mortgagee, he would be able to sell, gift or deal with the mortgaged house any way be likes and would enjoy absolute right over the same for all times to come. The Plaintiffs in accordance with the terms of the mortgage were looking after the annual repairs of suit house from time to time. Although the mortgage deed (Ext. A) is nomenclatured as an English mortgage, in fact and effect it is an usufructuary mortgage. After the completion of fifteen years from the date of the mortgage, the Plaintiffs demanded release of the mortgaged property, as by operation of law the mortgage was extinguished after the said period. The Plaintiffs filed this suit as the Defendant refused to release the house claiming absolute ownership over the same. 3. The Defendant contested the suit by admitting the execution of the mortgage deed (Ext. A), but asserted mainly that the transaction was not an English or an usufructuary mortgage but was a mortgage by conditional sale and as such the Defendant perfected his title to the suit property by the lapse of the stipulated time. He further contended that the Orissa Money Lenders Act is not applicable to the present case. 4. The learned Munsif decreed the suit in part on the finding that the Plaintiffs had the right of redemption; that the provisions of Section 17 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act as amended in 1956 were applicable to the present case, and as such the mortgage stood discharged automatically on completion of fifteen years from the date of the mortgage. The Defendant in first appeal raised only one point that the suit mortgage deed (Ext. A) was an English mortgage. This was directly contrary to his assertion in the trial Court. The first appellate Court however confirmed the decree of the trial Court. 5. The Defendant in first appeal raised only one point that the suit mortgage deed (Ext. A) was an English mortgage. This was directly contrary to his assertion in the trial Court. The first appellate Court however confirmed the decree of the trial Court. 5. In course of the hearing of this appeal a petition was filed by the Defendant-Appellant to allow the Appellant to take three additional grounds, which in effect were as follows: (i) That with regard to Ext. A the Plaintiffs failed to prove the requirements of Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act in as much as there was no evidence of due attestation of the mortgage instrument and as such the suit was not maintainable. (ii) That the document (Ext. A) is not a mortgage within the meaning of Section 58(80) of the Transfer of Property Act. (iii) That the Plaintiffs have not proved that Ext. A is a possessory mortgage as contemplated under the Explanation to Section 17 of the Orissa Money Lenders Act. 6. The Respondents in their counter to the aforesaid petition raised various objections which would be dealt with at relevant places. 7. Mr. Ramdas, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, seriously asserted his first point as mentioned above. 8. Mr. Mohanti, the learned Counsel for the Respondents, has two-fold objections to the above contention. His fist preliminary objection is that the Appellant is not permitted to raise the above new plea in this second appeal for the first time. In reply, Mr. Ramdas contends that this is not a question of new plea but is it substantial question of law dealing with the admissibility of Ext. A in evidence as a mortgage bond. In support of his contention he cited the decisions in V. Ramachandra Ayyar and Anr. v. Ramalingam Chettiar and Anr. 1962 S.C.D. 982, and Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh Vs. Walchand Ramchand Kothari wherein their Lordships indicated the, cope and applicability of Section 100, Civil Procedure Cone for interference by High Court in second appeals. In my view, the question as posed, irrespective of its merit which will be examined hereafter, being a question of law is one within the purview of Section 100, Civil Procedure Cone and can be allowed to be raised for consideration in this appeal though it was not agitated in the Courts below. 9. Mr. Mohanti's second line of attack is of substance. 9. Mr. Mohanti's second line of attack is of substance. It was contended by him that in view of the admission of the Defendant all through that Ext" A was a mortgage instrument, he could not now take this plea in this Court. In support of his above contention he cited the decision in Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale Vs. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and Others wherein (para 11) their Lordships observed that "An admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon, and though not conclusive, is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous". He next cited Mahendra Manilal Nanavati Vs. Sushila Mahendra Nanavati, wherein it has been observed "Where, however, there is no room for supposing that parties are concluding, there is no reason why admissions of parties should not be treated as evidence just as they are treated in other Civil proceedings". The provisions of the Evidence Act and the CPC provide for Courts accepting the admissions made by parties and requiring no further proof in support of the facts admitted. Another case cited on this point is Komalsing Kuwarsing Vs. Krishnabai wherein it has been held that Section 68 of the Evidence Act would be applicable only if the execution is to be proved. As is observed by their Lordships All that it says is that the execution of a document cannot be regarded as proved unless one attesting witness at least has been called for that purpose. But where the execution is not to be proved it is not necessary to call any attesting witness unless it is expressly