This second appeal under sec. 224(2) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 has been filed by the plaintiff appellants against the judgment of the Revenue Appellate Authority, Jaipur dated the 13th of November, 1963, whereby the order and decree passed by the Assistant Collector, Sikar on 31st of March, 1962 against the plaintiff-appellants were upheld. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the plaintiff-appellants filed a suit for permanent injunction in respect of their khatedari lands bearing khata No. 73 and khasra Nos. 5.2 26,22 and 44, measuring 11 bighas 9 biswas, 13 bighas 5 biswas, 4 bighas 10 biswas, 23 bighas, 5 biswas and 14 bighas totalling to 66 bighas 5 biswas, situate in village Rajore, against the defendants - respondents, who cultivated the disputed lands as Shikmis. In the plaint it was averred that in 1952, they came to know that the defendants-Shikmis were paying rent directly and, therefore, they approached the Tehsildar Sikar with the request that if any Shikmis deposited rent in respect of the suit lands the same maybe accepted. In 1953, these Shikmis defendants got the suit lands declared in their name by the order of the Anti-Ejectment Officer, and with the promulgation of Rajasthan Tenancy Act in 1955, under sec. 19(a) of the said Act, they became khatedar-tenants. The plaintiffs-appellants contested that the defendants were never conferred any right to cultivate the suit lands in writing and as such they could not be treated as sub-tenants and thus could not be allowed consequential relief. It was prayed that the defendants be ejected from the suit land and the Girdawari entries entered in defendants favour be corrected. The trial court after framing issues, adducing the evidence and deciding the issues, dismissed the suit, treating the defendants-respondents as Khatedar kashtkars by giving the benefit of possession delivered to them by the Anti-Ejectment Officer. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs went in appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority who concurred with the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. Hence this second appeal. It was contested on behalf of the appellants that the Revenue Appellate Authoritys judgment was no judgment in the eye of law. As the findings of first appellate court were binding on the second appellate court, it was all the more necessary for the court of first appeal to have fully examined, analysed and marshalled the facts and evidence on record. As the findings of first appellate court were binding on the second appellate court, it was all the more necessary for the court of first appeal to have fully examined, analysed and marshalled the facts and evidence on record. To support this, following authorities were cited : 1. Rodmal vs. Mthuralal (1950 RLW 104), 2. Mst. Kamla vs. Badrinarain (1953 RRW 552), 3. Mavasi vs. Balwant (1964 RRD 1939), 4. Sobharaj vs. Maheshnarain (AIR 1948 Oudh 27). It was contended that once the plaintiffs were the khatedars of the suit lands, the defendants ought to have proved or shown as to how they came into possession of the suit lands and to support this number of authorities were cited as under : 1. Pratap Singh vs. Madhosumar (AIR 1P60 Raj. 196), 2. Lalmohammed vs. Fatehlal (1955 RRD 221), 3. Kalu vs. Chiranjilal (1956 RRD 299), 4. Govind Sahai vs. Fatta. (1957 RRD 294), 5. Madho vs. Kalyan (1960 RRD 89), 6. Balmukund vs. Mangilal (1961 RRD 258/259), 7. Pusha vs. Pusha (1962 RRD 282), 8. Nandigir vs. Board of Revenue Raj. (1961 RRD 250), 9. Pyarchand vs. Surajmal (1965 RRD 1), 10. Matadeen vs. Maina (1968 RRD 30) It was also necessary for the lower court to have analysed the evidence on record while affirming the trial courts judgment. It was alleged that the order and decree of the trial court were perverse and erroneous on the face of the record, especially when no declaration in favour of the defendants under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act was made, no lease-deed was executed on any patta issued and produced in evidence. Besides, no relationship between the land holder and the tenant was proved. It was further contended that the Girdawaris upto Smt. 2003 in favour of the plaintiffs ought to have been taken into account, as provided under sec. 14 of the Evidence Act. Our attention was also drawn towards the provisions of sec. 100 C.P.C., corresponding to sec. 224 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, whereby a second appeal is admissible on the grounds of the decision being contrary to law, it having failed to determine some material issue of law and if a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the C.P.C. or law for the time being in force is apparent. To support this, following authorities were cited : 1. To support this, following authorities were cited : 1. Pusha vs. Pusha (1962 RRD 282), 2. Matadeen vs. Maina (1968 RRD 10), 3. Kamdar Kantalia Thikana vs. Heer Singh (1961 RLW 316), 4. Naurangrai vs. Ganpatrai (1954 RLW 488), 5. Sumermal vs. Hukma (1964 RLW 7), 6. Chandraram vs. Bhoma (AIR 1953 Rajasthan 167), 7. Abdulshakoor vs. Kotwaleshwar Prashad (AIR 1958 Allababad 54). In reply, the counsel for the respondents laid stress mainly on the appreciation of evidence by the first appellate court and the need for its thorough appreciation by the second appellate court. At the very outset the counsel for the respondents averred that the main question in this second appeal was whether it was necessary for the first appellate court to have discussed each and every piece of evidence when its judgment was a concurring one, and in support of this decision given in Indersingh vs. The Board of Revenue Rajasthan, (1962 RLW 587) was relied upon. It was argued that findings of fact by court of first appeal when concurrent with the findings of the trial court, the court of second appeal should not reverse the same Our attention was drawn towards the Girdawri entries upto Smt. 2008, which were examined by the Revenue Appellate Authority. The plaintiff-appellants had produced eight witnesses and their testimony was also discussed by the first appellate court and were not held reliable due to material discrepancies in their statements. Plaintiff appellants also failed to show who had cultivated the land other than the defendant-respondents prior to Smt. 2009. It was stressed, therefore, that the first appellate courts judgment was self contained and even if it was conceded that concluding and operative portion was incorrect, the court of second appeal could not go into a reappraisal of evidence. The counsel for the defendant-respondents referred to the trial courts judgment with particular reference to the finding appertaining to issues No. 1 and 6 regarding applicability of sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, relied upon by the lower court. He pleaded that the trial court had sufficiently taken pains to examine and appreciate the evidence on the record. The proceedings initiated by the plaintiff-appellants under the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance were also turned down both by the Board of Revenue as well as the Rajasthan High Court. Drawing our attention towards sec. He pleaded that the trial court had sufficiently taken pains to examine and appreciate the evidence on the record. The proceedings initiated by the plaintiff-appellants under the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance were also turned down both by the Board of Revenue as well as the Rajasthan High Court. Drawing our attention towards sec. 224 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, it was averred that there was no sufficient ground for filing second appeal. Further in the memo of appeal the plea of non-observance of the provisions of O. 41 r. 31 & 33 C.P.C. had not been raised. The plea had merely been taken regarding misappreciation of evidence. In a judgment of affirmation full examination of evidence by the first appellate court was not necessary, and to support this, he relied on the following authorities : 1. Mst. Kamla vs. Badrinarain (1953 RLW 412) 2. Krishna devanad Ramji vs. Kapildeodas (AIR 1951 Patna 330) 3. Lalsuraj Prashad vs. Ramcharitar Singh (AIR 1950 Patna 98) 4. Mahendranath Bhunia vs. Ashutosh Pradhan (AIR 1926 Cal. 545) 5. Liladhar Uttamchand Marwadi vs. Mago (AIR 1933 Nagpur 6) 6. Giribala Choudhary vs. Ushangini Debi (AIR 1955 Assam 177) 7. Sukhnooshah vs. Chandulal (AIR 1959 J. &. K. 114) 8. Deity Patabhiramaswahy vs. S. Hanumayya ( AIR 1959 SC 57 ) 9. Parasnath Thakur vs. Smt. Mohanidasi ( AIR 1959 SC 1204 ) 10. V. Ramchadra Ayyar vs. Ramalingam Chettia ( AIR 1963 SC 302 ) 11. Abdul Waheedkhan vs. Bhawani ( AIR 1966 SC 1718 ) In rebuttal of the ruling of Haridas vs. Banshidhar (1964 RLW 7) cited by the plaintiff-appellants (Para 12), it was averred by the counsel for the respondents that the ruling related to misreading or overlooking of evidence and the findings based on such misreading and overlooking, cannot be binding on the court of second appeal. In the instant case the first appellate court did examine the evidence on record and its conclusions were based on such examination. Even if its judgment was erroneous, the same could not be assailed in second appeal. In rejoinder, the decisions given in 1963 SC 302 and 1964 RLW 7 were referred to. It was pleaded that about 60 exhibits were produced by the plaintiff-appellants, but the first appellate court had failed to discuss any document. The difference between sec. 100 C.P.C. and sec. 224 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act was also emphasised. In rejoinder, the decisions given in 1963 SC 302 and 1964 RLW 7 were referred to. It was pleaded that about 60 exhibits were produced by the plaintiff-appellants, but the first appellate court had failed to discuss any document. The difference between sec. 100 C.P.C. and sec. 224 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act was also emphasised. Countering the arguments of failure of the plaintiff-appellants before the High Court, it was argued that the High Court had merely held the proceedings under