JUDGMENT G. D. Sahgal, J. - One Smt. Champa Devi held a decree against one Babu Sat Parsan Singh. She moved an application for the execution of that decree in November, 1958 which was registered as Regular Execution Case No. 17 of 1958 T he execution was sought by attachment and sale of immovable property. Two separate claims appear to have been preferred under Order XXI, Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure against separate items of the attached property, but they were both dismissed. Regular suits were filed under Order XXI, Rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure being numbered as Suits Nos. 122 and 125 of 1959. As a result of the filing of those suits the execution proceedings were ordered to be stayed. The execution proceedings were accordingly stayed and it was ordered on the 17th of October, 1958 that the file be consigned. During the period of this suspension of execution Smt. Champa Devi died on the 28th of January, 1960. Sri Keshav Shukla respondent moved an application on the 16th of May, 1960 in the execution case alleging that he was the heir of Smt. Champa Devi and prayed that his name be substituted in her place. He was directed to take steps for the issue of notices to the judgment-debtors, but he failed to do so with the result that the application was dismissed for default on the 23rd of July, 1960. Babu Sat Parsan Singh judgment-debtor also died in May, 1966. Thereafter in January, 1967 an application was moved again by the respondent Keshav Shukla for being substituted in place of Smt. Champa Devi and also for substituting the names of the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor among whom were the two appellants. This proceeding was registered as Regular Misc. Case No. 7 of 1967. Notices. were issued to the persons proposed to be brought on the record in place of the judgment-debtor, and treating the service made in that connection sufficient all order was. passed on the 6th of May, 1967 in the absence,of the proposed legal representatives who did not put in appearance allowing that application. In the meantime, the two suits filed under Order XXI, Rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure also terminated in favour of the decree-holder. passed on the 6th of May, 1967 in the absence,of the proposed legal representatives who did not put in appearance allowing that application. In the meantime, the two suits filed under Order XXI, Rule 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure also terminated in favour of the decree-holder. While one was dismissed on' the 15th of October, 1966, the other was dismissed on the 11th of April, 1967. It would thus appear that Regular Misc. Case No. 7 of 1967 had been initiated prior to the dismissal of those suits and as' the execution had' been stayed during the pendency of those suits, the miscellaneous case for substitution was filed at a time when the execution proceedings themselves were under suspension. After the two suits were dismissed, an application was moved for the revival of the proceedings in Execution Case No. 17 of 1958. This application was moved on the 11th of May, 1967 and is paper No. 29-C on the record of the lower court. On the 27th of May, 1967 an order was passed on this application for the reopening of the execution proceedings and the decree-holder was directed to take steps for the sale of the attached property. Steps were taken by Keshav Shukla as directed. But an application was moved by the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor, among others, the appellants purporting to be one under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure alleging that as they had no information of the application 29-C moved by Keshav Shukla, the order dated the 27th of May, 1967 for the reopening of the execution proceedings having been passed in their absence be set aside. This was registered as Misc. Case No. 27 of 1967. An objection also was filed purporting to be one under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was registered as Misc. Case No. 28 of 1967 on the 30th of October, 1967. Three points were raised in that objection. This was registered as Misc. Case No. 27 of 1967. An objection also was filed purporting to be one under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was registered as Misc. Case No. 28 of 1967 on the 30th of October, 1967. Three points were raised in that objection. namely, (1) that the order dated the 23rd of July, 1960 dismissing the application for substitution (this is the earlier application that was moved in January, 1960 referred to above) had a binding effect and a fresh application could not be moved in the proceedings; (2) that after the death of the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor the same execution proceedings could not continue; and (3) that the attached property being ancestral was not liable to sale. 2. Both the miscellaneous cases were heard together and they were both decided against the appellants, the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor. The application purporting to be one under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure giving rise to Misc. Case No. 27 of 1967 and the objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure giving rise to Misc. Case No. 28 of 1967 were both dismissed by an order dated the 30th of January, 1968. 3. This appeal has been filed against that order. When the arguments were started, the attention of the learned counsel for the appellants was drawn to the fact that though there may have been a common order, as it disposed of two applications, there ought to have been two separate appeals and he was thus given a choice as to which of the two appeals he would prefer to pursue, namely, the one against the order disposing of the objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the one against the order disposing of the application under Section 151 of that Code. He stated before us that this appeal may be treated as one against the order passed on the objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. This was obviously the correct course that he took because no appeal lies against an order passed in a proceeding arising out of an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We would thus deal with the objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure only. 5. 