contended that the attesting witness has not witnessed the execution of the document. It is to be mentioned here that there is no such express allegation nor even a trace of the contention raised at present either in the pleadings, or in the evidence or in the contention of the Defendant before both the Courts below. In the case reported in Satish Chandra Mitra v. Jogendranath Mahalanabis ILR 44 Cal. 345, 349, Woodroffe J. observed as follows: In the case of a document required by law to be attested the admission of a party to it of its execution by himself is, u/s 70 of the Evidence Act, sufficient proof of its execution as against him. In the case reported in Satish Chandra Mitra v. Jogendranath Mahalanabis ILR 44 Cal. 345, 349, Woodroffe J. observed as follows: In the case of a document required by law to be attested the admission of a party to it of its execution by himself is, u/s 70 of the Evidence Act, sufficient proof of its execution as against him. If, therefore, the question had arisen solely between the Plaintiff and the mortgagor in this case, it would not have been necessary to have called any attesting witness or other evidence. The admission by the party to the document would have dispensed with the necessity of all further proof. Woodruff in his Commentary on Evidence (8th Edition, p. 536) observed that if admission of execution did not dispense with proof of attestation there was no need of Section 70 of the Evidence Act. 10. Mr. Ramdas cited the decisions reported in Sita Dakuani and Ors. v. Rama Chandra Nahak and Ors. 33 (1967) C.L.T. 811, and Pravas Chandra Pati v. Jagamohan Das 26 C.L.T. 359, in support of his above contention that due attestation of the suit document in any case had to be proved in order that it could be used as evidence and taken into consideration in this case. It must here be noticed that in each of the cases cited by Mr. Ramdas it was always the mortgagee who was the Plaintiff in the suit. Attestation is required by law as a special precaution against forgery or fraud, and as such the burden lies squarely on the mortgagee in trying to enforce the mortgage bond in a suit against the mortgagor to prove due attestation of the deed as required under the law even inspite of admission of execution of the deed by the mortgagor. It was therefore held in the above case: ... that despite the admission of the execution of the deed by the Defendant (mortgagor) it was incumbent to prove the due attestation of the mortgage if the Plaintiff (mortgagee) wanted to take advantage of the transaction as a mortgage unless of course attestation is admitted. All that proviso to Section 68 lays down is that in such a case the document may not be proved by any attesting witness but all the same due attestation must be proved. All that proviso to Section 68 lays down is that in such a case the document may not be proved by any attesting witness but all the same due attestation must be proved. Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act intend to protect the mortgagor and prevent force, fraud, undue influence and forgery or perjury being perpetrated on him. "The object of attestation is to protect the executants from being required to execute a document by the other party thereto by force, fraud or undue influence" Kumar Harish Chandra Singh Das and Others Vs. Bansidhar Mohanty and Others also see AIR 1925 PC 89 . Therefore, what is intended to benefit the mortgagor cannot be construed to act to the detriment of his interest. That being so, the decisions cited by Mr. Ramdas do not apply to the facts of this case as the mortgagors are the Plaintiffs in this case and the Defendant-mortgagee contested the suit on admitting the execution of the suit document, ann the same to be a mortgage. 11. In the counter-affidavit filed by the Respondents, it s asserted that the Defendant-Appellant being a local man knew,bout the death of the attesting witnesses and of the scribe of he suit document by the time the parties want to trial on the suit. The Defendant-Appellant admitted the mortgage deed both in the trail and in appeal and proceeded on that hash merely contending that this was a, mortgage of a particular type though not a usufructuary or a possessory mortgage. If the Defendant had taken this plea under discussion in the trail Court, the Plaintiffs would have availed of the opportunity and might have proceeded to prove the suit document as required under the law. The Defendant's admission of the document to be a mortgage is decisive of the matter and he now would not be allowed to riggle out of his said admission on the new plea now taken by m. In view of the discussions made above, the above plea ken by Mr. Ramdas has no force and is of no avail to the Defendant-Appellant. 12. The second contention raised by Mr. Ramdas has no force and is of no avail to the Defendant-Appellant. 12. The second contention raised by Mr. Ramdas is that mortgage being a transfer of an interest, in a specific immoveable property for the purpose of securing the money advanced, d there being no such enumeration in the suit instrument it cannot be said to be an instrument of mortgage. This contention 'tin was not raised at any previous stage. I am however one the Mr. Ramdas's contention that this is a question of law involving construction of the document which can be agitated m in second appeal. 