the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance as being of a summary nature and, therefore, had directed that the plaintiff-appellants suit for declaration was to be decided by the trial court on its merits. The main plea of the plaintiff-appellants in the memo of second appeal was circumspect on the point of evidence. From a perusal of the judgment of the trial court we clearly find that the Assistant Collector, Sikar had thoroughly examined and appreciated almost all the evidence on record as well at the fact of benefit, having been given by the Anti-Ejectment Officer, as well as the provisions of sec. 19(a) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act as applicable to the defendant respondents. This plea was considered and appreciated both by the lowar court as well as the first appellate court. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that proper examination and appreciation of the evidence had been made at the lower stages and there was no justification in our going into the details of the same, especially when there was no sufficient cause to interfere with the findings of the lower courts viz., any misreading or omission of evidence on record. Sec. 19 (a) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act reads as under : "19. Conferment of rights on certain tenants of Khudkasht and sub-tenants : — (1) Every person who, at the commencement of this Act, (a) was entered in the annual registers then current as a tenant of Khudkasht or sub-tenant of land other than grove land, or (b) ............. shall as from the date of commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1959, hereafter in this Chapter referred to as the appointed date, become subject to the other provisions contained in this Chapter, the Khatedar tenant of such part of the land held by him as does not exceed the minimum area prescribed by the State Government for the purpose of clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 180 or exceeds the maximum area from which such person is liable to ejectment under clause (d) of the said sub-section of the said section and rights in improvements in that part of the said land shall also accrue to such person." The defendant-respondents had been cultivating the land in dispute since generations and their status had also been changed with the change in law, especial-ly since 1953 as per the order of the Anti-Ejectment Officer, and their having been declared as khatedars of the suit land. Sec. 224 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act deals with appeals on the grounds of: (i) the decision being contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law, (ii) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law, (iii) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by or under this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, which may possibly have produced an error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits; and, (iv) the decision being contrary to the weight of evidence on record where the lower appellate court has varied or reversed any finding of the trial court on a question of fact. Sec. 100 C.P.C. is no doubt corresponding to sec. 224 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, in its purport and meaning, but there is no need for reliance-being placed upon sec. 100 C.P.C. in the face of the specific provisions in sec. 224 of the R.T.A. Sec. 14 of the Evidence Act, deals with the facts showing existence of state of mind, or of body or bodily feeling and say that they are relevant, when the existence of any such state of mind or body or bodily feeling is in issue or relevant. Perusal of the number of authorities cited by both the parties in support of their contentions, and also of the record relevant to the facts of the case, leads ones attention mainly and directly to the order passed by the Anti-Ejectment Officer in 1953, and the consequential benefit of sec. 19(a) of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amend-ment) Act, 1959. There remains no doubt from the evidence produced by both the parties, that the defendants-respondents were Shikmis of the plaintiff-appellants prior to 1955, i. e. the year of promulgation of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. 19(a) of the Rajasthan Tenancy (Amend-ment) Act, 1959. There remains no doubt from the evidence produced by both the parties, that the defendants-respondents were Shikmis of the plaintiff-appellants prior to 1955, i. e. the year of promulgation of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The judgments of both the lower courts are self contained and there appears no reason tp brand them as having not done or followed a proper or balanced appreciation of law or evidence. Under the circumstances and in view of the above discussion of the parties, we not consider it desirable or necessary to interfere with the judgment of the lear-ned Revenue Appellate Authority dated 13-11-1963 upholding the judgment and decree of the Assistant Collector, Sikar dated 31-3-1962, and in the result this second appeal before this Board is rejected.