4. This was obviously the correct course that he took because no appeal lies against an order passed in a proceeding arising out of an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We would thus deal with the objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure only. 5. Though only three objections were taken under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as detailed above, in appeal a number of other objections also have been raised, and though the learned counsel for the respondent urged that he should not be allowed to raise those objections which were not taken in the lower court, we allowed him to raise those objections also as we wanted to avoid their being raised again under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure for prolonging the proceeding if this appeal was dismissed. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, thought that any further objections under Section 47 would be barred on the ground that they were not raised in the application under Section 47 and a party cannot be allowed to take up objections under that provision again and again. As this proposition appeared to its to be doubtful in view of what has been laid down in a Full Bench case of this Court, namely, Genda Lal v. Hazari Lal, LVIII I.L.R. 313 subsequently followed by a Division Bench in Ale Rasul v. Balkishan, 1937 A.L.J. 182 we allowed the other points also to be raised as they did not require any fresh evidence in the case and could be disposed of on the admitted facts in the case. 6. The first point urged is that the previous execution application exhausted itself on the 23rd of July, 1960 when the earlier application for substitution was dismissed for default. We have not been able to appreciate this argument. What happened was that the execution proceedings were stayed by an order dated the 17th of October, 1959 and the file was consigned to the records. It only meant temporary suspension of the execution on account of suits being filed for declaration of title to property that had been attached. It was as a result of an order in those suits that the proceedings were stayed, but that did not mean that those proceedings came to an end. The proceedings were taken in the name of Smt. Champa Devi, decree-holder. It was as a result of an order in those suits that the proceedings were stayed, but that did not mean that those proceedings came to an end. The proceedings were taken in the name of Smt. Champa Devi, decree-holder. Smt. Champs Devi, however, died in January, 1960 and so Keshav Shukla moved an application on the 16th of May, 1960 for his being brought on the record in her place so that he might take care of the execution proceedings. The application can in no way be called an application for execution. It is an application that Keshav Shukla may be allowed to continue the proceedings in place of Smt. Champa Devi who had died. The dismissal of the application for default, therefore, on the 23rd of July, 1960 brought to an end the application for substitution itself and not the execution proceedings. The execution proceedings remained pending. It cannot, therefore, be said that a fresh execution application ought to have been filed after that application by Keshav Shukla was dismissed for default. 7. The dismissal of the application itself for default also would not bar a subsequent application of a similar nature. It could not be barred on the ground of res judicata. for even though the provisions of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to such proceedings as they applied only to suits, even on the general principle of res judicata as the issue in the earlier application regarding substitution of the appellant in place of Smt. Champs Devi had not been heard and finally decided, the dismissal of the earlier application could not be a bar to the moving of a fresh application. By way of analogy a suit which is dismissed for default of the plaintiff at a stage when the defendant had not put in appearance can again be filed on the same cause of action subject, of course, to the law of limitation (vide sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order IX). The fresh application, therefore, moved in January, 1967 was not barred. 8. The next point urged was that a regular execution application should have been moved and not a substitution application. This contention also has no force. The application that was moved in the month of January, 1967 (Regular Misc. The fresh application, therefore, moved in January, 1967 was not barred. 8. The next point urged was that a regular execution application should have been moved and not a substitution application. This contention also has no force. The application that was moved in the month of January, 1967 (Regular Misc. Case No. 7 of 1967) was moved for not only bringing the legal representatives of the decree holder on record but also those of the judgment-debtor. 9. Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as to how a suit proceed on the death, marriage and insolvency of parties. 10. Rule I provides that on the death of a plaintiff or defendant no suit shall abate if the right to sue survives. 11. Rule 2 provides that where there are more plaintiffs or defendants than one, and any of them dies, and where the right to sue survives to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or against the surviving defendant or defendants alone the Court shall cause an entry to that effect to be made on the record, and the suit shall proceed at the instance of the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs, or against the surviving defendant or defendants. 12. Rule 3 provides for the procedure in case of death of one of the several plaintiffs or of the sole plaintiff, while Rule 4 provides for the procedure in case of death of one of the several defendants or of the sole defendant. While Rule 3 has two sub-rules, Rule 4 has three sub-rules. 13. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 provides that where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or a sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 provides that where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1), the suit shall abate solar as the deceased plaintiff is concerned. 14. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 provides that where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1), the suit shall abate solar as the deceased plaintiff is concerned. 14. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 provides that where one of the two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 provides that any person so made a party may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant. Sub-rule (3) of this Rule is similar to sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 and provides that where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1) , the suit shall abate as against the deceased defendant. 15. Rule 8 of this Order deals with the insolvency of the plaintiff. 16. I here are twelve rules in this Order and Rule 12 among them provides that Rules 3, 4 and 8 shall not apply to proceedings in execution of a decree or order. 