13. According to Mr. Ramdas, as per the stipulations in the suit document the mortgagee becomes only the absolute owner of the property on the failure of repayment of the money advanced, but there is nothing in the said deed which enables him to realise the money advanced from the said property, and as such it cannot be a security as required u/s 58 of I Transfer of Property Act. Having gone through the mortgage document I am satisfied that this contention of Mr. Ramdas is not tenable. In the recital of the deed it is mentioned that it is an English mortgage which is drawn up and registered for the purpose of taking money on mortgaging the suit house. The mortgagor expressly delivered possession of the same in favour of the mortgagee from the date of the execution of the deed. It is also stated therein that if the mortgage money of Rs. 600/- is paid back within the stipulated time, then the house in question along with the laid deed would be handed back to the mortgagor and neither the mortgagee nor his successor in interest can raise objection to the same. It is further provided that on the event of the mortgagor's failure to pay back the said amount within the stipulated time, the mortgagee would be able to sell, gift or deal with the house any way he likes and would enjoy absolute right over the same for all times to come. According to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Page 2697. Vol. 4, 3rd Edition)";-A 'Security', speaking generally is anything that makes the money more assured in its payment or more readily recoverable, as distinguished from e.g., a mere I. O. U. which is only evidence of a debt". According to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Page 2697. Vol. 4, 3rd Edition)";-A 'Security', speaking generally is anything that makes the money more assured in its payment or more readily recoverable, as distinguished from e.g., a mere I. O. U. which is only evidence of a debt". Therefore, "it is the assurance in its payment or ready recoverability that constitutes a particular thing a security for the debt' Shyamsundar Panda and Anr. v. Sitaram Singh Samanta and Ors. 24 C.L.T. 52, 63. In this case the possession of the property was delivered to the mortgagee enabling him to sell the same and/or to deal with the property as he desired in his absolute right in default of payment, of the mortgage debt. This being so, it cannot at all be said that the house in question which was mortgaged and handed over to the mortgagee, and the mortgage document executed for the purpose did not secure the repayment of the mortgage money. Thus this contention also fails. 14. It was at last contended by Mr. Ramdas that the provisions of Section 17 of the Money Lenders Act, providing for discharge of possessory mortgages, would not apply to the present case as: (i) the suit document (Ext.A) has neither been legally proved or can be construed to be a mortgage deed on the reasonings so far contended on behalf of the Appellant; and (ii) the plain tiffs, in any event, have not proved the suit transaction to be a possessory mortgagee as contemplated under the Explanation to Section 17 of the Money Lenders 4. 15. The first part of the above mentioned contention is not tenable as the reasonings forming the basis of this contention have been negatived in my findings in the preceding paragraphs. The second part of his contention is equally untenable. In order to establish a mortgage to be a possessory mortgage so as to come within Section 17 of the Money Lenders Act, three essential facts have to be established (i) the mortgagee must be in possession and enjoyment of the mortgage security; (ii) such possession and enjoyment must be in pursuance of the mortgage; and (iii) such possession and enjoyment must be in satisfaction of the mortgage debt either in whole or in part. On a construction of Ext. On a construction of Ext. A and on the ad mission of the mortgage and the pleadings and evidence on record, it is quite evident that the mortgagee was delivered possession of the suit house in pursuance of the mortgage transaction immediately on the execution of the mortgage deed, and as such he has been continuing in possession and enjoyment of the same all these days ever since that date. The mortgagee as such must be in possession and enjoyment of the house in satisfaction in some form and to some extent of the mortgage debt, which as such presumably is the motive for gain which actuated the transaction. As such all the three essential requirements stated above have been satisfied and established in this case. In this connection I may refer to a decision in Smt. Padmabati Devi v. Bhagabat Charan Padhi 33 C.L.T. 919, wherein it has been held: Section 17 is a beneficial provision in favour of the mortgagor. If the mortgagee is in possession of the property and the usufruct derived therefrom is not sufficient even to meet a portion of the interest what of the principal, the mortgage will stand extinguished after the expiry of fifteen years. The right of the mortgagee to continue in possession after the prescribed period is thus brought to an end. In this view of the matter it can definitely be said that the suit transaction has been satisfactorily proved to be a possessory mortgage, and as such the proposition advanced by Mr. Ramdas is not at, all tenable. Thus, on the provisions of Section 17 of the Money Lenders Act, the suit mortgage stands automatically discharged after the expiration of fifteen years from the date of the execution of the deed, and as the said period of fifteen years in the present case has already elapsed, the Defendant mortgagee has to deliver up to the Plaintiffs-mortgagors all documents in his possession or power relating to the mortgaged property and retransfer the suit house to the mortgagors free from all encumbrances which might have been created by the mortgagee or those claiming under him, and is now to put the mortgages in possession of the suit house. 16. In this view of the matter, the decrees of the Courts below are upheld. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed