JUDGMENT B. Dayal, J. - This Special Appeal by Seikh Mahfooz Jan and another is connected with four other writ petitions. All these five matters arise out of the same set of facts and are, therefore, being dealt with in this common judgment. 2. Several transport vehicle holders made applications for the grant of stage carriage permits on Meerut-Dankaur route. This route had not been opened and no applications were invited for this route. Applications received were, however, published. Sheikh Mahfooz Jan and another, appellants in _the present Special Appeal, who were already plying their buses on a major part of the route, filed objections that it was not necessary to grant fresh permits on the route from Meerut to Dankaur. All these matters came up for consideration before the Transport Authority, Meerut in the setting from July 26 to 28, 1965. Item No. 3 on the agenda was as follows: "To pronounce decision regarding recognition and classification of Meerut to Dankaur via Hapur Gulaothi Sikhandarabad route and grant of permits thereon." From this agenda it is seen that two points were for consideration. The first was to decide whether this route was to be recognised and the second was to consider the applications if this route was to be recognised. After hearing the parties, the Transport Authority passed the following resolution: ".......... After giving due consideration to the stand taken by person for or against the grant of permits on Meerut-Dankaur route we are not convinced that there is any justification and need to open this route for direct bus service. We do not think that there is enough direct trafic from Dankaur to Meerut. As such it is resolved that the route Meerut to Dankaur need not be opened foil direct services. The applications received for permits on this route as contained in Appendix 'N' to item No. 35 of the last R. T. A. meeting held on May 6 to 8, 1965 are rejected." This resolution, therefore, decides only the first question, namely, the feasibility of recognising the route and it was resolved that this route would not be recognised. The question of considering the individual applications, therefore, did not arise and all the applications having thus become infructuous were formally rejected. Aggrieved by this order, twelve appeals were filed before the Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow. The question of considering the individual applications, therefore, did not arise and all the applications having thus become infructuous were formally rejected. Aggrieved by this order, twelve appeals were filed before the Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow. Out of those twelve appeals, six were rejected by the Tribunal holding that they were time barred. Out of the other six, three were allowed by an order dated the 1st of September, 1967. The order of the Transport Authority was set aside and permits were granted to Jeewan Nath Wahal, Om Prakash Gupta and Abdul Rashid (respondents Nos. 3 to 5) . Against that order, five writ petitions were filed in this Court. One of such writ petitions was filed by the present appellants who were objectors before the Transport Authority. They had pleaded in this Court that the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Transport Authority deciding that no route need be opened and thus it was not necessary to issue any permit on that route. Another writ petition No. 3396 of -1967 was filed by Mohd. Yaqub whose appeal had been dismissed as time barred and he has challenged the correctness of that order. The other 'three writs by B. O. Hearn, Mirza Mohd. Ismail Khan and Jagat Nath Wahal, were filed at Lucknow Bench, Lucknow, challenging the decision of the Tribunal to the effect that although these appeals were within time yet permits could not be granted in preference to three respondents Jeewan Nath Wahal, Om Prakash Gupta and Abdul Rashid. 3. Writ petition No. 3145 of 1967 filed by Sheikh Mahfooz Jan and another, who were objectors, came up for hearing before a learned single Judge of this Court and was dismissed on the 20th of November, 1967. Against that judgment the present Special Appeal has been filed. Since the other four writs arose out of the same matter they were also connected with this Special Appeal and it is apparent that the question raised in this Special Appeal vitally affects all the four other writ petitions also. Against that judgment the present Special Appeal has been filed. Since the other four writs arose out of the same matter they were also connected with this Special Appeal and it is apparent that the question raised in this Special Appeal vitally affects all the four other writ petitions also. As stated above, in the petition under appeal the contention of the objectors was that the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Transport Authority and, if that was correct, the Tribunal could not have allowed the appeals on merits, and could not have granted permits to the three respondents and rejected three other appeals on merits. Since we are of the view that the objection raised by the objectors was right, for which we shall give reasons hereafter, it is unnecessary for us to go into the merits of each of the applications for grant of permit and to decide in the writ petitions connected with the Special Appeal anything on merits. The writ petitions automatically failed as the appeals filed by them should have been dismissed by the Tribunal on the, ground of want of jurisdiction. 4. The main controversy in this matter arises on an interpretation of Sections 47, 48 and 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Sub-sec. (1) of Section 47 of the Act points out the consideration from (a) to (f) which the Transport Authority has to keep in view while deciding applications for stage carriage permits. Sub-sec. (2) is not relevant and then sub-sec. (3) thereof may be quoted :- "47 (3) -A Regional Transport Authority may, having regard to the matters mentioned in sub-sec. (1) , limit the number of stage carriage generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any specified area or on any specified route within the region." 5. This is the general power of the Regional Transport Authority and obviously be-fore permits are granted or applications for permits are to be considered, it is necessary to make up its mind as to how many permits are to be granted. Out of several applicants, all are not equally fit to get the permit. This is the general power of the Regional Transport Authority and obviously be-fore permits are granted or applications for permits are to be considered, it is necessary to make up its mind as to how many permits are to be granted. Out of several applicants, all are not equally fit to get the permit. The best persons out of them have to be chosen for the grant of permits and for this it is necessary that there must be a pre-existing decision known both to the Tribunal and to the applicants indicating the number of permits to be granted. Then follows Section 48 under which permit is actually granted. Sub-sec. (1) of the said section. is as follows :- "48 (1) -Subject to the provisions of Section 47 a Regional Transport Authority may ........ grant a stage carriage permit ......... or refuse to grant such a permit .............." 6. Thus the power of actually granting or refusing permit comes after the stage of Section 47 (3) and is subject to the general power of limiting the number. If, therefore, the Transport Authority does not consider it necessary to issue any permit, it is not possible to exercise power under Section 48 of the Act and to consider applications individually on their merits for grant of such permits. Section 64 of the Act gives the power to go in appeal. Sub-sec. (1) (a) of Section 64 may be quoted: "64 (1) Any person- (a) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Authority to grant a permit ........ may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority ........." 7. It is significant to note here that an appeal is permitted against an order refusing a permit and it necessarily refers to the order under Section 48 (1) . No appeal has been provided against an order passed under Section 47 (3) of the said Act. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that in a case where. a Transport Authority holds that no permit is to be granted on a particular route, it is not an order contemplated by Section 47 (3) of the Act. According to the learned counsel that section refers only to an order which fixes the upper limit for grant of permits. It does not apply to an ordinary decision fixing the number of permits to be granted. According to the learned counsel that section refers only to an order which fixes the upper limit for grant of permits. It does not apply to an ordinary decision fixing the number of permits to be granted. But, in any case, according to him, it cannot possibly apply to an order which says that no permit is to be granted. Learned counsel contends that zero is not a number at all and in the present case, therefore, there was no order under sub-sec. (3) of Section 47. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. The word 'limit' used in this sub-section has not been used in a restricted sense. It only means fixing the number of permits to be granted and such an order is necessary to be passed before comparative merits of several applications are taken into consideration. Where, therefore, an order fixing the' number at two is passed, it naturally limits the number of permits which can be granted on that route to two. Further the argument of the learned counsel that the decision of the authority holding that no permit was necessary on the route does not fix any limit, does not stand to reason. If the Transport Authority can say under this section that only one or two permits can be granted, it can also say that no permit is necessary and both these orders are essentially of the same nature deciding the general matter of policy. There is no real distinction between an order saying that two permits are to be granted or saying that no permit is necessary. 9. Several authorities were cited by learned counsel on both sides. We will, however, refer only to those which have a direct bearing on the question. In an unreported decision in Jaye Ram Motor Service v. Sri S. Rajarathinam, Civil Appeal No. 95 of 1965 decided on 26.10.1967 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court had to consider all these relevant sections and after an analysis thereof they observed as follows : "Therefore, Section 47 envisages two stages of the enquiry; (1) the fixing of the number of permits under Section 47 (3) and (ii) the consideration thereafter of the applications for granting of permits and the representations, if any:..........." 10. From this observation it would be seen that the provisions of Section 47 (3) of the Act have been treated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as the first duty of the Transport Authority in every case i.e., deciding the number of permits that have to be granted and then to take up the question of the fitness of individual applicants. Power under sub-sec. (3) of Section 47 has not been treated as an extraordinary power of limiting the number of permits in rare cases, as has been contended for by the learned counsel for the respondents. In the present case, therefore, the Regional Transport Authority after deciding that no permit need be granted on this route did not find it necessary to enter upon a consideration of the individual applications and disposed them of, summarily rejecting the same. 11. The next question is whether an appeal lay against such an order. Section 64 (1) (a) as quoted above, contemplates an appeal against an order of refusal to grant a permit. That necessarily is an order under Section 48 of the Act on merits. No appeal is provided against an order under Section 47 (3) limiting the number of permits. In Mohd. Lukman Sharif v. State Transport Authority, 1960 ALJ 626 a Division Bench of this Court held at page 629: "Sec. 64 does not allow an appeal against the order of Authority limiting the number of stage carriages. It follows therefore that the appellate authority on an appeal by a person aggrieved by the refusal of the Authority to grant him a permit cannot refix the number of stage carriages in respect of that route ........" 12. Answering a further argument that if such a view is taken, the provision for an appeal against the order refusing to grant a permit would become useless, the learned Judges observed as follows: "The appellate authority has therefore merely to see whether the ground for ejecting the appeal (should be application) was proper or not. It cannot increase the limit in the exercise of its appellate powers and then hold that the order under appeal was bad and allow the appeal. It would then be doing which the authority itself cannot do in those circumstances." 13. We respectfully agree with this observation. It cannot increase the limit in the exercise of its appellate powers and then hold that the order under appeal was bad and allow the appeal. It would then be doing which the authority itself cannot do in those circumstances." 13. We respectfully agree with this observation. Even if a view is taken that Section 64 is wide enough to include an appeal against an order refusing to grant a permit on the ground that there was no vacancy, still the appeal must be dismissed because the decision of the Transport Authority would be a correct decision in refusing to grant a permit when there was no vacancy. This decision was approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Abdul Matin v. Kailash Pandey, A.I.R. 1963 SC 64. After analysing the relevant sections their Lordships observed at page 67: "The scheme of the Act therefore is that a limit is fixed under Section 47 (3) and the applications reseived are dealt with in the manner provided by Section 57 and permits can be granted under Section 48 subject .p the limit fixed under Section 47 (3) . Further it will be clear from Section 64 that the appeal there contemplated is by a person who is aggrieved by various orders specified therein. Section 64 clearly does not contemplate any appeal from an order under Section 47 (3) limiting the number of stage carriages generally etc., for that order being a general order cannot be a ground for grievance to any individual who may have the right of appeal under Section 64. Therefore, when the Appellate Authority deals with an appeal under Section 64 it is not sitting in appeal on the general order passed .finder Section 47 (3) and has to deal with the same matters with which the Regional Transport Authority dealt under Section 48 ........" 14. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have, therefore, clearly laid down that Section 64 of the Act does not contemplate an appeal against a general order under section 47 (3) and no person can be said to be aggrieved against such an order if his petition is rejected because there was no vacancy. 15. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have, therefore, clearly laid down that Section 64 of the Act does not contemplate an appeal against a general order under section 47 (3) and no person can be said to be aggrieved against such an order if his petition is rejected because there was no vacancy. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, placed strong reliance upon an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Purshottam Bhai Punambhai Patel v. The State Transport Appellate Authority Madhya Pradesh, Civil Appeal No. 762 of 1963 decided on 14.4.1964. In that case a Co-operative Society and certain other motor transport operators applied to the Regional Transport Authority for grant of permits. These applications were published under Section 57. Certain other persons applied for grant of permits on the 30th of May, 1958 on another route a major part of which route overlapped with the earlier one. The Society and five others were granted permits on the 29th of November, 1958 for the shorter route. Applications made on the 30th of May, 1958 were taken up later. All of them were dismissed on the ground that there was no necessity for grant of any permit on that route as permits already granted were sufficient. Only two appeals were filed before the Appellate Tribunal. The main ground in these appeals was that the Transport authority was wrong in assessing needs of the public. The Tribunal on the 7th of January, 1761 allowed the appeal. It disagreed with the view of the Transport Authority that facilities already provided were sufficient. The appellate authority by order dated 7th January, 1761 remanded the case with the following order : "We think it desirable, therefore, to remand these two appeals i.e., 27 of 1959 and 71 of 1959, to the R. T. A. for deciding how many permits for a direct service between Burhanpur and Ujjan should be granted. If they come to the conclusion that at least two services are to be permitted, the two appellants viz. Shri Babu Lal Fouzdar and Purshottam Bhai Patel would obviously have to be given the permits since only they out of all the applicants who had originally applied for permits have come up in appeal. If they come to the conclusion that at least two services are to be permitted, the two appellants viz. Shri Babu Lal Fouzdar and Purshottam Bhai Patel would obviously have to be given the permits since only they out of all the applicants who had originally applied for permits have come up in appeal. If, however, the R. T. A. comes to the conclusion that only one permit should be given they should determine which of these two appellants is the more suitable for the grant of that permit." 