17. Some other provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure also may be referred to. Section 146 deals with proceedings by.or against legal representatives. It provides that where any proceeding may be taken or application made by or against any person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be .made by or against any person claiming under him. 18. Section 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that where a judgment-debtor dies before the decree has been fully satisfied, the holder of the decree may apply to the Court which passed it to execute the same against the legal representative of the deceased. 19. Rule 16 of Order XXI provides that where a decree is transferred by assignment in writing or by operation of law, the transferee may apply for execution of the decree to the Court which passed it; and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by such decree-holder. 20. 20. A perusal of all these provisions would show that if a decree-holder dies, the decree can be proceeded with in execution by his legal representative and similarly if a judgment-debtor dies, it can be proceeded against the legal representative in place of the original judgment-debtor. We are here not considering the extent to which it can be proceeded against, but the fact remains that it can be proceeded against the legal representatives. In the light of these provisions we have to see as to what is the effect of the provisions of Rule 12 of Order XXII which provides for the non-applicability of the provisions of Rules 3 and 4 of Order XXII to execution. We have already seen that there are two sub-rules under Rule 3. Similarly in Rule 4 we may keep in mind only two provisions leaving aside the provisions of sub-rule (2) of Rule 4. While sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 provides for the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to be made a party, sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 provides for the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party. The other sub-rule provide for the abatement of the suit so far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned or the deceased defendant is concerned, as the case may be, in case an application is not made within the time provided under the law of limitation. In the circumstances, the question arises as to whether the non-applicability of the provisions of Rules 3 and 4 of Order XXII to execution proceedings means that on the death of a decree-holder or a judgment-debtor neither the decree-holder nor the judgment-debtor shall be allowed to be substituted at all or is it that though the provisions of Rule 12 do not create a bar to the substitution of the legal representatives of the decree-holder or the judgment-debtor, as the case may be, they only provide that like the suit the application for execution of a decree will not abate ? If Rule 12 is strictly construed, then the effect would be that the legal representatives of the decree-holder who died during the pendency of the execution filed by him cannot be substituted in his place in the execution proceedings nor can the legal representatives of a deceased judgment-debtor be so substituted. If Rule 12 is strictly construed, then the effect would be that the legal representatives of the decree-holder who died during the pendency of the execution filed by him cannot be substituted in his place in the execution proceedings nor can the legal representatives of a deceased judgment-debtor be so substituted. In other words, the execution proceedings shall abate and thus a situation will arise which Rule 12 of Order XXII was precisely provided to guard against (vide discussion of Jackson, J. in the Full Bench case of Venkatachalam Chetti v. Ramaswamy Servai, A.I.R. 1932 Madras 73. Only the general effect of the non-applicability of Rules 3 and 4, therefore, should be taken into consideration with the result that it should be held that though a suit may abate on the death of a plaintiff or a defendant if his legal representatives are not brought on the record within a period prescribed by law, there is no such abatement in the case of an application in execution and the proceedings shall continue even on the death of a decree-holder by his legal representatives and on the death of a judgment-debtor against his legal representatives. 21. It is in view of this state of law that Order XXI, Rule 16 has been interpreted as giving right to the legal representative of a decree-holder to continue proceedings in execution on the death of the original decree-holder rather than compelling him to start a fresh execution application The execution application may be in the form provided for fresh execution applications under Rule 11 of Order XXI for want of any other form, but the right of the legal representative of the decree-holder to continue the execution proceedings from the stage at which the original decree-holder died is there (vide a Seven Judge Full Bench case of this Court, namely, Baij Nath v. Rain Bharos, XLIX I.L.R. 509) which has peen followed with approval in Venkatachalam Chetti's case. It was therefore, not necessary for a fresh execution application to be moved by the legal representatives of the deceased decree-holder, and so far as the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor are concerned, the execution could continue under Section 50 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure against them as well. 22. It was therefore, not necessary for a fresh execution application to be moved by the legal representatives of the deceased decree-holder, and so far as the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor are concerned, the execution could continue under Section 50 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure against them as well. 22. The next point urged on behalf of the appellants was that that in any case the application moved in January, 1967 was time-barred and as such it should not have been allowed: 23. A perusal of a Full Bench case of this Court, namely, Chhattar Singh v. Ramal Singh, A.I.R. 1927 Allahabad 16 would show that an application for the revival of an execution application shall fall under Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (now Article 137 of the new Limitation Act) and the period of limitation in such a case would be three years from the date when the right to make it accrues. But the right to move an application for the revival of the execution application in the case arose in case of one property with respect to which the suit was dismissed on the 15th of October, 1966 on that date and in case of the other property, as the suit was dismissed on