JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE plaintiff Durga Prasad filed a civil suit in the Court of the IIIrd Additional District Judge, Jabalpur, under section 8 of the Madhya pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 for a declaration that the entry No. 305 in the register of Public Trusts was void and that the house in suit did not belong to any public trust. The suit has been filed against the Registrar of Public Trusts, jabalpur and the State of Madhya Pradesh as defendants. In this suit, the applicant Baijnath made an application under rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for being added as a party defendant to the suit on the ground that he was a necessary or, at least, a proper party because- (i) the Registrar had given his finding under section 6 of the Act on an inquiry initiated at his instance, (ii) his presence would be necessary for adducing evidence against the contentions of the plaintiff, (iii) he was a person interested in the trust and had moved an application to the Registrar for the registration of the trust, and (iv) his presence would be necessary for a decision of the matters in controversy in the suit. ( 2. ) THE application was opposed by the plaintiff, and the trial Court dismissed the application holding, inter alia,- (a) that the presence of the applicant was not necessary to enable it to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit; (b) that the fact that the presence of the applicant was necessary for adducing evidence did not make hern either a necessary or a proper party; and (c) that the applicant, beyond stating that he was interested in the trust, had not stated how he was interested in it. ( 3. ) THE learned counsel for the applicant contends that the learned Additional District Judge has erred in the exercise of his jurisdiction in dismissing the application of the applicant for a joinder and that he should be ordered to be joined in exercise of my re-visional powers under section 115 of the Code of civil Procedure. ( 4. ) IN my opinion, there is no merit in this contention, which must accordingly fail. ( 5. ( 4. ) IN my opinion, there is no merit in this contention, which must accordingly fail. ( 5. ) THE suit of the plaintiff is under section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh public Trusts Act, 1951, which reads as follows: A " (1) Any working trustee or person having interest in a public trust or any property found to be trust property, aggrieved by any finding of the Registrar under section 6 may, within six months from the date of the notice under sub-section (1) of section 7, institute a suit in a Civil Court to have such finding set aside or modified. (2) In every such suit, the Civil Court shall give notice to the State Government through the Registrars and the State Government, if it so desires, shall be made a party to the suit. " The plaintiff has joined both the Registrar and the State Government as party defendants to the suit; and though the State Government had an option to be made a party or not, it has, it appears, impliedly exercised its option in favour of its joinder. The Act does not in terms say that a person, who had initiated the inquiry under section 5 of the Act, should be made a party, nor does it say that every person interested in the trust property should be made a party defendant to the suit. ( 6. ) IT is settled law that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and that generally it is for him to choose against whom he shall fight, and that he cannot be compelled to fight against some person not of his choice unless such a process is required by any positive rule of law. ( 7. ) THE plaintiff in the instant case does not claim any relief against the applicant nor does he choose to implead him as a party defendant to the suit. The provisions of the Act also do not enjoin his joinder as a matter of positive law. ( 8. ) THE question, therefore, that arises for consideration in this application for revision is whether the plaintiff in this case should be compelled to "litigate not only against the defendants of his choice against whom he has prayed for reliefs but also the applicant against whom he claims no relief and whose joinder he strongly opposes. ( 9. ( 8. ) THE question, therefore, that arises for consideration in this application for revision is whether the plaintiff in this case should be compelled to "litigate not only against the defendants of his choice against whom he has prayed for reliefs but also the applicant against whom he claims no relief and whose joinder he strongly opposes. ( 9. ) THE rule in the Code of Civil Procedure, which deals with the joinder of parties, is rule 10 (2) of Order I and reads as follows : "the Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. " It enjoins the joinder of two classes of persons: (1) Persons who ought to have been joined. Such persons are known as necessary parties, because their presence is obligatory as, in their absence, no effective decree can at all be passed. (2.) Persons whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. Such persons are known as proper parties. ( 10. ) THE applicant is admittedly not a necessary party. The Act does not in terms enjoin his joinder and it is not the applicants case that, in his absence, no effective decree could be passed. Besides, if the applicant were a necessary party, he has nothing to worry because, in his absence, the suit was bound to be dismissed as not properly constituted. ( 11. ) THE applicant, therefore, presses his claim for joinder on the grounds that he is a proper party within the meaning of the aforesaid rule. ( 12. Besides, if the applicant were a necessary party, he has nothing to worry because, in his absence, the suit was bound to be dismissed as not properly constituted. ( 11. ) THE applicant, therefore, presses his claim for joinder on the grounds that he is a proper party within the meaning of the aforesaid rule. ( 12. ) THE trial Court has held that it did not consider it necessary to join the applicant as a party defendant in order to enable it to effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit and that the fact that the presence of the applicant was necessary for adducing evidence was not enough. It has further held that it had not been shown how the applicant was interested