16. This order of the Tribunal was not challenged by any party. The Transport Authority then considered the matter on remand and passed an order on the 28th of April, 1961 that it would be sufficient to grant one permit and further directed that the permit was to be shared by both the persons whose appeals had been remanded and each one of them was to run one single trip each day. Against this order appeals were filed by both the per-sons who had been granted permits. They claimed that full permit should be granted to each of them. The Tribunal on the 6th of October, 1962 allowed the appeal and granted one full permits to each of them. The legality of this order dated the fifth of October, 1962 was challenged by a writ in the High Court by the Co-operative Society. The High Court interfered because it thought that the Tribunal prejudiced the chances of the Society whose application, for extension of route which was pending might have been allowed. This order of the High Court was challenged in the Supreme Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the Society had never objected to the grant of permits to the two applicants and, therefore, it had no locus standi to be heard in this matter. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in this case had not to consider whether the order of remand passed by the Tribunal on the 7th of January, 1961 was within authority or not. That order was never challenged. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in this case had not to consider whether the order of remand passed by the Tribunal on the 7th of January, 1961 was within authority or not. That order was never challenged. Their Lordships have observed:-"We are not directly concerned with the correctness of the order of the Tribunal dated 7th January, 1961 which is the next event in order of date, for it proceeded on the-assessment of traffic needs on the route, a matter which was entirely for the transport authorities to judge." They further said, that Mr. Chatterji did not "make any submissions to that end." This case, therefore, does not help the respondents. 17. Reliance was also placed on another unreported case of the Supreme Court, Jaye Ram Motor Service v. Sri S. Rajarathinam, Civil Appeal No. 96 of 1965 decided on 27.10.1967. The first question raised in this case was: "Whether a person whose application is rejected by the authority on the ground that there is no need for a new route has a right of appeal under Section 64 (1) (a) of the Act." 18. After analysing the relevant provisions of the Act it was observed: "Therefore, Section 47 envisages two stages of the enquiry; (i) the fixation of the number of permits under Section 47 (3) and (ii) the consideration thereafter of the application ........ It would, therefore, be seen that once the Authority has fixed the number of vehicles to be operated ........ the stage of enquiry under Section 47 (3) is over ..............." 19. On the facts of the case, the Authority after fixing the number, entered upon the second stage of enquiry and yet refused to grant permits on the ground that there was no need of any, which obviously the Authority had no power to do. It was, therefore, held that appeals lay against such an order I and the Tribunal was right in setting it aside. These cases are, therefore, distinguishable on facts and are against the respondents on the principle decided therein. 20. After considering the matter, we are of the opinion that no appeal lay to the Appellate Tribunal in the cases before us and even if appeals were filed. These cases are, therefore, distinguishable on facts and are against the respondents on the principle decided therein. 20. After considering the matter, we are of the opinion that no appeal lay to the Appellate Tribunal in the cases before us and even if appeals were filed. they were bound to be dismissed on the ground that none of the appellants was aggrieved by the: order because no order under Section 48 of the Act had been passed deciding the respective merits of the different applicants. The result, therefore, is that the Special Appeal is allowed. The order of the learned single Judge and the order of the Tribunal dated the 1st of September, 1967 allowing the three appeals filed by respondents Nos. 3 to 5 are quashed and the said appeals declared incompetent. The appellants will get costs of this appeal and the writ petitions, one third from each of the respondents 3 to 5. 21. All the four writ petitions Nos. 3396 of 1967 and 4210, 4211 and 4212 of 1968 are dismissed. In writ petition No. 3396 of 1967 parties will bear their own costs. In Writ petitions Nos. 4210, 4211 and 4212 of 1968 the petitioners in each of the writ, petitions will pay one set of costs half and half to respondents Nos. 3 and 4 (Malk fooz Jan and Allah Bux) .