the 11th of April, 1967 under Order XXI, Rule 63 on the latter date. The application for the revival of the execution application was moved on the 11th of May, 1967 (Vide application 29-C of the trial court record) . The application was, therefore, well within time. 24. The two cases, namely, Girdhari Lal v. Ram Charan La1, A.I.R. 1926 Allahabad 331 and Ponnuru Satyanarayana v. Bolisetti Nagabushanam, A.I.R. 1951 Madras 429 which provided that an application for revival of an execution application is only a reminder to the court and no question of limitation arises in such cases, were cases where the execution application itself had been closed erroneously by the court for no fault of the decree-holder and on the principle that no party should suffer on account of the mistake of the court it was held that no question of limitation was involved. But where the execution application had been closed on account of an order of the Court, it was not on account of any fault of the court that the proceedings were closed and as such the application for revival could be moved only within three years of the accrual of the cause of action under the residuary Article 181 of the Old Limitation Act. 25. So far as the application for bringing the legal representatives on record is concerned, that application was disposed of on the 27th of May, 1967. The application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which had been registered as Regular Misc. Case No. 27 of 1967, against the setting aside of that order has been dismissed and the appeal does not relate to it. The substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased decree-holder as well as the judgment-debtor during the course of the execution proceedings has thus become final. The question whether the substitution application moved in January, 1967 was itself time-barred cannot, therefore, be reopened and re-examined. 26. The next point that was raised on behalf of the appellants was that an application in the form provided under Order XXI, Rule 11 should have been moved for the revival of the execution and not in the form in which it has been moved as an application under numbered paragraphs. The decree-holder and the judgment-debtor having died during the period of the suspension of the execution application, no application could in the nature of things be moved under Order XXI, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure for proceeding with the execution. As already pointed out, the provisions of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure other than Rules 3, 4 and 8 do apply in execution proceedings. The only way, therefore, in which the proceedings for substitution of the legal representatives of both could be made was in the manner in which the application for substitution was made and, after the substitution had been made, when the occasion arose for the revival of the execution application, an application for revival under numbered paragraphs only could be made and not under Order XXI, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the substitution had already taken place. That an application for substitution could be made apart from the application under Order XXI, Rule 16 is not without authority (vide Mohan Singh v. Jagat Singh, A.I.R. 1928 Allahabad 299 Moreover, if there is any defect at all in the form in which the application for the revival of the execution application had been moved, it is a defect only in form and not in substance and does not go to the root of the matter. 27. Yet another point that was urged on behalf of the judgment-debtor was that the legal representatives of the deceased decree-holder could not proceed with the execution of the decree without obtaining a succession certificate, Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act being a bar. Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act is a bar only to this extent that the court cannot proceed upon an application to execute a decree by the legal representative of a deceased decree-holder without the production of any of the documents referred to in sub-sec. (1) of that section, but that does not mean that the execution should be dismissed. If the succession certificate or production of any of the documents referred to in that section is necessary, time can still be granted by the Court for producing the same. On that ground, therefore, the execution would not e dismissed. 28. It was then urged on behalf of the appellants that the decree under execution is that of the District judge and as it was under execution before the Additional Civil Judge of Sultanpur, the application for substitution, if at all, could be moved in the court of the District judge himself and not before the Additional Civil Judge. There is no material on the record for coming to the conclusion that the decree is that of the court of the District Judge. Even if this contention is correct, then it is merely a case of an irregularity of procedure and not one that goes to the root of the matter (vide the case of Jang Bahadur v. Upper India Bank, A.I.R. 1928 Privy Council 162). 29. Further it was urged that the application on behalf of the respondent that was moved in January, 1967 should be dismissed on the ground that while the earlier application that was moved in May, 1960 was based on a will, the later was based on adoption. 29. Further it was urged that the application on behalf of the respondent that was moved in January, 1967 should be dismissed on the ground that while the earlier application that was moved in May, 1960 was based on a will, the later was based on adoption. It is not necessary to enter into this controversy, for the order on the application moved in the month of January, 1967 has become final, the objection against it under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure having been dismissed and there being no appeal against that order before this Court. Even on the merits, when the earlier application had been dismissed for default, the filing of the fresh application on a new ground cannot be a bar. 30. Lastly, it was urged that opportunity should have been given by the trial court to the appellants to produce evidence on the plea that the property was ancestral and was not liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree. The appellants had opportunity before the trial court to produce such evidence. A perusal of the order sheet in the case shows that no desire was ever expressed by them that they would produce evidence on the point. They, however, contended themselves by the case being argued out without any evidence being produced. No interference, therefore, can be made on that ground. Altogether, therefore, the appeal fails and ,is dismissed with- costs.