in the trust. ( 13. ) THE provisions of the English Rules of the Supreme Courts Order 15, rule 6 (2) are similar to the provisions of Order I, rule 10 (2) of the Code of civil Procedure and read as follows : "at any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter the Court may on such terms as it thinks just and either of its own motion or on application- (a) order any person who has been improperly or unnecessarily made a party or who has for any reason ceased to be a proper or necessary party, to cease to be a party; (b) order any person who ought to have been joined as a party or whose presence before the Court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon be added as a party; but no person shall be added as a plaintiff without his consent signified in writing or in such other manner as may be authorised. " ( 14. " ( 14. ) IN regard to the aforesaid rule, as it then stood, Coleridge C. J. , in norris v. Beazley (1877 2 CPD at p. 83.) said : "it seems to me to be correctly argued that those words plainly imply that the defendant to be added must be a defendant against whom the plaintiff has some cause of complaint, which ought to be determined in the action, and that it was never intended to apply where the person to be added as defendant is a person against whom the plaintiff has no claim, and does not desire to prosecute any. " Later, this rigid view was modified and now the rule is interpreted to mean that the Court has a discretion to add a person as a party defendant to a suit if by the decision in the suit, as it stands, his legal rights are to be affected. ( 15. ) IN Moses v. Marksmen (1892 1 Ch 487), the plaintiff, a patentee of a machine, brought an action against the defendant for using a machine which he alleged was an infringement of his patent. One Mont-forts, the maker and the patentee of the defendants machine, applied to be added as defendant, alleging that the judgment in the action would injure him and that the present defendant would not efficiently defend the action. The Court of Appeal consisting of Lord Justice linden and Lord Justice Kay, reversing the decisions of the Court below, held that Mont forts not being directly interested in the issues between the plaintiff and the defendant but only indirectly and commercially affected, the Court had no jurisdiction to add him as a defendant. Lord Justice Lindner at pages 489 and 490 observed as follows : "but reliance is placed can the following words of the rule, which provide for adding the names of parties whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the cause or matter. But what is the question involved in the action? The question, and the only question, is whether what Mars den is doing is an infringement of the plaintiffs patent. But what is the question involved in the action? The question, and the only question, is whether what Mars den is doing is an infringement of the plaintiffs patent. " And again later on, that eminent Judge said : "can it be said that the rule prevents the plaintiff from proceeding against a defendant without having to litigate with everybody who may be in any way affected, however indirect]y, by the action? It appears to me that it does not. The counsel for the applicant grounded his argument on the allegation that Mont forts interest would be affected by the decision in this action. It is true that his interest may be affected commercially by a judgment against the defendant, but can it be said that it would be legally affected? Can we stretch the rule so far as to say that whenever a person would he incidentally affected by a judgment he may be added as a defendant?" And Lord Justice Kay at pages 491 and 492 observed as follows : "no doubt the judgment in the present case may indirectly affect Mont-forts patent; but the answer to that is, that whether it would affect it or not, this rule does not apply to such a case. Mont forts say that the defendant will not contest the case properly, and will not conduct the defence so energetically as he would. But we cannot help that. " ( 16. ) THE question was again considered in Amon v. Raphael Tuck and sons, Ltd. . (1956 1 All ER- 273) where Devlin J. , on a review of authorities including the one quoted above, said : "the person to be joined must be someone whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party? It is not, of course, merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance and is afraid that the existing parties may not advance them adequately. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some question involved and has thought of relevant arguments to advance and is afraid that the existing parties may not advance them adequately. That would mean that on the construction of a cause in a common form contract many parties would claim to be heard, and, if there were power to admit any, there is no principle of discretion by which some would be admitted and others refused. The court might often think it convenient or desirable that some of such persons should old be heard so that the Court could be sure that it had found the complete answer, but no one would suggest that it is necessary to hear them for that purpose. The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he should be bound by the result of the action, and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. On the wider construction of the rule, I do not understand where the line is to be drawn between a commercial interest in the question involved in the case and a legal one. It is conceded that the line must be drawn somewhere. It is not enough that the intervener should be commercially or indirectly interested in the answer to the question; he must be directly or legally interested in the answer. , A person is legally interested in the answer only if he can say that it may lead to a result that will affect him legally-that is by curtailing his legal rights. " ( 17. ) IN the instant case it has not been shown how the applicant was directly and legally affected by the adjudication of the suit, and the fact that he was indirectly or incidentally affected was not enough, nor the fact that in his absence the case would not be adequately defended by the State. The prayer of the applicant was thus rightly refused. ( 18. ) THE application fails and is dismissed with costs. Application dismissed.